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2007 DIGILAW 1304 (MAD)

The Special Officer v. C. Deva Anbu & Another

2007-04-12

FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, K.VEERARAGHAVAN

body2007
Judgment : 1. This Writ Appeal is listed today for final hearing and we heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the first respondent and the learned Government Pleader for second respondent. 2. The present Writ Appeal arises out of the impugned order passed in W.P.(MD) No.8750 of 2006 dated 12. 2006, the operative portion of the same is reproduced below. "(12) Applying the above principles to the facts of this case and the petitioners suspension beyond one year is held unsustainable by Court in W.P. No.946 of 2004, dated 010. 2004. The second respondent is bound to pay full salary to the petitioner from the date expiry of one year period i.e., 8. 2003 to 112. 2004. The order suspension prior to 8. 2003, can be regulated by the respondent accordance with the rules. Hence, the second respondent is directed pay full salary to the petitioner from 8. 2003 to 112. 2004, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.” The appellant is the second respondent in the impugned order in Writ Petition No.8750 of 2006 and the first respondent is second respondent in the Appeal and the petitioner in the Writ Petition is the first respondent in this Writ Appeal. 3. We refer to the facts of the case as put-forth by the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. G. Pradbhu Rajadurai. It is stated that the appellant is the Nazarath Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd, and hence maintainability of the Writ Petition itself is not correct according to the learned counsel for the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the impugned order passed on 8. 2002 by the appellant herein was a suspension order against the first respondent and it is to be seen as it is and the consequences of the suspension order according to the learned counsel for the appellant is not automatic. The learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the impugned order passed on 8. 2002 by the appellant herein was a suspension order against the first respondent and it is to be seen as it is and the consequences of the suspension order according to the learned counsel for the appellant is not automatic. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the earlier Writ Petition in W.P. No.946 of 2004 was filed by the first respondent seeking for the following prayer: "For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit, it is prayed that this Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ or Order or Direction in the nature of Writ, calling for the records relating to the impugned order passed by the second respondent in his proceedings -Nil- dated 18.2002 and quash the same as illegal and pass such further or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case and thus render justice". 4. This Honourable Court was pleased to pass an order in the above mentioned Writ Petition No.946 of 2004 dated 10. 2004 and ruled as follows: "The suspension of the petitioner in each petition in my opinion is therefore opposed to by-law is liable to be quashed and the same is quashed. The Writ Petitions are allowed under costs. Consequently, connected M.Ps. are closed." 5. The order in Writ Petition No.946 of 2004 was not agitated by way of Appeal by the appellants herein and thus the said judgment attained finality. This Court entertained the Writ Petition No.946 of 2004, and passed an order dated 11. 2004, after considering the factual matrix and the law and quashed the order of suspension of the first respondent dated 8. 2004 which is impugned order in W.P.No.946 of 2004. Subsequently, in the order in W.P.No.946 of 2004 dated 10. 2004, the suspension being quashed, the appellant herein allowed the first respondent to join duty on 20.12.2004 but refused to pay the salary for the period commencing from 8. 2002 to 112. 2004 which is impugned order in W.P.No.946 of 2004. Subsequently, in the order in W.P.No.946 of 2004 dated 10. 2004, the suspension being quashed, the appellant herein allowed the first respondent to join duty on 20.12.2004 but refused to pay the salary for the period commencing from 8. 2002 to 112. 2004 i.e., from the date of suspension till he was allowed to join duty which is not the fault of the first respondent and only the appellant prevented the first respondent from performing his duty and when the order of suspension is quashed by this Court the natural consequences has to follow. The first respondent sent a lawyers notice dated 22. 2005 demanding the said arrears of salary as a consequence of this Honourable Courts order in W.P.No.946 of 2004 which was not responded nor the arrears were paid and hence for the second time the first respondent sought the equitable discretionary relief from this Court by preferring a "Judicial Review" in W.P.No.8750 of 2006 seeking a writ of mandamus to pay the arrears of salary. Which again due to the non-adherence of the order passed by this Honourable Court. This Court was pleased to consider the case of the writ petitioner in W.P.No.8750 of 2006 as well as the present first appellant and second respondent and passed an order directing the appellant herein and the second respondent to pay full arrears of salary to the first respondent from 8. 2002 to 112. 2004 since Rule 149(19)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules, 1988, contemplates as under: ‘No employee shall in any case be kept under suspension for a period exceeding one year without the approval of the Registrar.’ In the counter affidavit filed in the Writ Petition the appellant, admitted the fact that the first respondent joined duty on 20.12.2004. The appellant now contended that the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent herein in W.P. No.8750 of 2006 is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed on the ground that the appellant is a Co-operative Bank doing banking business and could not be termed as an instrumentality of the State. 6. Mr. The appellant now contended that the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent herein in W.P. No.8750 of 2006 is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed on the ground that the appellant is a Co-operative Bank doing banking business and could not be termed as an instrumentality of the State. 6. Mr. G. Prabhu Rajadurai, learned counsel for the appellant also took us through the various provisions of the "Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983" and submitted that it contains various procedures and when the `Act itself has various procedures to be followed for any redressal, invoking the writ jurisdiction is against the settled principles of law. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that the entertainability of the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when there is efficacious effective alternative remedies available to the first respondent under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 and the Rules thereon, is not correct in law. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant also invited our attention to the Larger Bench judgment of this Honourable Court in the case of K. Marappan v. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Namakkal Circle, Namakkal-636 001 and another, 2006 (4) CTC 689 , and specifically drew our attention to para 21 of the judgment in which the Larger Bench of this Honourable Court after making a thorough analysis of the various facets of law pertaining to the interpretation of `State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, observed that the Co-operative Societies may not come within the purview of ‘State and finally set out eight propositions that emerged out of the discussions and reasons of the Honourable Larger Bench. They are: "(i) If a particular co-operative society can be characterized as a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution (applying the tests evolved by the Supreme Court in that behalf), it would also be "an authority" within the meaning and for the purpose of Article 226 of the Constitution. In such a situation an Order passed by the Society in violation of the bye-laws can be corrected by way of Writ Petition. (ii) Applying the tests in Ajay Hasia it is held that a co-operative society carrying on banking business cannot be termed as an instrumentality of the ‘State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In such a situation an Order passed by the Society in violation of the bye-laws can be corrected by way of Writ Petition. (ii) Applying the tests in Ajay Hasia it is held that a co-operative society carrying on banking business cannot be termed as an instrumentality of the ‘State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. (iii) Even if a society cannot be characterized as a `State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, a writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty cast upon the society. In such a case, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the society is being treated as a ‘person or `an authority within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution and what is material is the nature of the statutory duty placed upon it and the Court will enforce such statutory public duty. Although, it is not easy to define what duty is, it can reasonably said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. .(iv) A Society, which is not a `State would not normally be amenable to the Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, but in certain circumstances, a Writ may issue to such private bodies or persons as there may be statutory provisions which need to be complied with by all concerned including societies. If they violate such statutory provisions a Writ would he issued for compliance of those provisions. .(v) Where a Special Officer is appointed in respect of the Co-operative Society which cannot be characterized as a `State a Writ would lie when the case falls under Clauses (iii) and (iv) above . (vi) The bye-laws made by a Co-operative Society registered under the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 do not have the force of law. Hence, where a society cannot be characterized as a `State, the service conditions of its employees governed by its bye-laws cannot be enforced through a Writ Petition. (vii) In the absence of special circumstances, the Court will not ordinarily exercise power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when the Act provides for an alternative remedy. Hence, where a society cannot be characterized as a `State, the service conditions of its employees governed by its bye-laws cannot be enforced through a Writ Petition. (vii) In the absence of special circumstances, the Court will not ordinarily exercise power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when the Act provides for an alternative remedy. (viii) The decision in M. Thanikkachalam v. Madhuranthagam Agricultural Co-operative Society, 2000 (4) CTC 556 , is no longer good law, in view of the decision of the Seven judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas case and the other decisions referred to here before". 8. We perused the Judgment and the propositions laid down by the Honourable Larger Bench of this Court and for the purpose of the present Writ Appeal the proposition No. (iii) and (iv) would be useful in which this Honourable Court categorically ruled that even if a Society cannot be characterized as a ‘State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, in certain special circumstances the Writ would lie against such persons or private bodies to enforce a statutory provisions and in the proposition No.(iv) as laid down by the Honourable Larger Bench it is clearly ruled that "a Society which is not a State would not normally be amenable to the Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but in certain circumstances, Writ Jurisdiction is available even against such private bodies or persons as there are statutory provisions which need to be complied with by all concerned including societies and the word "Not normally be amenable" is explicit to rule that there is no absolute bar for the exercise of the power of this Honourable Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If they violated such statutory provisions a Writ would be issued to correct the same. 9. The III and IVth proposition of law enunciated by the Honourable Larger Bench makes it clear that there is jurisdiction for this Court in certain special circumstances and entertainability of the Writ Petition, in our opinion in the present case on facts is not contrary to law. 9. The III and IVth proposition of law enunciated by the Honourable Larger Bench makes it clear that there is jurisdiction for this Court in certain special circumstances and entertainability of the Writ Petition, in our opinion in the present case on facts is not contrary to law. The further plea raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant being a Co-operative Bank is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Writ Courts is also not acceptable to us, since the appellant bank is also governed by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1983) and Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules, 1988 which mandates statutory performance of public duties and entertainability of Writs depends upon the special circumstances and the particular facts of each case and there is no absolute lack of jurisdiction for invoking the equitable and discretionary relief provided under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We also found that the Honourable "Larger Bench" in the case quoted above categorically stated that as and when there is a violation or non adherence of the statutory prescriptions found in the statute it is always open for this Honourable Court to step in to exercise the equitable and discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the power has to be exercised to effectuate the Regime of Law and not for abrogating it. On the peculiar facts of the present case we are unable to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant regarding maintainability aspect and the view taken by the learned Judge is justified. The learned Judge has considered the relevant circumstances in the present case and passed the impugned order keeping in view the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. 10. We find from the distinct facts of this case an order of suspension was quashed in W.P. No.946 of 2004 dated 10. 2004 and afterwards the respondent partly complied the order of this Honourable Court by allowing the first respondent to join duty on 20.12.2004 and denied the arrears of salary in spite of the suspension order being quashed by this Court in W.P.No.946 of 2004 dated 10. 2004 and afterwards the respondent partly complied the order of this Honourable Court by allowing the first respondent to join duty on 20.12.2004 and denied the arrears of salary in spite of the suspension order being quashed by this Court in W.P.No.946 of 2004 dated 10. 2004, which in our opinion is a flagrant violation of this Honourable Courts direction especially when the order in W.P.No.946 of 2004 reached finality, since neither the appellant nor the second respondent agitated the same by way of Appeal and therefore the first respondent sought redressal by preferring another Writ Petition No.8750 of 2006 in which this Honourable Court gave a specific direction to pay the full arrears of salary and that order which is impugned in the present Appeal is agitated on the ground of maintainability which stand of the appellant in our opinion is against the propriety and the letter of law. 11. We have perused the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of India in the case reported in Kanavalov v. Commander, Coast Guard Region, 2006 (4) SCC 620 , wherein the Apex Court declared the law as right to wages of any employee is an integral part of the right to livelihood and is entitled to protection under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and therefore in certain circumstances denial of arrears of wages amounts 10 transgression of constitutional mandate and would be construed as a violation of Constitutional Rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and on the consideration of the special circumstances and facts the above principle is applicable in the present case and it is also a settled law that wages and salary are one and the same and the former usually applies in the case of simple wage earners and the later may apply to higher income grant and thus the basic difference is very thin. .12. .12. The learned counsel for the appellant has substantiated his case by relying upon the judgment in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and another v. S.C. Sharma, 2005 (2) SCC 363 , in which the Honourable Supreme Court has ruled that the entitlement with regard to back wages or even full back wages would arise only when the employee is able to show that he was not gainfully employed and employer shall also be given opportunity to bring on record materials to rebut the claim of the employee and hence these exercise according to the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be done under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant was perused by us. In that judgment Their Lordships have ruled that the back wages cannot he treated as natural consequences whenever an order of termination is set aside and it was a case pertaining to dispensing with enquiry under Rule 19(ii) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and entitlement to full back wages without initial burden on employee to show that he was not gainfully employed and only in that context it was ruled that the employee neither pleaded nor placed any material to show that he is entitled to full back wages and thus the above case vary on facts with the present issue of law before us. It was a case in regard to an order of termination having set aside, the Honourable Supreme Court ruled that the back wages is not a direct consequences upon the order of termination. Whereas, in the present case the issue of law is whether the employee is entitled to get the arrears of salary as the case may be after the suspension order quashed by the judicial interference of this Honourable Court in W.P. No.946 of 2004 dated 10. 2004 and having allowed the first respondent to join duty on 20.12.2004 whether .14. The Teamed counsel for. the appellant also cited the case law in State of U.P and others v. Ajit Singh and another, 1998 (8) SCC 346 , to support his submissions. In that case it was ruled that in the case of suspension in certain situation the suspension can be construed as a deemed suspension as per the Rule 49-A(4)(a) if he was under suspension immediately before the penalty was awarded to him. In that case it was ruled that in the case of suspension in certain situation the suspension can be construed as a deemed suspension as per the Rule 49-A(4)(a) if he was under suspension immediately before the penalty was awarded to him. The order of his suspension shall subject to any direction of the appointing authority, be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of the dismissal or removal and this case differs on facts from the present case. In fact, in the present case, the short question is, in spite of the suspension order being quashed by the intervention of the Court of Justice in W.P. No.946 of 2004 dated 10. 2004 which became final and when that order was also partly complied with by allowing the first respondent to join duty on 20.12.2004 but not paid the arrears of salary after the lapse of one year from the date of suspension though Rule 149(19)(c) of Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rule mandates payment thereby driving the first respondent to file another Writ Petition No.8750 of 2006 for seeking compliance of the order passed in W.P. No.946 of 2004, and whether the appellant is justified legally by contending that arrears of salary is not the automatic consequence as a result of the quashing of suspension order on the special circumstances found in this case. The learned counsel for the appellant further relied on the following case for the point of law that the appellant can raise the plea of maintainability as regards W.P. No.8750 of 2006. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others v. Shyam Bihari Lal Gupta, 2005 (7) SCC 406 , it was ruled that the back wages cannot be given even in the case of a decree being obtained. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others v. Shyam Bihari Lal Gupta, 2005 (7) SCC 406 , it was ruled that the back wages cannot be given even in the case of a decree being obtained. We perused the above case law and found that in that case the order under challenge was termination and therefore that case also on facts distinguishable and for the execution of the decree which is governed by the procedural law in Civil Procedure Code a separate procedure is contemplated and unless the decree contains relevant material particulars in the decree it would not be possible to execute the said decree and only in that context Their Lordships ruled the law that the decree is absolutely silent so far as the back wages are concerned and as such decree becomes unforceable one. The above case also differs both on fact as well as on the point of law under consideration before us. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the case law in Banshi Dhar v. State of Rajasthan and another, 2007 (1) SCC 324 , and specifically relied upon para 8 and 9 of the judgment which reads as follows: "8. It may be true that the reason for long pendency of the trial or the Criminal Appeal filed by him may not be attributed to his acts of omission and commission but the fact remains that the entire period between 17. 1976 and the date when he reached his age of superannuation he did not work. He was placed under order of suspension validly from 1976 to 10. 1987. Legality of the order of dismissal on the basis of the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 22. 1985 has also not been questioned. It is true that his services were dispensed with as he had been convicted in a criminal case involving grave misconduct. On his acquittal, he was to be reinstated in service. He has been directed to be paid his pensionary benefits. The entire period during which he remained under suspension, thus, would be considered for calculating his pensionary benefits. Continuity of his service has also not been denied to him. The only question which arises for consideration, as noticed herein before, is as to whether in a situation of this nature back wages should have been granted to him. 9. The entire period during which he remained under suspension, thus, would be considered for calculating his pensionary benefits. Continuity of his service has also not been denied to him. The only question which arises for consideration, as noticed herein before, is as to whether in a situation of this nature back wages should have been granted to him. 9. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to grant of back wages. Each case has to be determined on its own facts. A grave charge of criminal misconduct was alleged against him. He was also found guilty of the charges levelled against him by the Special Judge. The High Court while delivering its judgment dated 11. 2001 in SB Criminal Appeal No.68 of 1985 inter alia held that the prosecution has not been able to prove that any demand had been made by him." 16. The findings of the Honourable Supreme Court of India is based on the fact that the petitioner in that case till reaching his age of superannuation did not work. He was placed under an order of suspension validly from 1976 to 10. 1987. Legality of the order of dismissal on the basis of judgment and conviction and sentence dated 22. 1985 has not been questioned. The law is well settled that each case has to be determined on its own facts and the above case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant also differs on facts from the present case since in the case before us after suspension order being quashed he was allowed to work through the intervention of the order of this Court. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the case in U.P State Road Transport Corporation v. Shri Birendra Bhandari, AIR 2006 SC 3220 , to impress upon this Court for the proposition that the payment of arrears relating to difference of salary, leave encashment, arrears of dearness allowance claim has to be made only through under Section 33-C(2) of the industrial Disputes Act and instead invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not correct according to the learned counsel for the appellant. We find that the said judgment also not helpful to the appellant since it was a case where the Honourable Supreme Court was pleased to consider the question regarding an adjudication of claim for back wages under Section 33-C(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, in which issue was whether a pre-existing right and the one flowing from a pre existing right is one and the same, and ruled that pre-existing right can be adjudicated by Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) and not the one flowing from pre-existing right which will have to be gone into or be considered in a judicious manner and thus the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the claim for the back wages is to be given only if the materials are placed before the appropriate forum which on a judicious manner be considered and decided and therefore invoking the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is impermissible is not acceptable to us since the impugned order in W.P. No.8750 of 2006 only directs the appellant to comply the earlier direction in W.P. No.946 of 2004 in full that too because of the failure to follow the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant further relied upon the case in State of UP and others v. Ratan Narain Mulla (Dead) by LRs., 1997(2) SCC 608. In this case also facts differs in the sense that it was a case pertaining to a person covered by Fundamental Rules who attained superannuation and the competent authority was directed to consider the payment of salary and allowances and other emoluments though employer conceded the right to claim full pension with continuity of service, and hence on facts the above case varies from the case under consideration. 18. We have heard the contra submissions of Mr. Ajmal Khan, the learned counsel for the first respondent. 18. We have heard the contra submissions of Mr. Ajmal Khan, the learned counsel for the first respondent. The learned counsel in his reply submissions relied upon the case, Union of India v. Braj Nandan Singh, 2005 (8) SCC 314 , specifically Paras 28 and 29 at page 324 in which the Honourable Supreme Court clearly ruled that the principles of "no work no pay" would not be accepted on the facts of the said case on the terms that when the workmen is willing to work but the employer did not allowing him to work, it would not be open to the employer to deny monetary benefits to the workman who was not permitted to discharge his duties and the learned counsel for the first respondent further contended that the order of suspension by the employer only prevented him from working and when the same was quashed, he was allowed to work on 20.12.2004 and thus it should be construed that the first respondent continued as a workmen and ought to have given the arrears of salary which is natural consequence. We find force in the submission and it is also necessary to consider the fact that the first respondent had "locus standi" to claim the arrears of salary since "vinculum ,juris " continued with employer after suspension. The learned counsel for the first respondent also drew our attention to the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Society Rules in Rule 19, sub-clause (c) which is reproduced below: "19. (c) No employee shall in any case be kept under suspension for a period exceeding one year without the approval of the Registrar". The learned counsel for the first respondent argued that the above said Rule is having the force of law and when the said Rule is not followed it amounts to procedural infraction especially the said old Rule is still enforceable so long as new rules replace it. 19. The learned counsel for the first respondent further submitted that the power of this Honourable Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere and set right the procedural infraction is an equitable one and in that aspect the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality, irregularities or improprieties, but only within the four corners of law, and therefore calls for no interference. The learned counsel for the first respondent also relied the case in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandsjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and others v. V. R. Rudani and others. AIR 1989 SC 1607 , to substantiate his case that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India Writs can be issued to any person or authority and it can be issued for enforcing of any Fundamental Rights and for any other purpose. 20. The judgment of the Full Bench in the case of K. Marappan v. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Namakkal Circle, Namakkal-636 001, 2006 (4) CTC 689 , in which this Honourable Court has not ruled that Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked at all in the case of Co-operative Societies, Co-operative Bank, etc., but clearly set out eight propositions of law, in which it was declared that the power of "Judicial Review" under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is available for the Courts of Justice and there is no lack of jurisdiction and the exercise of the power of Judicial Review depends on the special circumstances and facts of each case. We have also perused the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Kanavalov v. Commander, Coast Guard Region, 2006 (4) SCC 620 , and in that case the Honourable Apex Court declared the lex loci" that right of wages of any employee, is an integral part of the right to livelihood and is entitled to protection under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and we are of the opinion that on the distinct facts and special circumstances of the present case there is a violation of the Constitutional Rights and would attract Article 21 of the Constitution of India and it is settled Principle that whenever there is violation of Fundamental Rights the question of seeking alternative remedy is not required and in fact it was repeatedly ruled by the Court of justice that driving a party to seek alternative remedy is only a rule of self-imposed restriction and not an absolute bar and depends upon facts of each case. In the present case we have also considered the procedural violations committed by the appellant under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 and Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules, 1988 and from that point of view also there is failure to uphold the Rule of Law by the appellant which was rightly considered by the learned Judge while giving a direction in W.P. No.8750 of 2006. 21. On the basis of the discussions on the particular facts and special circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the impugned order in W.P. No.8750 of 2006 dated 12. 2006 passed by the Honourable Judge does. not call for our interference and ultimately the Writ Appeal fails and the same is dismissed without cost. Consequently, connected M.P. No.1 of 2007 is also closed.