JUDGMENT Honble Sushil Harkauli, J.—This matter has come up before this Full Bench by the order dated 19th September, 2006 passed by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice upon a reference dated 19th August, 2006 by a learned single Judge of this Court. The learned single Judge framed and referred the following four questions : (1) Whether a Coordinate Bench while hearing a Public Interest Litigation can issue directions without impleading the affected party which has the effect of taking away the impact of the final decision in favour of such party by a Bench of the same strength. (2) Whether the directions dated 14-7-2006 and 31-7-2006 of the Division Bench in the Public Interest Litigation (Writ Petition No. 2547 of 2005) run counter to and impede the implementation of the final decision dated 25-5-1998 in Writ Petition No. 32950 of 1994 and the decision dated 24-8-2005 in Writ Petition No. 20379 of 2003 keeping in view the fact that the order dated 5-11-2002 had not been quashed. (3) Whether the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can issue a mandamus to the State Authorities for acquiring land in suo moto exercise of its powers in a Public Interest Litigation. (4) Whether in such a situation if there are 2 conflicting orders, judicial discipline demanded a reference to a larger Bench instead of treating the impact of final judgments of this Court to be obiter. Facts necessitating the Reference : 2. A lease of Nazul plot No. 141, Civil Station, Allahabad, was originally granted in favour of Sapurji Rustam Gandhi and his son Khusro Sapurji Gandhi on 8th June, 1925 for a period of 50 years. The tenancy rights devolved upon Rustam Khusro Sapurji Gandhi, Jehangir D. Gandhi and Nariman D. Gandhi (hereinafter these three persons are referred to as petitioners for short), through testaments of will executed by the original lessees and, thereafter by the legatees. 3. As the lease was going to expire on 7th June, 1975, an application was filed by the lease-holders on 13th May, 1974 for renewal of the lease. No action was taken by the State to dispose of the application for renewal of lease and the matter remained pending with the District Magistrate, Allahabad. 3. As the lease was going to expire on 7th June, 1975, an application was filed by the lease-holders on 13th May, 1974 for renewal of the lease. No action was taken by the State to dispose of the application for renewal of lease and the matter remained pending with the District Magistrate, Allahabad. Therefore the petitioners filed a Writ Petition No. 32950 of 1994 which was decided by a Division Bench of this Court on 25th May, 1998 in the following words : “The facts of this case are covered by the judgment of this Court in P.D. Tandon v. State of U.P., 1987 A.L.R. 72. This petition is disposed of on the same terms and conditions as in the aforesaid decision. The petitioner’s lease shall be renewed within a month in accordance with law.” 4. On 15th November, 2002, the application for renewal of lease was rejected by the District Magistrate, Allahabad, by a very detailed order. The order of the District Magistrate dated 15th November, 2002 was challenged by the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 20379 of 2003. The said writ petition was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 24th August, 2005. In the judgment dated 24th August, 2005, the Division Bench quoted the earlier order dated 25th May, 1998 passed in Writ Petition No. 32950 of 1994, which has been quoted above in this judgment, and thereafter observed as follows : “Thus by allowing the earlier writ petition a direction had been issued to the respondents to grant renewal of the lease and no option had been given to the respondents to reject the application. The respondents had been asked only to perform the ministerial act; therefore, any order passed in contravention of this order is null and void. Whether this Court could have passed such an order is a debatable issue. However, the order has attained the finality and the issue cannot be reopened in these proceedings. In such a case, if the judgment and order dated 25-5-1998 has not been complied with by the respondents, the appropriate remedy for the petitioners is to file an application for contempt of Court for not complying with the order of the Court. With these observations, the writ petition is disposed of.” 5. In such a case, if the judgment and order dated 25-5-1998 has not been complied with by the respondents, the appropriate remedy for the petitioners is to file an application for contempt of Court for not complying with the order of the Court. With these observations, the writ petition is disposed of.” 5. Thereupon, the petitioners filed the present contempt petition on 17th August, 2006 seeking punishment of the present and past District Magistrates, the Additional District Magistrate (Nazul) Allahabad, and the Secretary (Housing), U.P. Government, for the alleged disobedience of the order dated 25th May, 1998. The Stamp Reporter reported the contempt petition to be time barred by almost 7 years. 6. During the preliminary hearing of this time barred contempt petition, the learned single Judge was shown copies of two orders dated 14th July, 2006 and 31st July, 2006 passed by another Division Bench of this Court in a PIL being Writ Petition No. 2547 of 2005. In a nutshell, the Division Bench hearing the Public Interest Litigation, after noticing the decisions of the Writ Petition No. 32950 of 1994 and Writ Petition No. 20379 of 2003, held by the two orders dated 14th July, 2006 and 31st July, 2006 that it did not find any obstacle in the way of the State Government/Administration to proceed with the acquisition of the Nazul land in question in public interest for the purposes of the High Court and, accordingly issued a direction in the following words : “Nazul department is hereby directed to take immediate steps for acquisition of the said land.” 7. Thus, the High Court directed the land, of which lease had been directed to be renewed in favour of the petitioners, to be acquired for the High Court, which is beyond doubt a ‘public purpose’. 8. Faced with these apparently conflicting orders i.e. orders by the Division Benches in the two writ petitions of the petitioners on one side as against the order passed by the other Division Bench in the Public Interest Litigation on the other side, the learned single Judge made the reference by his detailed order dated 19th August, 2006. The Answers to the referred questions : Question No. (IV) 9. Of the 4 questions referred, the 4th question hardly requires any debate and indeed there was no serious contest on that question by the learned Counsel before this Full Bench. The Answers to the referred questions : Question No. (IV) 9. Of the 4 questions referred, the 4th question hardly requires any debate and indeed there was no serious contest on that question by the learned Counsel before this Full Bench. It was in fact almost conceded, and we may say rightly conceded, that where there are two conflicting judicial orders, judicial discipline requires reference to a larger Bench. And, subject to the language used in the two conflicting decisions or orders, it would not be open to mellow down the impact of any of the conflicting judgments or orders, which have attained finality, treating it too be obiter. The 4th question is answered accordingly. Question No. (II) 10. So far as the second question referred by the learned single Judge concerned, we do not find any conflict in the directions issued in the Public Interest Litigation with the decisions of the two Division Benches in Writ Petitions No. 32950 of 1994 and 20379 of 2003. The two decisions in the two writ petitions of the petitioners only direct renewal of lease in favour of the petitioners. We have not been shown any law which prohibits compulsory acquisition of the land, under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, even after the lease had been renewed, merely because the lease has been renewed. A renewal of the lease in favour of the petitioners would not take away the power of the State Government of compulsory acquisition of the land under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In fact, the renewal of lease would at best be taken into consideration for determining the quantum of compensation. The question No. 2 is answered accordingly. Question No. (I) 11. So far as the 1st question referred by the learned single Judge is concerned, although it does not directly arise in view of our answer given to the question No. 2 above, we have no doubt that legally once a decision has attained finality in favour of a party/litigant, no other co-ordinate Bench while hearing a Public Interest Litigation or a writ petition of other nature can issue any directions, which could have the effect of taking away the impact of the final decision without impleading the affected party, who has obtained the decision which has attained finality, or even after impleading such party. The reason is that a co-ordinate Bench cannot sit in appeal and pass a judgment or issue a direction taking away the impact of a decision, which has attained finality, as that would virtually mean a co-ordinate Bench sitting in appeal over the final decision of another Bench of the same strength. Question No. (III) 12. This brings us to the most important issue which has been referred by way of the 3rd question. For convenience, we reproduce the 3rd question again : (3) Whether the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can issue a mandamus to the State Authorities for acquiring land in suo moto exercise of its powers in a Public Interest Litigation. 13. Whether the High Court is deciding a Public Interest Litigation or a private litigation it is, in the ultimate analysis, exercising the powers vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A direction in the nature of mandamus, which is permissible under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has to conform to the well defined limits of such power as laid down by judicial decisions. 14. Reference may be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of W.B. v. Nuruddin Mallick, 34 (1998) 8 S.C.C. 143 : 1999 S.C.C. (L & S) 144, wherein while considering the extent and dimension of jurisdiction conferred on superior Courts to issue a writ of mandamus, it has been observed as under : “The Courts can either direct the statutory authorities, where it is not exercising its discretion, by mandamus to exercise its discretion, or when exercised, to see whether it has been validly exercised. It would be inappropriate for the Court to substitute itself for the statutory authorities to decide the matter." 15. It is well-settled that a direction in the nature of mandamus to the executive can be issued as a positive direction only when the act directed to be done by the mandamus is a purely ministerial act, not involving any discretion on part of the executive. It is well-settled that a direction in the nature of mandamus to the executive can be issued as a positive direction only when the act directed to be done by the mandamus is a purely ministerial act, not involving any discretion on part of the executive. Where the executive has a discretion or adjudicatory function to perform; and the performance or non-performance of the ministerial act depends upon such discretionary or adjudicatory function, the mandamus can merely compel the executive to take a decision in respect of the discretionary or adjudicatory part of its function and thereby to decide whether the ministerial act ought or ought not to be performed. Such a mandamus can also, in most of the cases, fix a time frame for the performance of each of these functions i.e. the discretionary function and thereafter, if called for, the ministerial function. If the adjudicatory function or discretionary function has been wrongly performed by the executive, it would be open under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the decision, but again the Court can normally only direct fresh consideration of the issue by the executive. It may also be open to the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to guide the adjudicatory or administrative function by laying down the principles of law, but while quashing the wrong decision of the executive, it would normally not be open to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to substitute its own decision in respect of the adjudicatory or discretionary function. 16. The view taken by us finds support from decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee & Anr. v. C.K. Rajan & Ors., (2003) 7 SCC 546 , wherein it has been held as under : “The High Courts and the Supreme Court would not ordinarily issue a writ of mandamus directing the State to carry out its statutory functions in a particular manner. Normally, the Courts would ask the State to perform its statutory functions, if necessary within a time frame and undoubtedly, as and when an order is passed by the State in exercise of its power under the statute, it will examine the correctness or legality thereof by way of judicial review." 17. Normally, the Courts would ask the State to perform its statutory functions, if necessary within a time frame and undoubtedly, as and when an order is passed by the State in exercise of its power under the statute, it will examine the correctness or legality thereof by way of judicial review." 17. Coming back to the specific question referred namely, permissibility of issuing a mandamus to the State to acquire land in ‘public interest’ under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would be necessary to examine the scheme of the acquisition proceedings under the said Act. The various steps in acquisition proceedings are as follows : (1) It must first be ascertained by the executive that there is a public purpose involved. (2) Then, it has to be ascertained whether land is needed for the public purpose. (3) Then, it has to be ascertained how much land is needed for that public purpose. (4) After ascertainment of the above, a preliminary Notification under Section 4 of the Act is to be published in accordance with that section. (5) Thereafter, except in cases provided under Section 17(4), hearing of objections has to take place under Section 5A. (6) After disposal of the objections, {except in cases of Section 17(4)}, a declaration under Section 6 has to be published. 18. If a mandamus is permitted to be issued straight away directing acquiring of a particular land or a particular area of a particular land, the inquiry under Section 5-A would become a meaningless empty formality. More importantly, it is not inconceivable that there may be a particular case where even the executive is of the opinion that there exists a ‘public purpose’, that land is needed for that ‘public purpose’, that a particular minimum area of a particular land is needed for that ‘public purpose’ and, yet that land cannot be acquired because the executive is not in a financial position to provide for the compensation. The State has multifarious public duties and functions, each of which require the support from the financial resources of the State. The balancing of the budget and distribution of available resources among the various requirements under the Constitution of India is essentially a function of the Legislature. It would not be appropriate for the Court to encroach upon such legislative function by directing allocation of funds in the budget for a particular purpose. The balancing of the budget and distribution of available resources among the various requirements under the Constitution of India is essentially a function of the Legislature. It would not be appropriate for the Court to encroach upon such legislative function by directing allocation of funds in the budget for a particular purpose. Although, there is one provision in the Constitution namely Article 202(3)(e) of the Constitution of India, which provides for charging expenditure on the consolidated fund of each State with regard to any sums required to satisfy any judgment, decree or award of any Court or arbitral Tribunal, but this provision must necessarily be confined to apply to only those matters where the State Government is a party litigant in a normal case or arbitral proceedings. We are of the opinion that even this provision cannot be utilised for holding that the Court can keep creating financial liability on the State to meet public welfare schemes which the Court may evolve in its wisdom. What is primarily a legislative function must be left to the Legislature and interference should normally be avoided by Courts for the obvious reason that the Court is only examining the matter before it, whether of private interest or public interest, whereas, the Legislature is expected to take into account the financial requirements of other sectors of public welfare and, to balance and distribute its resources according to the needs, as per wisdom of the Legislature consisting of peoples’ representatives who are accountable to the people not only through elections but also through Courts. 19. To sum up a land acquisition is not a purely ministerial act to be performed by the executive and, therefore, no mandamus can be issued by the Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whether suo moto or otherwise, whether in public interest litigation or otherwise directing acquisition of land under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It would, however, be open to the Court in exercise of that power to invite the attention of the executive to any public purpose and the need for land for meeting that public purpose and to require the executive to take a decision, even a reasoned decision, with regard to the same in accordance with the statutory provisions, perhaps even within a reasonable time-frame. However, the power of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must necessarily stop at that. Thereafter, if the decision taken by the executive is capable of challenge and, there exist appropriate legal grounds for such challenge, it may also be open to the Court to quash the decision and to require reconsideration. But no direction in the nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to the executive to necessarily acquire a particular area of a particular piece of land for a particular public purpose. The question No. 3 is answered accordingly. 20. All the questions having been answered as above, the matter may be placed before the appropriate single Judge Bench for further consideration. ——— [2007(5) ADJ 102] ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT BEFORE : VINOD PRASAD, J. MANISH TYAGI ......Applicant Versus STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER .........Opposite Parties (Criminal Misc. Application No. 6488 of 2007, decided on 29th March, 2007) (A) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000—Sections 6(2), 12 and 52—Juvenile Justice Board—Power of—Whether Sessions Judge had got power of Juvenile Justice Board—Consonance with Section 6(2) of Act—On appreciation of evidence Sessions Judge found applicant was less than 18 years at time of incident—Bail application moved before Board—Held that Sessions Judge had no power to declare applicant to be juvenile—Sustainability of—Power of Board under Section 6(2) of Act is not absolute—But subject to other provisions of Act—Power which has been conferred on Board through Section 6(1) of Act—Has also been conferred on High Court and Court of Sessions under Section 6(2) of Act—In terms of Section 6 of Act—Power of Board can be exercised by High Court or Sessions Court in appeal, revision or otherwise—Court of Sessions competent to determine juvenility of applicant. [Paras 9 to 15] (B) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000—Sections 52 and 6(2)—Power thereunder—To set aside the order of Board—Sessions Judge and High Court having concurrent jurisdiction to determine juvenility—Board held that Sessions Judge has no power to determine age—If impugned order allowed to stand—It would mean that High Court also does not possess power to determine juvenility—It would amount to misinterpretation of provisions—Order passed by Sessions Judge binding on Board. [Para 13] (C) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000—Section 12—Age—Determination of—Power of Board—Scope of—Section 12 of Act nowhere provides that only Board can conduct an enquiry regarding determination of age—Section 12 of Act confers power on Board is only to decide bail application—If he is already declared to be juvenile—Or if not so declared earlier by competent Court—Then determine the same. [Para 14] Result; Application Allowed. Cases cited : AIR 1966 SC 1987 (Para 11); 2005 (2) ACC 880 (Para 15); 2003(46) ACC 719 (Para 16); 2005(2) JIC 537 (SC); 2002 (1) Crimes 385(SC) (Para 12)-Referred. Counsel : Satyendra Narayan Singh, D.B. Mishra and V.P. Srivastava for the Applicant; A.G.A. for the Respondents. JUDGMENT Hon’ble Vinod Prasad, J.—The neat legal question which is involved in this application is as to whether Sessions Judge had got the power of Juvenile Justice Board in consonance with Section 6(2) of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, (Act No. 56 of 2000) or not? The contention of Sri V.P. Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, Manish Tyagi is that under the aforesaid sub-section, Sessions Judge as well as the High Court has been statutorily conferred with such power vis-a-vis Juvenile Justice Board. The submission is that in view of the provision of Section 6(2) of the Act there cannot be another inquiry by Juvenile Justice Board for determining as to whether the accused is a juvenile or not once the inquiry conducted by the Additional Sessions Judge has declared him to be such. Before determining the proposition of law harangued by the applicant a thumb nail description of the facts seems to be indispensable which is sketched below. 2. The applicant, as is perceptible from the pleading made in the affidavit appended alongwith this Criminal Misc. Application, under Section 482, Cr.P.C., invoking the inherent power of this Court, are that the applicant is a socio criminals for an offence under Section 302, I.P.C. vide Crime No. 83 of 2005. FIR was lodged by Sri Om in respect of said incident alleged to have taken place on 11.4.2005 at 6.30 p.m. Investigation into the crime charge-sheeted the applicant as accused for the said offence and the applicant start facing trial before Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, Mathura in ST. No. 574 of 2005. 3. FIR was lodged by Sri Om in respect of said incident alleged to have taken place on 11.4.2005 at 6.30 p.m. Investigation into the crime charge-sheeted the applicant as accused for the said offence and the applicant start facing trial before Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, Mathura in ST. No. 574 of 2005. 3. During the course of the trial the applicant Manish Tyagi moved an application on 11.4.2005 that he was below 18 years of age and hence he was a juvenile. Resultantly he prayed that he should be declared a juvenile and be ordered to be dealt with as such in accordance with the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act 2000. Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3 Meerut who is seized of the aforesaid ST. No. 574 of 2005 conducted an inquiry and examined Jugneshwar father of the applicant as C.W. 1, Pandit Chitranjan Sharma (who had prepared the horoscope of the applicant) as C.W. 2 and Surendra Kumar as C.W. 3 (who is Principal of Janta Inter College, Kethwari where the applicant had studied from 6 standard up to intermediate). According to the statement of C.W. 3, the date of birth of the applicant was recorded in the school register as 23.9.1987. 4. Additional Sessions Judge after critically appreciating the evidence led by the aforesaid witnesses came to the conclusion that the applicant Manish Tyagi was less than 18 years of age at the time of the incident and hence was a juvenile. He consequently referred the case of the applicant to Juvenile Justice Board, Meerut to be dealt with in consonance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act. 5. Before the Board the applicant moved his bail application in the aforesaid crime for the aforesaid offence on which Juvenile Justice Board vide its impugned order dated 1.3.2007 held that the Sessions Judge had no power to declare applicant to be a juvenile as that power is vested with the board which is functioning since last many years and hence it ordered to conduct a fresh inquiry for determination of the age of the applicant to judge whether the applicant is a juvenile or not? Hence, this Criminal Misc. Application challenging the said order by the Board. 6. Hence, this Criminal Misc. Application challenging the said order by the Board. 6. I have heard Sri V.P. Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel in support of this application and learned A.G.A. in opposition and have gone through the impugned order and material place on the record of this application. 7. Since the controversy involved in this application centres around Section 6 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, (Act No. 56 of 2000), hereinafter referred to as the Act the said Section is quoted below : “6. Power of Juvenile Justice Board.—(1) Where a Board has been constituted for any district or a group of districts, such Board shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force but save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, have power to deal exclusively with all proceedings under this Act relating to juvenile in conflict with law. (2) The powers conferred on the Board by or under this Act may also be exercised by the High Court and the Court of Session, when the proceeding comes before them in appeal, revision or otherwise.” 8. A perusal of Section 6 of the Act clearly indicates that Board under the Act had got the power to deal with juvenile offenders notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force but save as “otherwise expressly provided under this Act”. Thus even though Board under the Act has got superintendence over any other law for the time being in force but it’s powers are subject to other express provision under the Act. Power of the Board thus is not absolute but it is subject to other express provision under the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act thus assumes much importance as it provides that High Court or Court of Session’s may also exercise power conferred on the Board in Appeal, Revision or otherwise. Thus the power which has been conferred on Juvenile Justice Board through Section 6 (1) of the Act has also been conferred on the High Court and Court of Sessions through Section 6(2) of the Act. 9. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act has got a salutary purpose. The Act was incorporated for the benefit of juvenile offenders providing for proper care, protection, treatment and rehabilitation for them. 9. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act has got a salutary purpose. The Act was incorporated for the benefit of juvenile offenders providing for proper care, protection, treatment and rehabilitation for them. The purpose of enactment is “An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to juveniles in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection, by providing for proper care, protection and treatment by catering to their development needs, and by adopting a child—friendly approach in the adjudication and disposition of matters in the best interest of children and for their ultimate rehabilitation through various institutions established under this enactment.” 10. With such an avowed object, the provisions of the Act has to be construed in such a manner that its object is projected glaringly and the provisions has to be interpreted keeping the purpose of enactment in forefront. It is because of this reason that sub-section (2) has been incorporated so that at any stage of the trial up to the High Court no juvenile is denied benefit of the Act. The intention of legislature for enacting such a provision seems to be that in a long drawn procedure of trial and finality of judgment and order delay in raising plea of being a juvenile up to the stage of High Court should always be available with a juvenile offender and he should not be denied benefit of the same merely on the reason of lapse of time and advance stage of trial. It should not be forgotten that the Act is a beneficial Legislation for the most veranable section of our society who are by and large dependant on some body else generally on their parents. Thus a narrow construction, as has been done in this case by the Board, of Section 6 (1) and (2) of the Act will probably frustrate the very object of the Act which cannot be sanctified. 11. Further the words of Section 6 as a whole are clear, unambiguous and does not admit any exception. Section 6 conspicuously provides that power of the Board can be exercised by the High Court or Sessions Court in appeal, revisions or otherwise. Here I may point out that cardinal principle of interpretation of Statute is that the words of the statute be interpreted as they are keeping in mind the stage, object, purpose and intention of legislature. Section 6 conspicuously provides that power of the Board can be exercised by the High Court or Sessions Court in appeal, revisions or otherwise. Here I may point out that cardinal principle of interpretation of Statute is that the words of the statute be interpreted as they are keeping in mind the stage, object, purpose and intention of legislature. If the words of a statute are clear, unambiguous and capable of direct interpretation then no ambiguity should be attached with it and the statute must be interpreted in such a manner that it brings forth or countenance most natural, plain and direct meaning without falling into any sort of unskilful and illogical absurdities. I can do no better than to refer the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in AIR 1966 SC 1987 , Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P. Wherein Hoh’ble The Chief Justice Subba Rao, J. speaking for the bench has observed that in construing the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of Parliament, the Court “will have to find out the express intention from the words of the Constitution or the Act, as they may be .............” Thus the Court should eschew such a construction which leads to absurdity and brings forth practical difficulties and inconvenience or makes the provision nugatory. 12. In the present contest, the words of the statute are plain and simple. High Court and Sessions Court always possess power of Juvenile Justice Board as the words “Appeal, revision or otherwise” in sub-section (2) of the Act is not capable of a limited interpretation but is of unfathomnable circumscription. (Emphasis mine) I am fortified in my this view by a decision our own Court rendered in Pankaj v. State, 2005 (2) JIC 537 ; and another decision in Jai Pal v. State of H.P., 2002 (1) Crimes 385. 13. There is another aspect of the matter and that is that under Section 52 of the Act Session’s Judge is the appellate authority of any order passed by the Board. Thus in an appeal a Session’s Court has got the power to set aside the order of the Board. With such a power conferred on the Session’s Court it surpasses all suppositions that Board can sit over the order passed by it’s appellate Court, when every order is passed by the Session’s Court is binding on the Board. Thus in an appeal a Session’s Court has got the power to set aside the order of the Board. With such a power conferred on the Session’s Court it surpasses all suppositions that Board can sit over the order passed by it’s appellate Court, when every order is passed by the Session’s Court is binding on the Board. The Act or the Rules framed thereunder nowhere provides that if a plea of being a juvenile is raised by an accused before the Session’s Court or the High Court then for determination of such a plea the matter has to be referred to the Board or that the matter should be transferred to the Board for its adjudication. If the Statute does not provide such a course, the Board while interpreting the Act cannot legislate such a duty on High Court or Court of Session’s. Further the power conferred under Section 6 (2) of the Act is concurrent both for Sessions Court and High Court. Therefore if the impugned order is allowed to stand it will mean that High Court also does not possess power to determine juvenility of an accused, which, to me seems to be, to say the least, will be a codswallop interpretation. 14. Turning to the impugned order once again Additional Sessions Judge, when once has decided that the applicant is a juvenile there was no scope for Juvenile Justice Board, Meerut to hold otherwise. Juvenile Justice Board, Meerut has not cared to look into the relevant provisions while passing the impugned order. Section 12 of the Act, which provides for consideration of bail of juvenile offenders has to be interpreted in conjunction with Section 6 thereof in consonance with the principles of harmonious construction of Statutes. Section 12 nowhere provides that only Board can conduct an enquiry regarding determination of age of an accused. The words used under that section are “........... is arrested or detained or appears or is brought before a Board.......”. These words means that an already declared juvenile may also appear or sent before a Board for consideration of his bail prayer. There cannot be any narrow interpretation of these words to restrict them in their scope. The words used under that section are “........... is arrested or detained or appears or is brought before a Board.......”. These words means that an already declared juvenile may also appear or sent before a Board for consideration of his bail prayer. There cannot be any narrow interpretation of these words to restrict them in their scope. Under Section 12 of the Act the power which has been conferred on the Board is only to decide bail application of a Juvenile offender if he is already declared to be juvenile or if not so declared earlier by a competent Court then determine whether he is a juvenile or not and then decide his bail prayer and no more. 15. Now a few words regarding the rulings referred to by the Board in the impugned judgment. So far as the decision of this Court in Pankaj v. State, 2005 (2) ACC 880 is concerned the same applied with full force on the facts of the present case and Board has wrongly distinguished it on facts. The principle of law laid down in that judgment applied with full force on the facts of the present case that under Section 6 Session’s Judge has got the power to determine the plea whether an accused is a juvenile or not? It has been observed in that judgment as follows : “It is also relevant to point out that Section 6 sub-section (2) of the Act provides that the power conferred on the Board by or under this Act may also be exercised by the High Court and the Court of Session, when the proceedings comes before them in appeal, revision or otherwise. In the present case this application was moved before the learned Session’s Judge, Baghpat and, therefore, he was bound to make preliminary inquiry and come to a conclusion, instead of relegating the applicant to approach the Board...” 16. The above quoted passage was the law declared and was binding on the Board in the present case which has been illegally ignored by the Board. Now coming to the second ruling cited by the Board in the impugned order i.e.; Soni v. State, 2003 (46) ACC 719. In this judgment there is nothing as been observed by the Board in respect of this judgment. Now coming to the second ruling cited by the Board in the impugned order i.e.; Soni v. State, 2003 (46) ACC 719. In this judgment there is nothing as been observed by the Board in respect of this judgment. On the contrary it has been held in the said judgment as follows : “.....Section 6 (2) of the Act also clear on this point which lays down that the powers conferred on the Board by or under this Act may also be exercised by the High Court and the Court of Sessions when proceeding come before them in appeal, revision or otherwise....” 17. Thus what has been held in this judgment is also the same law which has been held by this Court in Pankaj’s case (supra) and the view taken by me herein above. The Board is reminded that the judgment of this Court has to be read as it is in what it has said and not in what it could have said or what it has not said. While interpreting a judgment nothing should be added which has not been said in the judgment. 18. Thus concludingly, the observations by Juvenile Justice Board, Meerut in the impugned order that Session’s Court does not have the right to exercise power under the Act because Board is functioning since last many years is against the very statutory provision under Section 6 of the Act as well as the judgments of this Court referred to above and hence is wholly illegal and totally perverse. 19. In view of the above discussions, the impugned order passed by Juvenile Justice Board, Meerut dated 9.3.2007 in Case No. 56 of 2007 (State v. Manish Tyagi) under Section 302/201, l.P.C., P.S. Sarurpur, District Meerut cannot be sustained and resultantly is quashed. 20. This Criminal Misc. Application is allowed. Juvenile Justice Board is directed to treat the applicant as juvenile and proceed against him in accordance with law. ————`