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2007 DIGILAW 1240 (AP)

Pachala Durga Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2007-12-27

B.PRAKASH RAO, L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2007
COMMON JUDGMENT : (L. Narasimha Reddy) - Accused No.1 in S.C.No.25 of 2004, on the file of the II Additional District & Sessions Judge, East Godavari at Rajahmundry, was convicted for the offences under Sections 302 and 314 of IPC. He was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for one year, for the offence under Section 302 IPC. Sentence of imprisonment for life, for the offence under Section 314 of IPC, was also imposed, and both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. A-2, the father of A-1, and A-3, the sister of A-1, were tried for offences under Sections 302, 314, read with 114 and 498-A of IPC and under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. However, they were acquitted of the said offences. While the appellant (A-1) filed Crl.A.No.802 of 2005, assailing the conviction and sentence awarded to him, the State filed Crl.A.No.1057 of 2007, against the acquittal of A-2 and A-3. 2. Briefly stated, the case presented by the prosecution, before the trial court, is as under: A-1 to A-3 belong to Padmasali community. PW-1 who belongs to a different caste, had three sons, i.e. PWs-2, 3 and another, and a daughter, by name Bhagyalaxmi. PW-2 was running a hotel and a pan shop. Bhagyalaxmi used to look after the pan shop. The appellant, who is a mechanic, used to frequently visit the pan shop, and thereby developed intimacy with Bhagyalaxmi. Both of them have eloped and came back after three days. The elders of the village kept the appellant and Bhagyalaxmi, in the house belonging to a barber, where they lived for about two months. Mean while, Bhagyalaxmi became pregnant, through the appellant. The elders and well-wishers insisted on performance of marriage, but the appellant was demanding the house owned by PW-1 to be given towards dowry, or an amount of Rs.2,00,000/-. After deliberations and discussions, the marriage was performed in a temple at Gummalladoddi village, on PW.1 expressing her willingness to pay a sum of Rs.15,000/-. The appellant got the pregnancy of Bhagyalaxmi aborted, prior to the marriage. PW.1 took Bhagyalaxmi to her house at Gokavaram village, during Ashadamasam, and by that time, Bhagyalaxmi was pregnant of two months. After that month, she was taken away by the appellant, to his residence. The appellant got the pregnancy of Bhagyalaxmi aborted, prior to the marriage. PW.1 took Bhagyalaxmi to her house at Gokavaram village, during Ashadamasam, and by that time, Bhagyalaxmi was pregnant of two months. After that month, she was taken away by the appellant, to his residence. Bhagyalaxmi was complaining to PW-1 about the harassment by A-1 to A-3 and their insistence on abortion of the second pregnancy also. She was also made to fall in a bathroom, by applying oil on the floor. At a time, when the pregnancy was of six months, PW-1 took her initially to Korukonda, the residence of PW-2, and thereafter, to Gokavaram. None of A-1 to A-3, have visited Gokavaram for about 3 months to see Bhagyalaxmi. It was only on 24.2.2003 that the appellant came to Gokavaram to the place, where PW-1 and Bhagyalaxmi were living, at about 1'0 clock. By that time, PW-1 was not in the house and Bhagyalaxmi informed the neighbours, PWs-6 and 7 about the arrival of the appellant. Thereupon, the appellant was made to sit on a chair in the verandah, and PW-1 was sent for. After her arrival, PW-1 served a cool drink to the appellant. PW-7 woke up her husband, PW-6, who was sleeping in the house, and he came out. The appellant gave the keys of his scooter to Bhagyalaxmi and asked her to give the same to PW-6, to open the dickey. PW-6 tried, but could not open it. Thereupon, the appellant himself opened the dickey, and took out a tin/box of glucose. The appellant felt some discomfort, on account of presence of number of persons, who have come to see him, and the children that gathered. At his instance, Bhagyalaxmi asked all of them to leave, and they were left alone. Within a short time, PW-1 heard cries from the room, where the appellant and Bhagyalaxmi were staying. When she went inside, she found foam coming from the mouth of Bhagyalaxmi, and her tongue protruded. When PW-1 accosted as to what happened, the appellant tried to flee away. PW-1 held him by collar. She called PW-6 and Bhagyalaxmi was taken to a private hospital, run by PW-20. By the time they reached the hospital, Bhagyalaxmi was gasping, and even before any treatment could be started, she died. When PW-1 accosted as to what happened, the appellant tried to flee away. PW-1 held him by collar. She called PW-6 and Bhagyalaxmi was taken to a private hospital, run by PW-20. By the time they reached the hospital, Bhagyalaxmi was gasping, and even before any treatment could be started, she died. PW-1 gave a complaint to the police, stating that the appellant administered poison to her daughter, resulting of her death, and it was marked as Ex.P-1. Initially, the investigation was taken up, and autopsy was conducted on the dead body, by the Mandal Revenue Officer, who was examined as PW-24. The dead body was sent for post-mortem and PWs-23 and 27 conducted the same. It was found that the death of Bhagyalaxmi was on account of administration of 'Endosulphan' with some liquid. 3. The prosecution virtually conducted a marathon trial, by examining as many as 29 witnesses and marking Exs.P-1 to P-35. On behalf of the defence, Exs.D-1 to D-7, which are some portions of statements, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., from different witnesses, were marked. Through its judgment dated 7.4.2005, the trial court held the appellant guilty of the offences under Sections 302 and 314 IPC, and acquitted A-2 and A-3. 4. Sri C.Padmanabha Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, submits that the conviction of the appellant is only on the basis of circumstantial evidence, which is not coherent and consistent. He contends that even according to PW-1 and other witnesses, what was taken out by the appellant from the dickey of the scooter, was only a tin of glucose, and none of them have spoken to about possession of Endosulphan, or any other poison by the appellant. He further contends that the prosecution pleaded that the appellant purchased Endosulphan from the shop of PW-18, through PW-17, and since both the witnesses turned hostile, there is absolutely no basis for the accusation, in this regard. 5. Learned Senior Counsel supports the acquittal of A-2 and A-3 and opposes the appeal filed by the State against their acquittal. In this regard, he submits that though several witnesses were examined, none of them have pointed out any acts of demand of dowry, against A-2 and A-3. 6. 5. Learned Senior Counsel supports the acquittal of A-2 and A-3 and opposes the appeal filed by the State against their acquittal. In this regard, he submits that though several witnesses were examined, none of them have pointed out any acts of demand of dowry, against A-2 and A-3. 6. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that the circumstantial evidence, together with the conduct of the appellant, leads to only one conclusion and inference that it is the appellant, who committed the murder of the deceased. He contends that it is not even disputed that the appellant, was in the company of the deceased who was otherwise hale and healthy, and under the guise of giving glucose water, the appellant had administered poison to his wife. He also submits that the insistence by the appellant that the persons that gathered on his arrival must move away, is a pointer to his plan to ensure that the deceased must be alone and none should witness what he has planned to do. 7. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that apart from proving the guilt of the appellant, the prosecution has adduced considerable and dependable evidence to prove that A-2 and A-3 have harassed the deceased for dowry. 8. It was a love marriage between the appellant and the deceased. They belong to different castes. A-2 and A-3, on the one hand, and PWs-1 to 3, on the other hand, do not appear to have approved the affair between the appellant and the deceased. The record discloses that even before the marriage between them took place, the deceased became pregnant and it was terminated, just before the marriage. The appellant is said to have demanded PW-1 to give him the only residence held by her. PW-1, in turn, expressed her inability, on the ground that the house is to be shared by her three sons, and was inclined to give her share of the house to the deceased. Ultimately, the marriage took place. Though there were allegations of harassment of the deceased by PWs-1 to 3, they did not surface, till the death of the deceased. 9. The case of the prosecution rests upon circumstantial evidence. The whole incident occurred virtually in a span of half an hour. PW-1 brought his daughter, the deceased, to Gokavaram, when the latter was pregnant of six months. 9. The case of the prosecution rests upon circumstantial evidence. The whole incident occurred virtually in a span of half an hour. PW-1 brought his daughter, the deceased, to Gokavaram, when the latter was pregnant of six months. Since the place, where she was residing was a small hut, she took a premises on rent, in the neighbourhood, for the comfort and convenience of the deceased. On 24.2.2003, the appellant came to Gokavaram to meet his wife, the deceased. It was his first visit ever since the deceased came to her mother's house, and there was a gap of three months. PW-1 was not at the house, when the appellant came to Gokavaram. The deceased and PW-7 were there. The latter invited the appellant and deceased to her house, and offered a chair to the appellant. Thereafter, she went to inform PW-1. The latter, in turn, brought sweets and cool drink and offered the same to her son-in-law, the appellant. The cool drink was said to have been consumed partly, by the appellant. 10. PW-7 woke up her husband, PW-6. After he came out from the room, the appellant gave the keys of the scooter to the deceased, and asked her to hand over the same to PW-6, so that he can open the dickey and remove the glucose tin. PW-6 made an attempt to open the dickey, and when he could not open the same, the appellant himself opened it and removed a "glucose tin". In the process, several persons, including PWs-8 and 9, have gathered. On being asked by the appellant, the deceased informed her mother and others, who gathered there, to leave them alone. PW-7, in turn, asked the appellant and the deceased to go into the room of her house. Up to this extent, the evidence of PWs-1, 6, 7, 8 and 9 is consistent and clear. Shortly after the appellant and the deceased went inside, PW-1 heard some cries, and immediately reached into the room. She found that foam was coming out of the mouth of the deceased and even the tongue was protruding out. On the cries raised by PW-1, the other persons, such as PW- 6, 7, 8 and 9, gathered and immediately they shifted the deceased to the hospital of PW-20. Even before he started any treatment, the deceased died. She found that foam was coming out of the mouth of the deceased and even the tongue was protruding out. On the cries raised by PW-1, the other persons, such as PW- 6, 7, 8 and 9, gathered and immediately they shifted the deceased to the hospital of PW-20. Even before he started any treatment, the deceased died. It has already been pointed out that the post-mortem revealed that the death of the deceased occurred on account of administration of poison i.e. Endosulphan. 11. Two important aspects need to be noted here. The first is about the manner, in which the appellant had removed a box from the dickey of the scooter. After getting down from the scooter, he could have gone into the house, along with the glucose tin, which is almost a small box. Even assuming that he kept it in the dickey and he wanted to remove it later, he could have done it by himself. By giving the keys to his wife and asking PW-6 to remove it, he wanted to demonstrate that what he brought was only a glucose tin, so that none would suspect his bonafides. The second aspect is that soon after the deceased was administered poison, he tried to escape from the scene. It was PW-1, who held him by collar and stopped him from escaping. 12. Further, in the natural course of things, being the first person to notice the convulsion, vomiting, etc, of the deceased, the appellant was supposed to raise alarm. Till PW-1 entered the room, on hearing the cries, he was virtually comfortable by the side of the deceased. 13. The version of the prosecution that the appellant mixed some powder in the water and gave it to the deceased, is beyond any pale of doubt. In fact, the defence did not give any suggestion to the concerned witnesses that the appellant did not mix any powder in the water, that was given by him to the deceased. Their endeavour was only that it was a glucose powder that was mixed in the water. Except the liquid offered to her by the appellant, the deceased did not take anything, at least till he came to their house. The medical examination revealed that the deceased died out of consuming Endosulphan. Their endeavour was only that it was a glucose powder that was mixed in the water. Except the liquid offered to her by the appellant, the deceased did not take anything, at least till he came to their house. The medical examination revealed that the deceased died out of consuming Endosulphan. The inescapable conclusion is that it is the appellant that mixed Endosulphan in water, may be together with glucose, and that resulted in the death of the deceased. 14. The previous conduct of the appellant lent support to the said inference. It was not even disputed that at his instance, two months pregnancy of the deceased, before the marriage between herself and the appellant, was terminated. The evidence of PWs-4 and 5 tells upon the conduct of the appellant and the nature of treatment given by himself and A-2 and A-3 to the deceased. 15. It may be true that PWs-17 and 18, who were examined to show that the appellant procured Endosulphan, have turned hostile. That, however, makes little difference. The sequence of events that have taken place in a span of almost half an hour, when the appellant and the deceased alone were there, together with the medical evidence, furnishes a very strong circumstance, that leaves no doubt whatever, that the appellant administered poison to the deceased, and there existed a clear motive for him to resort to the same. The heinous and cruel act resorted to by the appellant has not only killed his wife, but also the baby, who was to take birth, in a matter of few days. But for the fact that there was no eye witness, or dying declaration of the deceased, the appellant deserved a capital punishment. We are of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the trial court, for holding that the appellant is guilty of committing the offences under Sections 302 and 314 of IPC, does not warrant interference. 16. So far as the acquittal of A-2 and A-3 is concerned, there is uninterested and independent evidence of PWs-4, 5 and some witnesses, to conclude that the said accused have harassed the deceased, such as by applying oil to the floor of bathroom, making her to wash all their clothes, even when she was pregnant of six months, etc. However, none of the witnesses have spoken to any demand of dowry by A-2 and A-3. However, none of the witnesses have spoken to any demand of dowry by A-2 and A-3. Further, the acts revealed by them came to light, only after the death of the deceased, and not earlier thereto. On the basis of such evidence, it is difficult to hold A-2 and A-3, guilty of the offence under Sections 498-A of IPC, or to conclude that they have abetted the appellant, in committing the offences under Section 302 and 314 IPC. Therefore, we are not inclined to take a different view from the one, taken by the trial court, in this regard. 17. Hence, Crl.A.Nos.802 of 2005 and 1057 of 2007 are accordingly dismissed.