Judgment Mahesh Grover, J. 1. This is an appeal against the judgment and order of sentence dated 19.2.1998 of the Sessions Judge, Ambala (hereinafter described as `the trial Court) by which the appellant was convicted and sentenced in the following manner:- (i) for offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment of six months; and (ii) for offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment of three months. 2. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 3. In this case, the appellant and the deceased shared the same name, i.e. Gurmeet Kaur. The appellant is the Bhabhi (brothers wife) of Manmohan Singh, husband of the deceased-Gurmeet Kaur alias Dimpi. The marriage between the deceased, who was a divorcee and Manmohan Singh, again a divorcee, was solemnized on 26.2.1995 according to Sikh rites and ceremonies in Ambala. The deceased was a qualified teacher and was teaching in a reputed school in the city. Her mother-Joginder Kaur was also a teacher in the same school. According to the allegations made in the FIR, the demands of dowry and other articles were made upon the family of the deceased by her husband and the appellant, who is stated to be exercising immense influence in their family. Inder Singh, the husband of the appellant, used to work in Delhi and remained away from Ambala where she was sharing the residence with the deceased and her husband. It was alleged that a demand of Rs. one lac was raised upon the family of the deceased and on 21.5.1995, she was subjected to beatings and again, a demand of Rs. 50,000/- was made, which could not be fulfilled. The husband of the deceased was also alleged to be having illicit relations with the appellant and it was alleged that they used to sleep in the same room on one bed even in the presence of the deceased. 4. On 23.5.1995, Gurmeet Kaur alias Dimpi died on account of consumption of aluminium phosphate at about noon time.
The husband of the deceased was also alleged to be having illicit relations with the appellant and it was alleged that they used to sleep in the same room on one bed even in the presence of the deceased. 4. On 23.5.1995, Gurmeet Kaur alias Dimpi died on account of consumption of aluminium phosphate at about noon time. She is said to have called her parents, as a result of which Harpreet Singh alias Goldi, her cousin (fathers sisters son) took the deceased to her parents house on a scooter and since her condition became precarious, she was taken to "Dutta Nursing Home, Ambala" where she expired at about 4.00 p.m. barely within eighty seven days of her marriage. 5. Immediately after her death, the father of the deceased reported that they did not suspect any foul play in the death of their daughter. 6. The Investigating Officer visited the hospital and carried out the inquest proceedings. He also made an application for post-mortem of the dead body and recorded the statement of the complainant on the basis of which formal FIR was registered. Both Manmohan Singh and the appellant were arrayed as accused and necessary investigations were carried out by the police. Manmohan Singh also made a disclosure statement regarding the dowry articles and got them recovered. 7. The post-mortem report confirmed that the death had taken place due to poisoning. 8. After completing the investigative process, the challan was presented against Manmohan Singh, husband of the deceased and the appellant for facing trial under Sections 304-B and 498 of the IPC. 9. After submission of challan, Manmohan Singh died. 10. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge framed against her and claimed trial. 11. The prosecution, in its evidence, examined as many as ten witnesses. 12. The appellant, in her statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., pleaded innocence, but did not adduce any defence evidence. The trial Court, on the basis of the evidence produced before it, went on to convict and sentence the appellant as aforestated. 13. Before this Court, the counsel, who had filed the appeal, did not put in appearance despite the fact that the case was shown on the warning list for a number of days. Ultimately, Shri Ajay Kaushik, Advocate was appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court on behalf of the appellant. 14.
13. Before this Court, the counsel, who had filed the appeal, did not put in appearance despite the fact that the case was shown on the warning list for a number of days. Ultimately, Shri Ajay Kaushik, Advocate was appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court on behalf of the appellant. 14. Assailing the impugned judgment and order of sentence, the counsel appearing for the appellant contended that there was absolutely no evidence to show that there were any demands of dowry made by the appellant and in such an eventuality, her conviction under Section 498-A of the IPC, as also her conviction under Section 304-B of the IPC, could not be sustained as no overt act was either attributed or proved by any evidence on record. It was also contended that at best, if the allegations of demands of dowry and cruelty were to be accepted, it could be qua Manmohan Singh, the husband of the deceased and not qua the appellant as she was not having any role to play in the material affairs of the deceased and her husband. 15. On the other hand, Ms. Shalini Attri, Assistant Advocate General, Haryana appearing for the State contended that there was ample evidence on record to establish the guilt of the appellant and that she had been instrumental in making demands of dowry upon the family of the deceased and the death had taken place barely within eighty seven days of the marriage on account of consumption of poison which attracted the presumption of law under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act and accordingly, there was no infirmity in the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court. 16. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length and have also perused the record. 17. It stands proved from the evidence on record that the death of the deceased had taken place on account of consumption of aluminium phosphate within a period of eighty seven days of her marriage with Manmohan Singh. There was, thus, a strong presumption of law attracted to the facts of the present case and the onslaught of such a presumption has to be off-set by cogent evidence to be adduced by the appellant, which, unfortunately, has not been done.
There was, thus, a strong presumption of law attracted to the facts of the present case and the onslaught of such a presumption has to be off-set by cogent evidence to be adduced by the appellant, which, unfortunately, has not been done. But, that is not to say that the prosecution has discharged its onus satisfactorily because in so far as the appellant is concerned, the demands of dowry so raised ought to have been directly connected with her, which it has failed to establish. 18. Concededly, the appellant was sharing the same matrimonial home as that of the deceased and her husband. The husband of the appellant was stated to be serving in Delhi. There is tangible evidence in the shape of the statement of the father of the deceased, who has stated that demands of Rs. one lac and Rs. 50,000/- were made separately upon him which he could not fulfill. Such demands are normally to be connected with the obvious beneficiary, who can be the husband in the present case. There is, thus, no escape from the conclusion that Manmohan Singh, who was also an accused in the case, was instrumental in making the demands of dowry upon the family of the deceased. Failure to meet such demands led to harassment and cruelty. Had Manmohan Singh been alive, there would have been little hesitation in convicting him under the provisions of Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC, but his death has rendered the question academic and as a consequence, the search for an answer, unnecessary. 19. The appellant was alleged to be having illicit relations with Manmohan Singh, which is also borne out from letter Ex. PH allegedly written by the deceased and sent to her parents through a student in the school in which there is a reference of harassment and illicit relations she was having with Manmohan Singh. The letter, unfortunately, has not been proved in accordance with law as there is nothing on record to prove that it was in the hand of the deceased and hence, cannot be commented upon. However, in the circumstances, if the evidence is evaluated, it leads to an irresistible conclusion that the appellant was also guilty of harassing the deceased for reasons not necessarily connected with demands of dowry forcing her to take the extreme step within three months of the marriage.
However, in the circumstances, if the evidence is evaluated, it leads to an irresistible conclusion that the appellant was also guilty of harassing the deceased for reasons not necessarily connected with demands of dowry forcing her to take the extreme step within three months of the marriage. In a way, being the eldest lady in the family, she presumably was in control of the household affairs and wielding influence over it. She, therefore, cannot escape the conclusion of having tormented the deceased leading her to end her life by consuming poison. The harassment of the deceased at her hands would clearly reduce her role to that of an abettor forcing the deceased to commit suicide. Since there are no demands of dowry which have been proved against her, it would be unsafe to convict her under Section 304-B of the IPC. Her conviction under Section 304-B of the IPC is, therefore, converted to that under Section 306 of the IPC since she had clearly tormented the deceased leading her to take the extreme step, while her conviction under Section 498-A of the IPC is maintained. 20. Considering the circumstances of the case, where a young woman was forced to take her life on account of miserable conditions generated on account of harassment at the hands of the appellant and the husband of the deceased, there is no reason to interfere with the sentence awarded by the trial Court except for the fact that her conviction shall now be under Sections 306 and 498-A, instead of Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC. 21. With the above observations, the appeal stands disposed of.