Judgment Vinod K.Sharma, J. 1. CM No. 9852-CU of 2010 Allowed. Application are exempted from filing the certified copies of Annexures A.l & A.2. CMNo.9854-CII of 2010 2. This application under section 5 of the Limitation At has been moved for condoning the delay of 1063 days in filing the application for rehearing of the Civil Revision. 3. It has been averred in the application that due to death of their counsel Shri M.L. Marchia, applicant/respondents were not aware of the listing of the case and therefore, the decision was taken at their back. 4. It is further averred in the application, that it was only when the execution was taken out by the decree holder that they came to know about the decision of the revision petition and the application has been moved immediately thereafter. The application is claimed to be within limitation from the date of knowledge. However, from the date of order there is delay of 1063 days. Application is supported by an affidavit. In spite of notice, no reply has been filed. 5. Consequently, this application is allowed and delay of 1063 days in filing the application is condoned. CM No. 9855-CII of 2010 & CM No. 9853-CII of 2010 6. This application under Order 41 Rule 21 of the Code has been moved for rehearing of the civil revision decided on 22.5.2007. 7. As the absence of the applicant is beyond control an opportunity is given to the applicants to make submissions in support of their case. 8. This court had accepted the revision petition filed by the landlord. The order dated 22.5.2007 passed by this court reads as under: "The petitioner-landlords had filed a petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short the Act) for ej ectment of the respondents from Shop No. 3545/3, Adalat Bazar, Patiala as per details given in the head-note of the petition. It was claimed that Morari Lal son of Babu Ram was the original owner of the shop in dispute and respondent No. 1 was tenant at the rate of Rs. 60/- per month. Besides the payment of rent, the tenant was also liable to pay house- tax as part of the rent. It was claimed that Morari Lal son of Babu Ram was the original owner of the shop in dispute and respondent No. 1 was tenant at the rate of Rs. 60/- per month. Besides the payment of rent, the tenant was also liable to pay house- tax as part of the rent. The property was said to have been sold by Morari Lal to the petitioners and thus, they claimed that they had become owners and landlords while respondent No. 1 became tenant at the rate of Rs. 60/- per month along with house-tax. It was claimed that notice of sale was given to the tenants by the vendor in August, 1978. It was averred in the petition that respondent No. 1 was in arrears of rent and house-tax since 10.3.1978. House- tax was claimed to be 15 per cent on monthly rent. It was also claimed that the shop had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation as it had out-lived its utility. Roof of Chobara had fallen down and there were cracks, sallab and other defects in the shop in dispute. It was claimed that the petitioners wanted to reconstruct the shop in dispute and Chobara. It was also claimed that Chobara can not be reconstructed unless the shop was reconstructed. Other ground on which ejectment was sought was that respondent No. 1 had sub-let the shop in dispute to respondent No. 2 and transferred exclusive possession to him. It was claimed that respondent No. 2 was carrying on the business of selling colours in the shop in dispute whereas respondent No. 1 was carrying on his own independent business at Ghalori Gate, Patiala. Respondent No. 1 was proceeded ex parte, while respondent No. 2 contested the application by filing written statement. The factum of Morari Lal being the landlord was admitted. Rate of rent was disputed as also the liability to pay the house tax. It was pleaded by the contesting respondent that the shop in dispute was on rent with Kundan Lal father of the respondents at the rate of Rs. II- per month. Kundan Lal was said to be doing business in the name of M/s. Kundan Lal Raja Ram and after the death of Kundan Lal, respondents were carrying on the business in partnership under the name of M/s. Kundan Lal Raja Ram. II- per month. Kundan Lal was said to be doing business in the name of M/s. Kundan Lal Raja Ram and after the death of Kundan Lal, respondents were carrying on the business in partnership under the name of M/s. Kundan Lal Raja Ram. It was further claimed that the respondents were heirs of original tenant as they had inherited the tenancy being sons. The rate of rent was Rs. 28.33P and the same was tendered on the first date of hearing which the petitioners refused to accept. It was claimed that the shop was fit and safe for human habitation. Chobara is also fit and safe. It was claimed that Chobara is not part of the tenanted premises. It was further claimed that Chobara was in possession of the landlord-applicants and they could do anything with Chobara to achieve their ends. It is also claimed that Chobara can be reconstructed if they so like. It was further claimed that the application was mala fide and has been moved to increase the rent. It was also claimed that the rate at Rs. 60/- was wrongly claimed and therefore, they would be liable to be prosecuted under section 18 of the Act. The business was said to being run in the partnership between the two respondents. Other allegations were also denied. On the pleadings of the parties the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues :- 1. Whether Raja Ram respondent No. 1 is the tenant in the shop in dispute under the petitioners and is liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 60/- per month besides house-tax ? OPA 2. If issue No. 1 is proved in the affirmative, whether the tender made by respondent No. 2 is valid ? OPR 3. Whether the shop in dispute is unfit and unsafe for human habitation ? OPA 4. Whether the respondent No, 1 has sublet the shop to respondent No. 2 ? OPA 5. Whether the respondents are partners and are carrying on business in the shop in dispute under the name and style of M/s. Kundan Lal and Raja Ram ? OPR 6. Whether Kundan Lal was a tenant in the shop in dispute and after his death the respondents became the tenants ? OPR 7. Relief. OPA 5. Whether the respondents are partners and are carrying on business in the shop in dispute under the name and style of M/s. Kundan Lal and Raja Ram ? OPR 6. Whether Kundan Lal was a tenant in the shop in dispute and after his death the respondents became the tenants ? OPR 7. Relief. Issues No. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 were taken up together by the learned Rent Controller and after consideration of evidence brought on record issues No. 1 and 4 were decided in favour of the petitioner-landlords while issue Nos. 2 5 and 6 were decided against the respondents and in favour of the petitioners. On issue No. 3 which was decided separately, learned Rent Controller was pleased to hold that the shop in dispute was unfit and unsafe for human habitation and accordingly eviction petition was allowed. Respondent-tenants filed appeal against the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller before the learned Appellate Authority. The learned Appellate Authority on appreciation of evidence brought on record recorded a positive finding of fact that Kundan Lal father of the respondents was, in fact, the tenant in the demised shop up to his death and after his death both the appellants i.e. respondent-tenants became tenants in the demised premises. It was also held that they were running the business in partnership and therefore, issue of sub-letting was not correctly decided and it was reversed. In order to come to this conclusion learned Appellate Authority recorded a finding that Kundan Lal was originally a tenant in the an end. Thus, it is proved that the said tenancy continued up to the date of his death and after his death his two legal heirs i.e. the respondent-tenants became tenants in the demised premises and they also entered into a partnership deed just after the demise of their father Kundan Lal and consequently the findings of the learned Trial Court on issues No. 4, 5 and 6 were also reversed. The learned Appellate Authority decided issue No. 4 against the landlord and issues No. 5 and 6 were decided in favour of the tenants by holding that the learned Rent Controller was wrong to come to the conclusion that Raja Ram appellant No. 1 had become the tenant of the shop in dispute in the year 1957. Thus, the finding on issue No. l.was also reversed. Thus, the finding on issue No. l.was also reversed. The rent tendered by the tenants was held to be valid tender and accordingly the finding on issue No. 2 was also reversed. On issue No. 3, the learned Appellate Authority observed that the learned Rent Controller had not held that the shop was unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Finding was given on the basis of condition of Chobara on the back portion of the shop in dispute and adj oining shop which also belonged to the petitioner-landlords. Learned Appellate Authority accepted the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent-tenants that the learned Rent Controller nowhere stated that the demised shop was unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Learned Appellate Authority also came to the conclusion that Chobara on the back side of the demised shop and adjoining shop could not be treated as integral part of the building and therefore, the ejectment of respondent-tenants could not have been ordered from the demised shop merely on the ground that Chobara on the back portion had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. It was also observed that as the Chobara was in possession of the petitioner-landlords and in case they had allowed it to fall they could not be allowed to take benefit of their mischief in seeking ejectment of the respondent-tenants. It was held that the shop in dispute was fit and safe for human habitation. Learned Appellate Authority also observed that as no repairs had been carried out since 1974, therefore, mere falling of Chobara did not give a right of eviction to the petitioner-landlord and accordingly it was held that the petitioner-landlords had failed to prove that the building has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation and consequently by reversing the findings on issues No. 3 the order passed by the learned Rent Controller was set aside. Mr. R.K. Battas, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners vehemently argued that the learned Appellate Authority was wrong in reversing the finding of the learned Rent Controller on the ground of sub-letting. Mr. R.K. Battas, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners vehemently argued that the learned Appellate Authority was wrong in reversing the finding of the learned Rent Controller on the ground of sub-letting. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that once it was proved on record that respondent No.1 was carrying on his independent business at Ghalori Gate, Patiala it has to be presumed that exclusive possession of the shop was given to respondent No. 2 for consideration and therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Appellate Authority can not be sustained. However, I find no force in this contention. The finding of subletting has been reversed by the learned Appellate Authority by taking into consideration the fact that in fact original tenant was Kundan Lal who was father of respondents No. 1 and 2. It was also observed that after the death of their father both brothers had entered into a partnership deed. Merely because respondent No. 1 was doing independent business along with partnership business it could not be said that there was any subletting. Learned counsel for the petitioners failed to dislodge this finding and accordingly the finding of the learned Appellate Authority on issue Nos. 1 and 4 is hereby affirmed. In view of this finding the learned Appellate Authority was also right in reversing the finding of learned Rent Controller on issues No. 5 and 6. The finding of the learned Appellate Authority on issue No. 2 also cannot be faulted with. However, there is force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners on issue No. 3. On issue No. 3, learned Rent Controller was pleased to hold that there was one Chobara on both the shops belonging to the petitioner-landlords which was integral part of the building. It was also held that the building was in dilapidated condition as deposed by Vidya Sagar and admitted by RW 4 Bakhtawar Singh to the effect that buttons of Chobara had fallen. The court also noticed that Chobara had fallen down and building was 80 years old. The contention of the tenant-respondents that they had no concern with Chobara was rejected by the learned Rent Controller by holding that the building was one and once the Chobara was unfit and unsafe the whole building has to be held to be unfit and unsafe for human habitation. The contention of the tenant-respondents that they had no concern with Chobara was rejected by the learned Rent Controller by holding that the building was one and once the Chobara was unfit and unsafe the whole building has to be held to be unfit and unsafe for human habitation. The statement of the land-lord that he wanted to reconstruct the whole building was held to be genuine and accepted by placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Paramjit Singh and other v. Hari Chand deceased represented by the L.Rs Chaman Lal & others 1984 C.L.J. (C & Cr.) 552. The learned appellate authority reversed this finding by treating Chobara to be not an integral part of the building. The authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner was distinguished by holding that it is only in case the substantial portion of the building becomes unfit and unsafe then the eviction can be ordered. However, when substantial portion is fit for human habitation no eviction can be ordered. Mr. Battas, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Sardarni Sampran Kaur and another v. Sunt Singh and another 1982(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 413 : AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana 245 and judgment of this Court in Paramjit Singh and others v. Hari Chand and others 1984(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 323 :1984 (2) RLR 382 to contend that the word building as given under section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act means and includes the integrated larger building as a whole rather than a part thereof demised to a tenant. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner therefore, was that in view of the finding of both the courts below if Chobara of the building has fallen down then it has to be treated that the building has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation and eviction of the tenants can be ordered therefrom. Paras No. 9,10 and 19 of the judgment in the case of Sardarni Sampran Kaur and another v. Sant Singh and another (supra) read as under :- "9. "Therefore only the remaining two facets (i) and (ii) above seem to call for a closer analysis. As would appear hereinafter, within this jurisdiction the question is not res integra and consequently has to be viewed in the context of the existing precedent. "Therefore only the remaining two facets (i) and (ii) above seem to call for a closer analysis. As would appear hereinafter, within this jurisdiction the question is not res integra and consequently has to be viewed in the context of the existing precedent. However, before adverting thereto the statutory provision calls for some examination and interpretation. Herein what first deserves highlighting is the fact that the definition of the word building in S. 2 of the Act is not in terms absolute but is subject to contextual limitations. The very opening part of the said section makes it explicit that the definition is to apply only if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or the context. Consequently the use of the word building in Section 13(3)(a)(iii) has to be viewed in its particular textual context and not with any inflexible absoluteness of the literal terms of cl. (a) of S. 2 of the Act. Therefore, it would be possible to construe the word building as used in S. 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act to include the integrated larger building as a whole rather than the part thereof demised to a particular tenant alone. Specifically this question came up before J.V. Gupta, J. in Mulk Raj v. Hari Chand etc. 1981 Cur LJ (Civil) 500, who held as follows :- "Thus, the definition of the building, as given in Section 2(a) of the Act, has to be read with reference to the opening words of Section 2, reproduced above. Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act inter alia provides that in the case of any building or rented land if the landlord requires it to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the local authority or any improvement scheme, or if it has become unsafe or unfit for human habitation, the landlord is entitled to eject the tenant therefrom. Now in this clause, the word building cannot be said to mean only a part of the building which is included in the definition of the term building, as given in Section 2(a) of the Act, because it will be repugnant in the context of S. 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Now in this clause, the word building cannot be said to mean only a part of the building which is included in the definition of the term building, as given in Section 2(a) of the Act, because it will be repugnant in the context of S. 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. If a landlord is required to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the local authority or any improvement Trust, it cannot be said that the rented premises being a part of the building will not be included therein and the tenant can claim protection in view of the definition of term building as given under S. 2(a) of the Act." It is unnecessarily to labour the point as I am in agreement with the aforesaid view which is unreservedly affirmed. 10. The other aspect which calls for somewhat pointed notice is that Section 13(3)(a)(iii) is not confined only to cases of buildings which are unsafe or unfit for human habitation. An identical right of ejectment is given therein to the landlord where he has to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or local authority or any Improvement Trust under some improvement or development scheme. In a way the aforesaid provision has in view the concept of urban renewal as its underlying purpose. It is plain that in case any improvement or development scheme requires a rebuilding or reconstruction or even substantial alteration of the existing structure then the landlord is forth with entitled to eject his tenants therein. It has to be sharply kept in mind that in these cases the building need not satisfy the test of being unsafe or unfit for human habitation. Even if it is wholly safe and fit for occupation the tenant loses his rights in face of the larger purpose of improvement or development schemes at the instance of the specified authorities. 19. Even if it is wholly safe and fit for occupation the tenant loses his rights in face of the larger purpose of improvement or development schemes at the instance of the specified authorities. 19. The answer to the legal question referred having been rendered in the terms above, the revision would now go back before a learned Single Judge for a decision on merits in accordance with law." Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the judgment of this court in Om Parkash v. Parkash Chand 1986(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 535 : (1986-1) P.L.R. 582 to contend that when large portion of the roof of the chobara had fallen it would amount to part of the tenancy premises being unfit and unsafe for human habitation and therefore, the landlord can get eviction. Para No. 3 of the judgment reads as under :- "3. The learned petitioners counsel has contended that the roof of the chobara can be replaced by the landlord and it cannot be said that due to the falling of the roof of the chobara the whole tenancy premises have become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. There seems to be no merit in this contention. This Court held in Shri Madan Lal Kapur and others v. Shri Nand Singh, that - "Whether a building is unsafe or unfit for human habitation is obviously a question of fact and indeed in the present case it is not disputed that a part of the building in question is unsafe for human habitation. The argument that only those rooms which are unsafe or unfit for human habitation may be got vacated and the landlord be asked to carry out the necessary repairs so as to make them safe and fit for human habitation, leaving the rest of the building with the tenant, seems to be wholly unacceptable on the language and scheme of the statue and on the general principles." There is no gainsaying that in the present case the chobara on the first floor has become unfit for human habitation as its roof has caved in. The tenant cannot be heard to say that the landlord should replace the roof. The tenant also is not competent to urge that the rest of the tenancy premises be left with him. The tenant cannot be heard to say that the landlord should replace the roof. The tenant also is not competent to urge that the rest of the tenancy premises be left with him. Once a part of the tenancy premises becomes unsafe or unfit for human habitation, the landlord is entitled to get the tenant evicted from the whole building in his occupation under section 13(3)(a)(iii)of the Act." The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners therefore, was that even as per the findings recorded by the learned appellate authority the matter in dispute is squarely covered by the judgment of this court in the case of Om Parkash v. Parkash Chand (supra). Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the judgment of this court in the case of Smt Mohinder Kaur v. Smt Kailash Ram and another 2007(1) Rent Control Reporter79 to contend that the learned Appellate Authority was wrong in taking into consideration the tenanted premises alone to come to the conclusion that the building was fit and safe for human habitation. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the building has to be seen as a whole and not only the part in possession of the tenant. It is not in dispute that the learned Rent Controller as well as Appellate authority have recorded a positive finding that the Chobara of the shop had fallen down. It is also not in dispute that the building is old and therefore, the learned appellate authority was not right in reversing the finding of the learned Rent Controller on issue No. 3. For the reasons stated above, this revision is allowed and eviction of the respondent-tenants is ordered on the ground of building being unfit and unsafe for human habitation." 9. Mr. Sunil Chadha, learned counsel for the applicant/respondents has supported the order passed by the learned appellate authority by contending that merely because Chobara of the building was damaged could not be a ground to hold that the tenanted premises had also become weak and unfit for human habitation. 10. In support of this contention, Mr. Mr. Sunil Chadha, learned counsel for the applicant/respondents has supported the order passed by the learned appellate authority by contending that merely because Chobara of the building was damaged could not be a ground to hold that the tenanted premises had also become weak and unfit for human habitation. 10. In support of this contention, Mr. Sunil Chadha, learned counsel for the applicants has placed reliance on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Piara Lal v. Kewal Krishan Chopra 1988(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 32 : AIR 1988 SC 1432, wherein Honble Supreme Court was pleased to lay down as under :- "On a careful consideration of the matter with reference to the contentions put-forth by the learned counsel for the parties, we are clearly of opinion that the High Court was not justified in allowing the revision and directing the eviction of the appellant under Section 13(3)(a)(iii). It is true that a roof of one of the rooms on the rear-side had fallen down and required replacement but there was no evidence whatever that the entire building or a substantial portion of it was in a damaged condition and consequently the building as a whole had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Unless the evidence warranted an inference that the falling down of the roof in one room was fully indicative of the damaged and weak condition of the entire building and that the collapse of the roof was not a localised event, we fail to see how the High Court could have concluded that the entire building had become unsafe and unfit for human habitation. In fact, the appellant had replaced the roof only at a cost of about Rs. 200 and this would independently show that the damage that had occurred could not have been of a serious or disquieting nature. In fact, the appellant had replaced the roof only at a cost of about Rs. 200 and this would independently show that the damage that had occurred could not have been of a serious or disquieting nature. The High Court has failed to notice two factors of relevance, viz., (1) that the respondent had given his consent to the Rent Controller granting permission under Section 12 of the Act to the appellant to replace the roof and (2) that inspite of the alleged cause of action having arisen due to the falling down of the, roof, the respondent did not immediately seek amendment of the petition so as to seek eviction of the appellant on the additional ground under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) but instead he chose to prosecute his petition only on the original grounds for eviction set forth therein and Only after failing before the Rent Controller and preferring an appeal to the Appellate Authority, he deemed it necessary to amend the petition and ask for eviction of the appellant or the additional ground under Section 13(3)(a)(iii). The above said conduct of the respondent would clearly reveal that he himself had not attached any significance to the falling down of the roof in one of the rooms and had not seriously considered that a sustainable cause of action had accrued to him under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) for seeking the eviction of the appellant. The High Court has not only failed to appreciate these factors but has also proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the falling down of the roof in one room was by itself sufficient to warrant a finding that the entire building had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation and called for a declaration to that effect. It is this basic error which has affected the reasoning of the High Court lead the High Court to apply the ratio laid down in certain cases where the facts and circumstances were entirely different." On consideration of matter, I find no force in the contention. 11 In the case in hand, Chobara has fallen down which was part and parcel of building as a whole which was an old building. 11 In the case in hand, Chobara has fallen down which was part and parcel of building as a whole which was an old building. Learned Appellate Authority, while deciding the appeal has recorded a positive finding, that Chobara of the building had fallen down and therefore, it was in the facts and circumstances of the case and on appreciation of evidence that a finding was recorded that the building was unfit and unsafe. Judgment relied upon, therefore, has no application to the facts of the present case as the judgment of Honble Supreme Court is based on the facts which were being considered. 12. Mr. Sunil Chadha, learned counsel for the applicants/respondents, thereafter placed reliance on the judgment of this court in the case of M/s. Labh Chand Out Parkash v. Krishan Lal & Ors. 1990 (1) RCR (Rent) 214, to contend that if the damage of the building does not show any effect on the premises in the possession of the tenant or damaged portion is not major portion which is not capable of being repaired, ejectment application cannot be held to be bona fide. 13. This judgment again cannot advance the case of the applicants as whole of the Chobara of the building had fallen down and therefore, the learned Rent Controller was right in holding that the building was unfit and unsafe for human habitation. 14. Learned counsel for the applicants also placed reliance on the judgment of this court in the case of Amar Nath alias Motha v. Kishan Kaur and Anr. 1982(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 371 : 1982 PLR 28, wherein this court was pleased to lay down that if out of three portions of the house, two portions become unsafe for human habitation, no presumption can be drawn that said portion had also become unfit and unsafe. 15. This judgment is again of no help to the respondents/tenants as in the present case, finding was that major portion of the building was damaged and therefore, the whole building was to be treated to be unfit and unsafe. 16. Reliance was, thereafter placed on the judgment of this court in the case of Mulakh Raj & Anr. 15. This judgment is again of no help to the respondents/tenants as in the present case, finding was that major portion of the building was damaged and therefore, the whole building was to be treated to be unfit and unsafe. 16. Reliance was, thereafter placed on the judgment of this court in the case of Mulakh Raj & Anr. v. Jugraj Singh 2008(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 50 : 2007 (2) RCR (Rent) 605, wherein this court held, that a few tiles of roof damaged and one Bala developed a little crack, it cannot lead to the conclusion that shop had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. 17. This judgment again cannot advance the case of the respondents/applicants in view of the findings recorded by this court while allowing revision petition. 18. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam Rastogi v. Ashish Kumar & Anr. 2008(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 642:2008(6) R.A.J. 41 : 2008 (2) RCR (Rent) 419, to claim that when the eviction is sought on the ground that the building was in dilapidated condition an independent engineer/advocate can be appointed to find out the real position. 19. This contention again cannot advance the case of the applicants as the learned Rent Controller on appreciation of evidence had recorded a finding that the building was unfit and unsafe for human habitation. 20. Learned appellate authority also did not reverse the said finding but merely held that as the shop was not in dilapidated condition,therefore, finding was reversed. Finding of the learned appellate authority, therefore, deserves to be set aside which was done by this court vide order dated 22.5.2007. 21. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of this court in the case of Tarsem Lal v. Krishan Chander 2005 (1) RCR (Rent) 456. to contend that building in the same condition as it was at the time of leasing, then no ejectment can be ordered on the ground that the building was unfit and unsafe. 22. Reliance on this judgment is misconceived, as it is not a case of the respondent/tenants that the building was in the same condition, rather the Chobara of the building had fallen many years after the tenancy. 22. Reliance on this judgment is misconceived, as it is not a case of the respondent/tenants that the building was in the same condition, rather the Chobara of the building had fallen many years after the tenancy. Learned counsel for the respondents/tenants then placed reliance on the judgment of this court in the case of Ramji Dass Nirmohi v. Gurbux Singh 1988 (2) RCR (Rent) 129, to contend that merely because the building is old no conclusion can be drawn that the building is unfit and unsafe for human habitation. 23. This judgment again cannot advance the case of the tenants as in this judgment it was held that whether the building had become unfit and unsafe is a question of fact to be adjudicated on the basis of evidence. 24. In the present case by leading cogent evidence landlord succeeded in proving that the building was unfit and unsafe for human habitation. 25. Reliance was thereafter placed on the judgment of this court in the cases of Mohinder Pal v. Hari Dass 2000 (2) RCR (Rent) 103 and Maman Chand Gupta v. Lakhpat Rai 2000 (2) RCR (Rent) 38 and Krishan Lal v. Bansi Lal 2000 (2) RCR (Rent) 700, to contend that merely because the building is old cannot lead to a conclusion that it was unfit and unsafe. 26. An attempt was also made by the learned counsel for the respondents to contend that subsequent event would show that building is not unfit and unsafe. He made reference to the photographs attached with this application. 27. There is no material on record in proof of the subsequent events and the oral assertion on the basis of information received from the tenants can not be taken note of. The alleged sub-sequent events do not advance the case of the applicants as there is no dispute that major part of the building that is chobara has fallen down and the landlord is to rebuild after demolishing the building. 28. In view of the facts and circumstances and the evidence led in this case it was proved that major portion of the building i.e. whole of Chobara had fallen down. This coupled with the fact that the building was old it was rightly held that the building was unfit and unsafe for human habitation. 29. 28. In view of the facts and circumstances and the evidence led in this case it was proved that major portion of the building i.e. whole of Chobara had fallen down. This coupled with the fact that the building was old it was rightly held that the building was unfit and unsafe for human habitation. 29. On consideration of the contentions raised, therefore, no ground is made out to recall the judgment dated 22.5.2007, passed by this court. No merit. Dismissed.