Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 1251 (PNJ)

Ranvir Singh v. State Of Haryana

2007-05-31

T.P.S.MANN

body2007
Judgment 1. By a common order, the present petition as well as Cri. Misc. No. 598-M of 2005, also filed by the petitioner, are being disposed of. 2. The complaint dated 1-7-1999 was filed by respondent No. 2 against the petitioner and two others with a prayer that they be summoned to face the trial for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420/34, I. P. C. The complainant had alleged that her son-in-law Hoshiar Singh was posted as Assistant Divisional Engineer (Telecommunication) at Srinagar (J & K) since 8-2-1999 and the petitioner, who was at that time posted as Chief General Manager, Northern Telecom Projects, was the Incharge of the affairs of the telecommunication and having territorial jurisdiction of Kashmir. On 18-5-1999, the Government of India promoted son-in-law of the complainant, along with other Assistant Divisional Engineers, against the post of Divisional Engineer (Telecommunication) and posted him at Bahadurgarh (Haryana). He was asked to join at Bahadurgarh within 40 days. The complainant came to know about it on 10-6-1999, on receiving a letter sent by her son-in-law, who had written therein that the petitioner was neither accepting his promotion as Divisional Engineer (Telecommunication) nor his posting at Bahadurgarh and instead insisting to retain him at Srinagar for another year. Accordingly, the complainant, along with her daughter-in-law Raj Bala, went to the petitioner on 14-6-1999 in his office at New Delhi and requested him to relieve her son-in-law from Srinagar. She was, however, told not to come time and again to him at Delhi and instead contact Raghubir Singh Hooda, Ex-President of All India Telecom Association at Rohtak, if she was willing to get her work done. On the following day, i.e. 15-6-1999, when the complainant was present in her house, Raghbir Singh Hooda, aforementioned, and his wife met her there and told her that they had come to meet her in response to a telephonic call received by them from accused Ranvir Singh. Both of them told the complainant that her son-in-law would be sent to Kargil and Drass in connection with a project and if she wanted to call him back at Bahadurgarh against his new promotion and assignment, she should keep ready an amount of Rs. one lac. Accordingly, she withdrew a sum of Rs. 40,000/- from her bank account on 16-6-1999 and collected another sum of Rs. 10,000/- from her other sources. one lac. Accordingly, she withdrew a sum of Rs. 40,000/- from her bank account on 16-6-1999 and collected another sum of Rs. 10,000/- from her other sources. On 19-6-1999, all the three accused, Ranvir Singh, Raghbir Singh Hooda and his wife came to her house at about 9.00 p.m. and dishonestly and fraudulently induced her to give them an amount of Rs. 50,000/- which she paid to Raghbir Singh Hooda, who after receiving the same handed it over to Ranvir Singh accused. She was assured that her son-in-law would be relieved from Srinagar shortly and join the service at Bahadurgarh. On the following day, Raghbir Singh Hooda told the complainant that her son-in-law would not be relieved unless and until the remaining amount of Rs. 50,000/- was paid to them. On this, the complainant brought the matter to the notice of her husband, who in turn called their son-in-law from Srinagar. On 22-6-1999, the complainant, along with her husband and son-in-law, went to Delhi and met Ranvir Singh accused in his office, but he refused to listen to them and instead asked them to talk to the other two accused, if they intended to get the needful done. 3. The complainant also alleged that Ranvir Singh accused relieved all others, who had been promoted along with the son-in-law of the complainant, but retained him at Srinagar. She had been dishonestly and fraudulently induced to pay Rs. 50,000/-and, thus, the accused committed offences punishable under Sections 420/34, I. P. C. 4. During the recording of preliminary evidence, the complainant examined herself as CW 1, Shri R. P. Vats, Advocate as CW 2 and Smt. Raj Bala as CW3, besides producing on record the copy of transfer letter Ex. P. 1, promotion letter Ex. P2, certificate issued by State Bank of India, Rohtak Ex. P. 3, application moved by her to the Government of India for prosecuting accused under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act Ex. P. 5 and postal receipt Ex. P. 6. 5. After going through the statements of the witnesses and documents available on the file, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak found sufficient reasons and material to proceed against the petitioner and two others and accordingly, summoned them for offences under Sections 420/34, I. P. C. vide order dated 19-8-1999. 6. P. 5 and postal receipt Ex. P. 6. 5. After going through the statements of the witnesses and documents available on the file, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak found sufficient reasons and material to proceed against the petitioner and two others and accordingly, summoned them for offences under Sections 420/34, I. P. C. vide order dated 19-8-1999. 6. At the relevant time, when the aforementioned complaint was filed against the petitioner and two others, the petitioner was still in service. Accordingly, the complainant had also moved the Government of India for the grant of permission to prosecute him for offence punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short the Act). It appears that no action had been taken upon the said request submitted by the complainant. Finally on 31-1-2002, the petitioner retired from Government service. She then made an application before learned Special Judge, Rohtak to summon the petitioner and two others for committing various offences punishable under the Act. Learned Special Judge, Rohtak vide order dated 16-4-2003 held that a prima facie case was made out for summoning the petitioner under Sections 7,11 and 13 of the Act and two other accused under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act and accordingly, summoned them for the same. However, for want of process fee and copies of the complaint for summoning the accused, learned Special Judge, Rohtak dismissed the complaint on 24-7-2003. The complainant then filed an application for restoration of the complaint by recalling the order dated 24-7-2003, but the said application was also dismissed on 18-9-2003. Left with no other option, the complainant filed a fresh criminal complaint dated 29-9-2003 against the petitioner and two others for summoning them under the various provisions of the Act. After recording preliminary evidence by way of testimony of the complainant herself as PW 1, her daughter Raj Bala as PW 2 and Sham Sharma, Advocate as PW 3, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak vide order dated 8-1-2004 found a prima facie case punishable under Section 7 of the Act against the petitioner and under Section 8 of the Act against Raghbir Singh Hooda accused and summoned them accordingly. 7. 7. Aggrieved from the summoning order dated 19-8-1999 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak whereby the petitioner was summoned to face trial for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420/34, I. P. C, he filed the present petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. with a prayer for setting aside the same while, the petitioner filed Crl. Misc. No. 598-M of 2005 against the order dated 8-1-2004 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak summoning him for offence under Section 7 of the Act. 8. While challenging his summoning for the offences under Sections 420/34, I. P. C., the petitioner submitted that the version, as given by the complainant, was false. He has mentioned various reasons for his saying so. He referred to the procedure observed in the reception office in the Telecommunication Department at Kidwai, where according to him a visitors book has been kept for making entry regarding the visit of outsiders, but no such entry had been made on 14-6-1999 when the complainant allegedly paid a visit to him. He also claimed that complainant could not be accompanied by Raj Bala on 14-6-1999 as the latter was working as Hostel Supervisor in Maharishi Dayanand University, Rohtak and as per letter dated 23-2-2000 written by the Registrar of the said University, she was on duty on 14-6-1999. He also asserted that on 19-6-1999, he did not visit Rohtak to meet the complainant as at that time he was visiting the Army Postal Mess at Rao Tula Ram Marg, New Delhi as guest of one Major General and stayed there till around 8.30 p.m. 9. All the aforementioned material referred to by filing CrI. Misc. No. 6703-M of 2000 for setting aside the summoning order dated 19-8-1999 cannot be looked into by this Court in petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. All this material has yet to be established by way of evidence by the petitioner, which can be done only at the relevant time when he would get an opportunity to lead his defence evidence. No implicit reliance can be placed upon the various circumstances as alleged by the petitioner so as to hold that the version given by the complainant was patently false or absurd. 10. No implicit reliance can be placed upon the various circumstances as alleged by the petitioner so as to hold that the version given by the complainant was patently false or absurd. 10. In the first complaint, the petitioner has only been summoned for the offences punishable under Sections 420/34, I. P. C. The petitioner is prima facie shown to have dishonestly and fraudulently induced the complainant to part with a sum of Rs. 50,000/- so that her son-in-law could be allowed to join his posting as Divisional Engineer (Telecommunication) at Baha-durgarh. As the act, said to have been com-mitted by the petitioner, was not in the dis-charge of his official duties, no sanction was required before the complaint could be filed or the summoning order could be passed, against the petitioner. 11. Coming to the challenge of the petitioner to his summoning for offence under Section 7 of the Act, he has prayed for quashing of the proceedings primarily on the ground that as at the relevant time, the petitioner had been in Government service, therefore, neither the complaint could be filed nor the petitioner could be summoned under the provisions of the Act without sanction of the Central Government as is required under Section 19 of the Act. 12. The relevant date with reference to which the valid sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of an offence, committed by a public servant as required by Section 19 of the Act is the date on which the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence of which he is accused and not the date when the said offence was committed. Reliance can be placed upon Parkash Singh Badal and another V/s. State of Punjab and others (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193 : (AIR 2007 SC 1274). 13. Another objection has been taken in regard to the summoning under the provisions of the Act that before the complaint in question was filed, a similar complaint had already been dismissed and an application was also filed by the complainant for its restoration but the same met with similar fate. Therefore, the order of dismissal of the complaint had become final and no second complaint was maintainable on the same grounds and for the same purpose. 14. Therefore, the order of dismissal of the complaint had become final and no second complaint was maintainable on the same grounds and for the same purpose. 14. The earlier complaint in which the petitioner was summoned vide order dated 16-4-2003 was dismissed on account of nonfiling of process fee and copies of complaint. The complainant had then filed an application for restoration of the complaint for recalling the order of dismissal but the said application was also dismissed. Therefore, it is clear that the dismissal of the earlier complaint was not on merits but for noncompliance of procedural requirements. Such dismissal of the complaint would not amount to the acquittal of the accused but only his discharge as he was sought to be tried in a warrants case and not in a summons case. Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bars the trial of an accused on same and similar allegations if he had already been acquitted or convicted. As mentioned above, the petitioner had not been acquitted in the first complaint and merely stood discharged. In such a situation, the complainant had the remedy of resorting to filing of second criminal complaint. 15. In view of the above, no case is made out for the grant of any relief to the petitioner in both the petitions. The petitions are, therefore, dismissed. 16. However, nothing stated above shall be construed to be an expression or opinion on the merits of the case. The petitioner will be entitled to take all the pleas available to him under the law before the trial Court.