Judgment A.K.Shrivastava, J:- ( 1. ) Learned senior counsel is heard on the question of admission. ( 2. ) This second appeal has been filed at the instance of tenant/defendant who has lost from both the Courts below in the suit filed by the landlord/plaintiff for eviction on the grounds envisaged under section 12 (1) (b) and (f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short the Act). ( 3. ) Learned trial Court decreed the suit on the ground of sub-tenancy i.e. under section 12 (1) (b) of the Act. However, the ground of bona fide requirement for the purpose of business has not been found to be proved and the suit of plaintiff on that ground has been dismissed. The cross-objection filed by plaintiff before the learned first appellate Court assailing the judgment of the trial Court not decreeing the suit on that ground has also been dismissed. ( 4. ) Necessary facts for the purpose of disposal of this appeal lie in a narrow compass. Suffice it to state that appellant is a tenant in the suit premises of plaintiff. A rent note Ex.P-1 dated 5/2/1985 was executed between the parties. In the rent note specifically it has been mentioned that for carrying out the business of cloth in the name and style of "Mukesh Kumar Rakesh Kumar Garg" the suit accommodation has been taken on tenancy basis by the appellant. This fact is admitted to the parties. Apart from this, this fact is also not in dispute that later on firm "Mukesh Kumar Rakesh Kumar Garg" has been registered as a registered partnership firm having partners Prakash Chandra Garg and Ashok Kumar Garg and defendant/tenant Mukesh Kumar Garg is totally a stranger to the said partnership firm as he is not a partner in the said firm. 4. Pleading of plaintiff in the plaint so far as it relates to sub-letting of suit premises is concerned, it has been embodied by the plaintiff by way of amendment that after filing of the suit he came to know that the suit premises has been sub-let by the tenant/defendant. In that regard plaint part 4-A may be seen in which there is specific pleading of the plaintiff that a week earlier i.e. 14-15/10/1991 he (plaintiff) came to know that defendant has parted with possession to the partners of the firm and has inducted a sub-tenant. In that regard plaint part 4-A may be seen in which there is specific pleading of the plaintiff that a week earlier i.e. 14-15/10/1991 he (plaintiff) came to know that defendant has parted with possession to the partners of the firm and has inducted a sub-tenant. The plaintiff has also pleaded that what is the secret contract between the defendant and those persons to whom he has parted with the possession of the suit accommodation is not known to him and it is in the knowledge of the defendant. ( 5. ) Though the averment made in para 4-A of the plaint in regard to sub-letting has been emphatically denied by the defendant by amendment and adding para 4-A in the written statement, but nowhere in reply to the said averment it has been so pleaded by the defendant that he is having legal possession in the suit premises and is carrying on the business of firm "Mukesh Kumar Rakesh Kumar Garg" or is having any control on the suit premises. ( 6. ) An issue in regard to sub-tenancy has been framed by the trial Court and parties led their evidence. The trial Court found the ground of sub-tenancy to be proved and eventually decreed the suit of plaintiff under section 12 (1) (b) of the Act. The appeal which was filed by the defendant before learned first appellate Court has been dismissed by the impugned judgment. Hence this second appeal has been filed by the tenant/defendant. ( 7. The trial Court found the ground of sub-tenancy to be proved and eventually decreed the suit of plaintiff under section 12 (1) (b) of the Act. The appeal which was filed by the defendant before learned first appellate Court has been dismissed by the impugned judgment. Hence this second appeal has been filed by the tenant/defendant. ( 7. ) It has been contended by Shri V.S.Shroti, learned senior counsel for the appellant that tenant/appellant Mukesh Kumar Garg is still having legal possession in the suit premises though firm "Mukesh Kumar Rakesh Kumar Garg" has been later on registered under the Partnership Act in which tenant/defendant Mukesh Kumar Garg is not a partner and since it is borne out from the evidence of Mukesh Kumar Garg (DW-1) that at the time of taking suit premises on tenancy basis it was pacified to the plaintiff that the family members of the defendant shall carry on the business of firm "Mukesh Kumar Rakesh Kumar Garg", therefore, it can be said that he (defendant) is having legal possession on the suit premises though business is being carried out by the registered partnership firm "Mukesh Kumar Rakesh Kumar Garg" whose partners are Prakash Chandra Garg, the father of the defendant and Ashok Kumar Garg, who is brother of his father Prakash Chandra Garg and, therefore, learned Courts below erred in substantial error of law in decreeing the suit of plaintiff under section 12 (1) (b) of the Act. In support of his contention, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on certain decisions of the Supreme Court; they are Dipak Banerjee v. Smt. Lilabati Chakraborty ( AIR 1987 SC 2055 ), Jagan Nath (Deceased) through LRs., v. Chander Bhan and others ( AIR 1988 SC 1362 ) and Smt. Krishnawati v. Shri Hans Raj ( AIR 1974 SC 280 ). By placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court M/s. Delhi Stationers and Printers v. Rajendra Kumar ( AIR 1990 SC 1208 ), it has been argued by learned senior counsel that registered partnership firm was created in the year 1985 and for a considerable long period the plaintiff did not object in respect to carry on the business by registered partnership firm "Mukesh Kumar Rakesh Kumar Garg" and, therefore, impliedly the landlord has waived this ground and has accepted firm "Mukesh Kumar Rakesh Kumar Garg" to be the tenant. By placing reliance on another decision of Supreme Court Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Manna (dead) by L.Rs. and others ( AIR 2001 SC 1273 ), it has been argued that the finding of two Courts below are perverse and therefore this appeal be admitted for final hearing. ( 8. ) Having heard learned senior counsel for the appellant, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed. ( 9. ) So far as the contention of learned senior counsel that defendant/tenant is still having legal possession on the suit premises is concerned, suffice it to state that though the pleading of plaintiff in para 4-A of the plaint has been denied by defendant by way of amendment in his written statement by adding para 4-A, but nowhere it has been specifically pleaded by him that still in the suit premises he is having legal possession or having control on the suit premises. In the evidence also the defendant Mukesh Kumar Garg (DW-1) has not so stated that still he is possessing the suit premises and he is having control over it and, therefore, the decisions of Dipak Banerjee, Jagan Nath and Smt. Krishnawati (supra) are not applicable in the present factual scenario. A Single Bench decision of this Court Rajendra Pal Singh v. Bala Sahib Matkar 2004 (II) MPWN 154 has also been placed reliance by learned senior counsel, but the same is also distinguishable on the above-said ground. The position would have been different if there would have been the evidence of the tenant that he is still having control over the suit premises and is possessing the same. But, in the instant case neither there is any such pleading of the defendant nor there is any evidence of his to that effect. ( 10. ) The plaintiff in his testimony has specifically stated that defendant has parted the possession of the suit premises and registered partnership firm "Mukesh Kumar Rakesh Kumar Garg" is carrying on the business in the suit premises. ( 10. ) The plaintiff in his testimony has specifically stated that defendant has parted the possession of the suit premises and registered partnership firm "Mukesh Kumar Rakesh Kumar Garg" is carrying on the business in the suit premises. To me, merely because the partners of the said registered partnership firm are the father and uncle, respectively of the defendant/tenant, itself is no ground to hold that the suit premises has not been sub-let and the possession of the suit premises has not been parted to the said partnership firm because there is no pleading of the defendant nor there is his evidence in that regard. I have already held here-in- above that there is no iota of evidence of defendant and he had not pleaded that despite registered partnership firm is running the business in the suit premises, he is still having possession and control over the suit premises. Initially the burden of proof of sub-letting was on the plaintiff which he has discharged by his evidence. However, in rebuttal defendant has not specifically pleaded and stated in his testimony that he is having possession or control over the suit premises and, therefore, parting with possession of suit premises and sub-letting can be inferred. ( 11. ) I do not find any substance in the second contention of learned senior counsel that at the time of taking suit premises on rent it was pacified to the plaintiff that the business of firm "Mukesh Kumar Rakesh Kumar Garg" shall be carried out by the family members of the defendant and thereafter only the rent note was executed. Shri Shroti, learned senior counsel has also invited my attention to para 4 of the statement of defendant recorded under Order XVIII Rule 4 CPC in that regard. Admittedly in the rent note Ex.P-1 no such term of agreement has been embodied. The execution of rent note is admitted to the parties in which Mukesh Kumar Garg has been shown as tenant and in Clause 5 a condition has been stipulated that the purpose of tenancy is non-residential and for carrying out the business of cloth in the name and style of "Mukesh Kumar Rakesh Kumar Garg". To me, when the rent note has been executed and the terms and conditions of contract have been reduced in form of rent note in writing, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement is admissible. To me, when the rent note has been executed and the terms and conditions of contract have been reduced in form of rent note in writing, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement is admissible. In that regard section 92 of the Evidence Act is very clear. Thus, this argument of learned senior counsel is also not helpful to the tenant/defendant. ( 12. ) So far as third contention of learned senior counsel in regard to waiver of the ground on the basis of long possession of registered partnership firm "Mukesh Kumar Rakesh Kumar Garg" in the suit premises is concerned, it would be fruitful to mention that it was not in the knowledge of the plaintiff that actually who is carrying on the business since the partners of the registered partnership firm are thickly related to the defendant. In para 4-A of the plaint which was added by way of amendment by the plaintiff, it has been specifically pleaded that a week earlier i.e. on 14-15/10/1991 it came in the knowledge of the plaintiff that defendant has parted with the possession and has inducted a sub-tenant. From the statement of Ramlal Mehra (PW-1) (who is Assistant Sales Tax Officer and who adduced evidence by bringing relevant documents of registered partnership firm from Sales Tax Department) it is clear that sales tax number was issued to the registered partnership firm on 18/11/1985. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that plaintiff was having knowledge about the possession of registered partnership firm in the suit premises for a considerable long period and, therefore, the decision of Rajendra Kumar (supra) is also not applicable. ( 13. ) The finding recorded by the two Courts below of sub-letting is a finding of fact and cannot be interfered with in the second appeal as no perversity, misreading of evidence or misconstruction of pleading and evidence has been shown. ( 14. ) No substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. This appeal is hereby dismissed summarily. ( 15. ) Looking to the period of tenancy of the defendant since he was inducted in the year 1985 it would be justifiable to grant some breathing time to him to vacate the suit premises. ( 14. ) No substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. This appeal is hereby dismissed summarily. ( 15. ) Looking to the period of tenancy of the defendant since he was inducted in the year 1985 it would be justifiable to grant some breathing time to him to vacate the suit premises. Looking to the facts and circumstances, it is hereby directed that appellant/defendant shall submit an usual undertaking before the executing Court on or before 31st January, 2008 that he shall vacate the suit premises on or before 30th June, 2008. He shall also deposit the entire rent if not already deposited and shall also deposit the costs of the two Courts below within that period. He is further directed to deposit monthly rent on or before 15th day of each succeeding month. If he fails to comply any of the condition, the landlord shall be free to get the decree executed. Appeal dismissed