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2007 DIGILAW 1255 (AP)

K. Marappan v. Superintending Engineer, T. B. P. H. L. C. Circle, Anantapur

2007-12-31

B.PRAKASH RAO, G.BHAVANI PRASAD

body2007
B. PRAKASH RAO, J Since parties are common and the questions that arise are also common, though falling under three different transactions, as arise under common judgment, these matters are being taken up together for disposal. 2. Heard Sri N. Subba Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Superintending Engineer of the State and Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent for the Contractor-claimant. 3. All these appeals and revisions are at the instance of both the sides namely the concerned Superintending Engineer and the Contractor, aggrieved against the common o judgment in OP Nos.118, 119, 120 of 1988, If O.S. Nos.165, 167 and 169 of 1988. In the appeals in CMA Nos.479, 93, 94, 480, 481 and 95 of 1990 arise out of the applications filed in Section 30 of the Arbitration Act seeking to set-aside the awards passed in O.P. Nos.118/88, 119/88 and 120/88. Whereas the revisions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in CRP Nos.303, 304, 305, 1039, 1040 and 1041 of 1990 arise out of the suits filed by the Contractor seeing a decree in terms of the awards passed by the Arbitrator dated 19.8.1988 in respect of disputes arising under the three different agreements by the second respondent-Arbitrator. 4. The facts in brief are that in terms of the tender notification dated 18.9.1978 for three different works namely (1) Construction of non-over flow masonry dam from Ch.670-00 to 748-50 M. on left flank of Pennahobilam Balancing Reservoir, (2) Construction of non-over flow masonry dam , from Ch.852-04 to 950-00 M. on right flank of Pennahobilam Balancing Reservoir, (3) Construction of spillway from Ch.748-50 to 852-04 M of Pannahobilam Balancing Reservoir, the contractor submitted tenders along with others and the same were accepted and the three different agreements, namely Agreement No.10/78-79, Agreement No.11/78-79 and Agreement No.14/79-80 were entered into between the parties. The value of the work in all these three agreements is Rs.78,25,920/-, Rs.1,03,70,180/- and Rs.1,34,39,330/- respectively. As per the terms of the agreement the work has to be completed within a period of 18 months period from the date of handing over possession of the site to the Contractor. The value of the work in all these three agreements is Rs.78,25,920/-, Rs.1,03,70,180/- and Rs.1,34,39,330/- respectively. As per the terms of the agreement the work has to be completed within a period of 18 months period from the date of handing over possession of the site to the Contractor. In the work under agreement No.10/78-79 the possession was handed over on 16.11.1979, for the work under 11/78-79 the site was handed over to contractor on 21.4.1979 and for the work under 14/79-89 the site was handed over on 28.6.1979. Accordingly, it is stated that the contractor commenced all the three works but could not complete the work within stipulated time of 18 months and extension of time was granted for completion of the work. However, contractor has complained to department that delay was on account of the fault of the department and since the rates have gone up therefore, he is entitled for enhanced rates. Though there has been a due recommendation for the extension as well as fixing the workable rates, Government did not agree for enhancement of rates and ultimately the contractor was asked to stop the work in September, 1993 and the contract was terminated on the request of the contractor himself on 13.8.1985. Even prior to the termination, the claims have been put forth by the contractor distinctly under various heads under the separate works. The claim No.1 related to extra lead of 4 k.m. for stone and metal for which he claimed three different amounts of Rs.7,68,825/-, Rs.12,38,250/- and Rs.9,59,325. Claim No.2 related to workable rates for the work done beyond agreement period for completion of the work for which he claimed Rs.1,23,42,010/- under agreement No.1 0/7879, Rs.1,28,56,560/- under agreement No.11/78-79, and Rs.l,21,20,453/- under agreement No.14179-80. Claim No.3 related to compensation on account of non-supply of food grains for which he claimed Rs.28,64,506/- and Rs.39,14,456/- and Rs.40,67,421/- respectively. Claim No.4 related to reimbursement of the non-supply of cement of quantity 660 metric tonnes, 1517 metric tonnes and 1560 metric tonnes respectively. Claim No.5 related to the alleged loss incurred by the contractor on account of keeping the equipments and the plants idle from the date of stoppage of work, wherein he set forth his claim Rs.67,92,867/- respectively for each of the three works. Claim No.5 related to the alleged loss incurred by the contractor on account of keeping the equipments and the plants idle from the date of stoppage of work, wherein he set forth his claim Rs.67,92,867/- respectively for each of the three works. Claim No.6 related to the overhead charges, site over heads and Head Office overheads for which he set forth Rs.11,28,033/- on account of each work. Claim No.7 related to the claim on account of stock of material accumulated by the contractor for the work in the project setting worth claim for Rs.2,65,000/-, Rs.l,10,000/and Rs.60,000/- respectively. Claim No.8 related to refund of seniorage charges and surcharges collected from the contractor. Claim No.9 related to the claim for interest at the rate of 18% p.a. in respect of all the three claims. Thus in all the contractor claimed Rs.2,41,62,241/- apart from the reimbursement amounts towards cement and interest. 5. For all these claims, the Government came forward with a reply disputing all the correctness thereof as made by the contractor and denying their liability. The contractor filed rejoinder. A panel of Arbitrators as constituted under the agreement namely: (1) Chief Engineer, P.W.D. (R&B), (2) Deputy Secretary to Government, Finance and Planning Department and (3) Director of Accounts, Sriram Sagar Project entered into the reference and passed three different awards on 19.6.1985, rejecting the claim Nos.3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 totally. However, awarded Rs.l,66,328/-, Rs.2,50,4711-, Rs.1,90,593/-, Rs.2,95,365/-, Rs.2,47,4111- and Rs.2,35,635/- under respective three works. Under Claim No.9, the Arbitrators awarded interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of the claim petition i.e. 28.11.1983. The total amount i.e. awarded came to Rs.4,61,668/-, Rs.4,97,882/- and Rs.4,26,228/- respectively and the said interest. 6. Assailing these awards, the contractor earlier filed applications under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act to set aside the same in O.P. Nos.162, 163 and 164 of 1985 which were allowed by the Court below on 24.9.1986 and those awards were set-aside mainly on the ground that the Arbitrators gathered the material bel1ind the back of the contractor, apart from the lack of reasons in support. 7. Later, at the instance of the contractor, applications in O.Ps.20, 21, 22 of 1987 was filed for appointment of sole Arbitrator under Sections 11 and 12 of the Arbitration Act and in those applications, a joint memo was filed on 7.3.1988. 7. Later, at the instance of the contractor, applications in O.Ps.20, 21, 22 of 1987 was filed for appointment of sole Arbitrator under Sections 11 and 12 of the Arbitration Act and in those applications, a joint memo was filed on 7.3.1988. Accordingly, the Respondent No.2, a retired District Judge was appointed as sole Arbitrator who entered upon reference on 26.4.1988 and passed three separate awards on 19.8.1988. Though the total number of claims remained the same, however on the second occasion there has been some enhancement in regard to the quantum under the claim Nos.5 and 6. Under the aforesaid above award, the claim Nos.6 and 8 were rejected in respect of three works. However, the Arbitrator allowed claim No.1 awarding Rs.7,68,825/-, Rs.12,38,250/- and Rs.9,59,325/- respectively and under claim No.2 awarded Rs.82,28,000/-, Rs.85,71,000/- and Rs.80,80,100/- respectively. Under claim No.3 awarded Rs.23,76,000/-, Rs.3I,50,000/- and Rs.36,00,000/- respectively. Under claim No.4, the Arbitrator awarded amount in lieu of the reimbursement of cement claimed by the contractor for a sum of Rs.2,74,560/-, Rs.6,53,420/- and Rs.6,48,960/- respectively. Under claim No.5 he awarded Rs.12,00,000/-. Under claim No.7 he awarded Rs.2,00,000/-, Rs.l,00,00/- and Rs.4,00,000/- respectively and ultimately in claim No.9 the Arbitrator awarded interest at 12% per annum on the amount awarded under claim Nos.1 to 4 and 7. Thus in all the total amount which has been awarded came to Rs.l,30,47,385/-, Rs.1,18,47,385/- and Rs.1,49,12,370/- and interest as stated. For the purpose of convenience the ultimate claims as awarded which are assailed are as follows : "Agreement No. 10/78-79 Claim No. Description of the claim I. Towards extra lead of 4 km for stone and metal II. On account of workable rate for the work done beyond the agreement period for completing the work in agreement quality III. Non-supply of food grains as per the conditions of the agreement. IV. Reimbursement of short supply of cement V . Towards loss incurred by the contractor due to idle equipment and plant. VI. Claim on account of over head charges, site over heads and head office over heads. VII. Claim on account of stock of materials accumulated by the contractor for work is to project VIII. Claim on account of recovery of seignorage charges and surcharges to be refunded. XI. Towards loss incurred by the contractor due to idle equipment and plant. VI. Claim on account of over head charges, site over heads and head office over heads. VII. Claim on account of stock of materials accumulated by the contractor for work is to project VIII. Claim on account of recovery of seignorage charges and surcharges to be refunded. XI. Interest at 1 8% p.a. under the interest Act 1 4/78 the period of interest not specified Claim amount Awarded amount 7,68,825/- 7,68,825/- 1,23,42,010/- 82,28,000/- 28,64,506/- 23,76,000/- 660 M.T. 2,74,560/- 1,06,86,467/- 12,00,000/- 17,70,750/- Rejected 2,65,000/- 2,00,000/- Amount not Rejected Indicated. Amount not At 1 2% awarded on Indicated claims I to IV and VIII from the date of claim petition (28.11.1983) ------------------ --------------------------- Rs.2,86,97,558/+ Interest Rs.1,30,47,385/+ Interest Agreement No. 11/78-79 Claim No. Description of the claim Claim amount Awarded amount ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Towards extra lead of 12,38.250/- 12,38.250/- 4 Km for stone and metal 12,38,250/- 12,38,250/- II. On account of workable 1,28,56,560/- 1,28,56,560/- for the work done beyond the agreement period for completing 1,28,56,560/- 1,28,56,560/the work in pursuance of the agreement upto agreement quality III. Non-supply of food 38,14,456/- 31,50,000/- grains as per the conditions of the agreement. IV. Reimbursement of short 1570 M.T. 6,53,120/- supply of cement V. Towards loss incurred 1,06,86,467/- 12,00,000/- by the contractor due to idle equipment and plant. VI. Claim on account 17,70,750/- Rejected of overhead charges, site overheads and charges site overheads and head office overheads. VII. Claim on account 1,10,000/- 6,60,000/- of stock of materials accumulated by the contractor for work in the project VIII. Claim on account of Amount not Rejected recovery of seignorage Indicated. charges and surcharges to be refunded. IX. Interest at 18% p.a. -do- At 12% p.a. under the interest on claims I to Act 14/78. The IV and VIII from period of interest the date of petition not specified. (29.11.1983) ------------------- ----------------------- Rs. 3,4,76,683/- Rs. 1,49,12,370/- + Interest + Interest Agreement No. 11/79-80 Claim No. Description of the claim Claim amount Awarded amount ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Towards extra lead of 9,59,325/- 9,59,325/- 4 Km for stone and metal II. On account of workable 1,21,20,433/- 80,80,100/- for the work done beyond the agreement period for completing the work in pursuance of the agreement upto agreement quality III. Non-supply of food 40,67,421/- 36,00,000/- grains as per the conditions of the agreement. IV. On account of workable 1,21,20,433/- 80,80,100/- for the work done beyond the agreement period for completing the work in pursuance of the agreement upto agreement quality III. Non-supply of food 40,67,421/- 36,00,000/- grains as per the conditions of the agreement. IV. Reimbursement of short 1560 M.T. 6,48,960/- supply of cement V. Towards loss incurred 1,06,86,467/- 12,00,000/- by the contractor due to idle equipment and plant. VI. Claim on account 17,70,750/- Rejected of overhead charges, site overheads and charges site overheads and head office overheads. VII. Claim on account 6,60,000/- 4,00,000/- of stock of materials accumulated by the contractor for work in the project VIII. Claim on account of Amount not Rejected recovery of seignorage Indicated. charges and surcharges to be refunded. IX. Interest at 18% p.a. -do- At 12% p.a. under the interest on claims I to Act 14/78. The IV and VIII from period of interest the date of petition not specified. (29.11.1983) ------------------- ----------------------- Rs. 3,4,76,683/- Rs. 1,49,12,370/- + Interest + Interest 8. Subsequent to the filing of the awards, the Court below issued notices to both sides and they have come forward with these applications for setting-aside the awards, and passing decree in terms thereof. 9. On behalf of the Government several contentions have been urged both on merits and in law as to the correctness of the amounts and the very liability as claimed and awarded. Apart from denying there being any delay or laches on their part, much less any breach. Further, it is stated that none of the claims arise out of the agreed terms and are even barred under the very terms. 10. On behalf of the contractor, it was sought to be sustained that the amounts as awarded by the Arbitrator on the ground of clear breach one to delay and laches. Therefore, Government was rightly held to be liable for the said amounts and thus there is no error whatsoever of nature either on merits or in law, nor would the Court could possibly go into factual appreciation. 11. On the basis of the allegations in regard to each of the claim and the respective pleas, on the basis of which the Court below framed the following issues : i. Whether the award is vitiated by misconduct and it is liable to be set aside on any of the grounds as set out in the petition, written statement? 11. On the basis of the allegations in regard to each of the claim and the respective pleas, on the basis of which the Court below framed the following issues : i. Whether the award is vitiated by misconduct and it is liable to be set aside on any of the grounds as set out in the petition, written statement? ii Whether the award is passed beyond time? iii. Whether the plaintiff is not entitled to make the award rule of the Court and for a decree in terms thereof? iv. Whether the petitions filed under Section 30 of Arbitration Act are in time? v. Whether the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to grant interest pending proceedings before him ? vi. To what relief? 12. After considering the common evidence and arguments, the Court below ultimately rejected the plea of the Government on issue No.(ii) holding that award was not passed beyond time. In respect of claims of the contractor, Claim Nos.3, 4, 5 and 7 were set-aside in full and award so far as to the claim Nos.1 and 2 and interest under claim No.9 are partly set-aside modifying the award to the following effect: "In the place of award for Rs.7,68,825/awarded under claim No.1 the contractor be and is hereby entitled to the rate applicable 12 200814) to the 6 K.m. lead as per standard schedule of rates fixed for Anantapur District for the year 1977-78 less tender percentage for the quantity of RR and C.R stones, metals, and spells, etc., conveyed during the period from 16.11.1979 to 15.5.1981 (agreement period) as per standard schedule of rates fixed for the year 1981-82 without deducting tender percentage for the quantity conveyed during period from 16.5 .1981 to 31.3 .1982 as per S.S.R fixed for 1982-83 without deducting tender percentage for the quantity conveyed on and from 1.4.1982. That the contractor be and is hereby entitled balance alone after deducting the amount already paid under this claim No.1 in the place of Rs.7,68,825/- awarded by the Arbitrator. That the contractor be and is hereby entitled balance alone after deducting the amount already paid under this claim No.1 in the place of Rs.7,68,825/- awarded by the Arbitrator. That the contractor be and is hereby entitled to in the place of Rs.82,28,000/- awarded under claim No.II to the revised rates in respect of each of the 21 items, for which extra rates claimed in the claim statement, as per the standard schedule of rates fixed for the year 1981-82 for Anantapur District without deducting tender percentage for the quantity of the work executed from 15.5.1981 to 31.3 .1982 as per the standard schedule rates fixed for the year 1982-83 without deducting tender percentage for the quantity of work executed on and from 1.4.1982. That the amounts already paid for this work have to be deducted and for the balance amount alone the contractor is entitled to under this claim in the place of Rs.82,28,000/- awarded by the Arbitrator. That the interest awarded at 12% p.a. from 26.4.1988 till the date of award 19.8.1988 (pendente lite) is set aside and the rate of interest awarded for the remaining period is affirmed." 13. Hence, these appeals and revisions by both sides, one assailing the correctness of the claims and another as to the very entitlement by the Contractor. 14. Sri N. Subba Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Government by taking us through the entire material, submitted that the claims as put forth by are primarily and jurisdictionally are barred under Clause 59 of the A.P. Standard Specifications and therefore, the contractor will not be entitled to the amounts, since admittedly the contractor did not complete the work within the prescribed period of time and having sought the extension. Therefore, the entire basis to hold that there was any breach which can impose any liability on the Government is wholly unsustainable. 15. Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the contractor taking serious objection to the said plea, submitted that the scope of the applications and the appeals are revisions in this Court arising therefrom in very limited and therefore, merits cannot be gone into and there could be no reappreciation of evidence to come to a different conclusion. That apart, the point as raised by the Government under Clause No.59 cannot be entertained nor justified. 16. That apart, the point as raised by the Government under Clause No.59 cannot be entertained nor justified. 16. Of these and several other submissions as made in detail, across the bar by both sides, the ultimate question which arises is in two fold, one as to whether on the facts and circumstances, the claims put forth by the contractor are bar under Clause 59 of the Rules. Secondly whether there is any breach or/and delay, laches on the part of the Government and if so, the contractor would be entitled to the amounts as claimed under different claims and rates. Taking up the first point, a point which has been in serious consideration before this Court repeatedly and as well as the Apex Court resulting into varied decisions. It is not out of place to mention that these decisions referred to by both sides though each case on its own facts and circumstances has come to a different conclusion both on the entitlement and the applicability of Clause 59, which gave rise to on the earlier decision by a Division Bench of this Court in T.A. Choudhary v. State of A.P., 2004 (3) ALD 357 , laying down its own norms. Therefore, since it's conclusions ran contrary to the decisions of the Apex Court, it was referred for consideration to a Full Bench especially in view of the different note stuck in regard to the said Clause 59. However, the Full Bench after taking into consideration the fact that the reference being only on the ground that the said later decision of the Division Bench runs contrary to the decision of the Apex Court and therefore, it is always open for the Court to consider each case and apply the principles laid down by the Apex Court aptly and thus without considering the correctness of the later decision of the Division Bench on the bar of dams under Clause 59 and left it open for each case to decide on merits. Across the bar, it has been submitted that as against the said judgment of the Division Bench, an appeal has been filed by the State and the same is still pending before the Apex Court. 17. Across the bar, it has been submitted that as against the said judgment of the Division Bench, an appeal has been filed by the State and the same is still pending before the Apex Court. 17. Shorn of all these varied decisions, Sri N Subba Reddy, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Ramnath International Construction Pvt. Limited v. Union of India and another, 2007 (2) ALD 111 (SC) = AIR 2007 SC 509 , wherein apart from the scope of Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, the plea as to the bar under similar such clause under I 1 (c) of the Contract in the Hanger contract, which was involved therein and after considering the decisions arising from this Court both in Associated Engineering Co. v. Government of A.P., 1991 (4) SCC 93 and in Ch. Ramalinga Reddy v. Superintending Engineer, 1999 (9) SCC 610 , held that the said clause would create bar against such claims and set-aside the award granting amounts thereunder. It was a case where contract was given fixing the period within which it has to be completed and admittedly the same was not having been completed and the period having been extended, the claims for compensation as a consequence of delay are held to be barred under Clause II (c) and approving other two decisions of the Court involving the terms on the selfsame lines under Clause 59 in the State. Since this question has been in contrary for a quite sometime and troubling in each of the matter of the similar nature as to sustainability of the claim and in view of the bar therefor it would be relevant to extract the said clause as found in the aforesaid decision which read as follows: "Clause 11 (c) : Provides that where extensions have been granted by reason of the delays enumerated in Clause (A) which were beyond the control of the contractor, or on account of the delays on the part of the employer specified in Clause (B), the contractor is not entitled to make any claim either for compensation or otherwise, arising in whatsoever manner, as a result of such extensions. After enumerating certain delays, sub-clause (viii) of Clause (A) specifically mentions delay on account of any other cause beyond the control of the contractor. After enumerating certain delays, sub-clause (viii) of Clause (A) specifically mentions delay on account of any other cause beyond the control of the contractor. The causes for delays specified in clause A, thus, encompass all delays over which the contractor has no control. This will necessarily include any delays attributable to the employer or any delay for which both the employer and the contractor are responsible. The contract thus provides that if there is any delay, attributable either to the contractor or the employer or to both, and the contractor seeks and obtains extension of time for execution on that account, he will not be entitled to 'claim compensation of any nature, on the ground of such delay, in addition to the extension of time obtained by him. Therefore, the claims for compensation as a consequence of delays, that is claim 24 of Hanger Contract and claims 13 to 16 of Road Contract are barred by Clause 11 (C)." 18. Both the decisions in Associated Engineering Company's case (supra) and Ch. Ramalinga Reddy's case (supra), have come up for consideration and which had been extracted with the approval in the following manner: "We are fortified in this view by several decision of this Court. We may refer to two of them, in Associated Engineering Co. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (supra), this Court was concerned with an appeal which related to similar claims based on delays in execution. The High Court had held (reported in AIR 1990 AP 294 ) thus : Applying the principle of the above decision to the facts of the case before us, it must be held that clause 59 bars a claim for compensation on account of any delays or hindrances caused by the department. In such a case, the contractor is entitled only to extension of the period of contract. In deed, such an extension was asked for, and granted on more than one occasion. (The penalty levied for completing the work beyond the extended period of contract has been waived in this case). The contract was not avoided by the contractor, but he chose to complete the work within the extended time. In such a case, the claim for compensation is clearly barred by Clause 59 of the APDSS which is admittedly, a term of the agreement between the parties. The contract was not avoided by the contractor, but he chose to complete the work within the extended time. In such a case, the claim for compensation is clearly barred by Clause 59 of the APDSS which is admittedly, a term of the agreement between the parties. This Court noticed that the claims were set aside by the High Court on the ground that those claims were not supported by any agreement between the parties, and that the Arbitrator had travelled outside the contract in awarding those claims. This Court held that the said claims were not payable under the contract and that the contract does not postulate, in fact prohibits, payment of any escalation under those heads. It affirmed the decision of the High Court setting aside the award of those claims. In Ch. Ramalinga Reddy v. Superintending. Engineer (supra), while considering the similar claim, this Court observed thus : "Claim 8 was for 'payment of extra rates for work done beyond agreement time at schedule of rate prevailing at the time of execution'. 111e Arbitrator awarded the sum of Rs.39,540/-. Clause 59 of the A.P. Standard Specifications, which applied to the contract between the parties, stated that no claim for compensation on account of delays or hindrances to the work from any cause would lie except as therein defined. The claim falls outside the defined exceptions. When extensions of time, were granted to the appellant to complete the work, the respondents made it clear that no claim for compensation would lie. On both counts, therefore, claim 8 was impennissible and the High Court was right in so holding." We, therefore, answer the first question in the affinnative. The Arbitrator in his two speaking Awards recorded the following finding regarding delay: "From the facts and evidence placed before me, I find that the department cannot absolve itself of partial breaches committed which are of fundamental nature and had snowball effect. The department alone is not fully responsible, the contractor also has contributed to certain delays."(In the Hangar Contract). "The documents, the evidence and the arguments clearly indicate that the delay for completing has been a joint responsibility of both the Department and Contractor" (in Road Contract). The department alone is not fully responsible, the contractor also has contributed to certain delays."(In the Hangar Contract). "The documents, the evidence and the arguments clearly indicate that the delay for completing has been a joint responsibility of both the Department and Contractor" (in Road Contract). ' In spite of having held hat both were responsible for the delay and having noticed the arguments based on clause 11(c) of the General Conditions of contract, the Arbitrator proceeded to award damages on the ground of delay on the reasoning that the contractor is entitled to compensation, unless the employer establishes that the contractor has consented to accept the extension of time alone in satisfaction of his claim for delay. As rightly held by the High Court, which decision we have affinned while considering question No.(i), clause 11 (c) of the General Conditions of Contract is a clear bar to any claim for compensation for delays, in respect of which extensions have been sought and obtained. Clause 11 (c) amounts to a specific consent by the contractor to accept extension of time alone in satisfaction of his claims for delay and not claim any compensation. In view of the clear bar against award of damages on account of delay, the Arbitrator clearly exceeded his jurisdiction, in awarding damages, ignoring clause 11 (c). In Associated Engineering Co. 's case (supra), this Court held: "The Arbitrator cannot act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independently of the contract. His sole function is to arbitrate in terms of the contract. He has no power apart from what the parties have given him under the contract. If he has travelled outside the bounds of the contract, he has acted without jurisdiction." xxx x A dispute as to the jurisdiction of th, Arbitrator is not a dispute within the award, but one which has to be decided outside the award. An umpire or Arbitrator cannot widen his jurisdiction by deciding a question not referred to him by the parties or by deciding a question otherwise than in accordance with the contract. He cannot say that he does not care what the contract says. He is bound by it. It must bear his decision. He cannot travel outside its bounds. If he exceeded his jurisdiction by so doing, his award would be liable to be set aside..... In the instant case, the umpire decided matters strikingly outside his jurisdiction. He cannot say that he does not care what the contract says. He is bound by it. It must bear his decision. He cannot travel outside its bounds. If he exceeded his jurisdiction by so doing, his award would be liable to be set aside..... In the instant case, the umpire decided matters strikingly outside his jurisdiction. He outstepped the confines of the contract. He wandered far outside the designated area. He digressed faraway from the allotted task. His error arose not by misreading or misconstruing or misunderstanding the contract, but by acting in excess of what was agreed. It was an error going to the root of his jurisdiction because he asked himself the wrong question, disregarded the contract and awarded in excess of his authority. In many respects, the award flew in the face of the provisions of the contract to the contrary." In Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd. v. Eastern Engineering Enterprises and another, 1999 (9) SCC 283 , this Court held thus: 'The rates agreed were firm, fixed and binding irrespective of any fall or rise in the cost of the work covered by the contract or for any other reason or any ground whatsoever. It is specifically agreed that the contractor will not be entitled or justified in raising any claim or dispute because of increase in cost of expenses on any ground whatsoever. By ignoring the said terms, the Arbitrator has travelled beyond his jurisdiction as his existence depends upon the agreement and his function is to act within the limits of the said agreement. This deliberate departure from the contract amounts not only to manifest disregard of the authority or misconduct on his part but it may be tantamount to mala fide action.... It is settled law that the Arbitrator is the creature of the contract between the parties and hence if he ignores the specific terms of the contract it would be a question of jurisdictional error which would be corrected by the Court and for that limited purpose the agreement is required to be considered .. . . .. He cannot award an amount which is ruled out or prohibited by the terms of the agreement. . . .. He cannot award an amount which is ruled out or prohibited by the terms of the agreement. In the view that we have taken the Arbitrator clearly misconducted himself in awarding compensation under claim No.24 under Hangar Contract and claim Nos.13 to 16 under the Road Contract which was rightly set aside by the High Court in the order impugned herein, on the ground that the Arbitrator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction." 19. On a perusal of the claims involved in this case and all the above decisions run on the same lines and similar to each other. Therefore, from the above, it is now settled by the Apex Court that in the circumstances where the contractor could not complete the work within a period as contemplated and sought extension, such delays cannot constitute a ground to mulct with any liability as against the Government or the employer. 20. Applying these principles, now going back to the facts of this case, the agreements are executed, admittedly prescribing the period of completion within 18 months from date of handing over possession. There is no dispute that the sites under these agreements were handed over on 16.11.1979, 21.4.1979 and 28.6.1979. Further, without any demur it is accepted that the work under these contracts was completed within the said stipulated period. That apart, at the instance of the contractor, the time was extended. Therefore, the whole grievance of the contractor rests on the sole reason of having done work beyond original period and thus he is entitled to the claims on the basis of increase in the rates and other losses. Whereas, the Government pus its defence under Clause 59 as barred. 21. Therefore, without there being any need for appreciation or reappreciation on merits, we take up each claims. It is to be noticed that claim No.2 relates to for a compensation for the work which was done beyond the period on the increased rates. There is no dispute in this case that there has been extension and the claims set-forth far beyond and above the rates as fixed in the agreement. Therefore, applying the principles in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, these claims totally fall well within the mischief of Clause 59 and thus gets barred. There is no dispute in this case that there has been extension and the claims set-forth far beyond and above the rates as fixed in the agreement. Therefore, applying the principles in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, these claims totally fall well within the mischief of Clause 59 and thus gets barred. Claim No.5 which is towards the loss incurred on account of keeping of the equipment idle from the date of stoppage of work which again virtually overlapped for similar such compensation for the work beyond the period where there has an extension and therefore, nothing as such can be attributed against the employer as held in the aforesaid decision and thus no liability can be mulcted against the Government and thus therefore, the very nature of the claim as set forth is falls again within the bar of Clause 59. Claim No.3 which relates to compensation on account of non-supply of food grains as per the conditions of the agreement, it again rests on the obligation as contemplated under agreement. Apart from the fact that there is no such total liability on the part of the Government to supply the food grains without which he could have proceeded with. The very clause which has been relied upon by the contractor for supply of the food grains reduced to the effect that clearly such supply would be made only if available, and therefore, it is not the case of the Contractor that though food grains were available it is not supplied by Government. There is no mention or any evidence in this regard let in on behalf of the contractor. Therefore, it is again the compensation which comes within the bar of Clause 59. In the claim No.4 the reimbursement of non-supply of cement is again a similar such obligation as the one stated to be in the earlier claim and even on this account, nothing has been pointed out on behalf of the contractor on facts or in details as to how it can be taken out from the claim for compensation as barred under Clause 59. The claim No.1 relates to extra lead of 4 k.m. for stone and metal is again attributable to the alleged delays, laches and breach on the department as complained by the contractor and therefore, such claim once again amounts to a compensation within the parameters of the bar as provided under Clause 59. Since we have found that the claims under items 2, 5, 3, 4 and 1 ex facie squarely come under the bar of Clause 59. In view of the very maintainability which go to the very root itself, these claims are squarely barred under Clause 59 as held in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in the case Ramnath International Construction Pvt. Limited's case (supra). 22. Having regard to the reasons as I especially, the authoritative pronouncement by the apex Court on the very question, we hold that the claims of the contractor are not sustainable and accordingly both the awards of Arbitrators dated 19.6.1985 and 19.6.1968 and the judgment and decree in O.P. No.118 of 1988 dated 7.10.1989 to the extent of awarding claims in respect of-the claim Nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 are set-aside and consequently we hold since the very claim being held to be not entitled, question of awarding any interest does not arise. 23. Hence, in the aforesaid circumstances, the appeals in CMA Nos.93, 94 and 95 of 1990 and CRP Nos.303, 304 and 305 of 1990 are allowed and CMA Nos.479, 480 and 481 of 1990 and CRP Nos. 1039 , 1040 and 1041 of 1990 are dismissed. However having regard to the circumstances of the case, there is no costs.