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2007 DIGILAW 1180 (AP)

V. Mangamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2007-12-03

B.PRAKASH RAO, L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2007
JUDGMENT : (L.Narasimha Reddy) The appellant figured as A.1 in S.C.No.398 of 2002 on the file of III Additional Sessions Judge, Tirupati. Herself and another, by name P.Sivakumar Reddy (A.2), were accused of committing murder of the husband of the appellant, by name V.Meghavarnam Reddy, on 29.06.2002. During the trial, A.2 died and the case was proceeded against the appellant alone. Through its judgment, dated 22.11.2004, the trial Court found the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C., and sentenced her to undergo imprisonment for life. She was also fined a sum of Rs.1,000/-, and was directed to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month, in default of payment of fine. The appellant was also convicted for the offence under Section 201 read with 34 I.P.C., and for this offence, she was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution alleged that the appellant developed illicit intimacy with A.2 and being unhappy with this development, the deceased admonished them, on several occasions. On 29.06.2002, the appellant and A.2 were said to be in the house of the deceased and that the latter came at 10.00 p.m. On seeing A.2, the deceased is said to have caught hold him and in the meanwhile, the appellant is said to have brought a pistol and gave a severe blow, on the head of the deceased, and he died on the spot. Thereafter, the appellant and A.2 are said to have shifted the dead body, on a TVS moped, to a culvert of a road, three kilometers away from the village, and kept the same, in a cement pipe. 3. The dead body is said to have been first seen by PW.3, who in turn, informed to PW.2, the village servant. PW.2 and PW.1, the Village Administrative Officer, are said to have proceeded to the place where dead body is kept, on 02.07.2002, at 8.00 a.m., and lodged a report with the police, which is marked as Ex.P.1. 4. The inquest was conducted on the dead body and the report thereon is marked as Ex.P.3. Subsequently, the post-mortem was conducted and certificate in relation thereto is Ex.P.8. The investigation into the offence was conducted by PW.11, the Circle Inspector of Police. 4. The inquest was conducted on the dead body and the report thereon is marked as Ex.P.3. Subsequently, the post-mortem was conducted and certificate in relation thereto is Ex.P.8. The investigation into the offence was conducted by PW.11, the Circle Inspector of Police. Charge sheet was filed accusing the appellant and A.2 of committing the offence of murder of the deceased. 5. Smt. B. Vasantha Lakshmi, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that there is neither direct, nor circumstantial evidence, in this case, to sustain the conviction, against the appellant. She contends that though serious effort was made by the prosecution to weave the story to implicate the appellant, there is not even basic material to convict the appellant. She contends that there is any amount of suspicion as to the role played by PW.4, the brother of the deceased, and even if his evidence is taken on its face value, it does not point anything against the appellant. 6. Learned counsel submits that there is serious lapse in the investigation itself. She contends that the report, prepared after conducting dog squad, was not filed into the Court, and thereby, the presumption provided for under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, gets attracted. She places reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Bharat v. State of M.P., 2003 (3) SCC 106 . 7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submits that though there is no direct evidence in the instant case, the prosecution was able to provide all the links to connect the appellant to the incident of the murder of her husband. He contends that the report of the forensic science laboratory clearly reveals that the blood-stains found in the house of the appellant, were that of the deceased and the only presumption that can be drawn is that the appellant is responsible for the murder. He contends that the evidence of PW.5 is also material, in this regard. 8. In the light of the submissions made by the respective Counsel, it has to be examined, whether the conviction recorded by the trial Court, against the appellant, can be sustained in law? 9. Apart from there not being any direct evidence, there is nothing to suggest that any one has seen the deceased, on the one hand, and the appellant and A.2 together, on the other, immediately before the occurrence. 9. Apart from there not being any direct evidence, there is nothing to suggest that any one has seen the deceased, on the one hand, and the appellant and A.2 together, on the other, immediately before the occurrence. Being the wife of the deceased, the appellant was to be in his natural company. But, viewed in the context of the death of the deceased under suspicious circumstances, a clear version must exist, at least, to make the needle of suspicion, to point against the appellant. 10. The dead body of the deceased is said to have been recovered nearly three days after the incident. The condition of the dead body was so mutilated that even the persons who have acquainted with Meghavarnam Reddy, were not able to recognize it to be that of his. It was only on the basis of the clothes that were said to have been recovered from the body that an opinion was formed that the dead body was that of the husband of the appellant. 11. It was alleged that the appellant and A.2 have committed the murder of the deceased and shifted the dead body to a culvert, which is three kilometers away from the village, on a moped, owned by PW.5. Having regard to the limited capacity of the moped, it is just unimaginable that two persons would have travelled upon it, together with the deadbody. Further, no blood-stains were noticed on the moped by the owner thereof, or any indication as to what had happened. The vehicle is said to have been returned to its owner, PW.5, hardly within minutes, by the A.2. 12. PW.4, the brother of the deceased, stated that on finding that his brother was not being seen, from the previous day, he went to the house of the appellant on 30.06.2002 and asked his whereabouts. The appellant is said to have replied that the deceased went to a village, by name Velenjeri, near Tiruthani. It was not as if weeks, or months have elapsed, ever since he has last seen the deceased. No reason, worth its name, was furnished as to how he suspected the information given by the appellant, as incorrect. The appellant is said to have replied that the deceased went to a village, by name Velenjeri, near Tiruthani. It was not as if weeks, or months have elapsed, ever since he has last seen the deceased. No reason, worth its name, was furnished as to how he suspected the information given by the appellant, as incorrect. Be that as it may, he is said to have proceeded to Velenjeri, searched for his brother for about two more days and returned to his village only on 04.07.2002, by 10.00 p.m. The house of the appellant was said to have been locked and that he came to know about the rumors that a deadbody was found in the culvert. It is to be noticed that by that time, PW.4 did not submit any complaint to the police. At one breathe, he stated that the house of the appellant was locked on 04.07.2002, when he visited the same at 10.00 p.m., and in another, he stated that in the early hours on the next day, he noticed blood-stains at some places in the house. He did not state as to how and when the lock of the house was opened. Except, this evidence, there is no other material, to suspect the involvement of the appellant for the death of the deceased. 13. PW.11 is the Inspector of Police, who conducted the investigation. His evidence disclosed that since there existed some mystery as to the death of the deceased, he availed the service of dog squad, and that a report was also obtained from the dog master, by name Ramchandraiah. On finding that the evidence was not complete, on this aspect, the trial Court itself enquired from PW.11, as to what had happened to the report of the dog master, duly demonstrating the necessary caution. The answer of the witness reads as under: "I am fully conscious that the report of the dog squad is quite material to decide the case. One week after the visit of the dog squad I obtained the report from Sri Ramachandraiah, the dog master. I did not file the said report into Court till today. I am fully conscious of the fact that it is a material document. I received the said document, but I did not file the same while filing the charge sheet. One week after the visit of the dog squad I obtained the report from Sri Ramachandraiah, the dog master. I did not file the said report into Court till today. I am fully conscious of the fact that it is a material document. I received the said document, but I did not file the same while filing the charge sheet. To confirm the track of the deceased and the miscreants, I summoned the dog squad. It is not correct to state that for the reasons best known to me I suppressed that material document." 14. It is true that the report in relation to the investigation carried with the help of a dog squad, cannot be treated as a conclusive proof. However, if the clue that emerges out of it, suspected by other evidence, it would become a useful material. Its relevance cannot be brushed aside. When the investigating agency has chosen to engage the service of a dog squad and a report was obtained from the dog master, it ought to have been formed part of record. Withholding of the same, would naturally lead to a presumption, provided for under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. 15. From the above discussion, it becomes evident that there did not even exist any material to suspect the role of the appellant vis--vis the death of the deceased. They were not even seen last together before the occurrence. The timing and the place of recovery of the deadbody, the shaky nature of the evidence of PW.5 and other witnesses improbabilise the story of the prosecution. It is not at all safe to convict a person under these suspicious circumstances. In Bharat's case (supra), the Supreme Court had cautioned the Courts in the matter of convicting the accused, when suspicious circumstances exist. It hardly needs any emphasis that the case of the prosecution must provide all the links to connect the accused to an offence and even if one link is missing, the benefit is naturally accrue to the accused. 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The Conviction and sentence recorded in S.C.No.398 of 2002 on the file of the III Additional Sessions Judge, Tirupati, dated 22.11.2004, against the appellant-V.Mangamma, is set aside and she is acquitted of the offences alleged against her. The appellant-accused shall be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The Conviction and sentence recorded in S.C.No.398 of 2002 on the file of the III Additional Sessions Judge, Tirupati, dated 22.11.2004, against the appellant-V.Mangamma, is set aside and she is acquitted of the offences alleged against her. The appellant-accused shall be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. The fine amount, if any, paid by the appellant, shall be refunded to her.