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Allahabad High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 1190 (ALL)

ABDUL KADIR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

2007-04-25

M.K.MITTAL

body2007
JUDGMENT Honble M.K. Mittal, J.—Application has been filed under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings in complaint case No. 13525 of 2004, Fahmeed alias Abdul Haque v. Rabia Begum & Ors., pending in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate-I, Kanpur Nagar wherein the applicants have been directed to be summoned by order dated 3-6-2004 under Sections 147, 148, 325, 504, 452 and 506, IPC by Additional Metropolitan Magistrate-I, Kanpur Nagar. 2. Brief facts of the case are that opposite party No. 2 Fahmeed alias Abdul Haque filed a complaint against Smt. Rabia Begum and others in the Court of Additional Metropolitan Magistrate-I, Kanpur Nagar alleging that he is owner of house No. 88/295 situate in Chamanganj, Mala Road, P.S. Chamanganj, Kanpur. After the death of his father he became owner of this house and was running cold drink shop in it. Accused No. 1 Smt. Rabia Begum had no concern with this house and was also not having any title therein and is living with her family in Iftikharabad, Kanpur Nagar but in collusion with the police Inspector of P.S. Chamanganj, the accused persons on 13-5-1999 at about 4 p.m. came to his cold drink shop and damaged it and looted Rs. 3,000/- from the cash box and also took forcible possession over the house. When the complainant went to lodge the report the inspector told him that he himself had damaged his shop and the inspector took a false report from accused No. 1 and took him in custody. The accused Nos. 1 and 2 had no evidence to show that the house belonged to them. In the circumstances he filed his complaint on 14-1-2000. 3. Learned Magistrate examined the complainant under Section 200, Cr.P.C. and witness Moinuddin under Section 202, Cr.P.C. and thereafter by order dated 3-6-2004, finding a prima facie case against thirteen accused persons directed to summon them as aforesaid. Feeling aggrieved, this application has been filed for quashing the proceedings. 4. I have heard Sri A. K. Singh, learned Counsel for the applicants, learned A.G.A. for opposite party No. 1. However, no one appeared for opposite party No. 2 to argue the case although counter-affidavit has been filed on his behalf. 5. According to applicants suit for partition was pending between applicant No. 2 and others and opposite party No. 2 and others and that was finally decided on the basis of compromise on 10-10-1991. However, no one appeared for opposite party No. 2 to argue the case although counter-affidavit has been filed on his behalf. 5. According to applicants suit for partition was pending between applicant No. 2 and others and opposite party No. 2 and others and that was finally decided on the basis of compromise on 10-10-1991. During arguments, learned Counsel for the applicants produced the certified copy of the decree of original suit No. 873 of 1990, Smt. Rabia Begum v. Fahmeed alias Abdul Haque and others, In this suit, the plaintiffs had claimed one-sixth share in house No. 88/295 Chamanganj and house No. 97/57 Talak Mahal, Kanpur City. On the basis of compromise, it was agreed that the plaintiffs had one-sixth shares of these houses. They were entitled to get the same. Further contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants is that they asked the opposite party No. 2 to release their share but he was not willing for the same and on 13-5-1999 at about 3 p.m., when the applicant was not present as she had gone to attend some funeral and on her return she found that the accused had broken the wall and taken possession of two rooms of applicant 2 and also misappropriated the house hold goods that were kept there. She raised alarm, Abdul Haque, i.e., opposite party No. 2 came there and gave kicks and fist blows and also threatened her. However, witnesses came and saved her. In that connection she lodged First Information Report at Police Station Chaman Ganj on 18-5-1999 at 9.05 p.m. Copy of the report is Annexure No. 2. The present complaint has been filed by opposite party No. 2 as counter blast to the report of applicant No. 2 on 14-1-2000 whereas the incident is alleged to have taken place on 13-5-1999. According to the applicants they were continuing in possession of this house and there was no question of taking any forcible possession by damaging the cold drink shop of opposite party No. 2. 6. In the counter-affidavit, it has been deposed that on 13-5-1999, i.e., the accused persons took forcible possession of ancestral house of the complainant and when he attempted to lodge the report it was not written, then he filed the complaint. He denied the pendency of any civil suit. 6. In the counter-affidavit, it has been deposed that on 13-5-1999, i.e., the accused persons took forcible possession of ancestral house of the complainant and when he attempted to lodge the report it was not written, then he filed the complaint. He denied the pendency of any civil suit. It has also been contended that a frivolous report was made by the applicant No. 2 against him only to pressurize him to withdraw his complaint. Learned Magistrate has rightly summoned the accused persons finding a prima facie case against the accused persons and there is no ground to quash the proceedings. 7. Learned Counsel for the applicant has contended that the complaint case as taken is highly improbable and the complaint has been filed only as a counter blast to harass the applicants. According to the learned Counsel for the applicants, they were already in possession on the basis of original partition suit and there was no question of dispossessing the complainant from the shop or house as alleged by him. The fact that there was partition suit between the parties in respect of the house No. 88/295 is amply established from the certified copy of the decree as filed by the applicants and the contention of the opposite party No. 2 that there was no civil suit between them is a false statement. 8. Learned Counsel for the applicants has contended that according to the complaint made by opposite party No. 2 no allegation has been made as to what specific act was done by these accused persons and only general allegations have been made. He has further contended that in the complaint, it has not been alleged that he was beaten or that he received any injury but in his statement under Section 200, Cr.P.C., the complainant stated that he was badly beaten with dandas and kicks and fist blows were also given to him and it resulted in fracture of right hand thumb and he was profusely bleeding. But it appears that he did not even get himself medically examined. Moreover this fact has not been mentioned in the complaint. Again the incident is alleged to have taken place on 13-5-1999 but no complaint was filed till 14-1-2000. But it appears that he did not even get himself medically examined. Moreover this fact has not been mentioned in the complaint. Again the incident is alleged to have taken place on 13-5-1999 but no complaint was filed till 14-1-2000. Even if the contention of the applicants that Inspector did not lodge his report is to be accepted, he has not given any reason as to why he filed the complaint after a long gap of about seven months. 9. Learned trial Court while passing the impugned order has observed that prima facie case was made out against the accused person but he has not given any reason and has not exercised his judicial mind. Any order de-hors reason is no order. Learned Magistrate was going to summon thirteen persons and he did not mention as to how he concluded that there was prima facie evidence against the accused persons to proceed in the matter. 10. In the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400, it has been held that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused. 11. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused. 11. In the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, 1992 SCC (Cri) 426, while considering the scope of Section 482, Cr.P.C., Hon’ble Apex Court has specified the illustrative categories where the complaint can be quashed. Some of them are (a) where the allegations made in the complaint even if they are taken on their face value and taken in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out case against the accused; (b) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable and vexatious that on the basis of which no prudent person can even reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (c) where the proceeding is manifestly attended with ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, the criminal proceedings can be quashed. This view has been constantly reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of judgments. 12. In the instant case, the evidence as mentioned and the conduct of the opposite party No. 2 clearly show that he filed the complaint only to harass the applicants knowing well that there was a family partition suit between them and on the basis of the compromise share of the applicant No. 2 and others was agreed in the house in question. The complainant also did not apparently come with correct facts and filed the complaint only as a counter blast to the First Information Report filed by the applicant No. 2. He has also made a wrong deposition in his counter-affidavit that the First Information Report has been filed by the applicants to make him withdraw his complaint. The fact is that the First Information Report was filed by the applicant on 18-5-1999 whereas the complaint was filed by opposite party on 14-1-2000. Therefore the First Information Report could not be filed to make him withdraw the complaint which was not even in existence at that time. 13. The fact is that the First Information Report was filed by the applicant on 18-5-1999 whereas the complaint was filed by opposite party on 14-1-2000. Therefore the First Information Report could not be filed to make him withdraw the complaint which was not even in existence at that time. 13. In the circumstances, I come to the conclusion that learned Magistrate has erred in summoning the accused persons and instead he should have dismissed the complaint under Section 203, Cr.P.C. 14. In the circumstances application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is liable to be allowed and the proceedings are to be quashed. 15. Application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is hereby allowed. Proceedings in the complaint case No. 13525 of 2004, Fahmeed alias Abdul Haque v. Rabia Begum, pending in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate-I, Kanpur Nagar are hereby quashed. ————