Prem Shanker Asopa, J.—By the instant writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order of termination of his services dt. 28.12.2002 (Annex. 1) as well as the order of the competent authority dt. 29.04.2003 (Annex. 4) whereby the representation has been rejected. 2. The facts, in brief, of the case are that the petitioner was selected and appointed as Sub Inspector/Exe (under training) on probation on 03.02.2002. During the training and period of probation, vide order dt. 28.12.2002 (Annex. 1) his services have been terminated with immediate effect on payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice on the ground that he is unfit to be retained in Central Industrial Security Force (in short C.I.S.F). The petitioner filed representation against the termination which was rejected by the competent authority on 29.4.2003 (Anx. 4). 3. The petitioner further stated in the writ petition that his services have been terminated without any valid reason and without any notice/opportunity to defend himself. He has further stated that on 7.6.2002 FIR No. 263/2000 was registered against him at Police Station Nayapura, Kota for the offence under Sec. 3/6 of the Rajasthan Use of Unfair Means in Examination Act and after filing challan in the Court, cognizance of the offence was taken. The charge framed by the Court was admitted by the petitioner. After hearing the petitioner on sentence, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Communal Riot Court, Kota in Criminal Case No. 231/2000 arising out of FIR No. 263/2000 granted benefit of probation to the petitioner and directed to maintain peace and be of good behaviour for one year. The Court asked the petitioner to furnish bond of Rs. 1,000/- as well as surety bond of the same amount with a further direction that he will not repeat the offence and maintain good behaviour with public and after imposing further condition of presenting himself in the Court on being called the petitioner was released on probation. It was also mentioned in the order dt. 07.08.2000 (Annex. 2) that as per Sec. 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1986 proved guilt of the petitioner will have no effect on his character. Therefore, the said order of the criminal Court cannot be made basis for termination of his services. It was also mentioned in the order dt. 07.08.2000 (Annex. 2) that as per Sec. 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1986 proved guilt of the petitioner will have no effect on his character. Therefore, the said order of the criminal Court cannot be made basis for termination of his services. It has also been stated in the writ petition that in case the termination has been based on the said order then it casts stigma and the same is misconduct for which enquiry was necessary. 4. The respondents have filed reply to the writ petition and disclosed the fact that in the attestation form (Annex. R-1) filled in by the petitioner, as against various clauses of Column No. 12 thereof, relating to arrest, prosecution, detention, bound down, fine etc. the petitioner has written ‘No’ but on verification, it was found that the petitioner has been prosecuted, convicted and bound down for the offence as aforesaid. Therefore, the warning printed on top of the first page of the attestation form i.e. “The furnishing of false information or suppression of any factual information in the Attestation Form would be a disqualification and is likely to render the candidate unfit for employment under the Government” was considered by the respondents and it was found that the petitioner has been prosecuted, convicted and bound down also. In reply to para 4 of the writ petition, the respondents have also quoted various clauses of Para 12 of the Attestation Form against which the petitioner had answered ‘No’. The same read as under: (a) Have you ever been arrested. (b) Have you ever been prosecuted. (c) Have you ever been kept under detention. (d) Have you ever been bound down. (e)Have you ever been fined by Court of law. (f) Have you ever been convicted by a Court of law for any offence. (g) Is any case pending against you in any Court of Law at that the time of filling up this attestation form.” (emphasis supplied) 5. (d) Have you ever been bound down. (e)Have you ever been fined by Court of law. (f) Have you ever been convicted by a Court of law for any offence. (g) Is any case pending against you in any Court of Law at that the time of filling up this attestation form.” (emphasis supplied) 5. The gist of the reply of the respondents is that the petitioner has suppressed the factual information as required in various clauses of Column No. 12 of the Attestation Form and, therefore, his services have been rightly terminated during the period of probation as per the warning, apart from rule 25 (2) of Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001 (in short ‘the Rules of 2001’), Clause 1.16(d) of CICF Recruitment Manual and Para 4 of the CICF Headquarters Circular No. 19/2000 dt. 31.10.2002. Rule 25(2) of the Rules of 2001 reads as under: “25.Probation.—(1) Every member of the Force except those appointed on deputation/absorption, shall be on probation for the period specified in relevant column of the Recruitment Rules : .... .... (2) If during the period of probation the appointing authority is of the opinion that a member of the Force is not fit for permanent appointment, the appointment authority may discharge him or terminate the services from the Force after issue of notice of one month or after giving one month’s pay in lieu of such notice, or revert him to the rank from which he was promoted or repatriate to his parent department, as the case may be. (3).....” (emphasis supplied) 6. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that use of the word ‘unfit’ casts stigma and the same is misconduct on which his services could not have been terminated without conducting enquiry. Counsel also submits that if the criminal case has been made basis of the termination, then it also equally casts stigma for which enquiry was necessary. Further submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that validity of the termination order is required to be adjudicated upon on the basis of unfitness and no other ground can be allowed to be raised by the respondents as referred in the writ petition of suppression of material fact. 7. Further submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that validity of the termination order is required to be adjudicated upon on the basis of unfitness and no other ground can be allowed to be raised by the respondents as referred in the writ petition of suppression of material fact. 7. Submission of the counsel for the respondents is that on verification, it was found that the petitioner has suppressed the factual information as required in Column No. 12(b), (d) and (f) of the attestation form and also did not care for the warning printed on top of the first page of attestation form. Therefore, the action of terminating services of the petitioner is in accordance with Rule 25(2) of the Rules of 2001, Clause 1.16 (d) of CISF Recruitment Manual and Para 4 of the CISF Hqrs Circular No. 19/2002 dt. 31.10.2002. 8. I have gone through the record of the writ petition and further considered rival submissions of the parties. 9. On 24.05.2007 the record was produced before me wherein I found that termination proceedings have been based on suppression of facts in reply to various clauses of Column No. 12 regarding prosecution, bound down and conviction etc. 10. With regard to the fact of not considering any other ground except mentioned in the impugned order, counsel for the petitioner has cited one judgment of the Division Bench in M/s. R.N. Products, Jodhpur vs. State of Raj. & Ors., RLR 1989(2) 741 and laid emphasis on paras 16 to 18 thereof. I find that the said judgment relates to refusal of renewal of licence under the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950 and the principle of piercing the veil is not applicable which has been applied by the Court in order to find out whether the case is of termination simplicitor or by way of misconduct for which proceedings of termination are held to be relevant in order to find out the motive or foundation for termination. Therefore, the said judgment is distinguishable. 11. The principle of piercing the veil has been discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of Anoop Jaiswal vs. Government of India and Anr., AIR 1984 SC 636 . The relevant observations made in paras 11 and 12 of the judgment reads as under: “11. On behalf....... As observed by Ray. Therefore, the said judgment is distinguishable. 11. The principle of piercing the veil has been discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of Anoop Jaiswal vs. Government of India and Anr., AIR 1984 SC 636 . The relevant observations made in paras 11 and 12 of the judgment reads as under: “11. On behalf....... As observed by Ray. C.J. in Samsher Singh’s case the form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment and that even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the facts and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave character of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of the provision of Art. 311(2). 12. It is, therefore, now well settled that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the Court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the Court holds that the order though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the Court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employee.” 12. On the issue that the termination order casts stigma on the petitioner, counsel for the petitioner has cited the decision in Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satvendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 983 but I find that in the present case, the proceedings after verification are simply motive and not foundation for the reason that no enquiry was conducted. The said fact of no enquiry has also not been disputed by the petitioner. Relevant portion of paras 20 and 22 of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “20. As to in what circumstances an order of termination of a probationer can be said to be punitive or not depends upon whether certain allegations which are the cause of the termination are the motive or foundation. Relevant portion of paras 20 and 22 of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “20. As to in what circumstances an order of termination of a probationer can be said to be punitive or not depends upon whether certain allegations which are the cause of the termination are the motive or foundation. In this area, as pointed out by Shah, J. (as he then was) in Madan Gopal vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 S.C. 531 there is no difference between cases where services of a temporary employee are terminated and where a probationer is discharged. This very question was gone into recently in R.S. Gupta vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. & Anr., J.T. 1998(3) S.C. 585 and reference was made to the development of the law from time to time starting from Purshottam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India, 1958 SCR 828 , to the concept of ‘purpose of inquiry’ introduced by Shah, J. (as he then was) in State of Orissa vs. Ram Narayan Das, 1961 (1) SCR 606 and to the seven Bench decision in Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab, 1974(2) SCC 831 and to post Samsher Singh case-law. This Court had occasion to make a detailed examination of what is the ‘motive’ and what is the ‘foundation’ on which innocuous order is based. 22. If findings were arrived at in inquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as ‘founded’ on the allegations and will be bad. But if the inquiry was not held, no finding were arrived at and employer was not inclined to conduct an inquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to inquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid.” 13. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to inquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid.” 13. In V.P Ahuja vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 239 protection has been given to probationer to a certain extent in case the termination is punitive considering the language of the termination. In the instant case, the language of the termination order dt. 28.12.2002. (Annex. 1) is as follows: “The services of 022420057 SI/Exe. (under training) Lakhan Lal Meena who was appointed as such on Probation on 03.02.2002 (Forenoon) vide NISA CISF Service Order Part I No. 17/2002 issued under letter No. E-37013/1/2002 Admn. II 2232 dt. 17.03.2002 are terminated on being found unfit to be retained in CISF with immediate effect under CISF Rule 25(2) of CISF Rules, 2001. Clause 1.16 (d) of the CISF Recruitment Manual and Para 4 of the CISF Hqrs. New Delhi Circular No. 19/2002 issued under letter No. V-14013/41199/L & R/2872 dt. 31.10.2002. He shall be paid one month’s pay in lieu of one month notice.” (emphasis supplied) 14. The Full Bench in Dharam Pal Singh and Ors. vs. The State of Rajasthan and Ors., 2000(2) WLC (Raj.) 400 which has been cited by Mr. Bhanwar Bagri, counsel for the respondents, held that the circular covering willful suppression of fact under moral turpitude is valid. Paras 12 and 26 of the said judgment read as under: “12. The circular dt. 29.04.1995, relevant portion of which is already extracted above, clarifies that a willful suppression of information (particularly adverse information) would be covered under ‘moral turpitude’.” “26. In the light of the facts stated and the discussion made above, we answer the questions 1 to 3 aforementioned as follows: 1. That a candidate was prosecuted or subjected to investigation on a criminal charge is a material fact, suppression of which would entitle an employer to deny employment to a candidate on that ground. 2. That ultimate acquittal of a candidate, who was prosecuted on a criminal charge, would not condone or wash out the consequences of suppression of the fact that he was prosecuted. 3. 2. That ultimate acquittal of a candidate, who was prosecuted on a criminal charge, would not condone or wash out the consequences of suppression of the fact that he was prosecuted. 3. That suppression of material fact would itself disentitle a candidate from being appointed in service.” 15. Mr. Bagri has also cited judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. vs. Bakshi Ram, reported in 1990(2) SLR 65 which was case of release of the accused under Probation of Offenders Act wherein it has been held that the fact remains and stigma of conviction is not obliterated. Relevant portion of para 10 reads as under: “10. In criminal trial the conviction is one thing and sentence is another. The departmental punishment for misconduct is yet a third one. The Court while invoking the provisions of Section 3 or 4 of the Act does not deal with the conviction; it only deals with the sentence which the offender has to undergo. Instead of sentencing the offender, the Court releases him on probation of good conduct. The conviction however, remains untouched and the stigma of conviction is not obliterated. In the departmental proceedings the delinquent could be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; (See Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution and Tulsiram Patel case: (1985) Supp. 2 SCR 131 at 282).” 16. On consideration of rival submissions of the parties on the touchstone of the aforesaid judgments, I am of the view that the present case is of suppression of facts and the respondents have rightly held the petitioner unfit for service which does not cast any stigma nor constitute misconduct. Therefore, the judgments cited by counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable on this issue and those cited by learned counsel for the respondents are relevant. 17. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed. * * * * *