JUDGMENT M.Y. Eqbal, J. 1. This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment dated 7.9.2006 passed in W.P. (S) No. 3176 of 2004 whereby the learned Single Judge quashed the order passed by respondent No. 1 passed by Chairman- cum-Managing Director of the appellant M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited (in short BCCL) and directed for payment of back wages and other service benefits. 2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass: Respondent-Binod Kumar Singh while working as Personnel Manager with the appellant Company was made accused in a criminal case Instituted by C.B.I, in the year 1984 under Sections 420, 468,471 and 120B IPC on the allegation of some fraud and forgery in respect of grant of employment of class III and IV employees in the appellant Company. In the said criminal case being RC case No. 3 & 9 of 1984, respondent was convicted by judgment dated 21.12.1998 and was sentenced to go one years R.I. By reason of his conviction, respondent was served with notice dated 10.2.1999 calling upon him to show cause as to why penalties under Rule 27 should not be imposed on him. After considering the reply, respondent was dismissed from service by the appellant vide order dated 6.7.1999. In the meantime, respondent preferred appeal against the judgment of conviction and during pendency of this appeal, he retired from service on 31.8.2002. After his retirement, Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 1999 was decided vide order dated 1.10.2002 and the conviction was set aside and the respondent was acquitted from the charges. Respondent, thereafter, preferred representation seeking reinstatement in service from the date of his dismissal and all consequential benefits, but when the representation was not considered, respondent preferred writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 1619 of 2004 which was disposed of 24.3.2004 with a direction to the appellant-BCCL to dispose of the representation. Accordingly, representation filed by the respondent was disposed of rejecting the claim of the respondent for back wages/salary for the period of conviction i.e. 6.7.1999 to 31.8.2002. The respondent was also denied bonus, L.T.C., medical bills, etc. Respondent, thereafter, filed writ application challenging the order by which his representation was rejected. 3. Accordingly, representation filed by the respondent was disposed of rejecting the claim of the respondent for back wages/salary for the period of conviction i.e. 6.7.1999 to 31.8.2002. The respondent was also denied bonus, L.T.C., medical bills, etc. Respondent, thereafter, filed writ application challenging the order by which his representation was rejected. 3. Learned Single Judge, after considering the entire facts of the case, held that the respondent is entitled to back wages and all other benefits and quashed the order passed by the appellant. Although, learned Single Judge noticed the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board and Anr. and in the case of Union of India and Ors v. Jaipal Singh , but held that these two decisions of the Supreme Court are distinguishable for the reason that the conviction of the respondent was not relatable with his employment. According to the learned Single Judge, in the instant case, the respondent was deprived of the benefits of the service due to no fault of the employee. Para-6 of the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is quoted herein below: In the present case, the allegation against the petitioner had direct connection with his employment. He was accused of an act of fraud and forgery during the course of and in relation to his employment, finally he was acquitted of the criminal charge. Final Court has exonerated the petitioner of all the allegations against him having not been established and his conviction set aside. Dismissal of the petitioner was only on account of his conviction for the aforesaid offence. Had there been no complaint of his misconduct during the course of his employment, there had been no proceedings against him. As a matter of fact, he was tried at the instance of the employer. The conviction and later dismissal had direct nexus with the employment. It was not an individual or independent act of the petitioner which deprived the employer of the benefit of his service rather employee, was denied the benefit of his service, on account of criminal proceedings initiated in relation to his employment/service. His dismissal being solely on account of conviction, he cannot be denied the benefit of back wages and other service benefits on acquittal of the charges. His dismissal being solely on account of conviction, he cannot be denied the benefit of back wages and other service benefits on acquittal of the charges. Supreme Court has clearly indicated in 1996(11) SCC 603 (supra) that every case has its own facts. The facts of the present case are different from both the cases referral to above where the employee was found not entitled to back wages. 4. In the instant case, admittedly the C.B.I. instituted a-criminal case against 16 persons including the respondent under Section 120B read with Sections 420, 468, 471 IPC in relation to grant of employment of Class-III and Class-IV employees in BCCL. By judgment dated 21.12.1998, respondent was convicted along with other accused persons and were sentenced to undergo R.I. for one year. On account of conviction in criminal case, respondent was served a show cause notice calling upon him to show cause as to why penalties under Rule 27 should not be imposed on him on account of conviction in criminal case. After considering the show cause, the Disciplinary Authority by order dated 6.7.1999 dismissed him from service on account of his conviction in the said criminal case. However, by judgment dated 1.10.2002 passed in Cr. Appeal No. 6 of 1999, respondent was acquitted by the appellate Court holding that C.B.I. had wrongly implicated the respondent in the said criminal case. It is worth to be noticed here that before the judgment of acquittal passed by the appellate Court, respondent had already superannuated on 31.8.2002. It is, therefore, clear that because of judgment of conviction, respondent was dismissed from service on 6.7.1999 and during the pendency of the appeal, he was superannuated on 31.8.2002. In the aforesaid premises, the question that falls for consideration is as to whether respondent is entitled to full back wages. 5. As noticed above, the prosecution was launched not by the employer but by the C.B.I, and investigation was carried out by the said agency. F.I.R. was also lodged not by the employer but by the authorities of the C.B.I. It was only because of the conviction of the respondent which amounted to misconduct under the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978, he was dismissed from service. F.I.R. was also lodged not by the employer but by the authorities of the C.B.I. It was only because of the conviction of the respondent which amounted to misconduct under the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978, he was dismissed from service. In our view, therefore, respondent, as a matter of right, cannot and shall not be entitled to the entire back wages for the period he was out of service because of his conviction. 6. Recently, in the case of U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd. and Anr v. Uday Narain Pandey , the Supreme Court considered a similar question for grant of back wages. Their Lordship observed: 17. Before adverting to the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the parties, we may observe that although direction to pay full back wages on a declaration that the order of termination was invalid used to be the usual result but now, with the passage of lime, a pragmatic view of the matter is being taken by the court realizing that an industry may not be compelled to pay to the workman for the period during which he apparently contributed little or nothing at all to it and/or for a period that was spent unproductively as a result whereof the employer would be compelled to go back to a situation which prevailed many years ago, namely, when the workman was retrenched. Their Lordship further observed: 22. No precise formula can be laid down as to under what circumstances payment of entire back wages should be allowed. Indisputably, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each. It would, however, not be correct to contend that it is automatic. It should not be granted mechanically only because of technical grounds or otherwise an order of termination is found to be in contravention of the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 7. Undisputedly, the respondent had since attained the age of superannuation, the question of reinstatement does not arise. Because of judgment of acquittal, respondent will be entitled to his retiral benefits. In our view, therefore, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, grant of 50% back wages for the period respondent remained out of service will meet the ends of justice. 8. Because of judgment of acquittal, respondent will be entitled to his retiral benefits. In our view, therefore, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, grant of 50% back wages for the period respondent remained out of service will meet the ends of justice. 8. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is allowed in part and the judgment passed by learned Single Judge is modified to the extent that the respondent shall be entitled to 50% back wages for the period in question.