Judgment :- Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the Judgment and award dated 27.07.1999 made in M.C.O.P.No.704 of 1995 on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Principal District Judge), Dindigul. 2. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against the Judgment of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Principal District Judge), Dindigul dated 27.07.1999, whereby the claim petition M.C.O.P.No.704 of 1995 filed by the appellants herein have been dismissed. .3. Claiming to be the legal representatives and dependants of the deceased Raju, who met with an accident on 22.04.1995 at about 07.45 p.m. near Veerakkal Pirivu on Dindigul Chempatti Road involving the vehicle belonging to the first respondent herein, viz., a passenger bus, bearing Registration No.TN-57-A-0303 and later on succumbed to the injuries on the very same date, filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act and claimed a sum of Rs.1,50,000/-as compensation from the respondents 1 and 2. The claim petition filed by the appellants herein was taken on file by the Tribunal as M.C.O.P.No.704 of 1995. Similarly in respect of the very same accident and for the death of the above said Raju, his parents, who are respondents 3 and 4 herein and his sister one Jeya Bharathi (not a party in the appeal) preferred a claim petition in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995 on the file of the very same Tribunal for a sum of Rs.1,25,000/- as compensation against respondents 1 and 2, claiming that they alone were the legal representatives and dependants of the deceased Raju. Both the petitions were taken up for joint trial by the Tribunal, in which, as many as five witnesses were examined and 13 documents were marked on the side of the claimants in both M.C.O.Ps. 4. The first respondent herein, the owner of the offending vehicle did not file any counter statement and remained exparte. The second respondent/Insurance Company alone contested the claim, denying the allegations made in both the petitions regarding the manner in which, the accident took place, age, occupation and income of the deceased, nature of dependency alleged on the reasonableness of the amounts claimed as compensation. The second respondent chose to examine no witness on his side and no document was marked on the side of the second respondent in both M.C.O.Ps. 5. The second respondent chose to examine no witness on his side and no document was marked on the side of the second respondent in both M.C.O.Ps. 5. At conclusion of enquiry, the Tribunal heard the arguments advanced on both sides and upon a consideration of the materials on record, held that the driver of the offending vehicle, viz., a passenger bus bearing Registration No.TN-57-A-0303 was responsible for the accident and that the first respondent, as the owner of the offending vehicle and the second respondent, as the insurer of the offending vehicle were liable to pay compensation to the legal representatives and dependants of the deceased Raju. It was further held by the Tribunal that the appellants herein/petitioners in M.C.O.P.No.704 of 1995 were not the wife and son of the deceased Raju as claimed by them in their claim petition, nor were they the dependants of the deceased and that hence they were not entitled to any compensation for the death of the deceased Raju. .6. On the other hand, the claim of the respondents 3 and 4 herein (Petitioners 1 and 2 in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995) and Jeya Bharathi (Petitioner No.3 in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995) was upheld, holding that they being the parents and unmarried sister of the deceased Raju, who died as a bachelor, were his legal representatives and dependants and hence they were entitled to claim compensation to the exclusion of the appellants herein. The Tribunal assessed the quantum of compensation at Rs.1,24,000/-and directed the respondents 1 and 2 herein to pay the above said amount jointly and severally with an interest at the rate of 12% p.a. from the date of claim till date of deposit. The above said amount was directed to be apportioned among the parents and sister of the deceased Raju (petitioners in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995) in the ratio of Rs.50,000/-, Rs.50,000/- and Rs.24,000/- respectively. 7. The petitioners in M.C.O.P.No.704 of 1995, aggrieved by the dismissal of their claim in its entirety, have come forward with this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal. Two sets of claimants had made, separate claims for compensation by filing separate petitions before the very same Tribunal in respect of the death of one and the same person. The appellants filed M.C.O.P.No.704 of 1995 claiming themselves to be the legal representatives and dependants of the deceased Raju to the exclusion of other three claimants, viz., the claimants in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995. The appellants filed M.C.O.P.No.704 of 1995 claiming themselves to be the legal representatives and dependants of the deceased Raju to the exclusion of other three claimants, viz., the claimants in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995. On the other hand, the petitioners in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995, being the parents and sister of the deceased Raju, made a claim for compensation to the exclusion of the appellants herein, viz., the petitioners in M.C.O.P.No.704 of 1995. The claimants in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995 did not choose to implead the appellants herein/claimants in M.C.O.P.No.704 of 1995 either as co-claimants or respondents. They had maintained that the claimants in M.C.O.P.No.704 of 1995 were no way connected with the deceased Raju and their claims should be dismissed in entirety as they were neither the legal representatives nor the dependants of the deceased Raju. .8. On the other hand, the appellants/claimants in M.C.O.P.No.704 of 1995 claiming to be the wife and son of the deceased Raju respectively had made the claim against the owner and the insurer of the offending vehicle without impleading anyone of the petitioners in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995. Later on, after coming to know that the parents and sister of the deceased Raju had made a claim for compensation by filing a separate M.C.O.P., filed an application I.A.No.348 of 1998 and impleaded the parents of the deceased alone as respondents 3 and 4 in the above said M.C.O.P.No.704 of 1995. .Since two separate claims had been made by two sets of claimants for compensation in respect of the death of one and the same person, the Tribunal conducted a joint enquiry of both M.C.O.Ps. Though a common Judgment was pronounced, by which, M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995 the claim petition filed by the parents and sister of the deceased was allowed and compensation was awarded in their favour, whereas the claim petition made by the appellants herein, viz., M.C.O.P.No.704 of 1995 was dismissed, the appellants have chosen to prefer an appeal only against the dismissal of their petition and not against the award passed in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995, whereby the petitioners therein alone were held entitled to the apportionment of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. Except the third petitioner in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995, all other parties are the respondents in this appeal. Except the third petitioner in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995, all other parties are the respondents in this appeal. So far as the third petitioner in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995 Jeya Bharathi is concerned, she has not been made a party to the present appeal filed by the appellants herein. 9. The fact that the son of the respondents 3 and 4 herein by name Raju met with an accident on 22.04.1995 at about 07.45 p.m. on the Dindigul Chempatti Road near Veerakkal Pirivu, involving the bus bearing Registration No.T.N.57.A.0303 belonging to the first respondent herein and insured with the second respondent herein and sustained fatal injuries and that the above said Raju on the way to the hospital succumbed to the injuries on the very same date, is not in dispute. The finding of the Tribunal that the driver of the above said vehicle belonging to the first respondent was at fault and hence the respondents 1 and 2 herein, being the owner and insurer of the offending vehicle, were liable to pay compensation to the legal representatives and dependants of the deceased Raju has also not been disputed. The assessment of compensation at Rs.1,24,000/- by the Tribunal also has not been challenged either by the owner of the vehicle or by the insurer. .10. Under these circumstances, the following alone is the issue, that is involved in this appeal: ."Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation to the exclusion of the petitioners in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995 or along with them for the death of Raju either as the legal representatives of the deceased Raju or as his dependants?" 11. Mr.M.Ajmalkhan, learned counsel, advancing arguments on behalf of the appellants, would contend that the Tribunal committed an error in rejecting the claim of the appellants to be the legal representatives and dependants of the deceased Raju; that even assuming that the appellants could not be considered as legal representatives of the deceased, they should have been held entitled to compensation as dependants of the deceased, as sufficient evidence had been adduced to show that the deceased was living with the appellants herein and it was the deceased, who was maintaining the appellants herein and that the Tribunal should have held the appellants entitled to a share in the compensation awarded in respect of the death of Raju. 12. 12. Respondents 1 and 2 are not interested, since it is a matter between the rival claims made by two sets of claimants. Mr.K.Kumaravel, the learned counsel for the respondents 3 and 4 would contend that the appeal itself is not maintainable because the appellants have not chosen to file an appeal against the award passed in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995, in which not only the respondents 3 and 4 herein were the claimants but also one Jeya Bharathi, the daughter of the respondents 3 and 4 herein was the third claimant and compensation has been awarded by the Tribunal for all the three claimants in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995. The further contention of the learned counsel for the respondents 3 and 4 is that on a proper appreciation of evidence adduced on behalf of the appellants herein and on behalf of the respondents 3 and 4 herein, the Tribunal came to a correct conclusion that the first appellant was not the wife and the second appellant was not the son of the deceased Raju and hence at no stretch of imagination, they could be termed as legal representatives of the deceased. The learned counsel for the respondents 3 and 4 contended further that the claim of the appellants herein, as dependants of the deceased, based on the alleged marriage between the first appellant and the deceased Raju and on the averment that the second appellant was the son of the deceased Raju, was rightly rejected by the Tribunal, as it had been proved by ample evidence that the first appellant was the wife of one Joseph and the second appellant was the son of the above said Joseph and that hence there was no scope for interference with the well considered order of the Tribunal. .13. The appellants herein preferred a claim for compensation for the death of the deceased Raju claiming that they were respectively the wife and son of the deceased Raju. A parallel claim was made by the parents and sister of the deceased Raju by filing a separate M.C.O.P. Though the appellants had chosen to implead the parents of the deceased alone as respondents 3 and 4 in their claim petition, they did not choose to implead the sister of the deceased, who had made her claim based on the plea of dependency on the deceased. Even though both the M.C.O.Ps. Even though both the M.C.O.Ps. were tried together and a common judgment was pronounced and an award of compensation was passed in favour of the petitioners in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995 alone, holding that all the three petitioners therein were entitled to get compensation to the exclusion of the appellants herein, the appellants have not chosen either to challenge the award passed in the above said M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995 by filing a separate appeal against the same or to make the third petitioner therein as one of the respondents herein in this appeal, so that the Judgment pronounced in this appeal may have the effect of binding all the parties to the other M.C.O.P., viz., M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995. Therefore, this Court finds substance in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondents 3 and 4 that the appeal itself is not maintainable because of the non-joinder of the sister of the deceased in favour of whom also an award has been passed by the Tribunal in M.C.O.P.No.1011 of 1995. .14. Coming to the question of sustainability of the claim made by the appellants on the strength of the plea that the appellants are the wife and son of the deceased Raju, this Court is of the considered view that the Tribunal, on a proper appreciation of evidence, made a correct conclusion that the first appellant was not the wife of the deceased and the second appellant was not the son of the deceased Raju. The first appellant, who deposed as P.W.1, has candidly admitted that she was given in marriage to one Joseph and that the said marriage has not been dissolved. On the other hand, she would contend that the above said Joseph was of unsound mind and hence she married the deceased Raju during the life time of above said Joseph. Except the interested testimony of P.W.1, Rajammal that she underwent a form of marriage with the deceased Raju even during the life time of her husband Joseph, there is no other evidence to support her contention. On the other hand, clear evidence has been adduced on the side of the respondents 3 and 4 to the effect that there was no connection between the deceased Raju and the first appellant. The Tribunal is right in rejecting the claim of the first appellant that she was the wife of the deceased Raju. On the other hand, clear evidence has been adduced on the side of the respondents 3 and 4 to the effect that there was no connection between the deceased Raju and the first appellant. The Tribunal is right in rejecting the claim of the first appellant that she was the wife of the deceased Raju. So far as the second appellant Arockia Doss is concerned, there is the evidence of P.W.4 and Ex.P.8 Baptism Certificate, which clinchingly proved that the above said Joseph was his father and that he was not the son of the deceased Raju. 15. The further contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that even assuming that the appellants were not the wife and son of the deceased Raju, as they were proved to be maintained by the deceased Raju, they should be considered as eligible dependants for claiming compensation for the death of the deceased, has got to be rejected for more than one reason. At the first instance, the appellants had made their claim based on their assertion that the first appellant was the wife and the second appellant was the son of the deceased Raju and that only due to the said relationship, they were being maintained by the deceased. In order to substantiate their case that there was a marriage between the deceased Raju and the first appellant herein, besides examining herself as P.W.1, the first appellant has chosen to produce the following documents, they are: .(i) Ex.P.12 - the certificate of registration issued by the Sheristadar of the District and Sessions Judge to the deceased Raju registering him as an Advocate Clerk; .(ii) Ex.P.9 - the certificate regarding information furnished at the grave yard; (iii) Ex.P.11 – group photograph; .(iv) Ex.P.10 - notice issued by the Tahsildar to the first appellant, directing her to appear for the enquiry regarding her application for obtaining the legal heir certificate; .(v) Ex.A-5 - Legal Heir Certificate; and .(vi) Ex.P.13 - the office file relating to the above said Legal Heir Certificate. .16. Admittedly, before the alleged marriage with the first appellant and the deceased Raju, P.W.1 was given in marriage to one Joseph and the said marriage was not at all dissolved. Except Ex.P.11 and Ex.P.12, all other documents, admittedly came into existence after the death of the deceased Raju. .16. Admittedly, before the alleged marriage with the first appellant and the deceased Raju, P.W.1 was given in marriage to one Joseph and the said marriage was not at all dissolved. Except Ex.P.11 and Ex.P.12, all other documents, admittedly came into existence after the death of the deceased Raju. Ex.P.9 – certificate regarding information furnished at the grave yard may not be enough to prove that the first appellant and the deceased Raju underwent a form of marriage prior to his death.Curiously, the first appellant, who was examined as P.W.1, was not in a position to state the date, month and year of her alleged marriage with the deceased Raju. Ex.A.5 – Legal Heir Certificate was issued describing the appellants herein and the respondents 3 and 4 as the legal heirs of the deceased Raju. Of course there is Ex.P.10 to show that the Tahsildar, before issuing the certificate, sent a notice to the first appellant to appear before him for enquiry. But there is nothing on record to show that the said document was issued, after notice to the respondents 3 and 4 herein and after affording them an opportunity to make a representation of their case. Ex.P.13 office file relating to the issue of the legal heir certificate does not contain any reference to any notice issued to either of the respondents 3 and 4 or an opportunity being given to either of them to represent their case. It is pertinent to note from the said file that without conducting proper enquiry and without giving notice to the respondents 3 and 4, who are the parents of the deceased, based on the statement of the first appellant herein who claimed to be the wife of the deceased Raju, the Tahsildar has issued the above said Legal Heir certificate and hence no credence can be attached to the certificate issued by the Tahsildar, which has been marked as Ex.A.5. 17. If at all the first appellant and the deceased Raju, before his death, were living under the same roof as husband and wife and the second appellant was born to them, nothing prevented the appellants from producing the family card, voters ID card of the deceased or the voters list in order to substantiate their contention. 17. If at all the first appellant and the deceased Raju, before his death, were living under the same roof as husband and wife and the second appellant was born to them, nothing prevented the appellants from producing the family card, voters ID card of the deceased or the voters list in order to substantiate their contention. As none of the above said documents have been produced, no importance can be attached to Ex.P.11 group photograph, in which the deceased Raju is found along with the appellants. There is no evidence regarding the date on which and under what circumstances the said photograph was taken. The photographer was also not examined. Under these circumstances, the mere fact that the deceased happened to be in the group photograph along with the appellants will not be enough to come to a conclusion that the first appellant and the deceased were living as husband and wife and that the second appellant is the son of the deceased. .18. Yet another document relied on by the appellants is the certificate of registration of advocates clerk issued by the Sheristadar of the District and Sessions Judge, Dindigul to the deceased Raju to show that he was a registered advocates clerk. The same has been marked as Ex.P.12. A mere perusal of the said document will make it clear that an alteration has been made by inserting the words "Husband of Rajam" in brackets, after the name of the deceased. It is also obvious that the ink used for the said addition is different from the ink used for filling up other particulars. The normal practice is to mention the name of the concerned person along with the fathers name or husbands name and the male will not be described as husband of a particular woman in any of such certificates. As such, it is quite surprising that such a reference has been made to the first appellant in Ex.P.12. The same itself will be enough to reject the said document as a manipulated one for the purpose of making a claim of compensation for the death of the deceased Raju. 19. As such, it is quite surprising that such a reference has been made to the first appellant in Ex.P.12. The same itself will be enough to reject the said document as a manipulated one for the purpose of making a claim of compensation for the death of the deceased Raju. 19. On the other hand, the evidence adduced on the side of the respondents 3 and 4 are more than enough to show that the first appellant could not be the wife of the deceased and the second appellant could not be the son of the deceased Raju. The Baptism certificate of the second appellant has been produced on the side of the respondents 3 and 4 through one Michaelammal, P.W.4 and marked as Ex.P.8. In the said certificate, the first appellants name has been given as Maria Rajam and her husbands name as Joseph. P.W.4 happened to be the God Mother of the second appellant, at the time of Baptism. P.W.4 has given cogent evidence to the effect that the first appellant was the wife of Joseph and the second appellant was the son born to the above said Joseph and the first appellant and that she was the God Mother of the second appellant at the time of Baptism on 01.05.1977. Nothing has been elicited from P.W.4 to discredit her evidence. From Ex.P.8 and the evidence of P.W.1 corroborated by the admission of P.W.1, it is quite clear that the first appellant was the wife of one Joseph. The second appellant has not been examined as a witness on the side of the appellants. Neither the certificate of birth regarding the second appellant nor his school certificate has been produced to show his date of birth and the name of his father as per the records maintained in the respective departments. Even though such documents have not been produced by the appellants, the first appellant (P.W.1) has ventured to state that she had produced the birth certificate of the second appellant. In fact it is not so. The inbuilt contradictions in the evidence of P.W.1 would also improbabalise the case of the appellants that the second appellant was the son of the deceased Raju born through the first appellant. In fact it is not so. The inbuilt contradictions in the evidence of P.W.1 would also improbabalise the case of the appellants that the second appellant was the son of the deceased Raju born through the first appellant. When P.W.1 was examined on 08.07.1998, she stated that the marriage between herself and the deceased Raju took place about 13 years back, whereas the second appellant was stated to be 16 years old as on the date of filing of the claim petition, viz., 28.h09.1995. Therefore, it is quite clear that the second appellant could not be the son of the deceased Raju. 20. The Tribunal, after marshalling the evidence adduced on both sides in a proper manner, has come to a correct conclusion that the first appellant was not the wife of the deceased Raju and the second appellant was not the son of the deceased Raju. In a claim for compensation for the death of a person in a road accident, a claimant can succeed in getting compensation either as a legal representative or as a dependant or in both capacities. In this case, the appellants have miserably failed in their attempt to make a claim for compensation on the plea that they were the legal representatives of the deceased Raju in their capacity as wife and son of the deceased Raju. The further attempt made on the part of the appellants to show that even assuming that the first appellant was not the wife of the deceased, as there was a marriage between the deceased Raju and the first appellant, though not legal, the second appellant was entitled to claim compensation as a legal representative, as he was the son of the deceased Raju born through the first appellant. The said contention of the appellants that the second appellant was the son of the deceased Raju has got to be discountenanced for the reasons enumerated above. 21. The next line of argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that even though the first appellant was not the wife of the deceased and the second appellant was not the son of the deceased, as they were maintained by the deceased Raju as dependants, they were entitled to claim a share in the compensation, though attractive at the outside, cannot stand the scrutiny of the Court legally or factually. It has been pointed out supra that the appellants have not even proved such a dependency on the deceased at any point of time prior to his death. Apart from the same, even assuming that the deceased would have extended some help to the appellants during his life time out of mercy, that alone will not be sufficient to hold that the appellants were depending on the deceased. To say one is a dependant of other, there must be some kind of right conferred upon such person to put forth a legal claim for maintenance in the absence of proximity of blood or conjugal relationship. When such a test is applied to the facts and evidence of this case, the only conclusion that can be arrived at is that the appellants are not dependants of the deceased Raju. The Tribunal has come to a correct conclusion that the appellants were not entitled to compensation even as dependants of the deceased. There is no scope for interference with the decision made by the Tribunal that the appellants are not entitled to any compensation for the death of the deceased Raju and that the respondents 3 and 4 and their daughter Jeya Bharathi alone were entitled to claim compensation and the same deserves to be confirmed. 22. For all the reasons stated above, this Court comes to a conclusion that there is no merit in this appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed with cost. 23. In the result, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed with cost.