JUDGMENT:- This appeal arises out of a judgment and decree, dated 29.08.1988, passed by the Court of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Chittoor in O.S.No.61 of 1981. 2. Over the past quarter of a century, almost all the original parties to the suit died, and their legal representatives are on record. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred as arrayed in the suit. 4. Sri Takkillapati Muniswami Naidu, the first defendant, had four sons, by name T. Krishnama Naidu, the plaintiff, T. Chengalraya Naidu, the second defendant, T. Doraswamy Naidu, the third defendant, T. Srinivasulu Naidu, the fourth defendant. His wife, Narayanamma, the fifth defendant. The family held vast extents of landed, and other properties. Doraswamy Naidu filed the suit for partition against his father, three brothers and mother. He pleaded that there was a severance of status of the joint family on account of the disputes among the womenfolk, but the properties were not divided by metes and bounds. According to him, the first defendant continued in the management of the entire properties and by taking advantage of his superior position in the family, he has alienated several items of the joint family properties in favour of defendants 6 to 16. He alleged that some of the items were purchased in benami in the name of the fifth defendant. 5. The first defendant filed a written statement stating that there was a division of status among the coparceners in the year 1968. He pleaded that there did not exist any ancestral properties and all the items of suit schedule were acquired by himself, and that he permitted the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 4 to enjoy certain items, out of grace towards his sons. He further pleaded that the plaintiff executed a deed of relinquishment on 06.02.1980 and, thereby, lost his right to seek partition. 6. The written statement of the first defendant was adopted by defendants 2, 4 and 5. The alienees, i.e defendants 6 to 16 have also taken the same plea. 7. Pleading that the version of defendants 1,2, 4 and 5 to 16 is in agreement with that of the plaintiff, the third defendant, T. Krishnama Naidu, filed I.A. No.1164 of 1981 with a prayer to transpose him as plaintiff, and the original plaintiff, as the third defendant. The application was allowed on 28.12.1981. 7. Pleading that the version of defendants 1,2, 4 and 5 to 16 is in agreement with that of the plaintiff, the third defendant, T. Krishnama Naidu, filed I.A. No.1164 of 1981 with a prayer to transpose him as plaintiff, and the original plaintiff, as the third defendant. The application was allowed on 28.12.1981. As a result, the original plaintiff became the third defendant and vice versa. Hereafter, Sri T. Krishnama Naidu, the original third defendant would be referred to as the plaintiff and Sri T. Doraswamy Naidu as the third defendant. 8. During the pendency of the suit, the fourth defendant, Sri T. Srinivasulu Naidu, died. His wife and two daughters came on record as legal representatives and were added as defendants 17 to 19. They filed a separate written statement pleading that an oral partition in the family was taken place, where under, the property was divided by metes and bounds and the list of the same was reduced into writing in a memorandum, marked as Ex.B1. 9. The trial Court disbelieved Ex.B1, but took a view that there was a complete and comprehensive partition among the joint family and accordingly, dismissed the suit, through its judgment, dated 29.08.1988. Hence, the plaintiff in the suit filed this appeal. During the pending of the appeal, he died and his legal representatives are on record. 10. Sri V.L.N. Gopala Krishna Murthy, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, submits that the first defendant and his four sons, the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 4, have presented a consistent version before the trial Court that there was a division of status, but the properties were not divided by metes and bounds; and in that view of the matter, there was no basis for the trial Court in coming to the conclusion that there was a prior partition. He submits that the legal representatives of a party cannot take a stand, inconsistent with the one, taken by the original party and that the trial Court committed an error in law, not only in permitting defendants 17 to 19 to take a plea, inconsistent with the one taken by their predecessor, but also in treating it as the basis for adjudication of the rights of the parties. He had urged certain other grounds also. 11. The legal representatives of the second defendant alone are contesting this appeal. He had urged certain other grounds also. 11. The legal representatives of the second defendant alone are contesting this appeal. Sri D. Prakash Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Smt. Bobba Vijayalakshmi, the learned counsel for the second defendant, submits that sufficient evidence has been placed before the trial Court to prove that there was a prior family partition and that no exception can be taken to the judgment under appeal. He submits that at more places than one, the plaintiff as P.W.1 admitted that there was partition and that he sold some of the items that have fallen to his share. He further contends that even otherwise, once there was a division of status, the plaintiff cannot lay claims as regards the properties that were acquired by various parties, particularly the first defendant, subsequent to the division of status. 12. As per the pleadings of the original parties, there was a division of status but not of the properties. The original plaintiff was sought to be non- suited on the basis of his relinquishment. Therefore, transposition of the parties took place and the trial Court framed the following issues. 1. What are the joint family properties of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4? 2. Whether the plaintiff had relinquished his right in the joint family in favour of defendants 1 to 4? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek for partition? 13. After defendants 17 to 19 came on record as legal representatives of the fourth defendant and filed a written statement, pleading prior partition, additional issues came to be framed, as under: 1. Whether there has been partition and division of all the plaint schedule properties of the first defendant and his sons and the other members of this family in 1968 and there is no longer any joint family or any joint family properties liable for partition? 2. If the additional issue No.1 is found in the affirmative in this suit for partition against the plaint schedule properties is maintainable? 3. Whether defendants 17 to 19 have acquired and perfected right and title to the properties detailed in schedule to the written statement of the 17th defendant by adverse possession as pleaded by her over 12 years 4. If the additional issue No.1 is found in the affirmative in this suit for partition against the plaint schedule properties is maintainable? 3. Whether defendants 17 to 19 have acquired and perfected right and title to the properties detailed in schedule to the written statement of the 17th defendant by adverse possession as pleaded by her over 12 years 4. Whether the alienation if any made by the first defendant of any of the properties stated in the schedule 'E' to the written statement of the 17th defendant is valid and binding on defendants 17 to 19? 5. Whether if for any reason it is found that the partition and division pleaded by the 17th defendant is found to be not legal and valid and binding on the plaintiff and the other defendant and the plaint schedule properties are still joint family properties liable for partition and division? 6. Whether defendants 17 to 19 are entitled to have the properties detailed in schedule to the written statement of 17th defendant allotted to the share of defendants 17 to 19? 14. The plaintiff deposed as P.W.1 and no other witnesses were examined on his behalf. He filed Exs.A-1 to A-6. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-26 were marked. The trial Court dismissed the suit by concluding that there was a prior partition. 15. The original joint family comprised of the first defendant, the father, and his four sons, plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 4. Though with some difference as to the tone and tenor, all of them admitted that there was severance of status of joint family on account of the differences among the womenfolk. While the sons were not certain as to the point of time at which the status of joint family ceased, the first defendant pleaded that it was in the year 1968. They were also in agreement that the partition of the properties by metes and bounds has not taken place by the time the suit was filed. Here again, emphasis changed from party to party. 16. The principal contention was that of the first defendant, who pleaded that almost all the items mentioned in the suit schedule were his self-acquisition and only item Nos. 2, 12, 25, 27, 34 and 36 are the ancestral properties. Here again, emphasis changed from party to party. 16. The principal contention was that of the first defendant, who pleaded that almost all the items mentioned in the suit schedule were his self-acquisition and only item Nos. 2, 12, 25, 27, 34 and 36 are the ancestral properties. In addition to this, he pleaded that some other items were given to his wife, the fifth defendant, as pasupu kunkuma by her parents. He further pleaded that the original plaintiff Sri T. Doraswamy Naidu executed a deed of relinquishment on 06.02.1980 relinquishing his share of the property. There was no rejoinder to this plea. It is a separate question as to whether the deed of relinquishment was binding on others or whether it has brought about complete severance of the original plaintiff, the third defendant, from the rest of the joint family. However, having sensed that the suit itself was going to result in dismissal, the original third defendant got transposed himself as the plaintiff. 17. It has already been pointed out that the second defendant died during the pendency of the suit and the legal representatives came on record as defendants 17 to 19. On his part, the second defendant did not take any independent stand and had, in fact, adopted the written statement filed by his father, the first defendant. It is permissible for the minors, who were already parties to the suit, to take a stand different from the one taken by the persons, who represented them. However, the legal representatives of a party in a suit cannot deviate from the stand taken by the original party. They have to stand or fall, by what was pleaded by their ancestor. Reference, in this context, may be made to the judgments of this Court in SIVAIAH v TEKCHAND and PUJARI CHENGAL REDDY v SHANTA KUMARI Therefore, it was totally impermissible for defendants 17 to 19, to plead that there was a partition by metes and bounds when the second defendant himself did not take such a plea. In that view of the matter, granting permission to defendants 17 to 19 to take such a plea and framing of additional issues was untenable and the trial Court committed a serious legal error, in this regard. 18. There was dispute as to the relationship of the parties. In that view of the matter, granting permission to defendants 17 to 19 to take such a plea and framing of additional issues was untenable and the trial Court committed a serious legal error, in this regard. 18. There was dispute as to the relationship of the parties. Once, the original coparceners, in one voice, admitted that there was no division of joint family properties by metes and bounds, the only alternative left for the Court was to ascertain the properties that are available for partition. There ought not to have been any occasion for the trial Court to delve into the question whether there was prior partition at all. Unfortunately, the trial Court devoted whole of its attention only to that question and found that there was a prior partition. 19. Assuming that there was a legally tenable plea that there was a prior partition, it needs to be seen as to how far it was proved to the satisfaction of the Court. Partition is a phenomenon, which must result in ascertainment of the shares of various coparceners or co-sharers, as the case may be; ascertainment of the properties available for partition, and allotment thereof to the parties concerned, commensurate with their entitlement. Unless the factum of division of properties by metes and bounds and allotment of the definite and fixed shares to the respective parties in accordance with the shares is proved, the Court can infer partition. It may not be necessary that there must be a written and registered document, to evidence partition. Even with the help of oral and other documentary evidence, the partition can be proved. However, the proof must be as regards nothing short of division of properties and allotment of shares to the respective coparceners, or co-sharers. 20. The trial Court had arrived at a conclusion, as to the prior partition, on the basis of some admissions attributed to P.W.1 about the enjoyment of the properties by the respective co-owners. In fact, everybody unanimously pleaded that pending partition by metes and bounds, they were enjoying some extents of properties subject to convenience. Such an arrangement cannot be treated as a partition, in the eye of law. Therefore, the judgment and decree of the trial Court cannot be sustained in law, and accordingly, they are liable to be set aside. 21. In fact, everybody unanimously pleaded that pending partition by metes and bounds, they were enjoying some extents of properties subject to convenience. Such an arrangement cannot be treated as a partition, in the eye of law. Therefore, the judgment and decree of the trial Court cannot be sustained in law, and accordingly, they are liable to be set aside. 21. Subsequent to the dismissal of the suit and filing of the appeal, certain developments have taken place. The third defendant, who is the appellant herein filed an application for inclusion, in the suit schedule, certain items of property, acquired by the first defendant. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that the application was ordered, but the corresponding amendments were not carried as per Rule 18 of Order 6 C.P.C. The record discloses that necessary steps were not taken. It is urged on behalf of the second defendant that the amendment become untenable, on account of non-compliance. 22. In the context of amendment of pleadings and carrying out the necessary corrections, the suits for partition stand somewhat on a different footing, when compared to other suits, particularly, if the amendments relate to the inclusion, or exclusion of items in the schedule. The reason is that with the drawl of final decree in a suit for partition, it is permissible to exclude or include items, depending on the facts that may be pleaded and proved by the parties concerned. When steps in this direction can be taken even after the preliminary decree is passed, there is no basis, to prevent a party from pleading such inclusion, on the sole ground that necessary steps were not taken as required under Rule 18 of Order 6 C.P.C. That, however, does not conclude the controversy between the parties, to this appeal. 23. Even according to the plaintiff, the items that were sought to be included were acquired by the first defendant subsequent to dismissal of the suit, leave alone, the date of filing the suit. It is trite that once there is a division of status in a joint family, each party would be entitled to exercise his own rights, including the one to acquire new items of property. The properties so acquired are not liable to be thrown into the common pool, for the purpose of partition. It is trite that once there is a division of status in a joint family, each party would be entitled to exercise his own rights, including the one to acquire new items of property. The properties so acquired are not liable to be thrown into the common pool, for the purpose of partition. In fact, nothing like a co-parcenary remains in existence after the division of status. Therefore, the properties acquired by the first defendant or for that matter any party, subsequent to the division of status cannot be brought under the purview of the partition. The question as to when and how, the properties are acquired, is a matter, for the Court, to decide on the basis of evidence. Inasmuch as the first defendant happens to be the father of plaintiff and defendants 2 to 4, the question as to how and in what manner the property so acquired would devolve upon his legal heirs, is different question altogether and it cannot constitute a subject matter of the present suit for partition. The concerned parties have to work out their remedies in separate set of proceedings, once it is held that the properties are subsequent acquisitions. 24. Hence, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court are set aside. The suit is remanded to the trial Court, limited to the extent of ascertaining the properties available for partition, as on the date of the filing of the suit. The trial Court shall proceed on the basis that there was no prior partition. It shall be open to the parties to lead such evidence as they intend to. It is also made clear that the properties that are acquired by the respective parties, subsequent to the division of status shall not be available for partition. 25. Since the suit is of the year 1981 and all the original parties died, the trial Court shall pay special attention to this suit and dispose it of, within six months from the date of receipt of the record. There shall be no order as to costs.