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2007 DIGILAW 1251 (AP)

C. K. Pounamma v. K. Chirmaswami

2007-12-31

G.YETHIRAJULU

body2007
ORDER :- This civil revision petition has been preferred by the petitioners in A.T.C. No.2 of 1982 on the file of the Principal District Munsif-cum-Special Officer, Chittoor under Section 13 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (for short 'the Act') for termination of the tenancy arising out of the lease agreement dated 11.3.1976 and for eviction of the respondent from the petition schedule land and put the petitioners in possession of the same. The Special Officer after considering the entire oral and documentary evidence dismissed the application by refusing to grant the relief in favour of the petitioners, through the order dated 31.8.1996. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioners preferred AT.A No.1 of 1998 before the District Judge, Chittoor (hereinafter called as 'the appellate Tribunal') and the appellate Tribunal after considering the material available on record dismissed the appeal confirming the order of the Special Officer, through the judgment, dated 29.8.2003. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioners preferred the present civil revision petition challenging the orders of the Tribunals below. 2. The averments made by the petitioners in the eviction petition are briefly as follows: The petitioners are the owners of the petition schedule property. The petitioners inherited the property from one Krishna Mandadi, who was the husband of the first petitioner and father of the petitioners 2 and 3. He died in July 1976. The respondent filed A.T.C. No.3 of 1981 on the file of the Special Officer, Chittoor for declaration that he is the cultivating tenant of the property basing on the lease agreement, dated 11.3.1976 said to have been executed by late Krishna Mandadi. The petitioners resisted the said AT.A. contending that the alleged agreement of lease deed dated 11.3.1976 is a forged one and there is no landlord and tenant relationship. The respondent obtained interim injunction in LA No.10 of 1981 in A T.e. No.3 of 1981 by playing fraud and mis-representation and is squatting over the disputed land under the guise of injunction. Even if the agreement of lease is stated as genuine, the respondent committed wilful default of payment of rent of Rs.604.50 per annum and thus the respondent incurred the disqualification and the tenancy is liable to be terminated. 3. The respondent resisted the application by making the following conditions in the counter-affidavit filed by him. The respondent is the tenant in perpetuity. 3. The respondent resisted the application by making the following conditions in the counter-affidavit filed by him. The respondent is the tenant in perpetuity. The respondent has been paying rent regularly and did not commit any wilful default. The respondent offered rent payable for the period 1982-83 to the first petitioner in the month of March 1982. . She promised to take the rent after consulting her advocate. The respondent waited for sometime and found that no reply is forthcoming from her and he was constrained to deposit the rent into the Court. Therefore, there is no wilful default committed by the respondent in payment of the rent. The respondent is in lawful possession and enjoyment of the land in question. Therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. The petitioners, in order to prove their case, examined PW.l and marked Exs.A.l to A.8. The respondent examined RWs.1 to 4 and marked Exs.B.1 to B.6. 5. The petitioners contended that the agreement of lease has been forged by the respondent and that there is no landlord and tenant relationship. They also took a plea that the respondent committed wilful default in payment of the rent and therefore, he is liable to be evicted. 6. The respondent contended that he is continuing as a cultivating tenant on the basis of agreement of lease dated 11.3.1976 and that he has not committed any wilful default in payment of the rent and the rents were being deposited into the Court when the petitioners failed to receive the same and therefore, the petition. is liable to be dismissed. 7. In the light of the contentions raised by both parties, the point that arises for my consideration is: "whether the orders passed by the Tribunals below dismissing the application for eviction filed by the petitioners-owners are liable to be set aside." 8. The respondent filed A.T.C. No.3 of 1981 to declare that he is the cultivating tenant. AT.C. No.2 of 1982 was filed by the petitioners for eviction of the tenant. Both the matters were disposed of on merits separately by dismissing AT.C. No.2 iof 1982 and allowing A.T.C. No.3 of 1981 by declaring that the respondent is the cultivating tenant of the property. AT.C. No.2 of 1982 was filed by the petitioners for eviction of the tenant. Both the matters were disposed of on merits separately by dismissing AT.C. No.2 iof 1982 and allowing A.T.C. No.3 of 1981 by declaring that the respondent is the cultivating tenant of the property. Aggrieved by the orders of the Special Officer in those two cases, the petitioners preferred AT.A Nos.3 and 4 of 1990 and they were disposed of by the appellate Tribunal, Chittoor, through the order dated 22.7.1996 remanding AT.C. No.2 of 1982 for fresh disposal according to law after giving opportunity to both parties to adduce additional evidence, if any, specially in respect of issue of wilful default in payment of the rent. 9. The Special Officer secured the presence of both parties and again considered whether there is wilful default on the part of the respondent in payment of the rent. The Special Officer after considering the evidence came to the conclusion• that the respondent-tenant has not committed default in payment of rent due even in the year 1982 and as the petitioners reported no objection for deposit of the rent, the rents were being deposited regularly. Therefore, the ground• that the respondent committed wilful default in payment of the rent is not made out. Therefore, the petition is dismissed. 10. The appellate Tribunal also by concurring with the view expressed by the Special Officer dismissed the appeal. 11. The petitioners in the grounds of revision contended that the respondent failed to pay the rent due to the petitioners; that the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proof that he paid the rent due by him without committing any default; that the credibility of the version of the petitioners about the non-payment of the rent is doubtful; that the Tribunals below have not properly considered the terms and conditions of the lease deed; that the respondent is not entitled to the benefit of grace period of one month contemplated under Section 13 of the Act; that the decision cited by the Special Officer is not applicable to the facts of the present case, therefore, the revision petition is liable to be allowed by setting aside the orders of the Tribunals below. 12. 12. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that though it is contented by the respondent that the first petitioner refused to receive the rent, no notice was given before depositing the amount into the Court; that there is no proof that the respondent paid the rent from the year 1976; that the deposit was made only from the year 1981 and that in the light of the judgments of this Court and the provisions of Section 13 of the Act, it has to be treated that the respondent committed default in payment of the rent and he is liable for eviction. 13. The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that he was regularly paying rents and when the petitioners refused to receive the rent, he immediately sought permission from the Tribunal and deposited the amount and therefore, the question of wilful default does not arise. 14. Section 13 of the Act mentions about the termination of tenancy, which reads as follows: "13. Termination of Tenancy.- Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 10, 11 and 12, no landlord sha1l be entitled to terminate the tenancy and evict his cultivating tenant except by an application made in that behalf to the Special Officer and unless such cultivating tenant. (a) has failed to pay the rent due by him within a period of one month nom the date stipulated in the lease deed, or in the absence of such stipulation, within a period of one month nom the date on which the rent is due according to the usage of the locality; and in case the rent is payable in the form of a share in the produce, has failed to deliver the produce at the time of harvest; or (b) has done any act or has been guilty of any neglect, which is destructive of, or permanently injurious to the land; or (c) has sub-let the land; or (d) has violated any of the conditions of the tenancy regarding the uses to which the land may be put; or (e) has wilfully denied the landlord's title to the land; or (f) has failed to comply with any order passed or direction issued by the Special Officer or the District Judge under this Act." 15. On perusal of clause (a) of Section 13 of the Act, it is clear that the tenancy is liable to be terminated if the tenant fails to pay the rent due by him within a period of one month from the date stipulated in the lease deed or in the absence of such stipulation within a period of one month from the date on which the rent is due according to the usage of the locality or in case, the rent is payable in the form of a share in the produce, has failed to deliver the produce at the time of harvest. The section makes it very clear that the rent has to be paid within one month from the date stipulated in the lease deed or the date on which the rent became due. 16. In M Venakteswara Rao v P. Narayana Rao and others, 1980 (II) ALT 101 , a learned Single Judge of this Court by dealing with the Section 13 of the Act observed as follows: "The intention of the enactment is that a cultivating tenant will be liable to be evicted only for failure to pay not advance rent but rent due by him in the sense, that the rent becomes due only after he cultivates the land and in the usual course raises the crop and realize the produce. If the tenant is evicted for failing to pay the advance rent, then the very intendment for object of the Act is likely, if not certainly, to be frustrated if not defeated. Even assuming that there is an agreement for the payment of the advance rent, in view of the fact that such a provision is opposed to the interests of the cultivating tenant, such an agreement need not have to be given countenance and only it is the provisions of the Act that shall have to be interpreted as predominant and as prevailing over such an agreement." 17. In K. Seethanna v. M Subba Reddi and others, 1969 APLJ SN 82, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the mere fact that the rent was accepted beyond the period of grace does not cure the default, which has already accrued and the landlord is certainly entitled to file an application for eviction. In K. Seethanna v. M Subba Reddi and others, 1969 APLJ SN 82, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the mere fact that the rent was accepted beyond the period of grace does not cure the default, which has already accrued and the landlord is certainly entitled to file an application for eviction. In the case covered by the above decision, the rent is payable on or before 15th of January every year. The tenant delivered paddy on 25.2.1963 i.e., beyond the grace period of 30 days and obtained a receipt. In reply to the notice issued by landlord alleging default in payment of rent and asking the tenant to vacate the land, the tenant gave a reply stating that he went to landlord's place on two occasions and that the landlord expressed inability to come and collect the paddy and as such he was not responsible for the delay in payment of rent. There is nothing in evidence to show that the tenant approached the landlord before 15th February 1963 by which date the grace period expired. When the relationship between the parties became strained after the expiry of the written lease, one would expect the tenant to have issued a registered notice stating that he was ready to tender the paddy and that the landlord should come and take delivery of the same. 18. It is the specific claim of the petitioners that no rent was paid upto the filing of A.T.C. No.2 of 1982. The respondent is claiming that he is regularly paying the rent without default. The respondent as RW.1 stated that he paid the rent in the year 1986 to the late Krishna Mandadi and later to PW.1 till 1981 for which he did not obtain any receipt as per the usual practice and had to file AT.C. No.3 of 1981 when he was attempted to be dispossessed by PW.l and after which he was depositing the rents into the Court since 1982 when PW.l evaded to receive the same. He further deposed that he paid the rent in the presence of RW.2 and one Dora Swamy Reddy on two or three occasions. He claimed to have deposited the rent payable in advance in March every year and not the arrears of rent. PW.l never demanded him about the non-payment of the rent prior to A.T.C. No.3 of 1981. 19. He further deposed that he paid the rent in the presence of RW.2 and one Dora Swamy Reddy on two or three occasions. He claimed to have deposited the rent payable in advance in March every year and not the arrears of rent. PW.l never demanded him about the non-payment of the rent prior to A.T.C. No.3 of 1981. 19. The first petitioner as PW.1 stated that the respondent never paid the rents to them and did not deposit the rents into the Court. She claimed possession of the property and alleged to have raised sugarcane crop when the respondent came into possession of the property by virtue of ex parte injunction. She never demanded the respondent to pay the rents from the year 1976 to 1981 before filing of AT.C. No.3 of 1981 and she claimed ignorance whether the respondent deposited the rents in ATC No.3 of 1981 from the date of petition upto the date. She also stated that she mentioned in the petition that since 1981, the respondent paid the rents and denied payment of rents prior to 1981. 20. The Tribunals below by taking into consideration the evidence placed by both parties rightly came to the conclusion that the petitioners failed to establish that the lease deed is a forged one and there was wilful default in payment of the rents. Therefore, the Tribunals rightly came to the conclusion that the respondent is not fi liable to be evicted from the land on the ground of default in payment of the land. 21. After going through the entire material, I am of the view that the Tribunals were right in coming to the conclusion that there are no grounds to grant the relief of eviction in favour of the petitioners and I do not find any ground to interfere with the orders of the Tribunals below. 22. In the result, the civil revision petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.