Virendra Haribhau Gajbhiye v. State of Maharashtra
2007-09-06
A.H.JOSHI, R.C.CHAVAN
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
Oral Judgment Per A.H. Joshi, J. 1. Rule is made returnable forthwith and is heard by consent. Pleadings are complete. 2. This petition was initially filed by Gautam Magasvargiya Kapus Utpadak Sahakari Sootgirni Ltd., Saoner. By seeking leave to amend, the present petitioners were substituted. 3. The petitioners have a grievance against the order passed by the Government on 6-1-2007, by which the Government has declined to concede to the petitioners' proposal for their continuation in office as Ad hoc Board/Managing Committee. By same order, the Government directed to appoint an Administrator in place of the petitioners to manage the affairs of the Society. 4. According to the petitioners, the Government ought to have favourably considered their application dated 28-2-2005 and in case the Government would feel that the petitioners' request cannot be acceded to, the petitioners were entitled for hearing under Section 157 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. 5. According to the petitioners, they were waiting for the Government to decide their application, lest they would have taken steps for holding the elections which they could not attend to since the work of raising the plant was in the process. 6. Shri Shriniwas Deshpande, learned Advocate for the petitioners, took us through Section 157 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. The emphasis of the learned Advocate for the petitioners is on the aspect of hearing the Society in the event the decision being taken by the Government is adverse to the Society while deciding the question of exemption from certain provisions, and particularly as in the present case. 7. We find that the present Committee is the first Committee upon registration of the Society and such Committee was to be appointed by the State Government on the basis of the bye-laws thereof. The Committee, which is appointed, continues to hold the office until elected Committee enters the office. The Administrative Committee does not and cannot have a right of being continued for any specific tenure including tenure if any specified while appointing such Committee muchless beyond the term available under the Statute. Moreover, the members of such Committee do not have right either of tenure or otherwise, unless they are displaced with a stigma. We are supported in our view by the reported judgment in the case of Ashripatrao Limbaji Kadam and others v. State of Maharashtra and others (AIR 1979 Bombay 222). 8.
Moreover, the members of such Committee do not have right either of tenure or otherwise, unless they are displaced with a stigma. We are supported in our view by the reported judgment in the case of Ashripatrao Limbaji Kadam and others v. State of Maharashtra and others (AIR 1979 Bombay 222). 8. Admittedly, the petitioners have adopted a resolution, to which they regard resolution of the Society. Based on this resolution, the petitioners have applied for extension of their term. The petition proceeds on an assumption that if the Committee does not hold the elections within time, the Administrator is liable to be appointed and the Registrar or Administrator has to hold the elections. 9. It cannot be lost sight that when present Committee is an Administrative Committee appointed by the State Government, its continuation in the office is ordinarily at the will and pleasure of the appointing authority. 10. The application by such Committee for extension of term is for overcoming the obligation emerging from Section 73H of the Act. According to learned Advocate Shri Deshpande for the petitioners, this application is, therefore, an application for exemption under Section 157 of the Act. 11. We find that the petitioners have been very sternly attacking on the action of the Government in declining to grant extension and failing to hear the Society. 12. We also see that the contents of the resolution as well as the letter of request for extension do not contain any grounds and special circumstances as to why the appointed Committee should be continued for another five years by precluding the election which was due. 13. The petitioners are not able to show any rights available under the Statute to claim that the State should have extended their term notwithstanding the fact that before expiry of the terms, the steps to hold the elections were not taken. We find that this application is, therefore, an application by the Ad hoc Committee and not an application by the Society. The petitioners are mistaking themselves with the Society. 14. Hearing the Society as contemplated provided in Section 157 of the Act is attracted when the State Government would grant exemption to the Society from certain provisions, which results in prejudicing the Society. 15. Refusal of the State to extend the term of Ad hoc body can by no stretch be an act of prejudice to the Society. 16.
14. Hearing the Society as contemplated provided in Section 157 of the Act is attracted when the State Government would grant exemption to the Society from certain provisions, which results in prejudicing the Society. 15. Refusal of the State to extend the term of Ad hoc body can by no stretch be an act of prejudice to the Society. 16. The fact that the Government had called certain information and the same was furnished by the petitioners and the District Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies does not in any manner vest a right in the petitioners. In these premises, we find that no interference is called for. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. Rule is discharged with costs.