JUDGMENT 1. - By the instant writ petition, the petitioner has challenged legality, validity and correctness of the departmental proceedings as well as order of removal dated 24.11.1997 passed in pursuance thereof. 2. The facts, in brief, of the case, as per petitioner, are that at the relevant time, the petitioner was working as Branch Manager in the year 1981. The departmental proceedings were initiated vide charge sheet dated 10.8.1981 levelling the charge of misappropriating of Rs. 9768/- or helping in misappropriation of the same. The statement of allegations was served after one year of the issuance of the charge sheet i.e. on 11.9.1982. It is stated in the writ petition that in respect of the same embezzlement, enquiry under Section 17 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (in short "the Act of 1965") was initiated and thereafter proceeding under Section 74 of the Act of 1965 have been taken against the petitioner and four others whereby whereby it was held by the Assistant Registrar vide judgment of the dated 30.9.1982 (Ex. 17) that the case of the petitioner did not fall within the ambit of Section 74 of the Act of 1965 and four other employees of the societies were held guilty. Further the said amount was ordered to be recovered under Section 118(c) of the Act of 1965 and it was held desirable to conduct the departmental enquiry against the petitioner. During the course of enquiry, the petitioner made requests on 9.4.1983, 12.3.1983 and 17.1.1984 for appointment of Shri B.D. Jindal as defence nominee, but the said request of the petitioner was declined on 9.4.1983 on the ground that it does not bear the approval of disciplinary authority. Even the subsequent request made by him, have not been considered by the enquiry officer/disciplinary authority. The enquiry continued without allowing him the defence nominee in violation of Rule 16(5) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeals) Rules, 1958 (in short "the Rules of 1958"). On completion of the enquiry, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 17.2.1986 as to why services of the petitioner be not terminated. 3. Apprehending termination of the services, the petitioner instituted a civil suit seeking declaration that the departmental proceeding are illegal, invalid, inoperative and non-est in eye of law for flagrant violation of principle of natural justice. 3. Apprehending termination of the services, the petitioner instituted a civil suit seeking declaration that the departmental proceeding are illegal, invalid, inoperative and non-est in eye of law for flagrant violation of principle of natural justice. Along with the said civil suit, the petitioner had also filed an application for temporary injunction. On 3.9.1987, temporary injunction was passed by the trial court in favour of the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner will not be removed on the basis of notice dated 17.2.1986 and status quo be maintained. Against the said temporary injunction order, the respondent Bank filed an appeal before the Appellate Court and the Appellate Court vide its order dated 19.5.1995 allowed the appeal and set aside the i temporary injunction order dated 3.9.1987. Against which the petitioner had filed a revision petition before this Court which was registered as S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 887/1995. This Court vide its order dated 20.11.1996 allowed the revision petition and quashed the order of the Civil Judge (SD) Ajmer dated 19.5.1995 and restored the order of the Additional Munsif, Ajmer (West) and directed the trial court to decide the civil suit pending before it within six months. 4. During the pendency of the aforesaid civil suit and proceeding arising out of the temporary injunction application, one resolution and an office order have been passed by the Bank. In the resolution dated 29.3.1991 it has been mentioned that in case the petitioner withdraws the suit challenging the departmental proceeding then the Bank would held the enquiry in consonance with the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeals) Rules, 1958, thus, impliedly admitted the illegality in the departmental proceeding. In pursuance of the aforesaid resolution No. 5 of resolution dated 29.3.1991, and office order was passed on 10.4.1991 that in case the petitioner withdraws the civil suit then as per resolution dated 29.3.1991 the Executive Officer of the Bank be appointed as enquiry officer and the proceeding will be continued as per Rules of 1958. The Administrative Officer of the Bank was appointed as Presenting Officer. The petitioner filed an application for withdrawal of the civil suit which was not resisted by the Bank and the civil suit was withdrawn on 22.5.1997. The Administrative Officer of the Bank was appointed as Presenting Officer. The petitioner filed an application for withdrawal of the civil suit which was not resisted by the Bank and the civil suit was withdrawn on 22.5.1997. It is further stated that after withdrawal of the civil suit, on the basis of resolution No. 5 dated 29.3.1991, the Bank was under an obligation to conduct the enquiry in accordance with the said resolution and they could not have back out from the action required to be taken as per resolution dated 29.3.1991 and office order dated 10.4.1991, but without conducting the enquiry in accordance with the aforesaid resolution and office order, the Bank straightaway passed the removal order on 24.11.1997 without holding any enquiry. The petitioner has crossed the age of superannuation presently being 63 years of age. 5. It is further stated in the writ petition that the order of removal is not only contrary to the resolution dated 29.3.1991 and office order dated 10.4.1991 as the respondents have not acted in accordance with the Rules of 1958, but is also violative of principle of natural justice more particularly when copy of the enquiry report was not supplied to him. On 4.1.2007, one week's time was granted to the petitioner to specify the prejudices caused to him on account of non-supply of copy of the enquiry report. The petitioner filed an additional affidavit, wherein the gist of prejudices caused to him is that Rule 16(5) onwards of the Rules of 1958 have been violated on account of not allowing the defence nominee and further not even holding the departmental enquiry after withdrawal of civil suit. It has also been stated in the additional affidavit that alleged misappropriated amount of Rs. 9768/- has been recovered from Shri Kailash Chand Sharma, Ex-Manager of the Co-operative Society in the proceeding under Section 74 of the Act of 1965, therefore, the charge and removal order must fall on ground. 6. The respondents have filed reply to the writ petition and raised preliminary objection of availability of alternate remedy under Section 75 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (in short "the Act of 1965"). The petitioner has also not availed the departmental remedy of filing the appeal before the Registrar in view of notification dated 11.8.1986. 7. 6. The respondents have filed reply to the writ petition and raised preliminary objection of availability of alternate remedy under Section 75 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (in short "the Act of 1965"). The petitioner has also not availed the departmental remedy of filing the appeal before the Registrar in view of notification dated 11.8.1986. 7. On merits, the respondents have stated that appointment of Shri B.D. Jindal as defence nominee does not bear the approval of the disciplinary authority in view of Rule 16(5) of the Rules of 1958, therefore, the petitioner was not allowed to represent through the defence nominee. The respondents have further stated that the petitioner was provided an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and further opportunity to produce his witness. Non-supply of enquiry report has not caused any prejudice to the petitioner. As regards, resolution dated 29.3.1991 and office order dated 10.4.1991, it is stated in the reply that the petitioner has filed the application of withdrawal of civil suit after six years of the resolution when the apprehended that the civil suit will be dismissed by the civil court, therefore, now the petitioner cannot take the advantage of the resolution dated 29.3.1991 and office order dated 10.4.1991. In the said decision, the Assistant Registrar not found the petitioner guilty on technical ground and held that provisions of Section 74 of the Act of 1965 are not applicable to the case of the petitioner. The respondent Bank has also filed counter affidavit to the additional affidavit submitted by the petitioner and repeated the contents of reply to the writ petition with the addition that the petitioner was not only charge-sheeted for misappropriation, but also for helping the other persons in misappropriating the amount and the said charge has rightly been proved. In the said counter affidavit it has not been mentioned that enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 has not been initiated/continued after dismissal of the civil suit. In the said counter affidavit it has not been mentioned that enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 has not been initiated/continued after dismissal of the civil suit. It has also been stated in the said counter affidavit that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner and as regards enquiry under Section 74 of the Act of 1965 against Kailash Chand Sharma and consequential recovery, the same does not make any effect on the removal order dated 24.11.1997 on account of the fact that the same was not permissible under Section 74 of the Act of 1965 against the petitioner. 8. Submission of counsel for the petitioner is that not only in the present case principles of natural justice have been violated, but also compliance of resolution No. 5 of resolution dated 29.3.1991 has not been made in pursuance to which order dated 10.4.1991 was passed, therefore, alternate remedy/departmental remedy would not operate as a bar. 9. On merits submission of counsel for the petitioner is that after withdrawal of civil suit on the basis of aforesaid order dated 29.3.1991 and office order dated 10.4.1991, the Bank has proceeded from the state of show cause notice for termination and has not conducted the enquiry from the stage of appointment of Presenting Officer, which has resulted in violation of Rule 16(5) onwards of the Rules of 1958. He also submits that order dated 9.4.1983 declining appointment of defence nominee becomes infructuous in view of resolution dated 29.3.1991 and office order dated 10.4.1991 whereby Executive Officer was appointed as Enquiry Officer and Administrative Officer was appointed as Presenting Officer, therefore, fresh opportunity was required to be granted to him. On the issue of non-supply of enquiry report and prejudices caused to him, the petitioner has pointed out the prejudices in the additional affidavit filed in pursuance of the order of this Court dated 4.1.2007, which starts from appointment of defence nominee onwards till conclusion of the enquiry and culminating the enquiry in removal order. In support of argument that alternate remedy is no bar in certain circumstances, counsel for the petitioner cited the judgments of Supreme Court in cases of L. Hirday Narain v. Income-Tax Officer, Bareilly- AIR 1971 SC 33 , Whirlpool Corp. v. Registrar, Trade Marks- (1998) 8 SCC 1 para 15, Harbans Lai Sahnia & anr. v. Indian Oil Corp. In support of argument that alternate remedy is no bar in certain circumstances, counsel for the petitioner cited the judgments of Supreme Court in cases of L. Hirday Narain v. Income-Tax Officer, Bareilly- AIR 1971 SC 33 , Whirlpool Corp. v. Registrar, Trade Marks- (1998) 8 SCC 1 para 15, Harbans Lai Sahnia & anr. v. Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. & Ors.- (2003) 2 SCC 107 , Durga Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Principal Secretary, Govt. of 1 AP - (2004) 13 SCC 665 and M/s. Pop-corn Entertainment & anr. v. City Industrial Development Corp. & Anr.-2007(1) WLC (SC) Civil 635 : (2007) 3 Supreme 52 and the judgments of this Court in cases of Firdosh Khan v. State of Raj.-(2000) 2 WLC (Raj.) 127 and G. Mishra v. State of Raj. - (1992) 2 WLC (Raj.) 726 para 8 . 10. On the issue of violation of principles of natural justice resulted in denial of reasonable opportunity of being defend as envisaged in Rule 16(5) onwards of the Rules of 1958, the petitioner has cited C.L. Subramaniam v. The Collector of Customs-1972 Lab I.C. 1049 para 22, Bhagat Ram v. State of H.R-1983 Lab I.C. 662, Union of India v. Ramzan Khan- (1991) 1 SCC 588 , Managing Director and ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar-(1993) 4 SCC 723 and Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force & Ors. v. Bhopal Singh-(1993) 4 SCC 785. 11. Counsel for the respondents has raised the preliminary objection regarding availability of alternate remedy under Section 75 of the Act of 1965 and departmental remedy. On merits, he submits that resolution dated 29.3.1991 and office order dated 10.4.1991 cannot be pressed into service on account of the fact that civil suit was withdrawal after six years, but the counsel is not able to submit the fact that the said resolution/office order have been withdrawn. Counsel submits that they have not given any undertaking in the civil suit. Counsel for the respondents has cited the following judgments rendered in cases of Sawai Madhopur Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd., Sawaimadhopur v. Rajasthan State Co-operative Tribunal, Jaipur- 1989(2) RLW 321 , R.C. Tiwari v. M.P. State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. & Ors.- (1997) 5 SCC 125 , Sagarmal v. Distt. Sahkari Kendriya Bank Ltd. Mandsaur & anr.- (1997) 9 SCC 354 , Laxman Singh Verma v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors.-2000(2) WLC (Raj.) 11 and Girdhari Lal & 2 Ors. Sahkari Kendriya Bank Ltd. Mandsaur & anr.- (1997) 9 SCC 354 , Laxman Singh Verma v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors.-2000(2) WLC (Raj.) 11 and Girdhari Lal & 2 Ors. v. State of Raj. & Etc.-2001 (1) WLC (Raj.) 248. 12. I have gone through the record of the writ petition and further considered rival submissions of the parties. 13. v. State of Raj. & Etc.-2001 (1) WLC (Raj.) 248. 12. I have gone through the record of the writ petition and further considered rival submissions of the parties. 13. Before discussing the judgments cited by both the parties, on the aforesaid issued, it would be worthwhile to quote some orders/applications/Rule 16(5) of the Rules of 1958 : ORDER dated 10.4.1991 passed in pursuance of the resolution dated 29.3.1991 is as follows: " vtesj lSaV~y dksvkijsfVo cSad fy0] vtesj dzekad % iz'kklu@ fnukad % 10-4-1991 dk;kZy; vkns'k cSad ds lapkyd e.My dh cSBd fnukad 29-3-91 ds izLrko la[;k 5 ds vuqlkj Jh vejhd flag xpkZ ' Mh ' Js.kh vf/kdkjh cSad dh lsokvksa ls lEcf/kr ,d okn eqaflQ eftLV~sV ds U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu gSA ekeyk Jh xjpk dks lh0lh0,0 fu;e 16 ds vUrxZr lsokvksa ls i`Fkd~ fd;s tkus ds fo:) ekuuh; U;k;k/kh'k ds U;k;ky; esa izsf"kr fd;k x;k FkkA mijksDr ekeys esa Jh xjpk ds fuosnu rFkk fof/k lykgdkj dh jk; dks e/;utj j[krs gq, vkns'k fn;s tkrs gS fd Jh xjpk loZizFke eqaflQ eftLVs~V vtesj ds U;k;ky; ls viuk okn okil ys ysos rFkk okn okil fy;s tkus ij lapkyd e.My ds fu.kZ;kuqlkj mijksDr ekeys dh fof/kor tkap fd;s tkus ds mn~ns'; ls vf/k'kk"kh vf/kdkjh cSad dks tkap vf/kdkjh fu;qDr fd;k tkrk gSA tkap dk;Zokgh lh0lh0,0 fu;e ds izko/kkukuqlkj dh tkosA iz'kklfud vf/kdkjh cSad dks mDr ekeys esa iztsfUVax vf/kdkjh fu;qDr fd;k tkrk gS rkfd cSad i{k izLrqr fd;k tk ldsA tkap i=koyh iz'kklfud vf/kdkjh cSad ls izkIr dh tk ldrh gSA izcU/k lapkyd " (emphasis supplied) The application for withdrawal of civil suit moved under Order 23 Rule 1 is as follows : " izkFkZuk i= vUrxZr vkns'k 23 fu;e 1 okn okil ysus gsrq Ekuuh; U;k;ky; ls oknh&izkFkhZ dh vksj ls fuEu fuosnu gS fd& 1- ;g fd mDr okn ekuuh; U;k;ky; ds le{k fopkjk/khu gSA 2- ;g fd izfroknhx.k ds lapkyd e.My ds izLrko la[;k 5 fnukad 29-3-1991 ds vuqlkj fu.kZ:] fy;k x;k Fkk ;fn oknh viuk okn okil ysrk gS rks cSad foHkkxh; tkap u;s fljs ls izkjEHk djsxkA 3- ;g fd mijksDr ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa oknh viuk okn okil ysuk pkgrk gSA vr% fuosnu gS fd oknh&izkFkhZ dks viuk okn vkil ysus dh vuqefr iznku djus dh d`ik djsaA vtesj fnukad % 22-5-1997 oknh&izkFkhZ " (emphasis supplied) The order of withdrawal of civil writ passed by the trial court on 27.5.1997 is as follows : " vejhd flag jftLV~kj lfefr;ka oxSjg odhy i{kdkju mi0A vkt okn us ,d nj0 u/o. 23 RJ CPC is'kdj eqdnek dj ugha pykuk pkgrk gSA vr% oknh dk okn withdrawal djus ls [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSA i=koyh ckn rdehy Qsly'kqekj gksdj nkf[ky nQrkj gksA " Rule 16(5) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeals) Rules, 1958 is as follows : Rule 16(5) : The Disciplinary Authority may nominee any person to present the case in support of the charges before the authority inquiring into charges (hereinafter referred to as the Inquiring Authority). The Government servant may present the case with the assistance of any other Government servant (or retired Government servant) approved by the Disciplinary Authority, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the person nominated by the Disciplinary Authority is a legal practitioner or unless the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits. (i) Provided that no Government servant shall be entitled to take up more than one case at a time. At the time of appearance before the Inquiring Officer the retired Government servant certify that he has only one case on hand at that time. (ii) Provided further that if the retired Government servant is also a legal practitioner, the restrictions on engaging a legal practitioner by a delinquent Government servant to present the case on his behalf, would apply. (emphasis supplied) 14. In the judgments cited by counsel for the petitioner on the issue of alternate remedy reported subsequent to Whirlpool Corp. v. Registrar Trade Marks- (1998) 8 SCC 1 , the said judgment has been followed, therefore, I would like to refer the same only. In Whirlpool Corp. (supra), the Supreme Court after discussing the entire law on the issue of alternate remedy has held that the High Court has imposed itself certain restrictions on exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction, but the alternate remedy has been consistently held by the Supreme Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies (1) for enforcement of fundamental right (2) in case violation of principle of natural justice and (3) where order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or vires of Act is challenged. In other words, alternate remedy is a self imposed restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which can be relaxed in the aforesaid three circumstances. The case of the petitioner is covered by principle No. 1. The para 14 & 15 of the said judgment are as follows : "14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution of plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. The case of the petitioner is covered by principle No. 1. The para 14 & 15 of the said judgment are as follows : "14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution of plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose". 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain writ petition. But the High Court has impugned upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case law on this point out to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field." (emphasis supplied) 15. Further judgments of Supreme Court relied by the petitioner in case of Harbans Lai Sahnia & anr. v. Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. & Ors.- (2003) 2 SCC 107 and M/s. Popcorn Entertainment & anr. v. City Industrial Development Corp. & anr. 2007(1) WLC (SC) Civil 635 : (2007) 3 Supreme 52 are also on the same issue and the judgment of Whirlpool Corp. v. Registrar Trade Marks,(supra) was affirmed. 16. v. Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. & Ors.- (2003) 2 SCC 107 and M/s. Popcorn Entertainment & anr. v. City Industrial Development Corp. & anr. 2007(1) WLC (SC) Civil 635 : (2007) 3 Supreme 52 are also on the same issue and the judgment of Whirlpool Corp. v. Registrar Trade Marks,(supra) was affirmed. 16. The Division Bench of the High Court in case of Firdosh Kha v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors.-2000(3) WLC (Raj.) 127 has held that alternate remedy in case of violation of fundamental right and principle of natural justice is no bar and further, in case of G.P. Mishra v. State of Rajasthan- (1992) 2 WLC (Raj.) 726 , Single Bench of this Court has held that remedy under Section 75 of the Act of 1965 Is no bar for entertaining the writ petition. The relevant para 8 of G.P. Mishra's case is as follows : "S. I will now proceed to examine both the cases in the light of the aforesaid position of law as in both the cases orders of premature retirement in exercise of the powers conferred under clause 9 of the bipartite settlement dated July 31, 1980 have been made. But, before I proceed to deal with the individual cases, it will be necessary to deal with preliminary objection that the Central Co-operative Bank is not 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and therefore, is not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. Another preliminary objection raised is that there is alternative remedy under Section 75 of the Act. None of the aforesaid contentions has any force. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Phool Chand v. State of Rajasthan and others, RLR 1985-365 , has held that the Central Co-operative Bank Bharatpur is an authority and instrumentality of the State and as such it is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and the existence of alternative remedy is not absolute bar to the exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Moreso, as shall be presently shown, the action of the respondents is arbitrary and the petitioners cannot be non-suited on the ground of exercise of alternative remedy under Section 75 of the Act." (emphasis supplied) 17. There are other circumstances also when a writ petition is not to be thrown in case the same was entertained and was heard on the merits and is pending for considerable time, as has been held by Supreme Court In case of L. Hirday Narain v. Income-Tax Officer, Bareilly- AIR 1971 SC 33 . The relevant portion of para 12 of the said judgment is as follows : "12. An order under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act is not appealable. It is true that a petition to review the order could be moved before the Commissioner of Income-tax. But Hirday Narain moved a petition in the High Court of Allahabad and the High Court entertained that petition. If the High Court had not entertained his petition, Hirday Narain could have moved the Commissioner in revision, because at the date on which the petition was moved the period prescribed by Section 33-A of the Act had not expired. We are unable to hold that because a revision application could have been moved for an order correcting the order of the Income-tax Officer under Section 35, but was not moved, the High Court would be justified in dismissing as not maintainable the petition, which was entertained and was heard on the merits...." (emphasis supplied) 18. Here, the instant case is pending for 10 years and the pleadings are complete and further the same has been heard on merits also. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Supreme Court in case of Durga Enterprises (P) Ltd. & anr. v. Principal Secretary. Government of U.P. & Ors.- (2004) 13 SCC 665 has held that the Court can relax the self imposed restriction of alternate remedy and entertain the writ petition under its extra ordinary jurisdiction vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The 1 relevant para 3 of the said judgment is as follows : "3. The High Court, having entertained the writ petition, in which pleadings were also complete, ought to have decided the case on merits instead of relegating the parties to a civil suit." (emphasis supplied) 19. The 1 relevant para 3 of the said judgment is as follows : "3. The High Court, having entertained the writ petition, in which pleadings were also complete, ought to have decided the case on merits instead of relegating the parties to a civil suit." (emphasis supplied) 19. On the said issue of alternate remedy, counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on a Division Bench Judge of this Court in case of Sawai Madhopur Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd., Sawaimadhopur v. Rajasthan State Co-operative Tribunal, Jaipur- 1989(2) RLW 321 wherein it has been held that suspension and termination of the Manager touches the management of the society and such dispute falls within ambit of Section 75 of the Act of 1965 and reference under Section 75 of the Act of 1965 is maintainable. In the said case before the Division Bench, the judgment of the Co-operative Tribunal was under challenge wherein it has been held that reference under Section 75 of suspension and termination of the Manager is not covered by the term "touches the management of the society". The learned Single Judge has held that it touches the management of the society, which has been affirmed by the Division Bench, but there was no issue that remedy under Section 75 of the Act of 1965 is a bar for entertaining the writ petition. The relevant para 17 of the said judgment is as follows : 17. In the light of the consideration which we have made above, it is not necessary to deal with other case-law which has been referred to by the learned counsel for the parties as the cases do not directly deal with the controversy in question. Thus having regard to the provisions of the Act and the Rules as considered above, we are clearly of the opinion that the dispute in question relating validity of the suspension and termination is a dispute touching the management of the society and falls within the ambit of section 75 and we agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge." (emphasis supplied) 20. The case law cited by the respondents of Division Bench in case of Sawai Madhopur Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. (supra) has already been discussed. However, I would like to add that in that case, there was no issue of not entertaining the writ petition on account of availability of alternate remedy. The case law cited by the respondents of Division Bench in case of Sawai Madhopur Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. (supra) has already been discussed. However, I would like to add that in that case, there was no issue of not entertaining the writ petition on account of availability of alternate remedy. The other judgment of Supreme Court in case of R.C. Tiwari (supra), the issue was with regard to maintainability of the reference under Section 10(1) of the I.D. Act, 1947 in respect of the employees for whom alternative forum was available in M.F. Co-operatives Societies Act and the reference was held not maintainable. Another case of Sagar Mal (supra) is also of reference. In the said cases of Supreme Court, the issue was not of entertaining the writ petition, but was of maintainability of the reference under I.D. Act, 1947. For maintainability of the writ petition which is constitutional remedy doctrine of bar/exclusion of jurisdiction will not apply, but different considerations as laid down by Supreme Court would prevail and for exclusion of jurisdiction under any enactment, different consideration of Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code of bar/exclusion of jurisdiction would apply, therefore, the said judgments are distinguished. The relevant para 3 of the judgment in R.C. Tiwari (supra) is as follows : "3. The learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to place reliance on Section 64 of the Act dealing with disputes referable to the arbitration and contends that the dispute of dismissal from service of the employee of the society being not one of the disputes referable to the arbitration under the Societies Act, the award of the Dy. Registrar is without jurisdiction. He relied on the decision of this Court in Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal. He also places reliance on Section 93 of the Societies Act which states that nothing contained in the Madhya Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, 1958, the M.P. Industrial Workmen (Standing Orders) Act, 1959 and the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 shall apply to a Society registered under this Act. By necessary implication, application of the Act has not been excluded and that, therefore, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to decide the matter. We find no force in the contention. By necessary implication, application of the Act has not been excluded and that, therefore, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to decide the matter. We find no force in the contention. Section 55 of the Societies Act gives power to the Registrar to deal with disciplinary matters relating to the employees in the Society or a class of Societies including the terms and conditions of employment of the employees. Where a dispute relates to the terms of employment, working conditions, disciplinary action taken by a Society, or arises between a Society and its employees, the Registrar or any officer appointed by him, not below the rank of Assistant Registrar, shall decide the dispute and its employees. As regards power under Section 64, the language is very wide, viz., "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law of the time being in force any dispute touching the constitution, a management or business of a Society shall be referred to the Registry by any of the parties to the dispute." Therefore, the dispute relating to the management or business of the Society is very comprehensive as repeatedly held by this Court. As a consequence, special procedure has been provided under this Act, Necessary, reference under section 10 of the Societies Act stands excluded. The judgment of this Court arising under Andhra Pradesh Act has no application to the facts for the reason that under that Act the dispute did not cover the dismissal of the servants of the society which the Act therein was amended." (emphasis supplied) The other two judgments of the High Court cited by the respondents in cases of Laxman Singh (supra) and Girdhari Lal (supra) also nowhere lays down that alternate remedy is a bar in entertaining the writ petition. Otherwise also, the facts of those cases are different from the present case. 21. The respondents have failed to point out the provisions of the remedy of departmental appeal in rules, regulation and Bye-laws except the notification dated 21st August, 1986, copy of which has been annexed as Annexure- R-1/6, but in the notification there is no reference of appeal against disciplinary action or order passed thereto which are strictly to be dealt with in accordance with the rules and bye laws of the society, therefore, both the preliminary objections raised by the respondents are liable to be over-ruled and the same are over-ruled. Otherwise also, relegating employee to avail departmental alternate remedy after 10 years is not proper. 22. In view of the discussion of the judgments cited by both the parties, I am of the view that self imposed restriction of alternate remedy is to be relaxed and the writ petition is required to be decided on merits for the following special feature of the case : 1. There appears to be a gross violation of principles of natural justice as well as Rule 16(5) onwards of the Rules of 1958. 2. Pleadings were complete and the petition was argued on merit also. 3. Relegating a party to avail alternate remedy after 10 years that too after three years of attaining the age of superannuation will not be just and proper. 23. Having over-ruled the preliminary objections, now I proceed to examine the case on merits. 24. The respondents have not submitted that the resolution dated 29.3.1991 has been withdrawn. A bare perusal of office order dated 10.4.1991 passed in pursuance of resolution dated 29.3.1991 would reveal that Bank has agreed in principle to follow the provisions of Rules of 1958. Having agreed in principles to follow the Rules of 1958, the Bank was under an obligation to proceed in accordance with the rules after the appointment of enquiring officer and Presiding Officer and as per Rules of 1958, next stage is of appointment of defence nominee as per 16(5) of the Rules of 1958, but no such proceeding has taken lace, therefore, entire enquiry proceedings are vitiated on account of not following rules 16(5) to Rule 16(12) of the Rules of 1958, which include supply of copy of the enquiry report as per Constitutional Bench judgment. 25. The Supreme Court in case of Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh & ors.-1983 Lab. I.C. 662 has held that where disciplinary authority is represented by presenting officer then it was duty of disciplinary authority to inform delinquent and grant him opportunity of defence nominee which is valuable right. The relevant portion of para 5 of the said judgment is as under : "5. I.C. 662 has held that where disciplinary authority is represented by presenting officer then it was duty of disciplinary authority to inform delinquent and grant him opportunity of defence nominee which is valuable right. The relevant portion of para 5 of the said judgment is as under : "5. ........In fact, justice and fair play demand that where in a disciplinary proceeding the department is represented by a Presenting Officer, it would be incumbent upon the Disciplinary authority while making appointment of a Presenting Officer to appear on his behalf simultaneously to inform the delinquent of the fact of appointment and the right of the delinquent to take help of another Government servant before the commencement of inquiry. At any rate the Inquiry Officer at least must enquire from the delinquent officer whether he would like to engage anyone from the department to defend him and when the delinquent is a Government servant belonging to the lower echelons of service, he would further be informed that he is entitled under the relevant rules to seek assistance of another Government servant belonging to department to represent him. If after this information is conveyed to the delinquent Government servant, he still chooses to proceed with the inquiry without obtaining assistance, one can stay there is substantial compliance with the rules...... 26. Seven Judges Constitutional Bench in para 29 of Managing Director, ECIL Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar- (1993) 4 SCC 723 has held that the supply of enquiry report is mandatory in order to follow the principle of natural justice. The relevant extract of para 29 is as follows : "29.....Hence, when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the. employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice...... That right is a part of the employee's to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the. employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice...... In the judgment of Union of India v. Ramzan Khan (supra) supply of enquiry report was held to be mandatory and the said law was made prospective in the judgment of Managing Director ECIL (supra). Both the aforesaid judgments have been followed in case of Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force & Ors. (supra) and the date has been specified as 20.11.1990 i.e. the date of judgment in case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan. In the instant case, removal order was passed on 24.11.1997 without giving copy of the enquiry report. 27. In the counter affidavit, the respondents have not specified why the enquiry in accordance with the aforesaid resolution dated 29.3.1991 and office order dated 10.4.1991 was not conducted. The contents of prejudice referred in the additional affidavit have also not been specifically denied. As regards prejudice, every stage of enquiry from Rule 16(5) to Rule 16(12) as detailed out in the additional affidavit along with non-supply of copy of enquiry report resulted in denial of reasonable opportunity of being heard, therefore, the impugned order of removal is liable to be set aside. The contention of the petitioner has force and the contention of the respondents has not force. 28. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed. The removal order dated 24.11.1997 is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to release all post retiral benefits to the petitioner within a period of three months.Writ Petition Allowed- Release of post retiral benefits ordered. *******