JUDGMENT 1. Heard on IA No. 9989/07. This is an application made by the appellant (claimant) under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing this appeal filed by him under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act against an award dated 6.4.2005, passed by learned 12st Additional Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Indore in Claim Case No. 278 of 2003. According to the appellant as also from the noting of the office, the delay in filing appeal is of 833 days. In other words, the appeal is filed beyond the period of limitation by 833 days. Notice of this application was issued to the respondents. They are duly served and represented. 2. The facts in brief need to be mentioned to appreciate the issue involved in this appeal as also in the application under consideration. 3. It is the case of the appellant (claimant) that he sustained injuries on 29.9.1998 while going on a scooter. It is this incident, which was made the basis by the appellant (claimant) for filing the claim petition under S. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act before the Claims Tribunal claiming compensation for the injuries alleged to be sustained by him in the said accident being Claim Petition No. 115/99. The claim petition was dismissed by the Tribunal, Indore by order dated 11.3.2002 (Annexure A in the original case record) on merits by holding that it is dismissed for want of evidence i.e. claimant failed to adduce evidence in support of claim petition. 4. Almost after one year of the rejection of the first claim petition referred supra, the claimant filed second claim petition, out of which this appeal arises. In the claim petition, the claimant again on the same cause of action claimed compensation for the alleged injuries sustained by him in the accident which according to him had occurred on 29.9.1998. In the claim petition, the claimant did not disclose this fact that he had earlier filed the claim petition and the same came to be dismissed by the Tribunal by order dated 11.3.2002. In other words, the claimant suppressed the fact of filing of the claim petition on the earlier occasion, and its consequent dismissal by the Tribunal on 11.3 .2002. On an objection being raised by the respondent, the Tribunal by impugned award dismissed the claim petition as being not maintainable as barred. In other words, the claimant suppressed the fact of filing of the claim petition on the earlier occasion, and its consequent dismissal by the Tribunal on 11.3 .2002. On an objection being raised by the respondent, the Tribunal by impugned award dismissed the claim petition as being not maintainable as barred. It is against this award of dismissal of the claim petition, the claimant has preferred this appeal. As stated supra, this appeal was filed beyond limitation by 833 days and hence, an application is made for condonation of delay under section 5 of Limitation Act. 5. The question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether any case is made out for condonation in filing the appeal and if so whether there is any substance in the appeal? 6. After having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record of the case, we are constrained to not only dismiss this application of the appellant made under S. 5 of the Limitation Act but also the appeal as being not only filed beyond limitation but otherwise having no substance whatsoever. 7. We have gone through the cause stated in the application. In our view, it does not make out any cause much less sufficient cause as contemplated in section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 833 days in filing this appeal under S. 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act by the claimant against the impugned award. In our view the alleged cause pleaded is a cause just mentioned for the sake of mentioning rather than a genuine one. The delay of 833 days is unreasonable. No proper reasons are mentioned as to what the appellant was doing all these days and why he was prevented from even filing the appeal no sooner the impugned award was made available to him for filing the appeal. The alleged cause shown is not bona fide. Rather, it lacks bona fide. We thus cannot hold the same to be bona fide and sufficient for condoning the delay. 8. To begin with, the appellant did not come to the Court with clean hands. It is apparent from several reasons, which appear on the face of the record of the case. Rather, it lacks bona fide. We thus cannot hold the same to be bona fide and sufficient for condoning the delay. 8. To begin with, the appellant did not come to the Court with clean hands. It is apparent from several reasons, which appear on the face of the record of the case. In the first instance, the appellant had no right to file the present claim petition, out of which this appeal arises because there was no subsisting cause of action to file the second claim petition. Secondly, once the earlier claim petition came to be rejected on the ground of nonavailability of the evidence adduced by the claimant in support of his claim petition then, it was a dismissal on merits. Thirdly, the remedy of the appellant in such a case was to file appeal against such dismissal before this Court under S. 173 of the M.V. Act and not to file a second claim petition after expiry of one year of the rejection of earlier petitions. Fourthly, what was more a matter of serious concerned was that the appellant did not disclose the dismissal of his earlier claim petition in the claim petition in the concerned column. It is clear from the findings recorded by the Tribunal in para 6 of the impugned award which is not even controverted by the appellant in the grounds of appeal. Fifthly, suppression of material facts, which has a direct bearing over the controversy is the serious matter and lapse on the part of the appellant. It cannot be countenanced and has to be dealt with severely by the Courts while passing the order in accordance with the provisions of law. 9. In our considered opinion, therefore, this is a fit case where we can record a finding against the appellant that he is not entitled to claim any indulgence from either Tribunal or from this Court. Rather he has to be dealt with severely in accordance with the procedure laid down under the law in this regard because it is a clear case of abusing the process of law for obtaining relief which under the law he was not entitled to claim. We, accordingly, uphold this finding of Tribunal which in our opinion was rightly recorded. 10. We, accordingly, uphold this finding of Tribunal which in our opinion was rightly recorded. 10. What is more a matter of concerned to this Court is that the appellant's greed to earn money by such illegal means was not stopped then but it was pursued because he again waited for 833 days in filing appeal to this Court and went on to pursue it. As observed supra, the cause mentioned in the application is far from satisfactory. It was not a cause made out by the appellant but a cause set up by the counsel, drafting the application. 11. Taken the whole scenario on both the issues, neither the appeal nor the application have any merit whatsoever. Normally this Court would have simply dismissed the appeal as being barred by limitation, once the application for condonation of delay was found to be of no substance, making out no sufficient cause but in this case we have deliberately set out the facts on merits and recorded our findings of concurrance to show how the process of law was misused by the appellant for obtaining the relief of compensation which was earlier refused. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, not only the application but also the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 13. Now the question that arises for consideration is what penalty in terms of cost should be imposed upon the appellant for resorting to such type of frivolous litigation. Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure takes care of such situation. It deals with the cases for awarding compensatory costs where litigant files vexatious or false claims. In our view, the case in hand is just and fit case where we can invoke the provisions of S. 35-A ibid against the appellant for imposing compensatory cost on him which is payable to respondents. When the appellant had suppressed the material fact which has in his knowledge and which under the law he ought to have disclosed while filing the second claim petition then nondisclosure renders the appellant guilty of suppression of material facts. It is for the reason that disclosure of this fact in claim petition would have resulted in dismissal of claim petition on this ground alone and the Tribunal was not required to wait for the respondent to appear and disclose in their written statement. It is for the reason that disclosure of this fact in claim petition would have resulted in dismissal of claim petition on this ground alone and the Tribunal was not required to wait for the respondent to appear and disclose in their written statement. In a situation like the one, a clear case for imposition of compensatory costs as contemplated under S. 35-A of the C.P. Code is made out against the appellant for being paid to the respondent No.2 and Insurance Company i.e. respondent No.3, who were dragged in false litigation not only in Tribunal but also in High Court by engaging a lawyer to defend them. 14. Looking to the manner in which the claimant filed a claim petition and pursued it not only before the Tribunal but also by filing appeal filed beyond the period of limitation, we consider it fit and proper to award/ impose a sum of Rs. 25,000/- by way of compensatory cost under section 35-A of the C.P.C. on the appellant. It in is our view just and proper. Accordingly, we award/impose a compensatory costs of Rs. 25,000/- on the appellant Hastimal s/o Nandram. Jain, Transporter, Indore for being paid by him (appellant) to respondents No.2 and 3 i.e. Insurance Company. Let this amount be deposited by the appellant within two weeks from today in the Court of 1st Additional M.A.C. Tribunal, Indore. The Claims Tribunal will allow both respondent No.2 and respondent No. 3 to withdraw Rs. 12,500/- payable to each i.e. 1/2 of Rs. 25,000/- by way of cost to each respondent i.e. respondent No.2 and respondent No.3. Since no one appeared for respondent No.1 despite notice of appeal and hence he is not entitled to claim any cost. If the amounts awarded by this Court is deposited by the appellant in cash, then the same shall be paid or allowed to be withdraw by the respondent No.2 as also by Insurance Company i.e. respondent No. 3 herein as indicated above in equal proportion. In case, if the appellant fails to deposit the awarded amount of Rs. If the amounts awarded by this Court is deposited by the appellant in cash, then the same shall be paid or allowed to be withdraw by the respondent No.2 as also by Insurance Company i.e. respondent No. 3 herein as indicated above in equal proportion. In case, if the appellant fails to deposit the awarded amount of Rs. 25,000/in terms of the order passed by this Court, then in such event, appropriate action for its recovery including an order for detaining the appellant in a civil prison be issued by the Tribunal in accordance with law either at the instance of respondents No.2 or 3 or even suo moto to uphold the rule of law and for ensuring compliance of this Court order.