JUDGMENT 1. 1. These six petitions arise out of cognizance order dated 7.5.1996 passed in different criminal cases. Since the factual matrix eminates out of same set of circumstances, since the arguments are common in all the petitions, therefore, they are being decided by this common judgment. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the cognizance orders dated 7.5.1996 whereby the Judicial Magistrate, Special Court, Economic Offences, Jaipur has taken cognizance for offences under Sections 276(c)(i) and 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ("the Act" for short). The factual matrix, taken from S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 758/1998, is that the petitioner is an Income Tax payee. However, from the assessment year 1981-82 to 1990-91, allegedly the assessee had mis-declared his income. On 25.9.1990, Officers of the Income Tax Department carried out a raid at the residential and business premises of the petitioner. During the course of raid, they discovered that the petitioner was engaged in the business of money lending @24% per annum. They also discovered that he was earning income by renting out the property. They also discovered undisclosed income of the assessee. In the return filed on 31.8.1990 for the assessment year 1990-91, the petitioner had shown his income as Rs. 21,970/-. However, it was discovered during the raid that he had earned Rs. 12,69,208/- by way of interest on the money lent by him and also earned Rs. 2,56,906/- by financing tractors to other persons. After concluding the raid, and after examining the documents recovered during the raid, the department came to the conclusion that the petitioner had evaded the tax to the tune of Rs. 70,00,000/-. Therefore, the department issued a notice to him under Section of the Income Tax Act. Consequently on 4.12.1992, the petitioner submitted a second return wherein he claimed that he had earned income of Rs. 5,03,090/- for the assessment year 1990-91. The re-assessment of his income revealed that even in his second return, he had not stated the correct income amount earned by him during the assessment year. The Assistant Collector, Income Tax, assessed the income of the. petitioner vide order dated 20.3.1993. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Income Tax Commissioner (Appeals) but even the Income Tax Commissioner (Appeals) concluded that the petitioner had evaded the payment of proper income tax. The petitioner, thereafter, filed an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ('ITAT' for short). The Assistant Collector, Income Tax, assessed the income of the. petitioner vide order dated 20.3.1993. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Income Tax Commissioner (Appeals) but even the Income Tax Commissioner (Appeals) concluded that the petitioner had evaded the payment of proper income tax. The petitioner, thereafter, filed an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ('ITAT' for short). Vide order dated 22.2.1997, the ITAT also held that the petitioner had evaded the payment of tax. Meanwhile, the Department filed a complaint against the petitioner for offences under Sections 276(c)(i) and 277 of the Act. It is pertinent to point out that the different complaints were filed by the department for different assessment years and the learned Magistrate took cognizance against the petitioner, in all the complaints filed by the department vide different orders, all dated 7.5.1996. Aggrieved by the orders dated 7.5.1996, the petitioner has filed the above mentioned petitions before this Court. 3. Mr. M.K. Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised number of contentions before us; firstly, that Section 276(C) uses the word "Wilful". Therefore, there is an element of intention involved. However, there is no evidence on record to prove the existence of the essential mens rea required for the commission of the offence. Therefore, no offence is made out under Section 276(C) of the Act; secondly that during the departmental adjudication and the appeal arising therefrom, it was discovered that the department has to refund Rs. 11,00,000/- to the petitioner and according to the findings of the ITAT, the petitioner was required to pay only Rs. 3,92,000/- by way of interest on the amount owed by the petitioner to the department. Therefore, the department had wrongly claimed that the petitioner had evaded income tax to the tune of Rs. 70,00,000/-. Therefore, the facts placed before the Sanctioning Authority were incorrect in their nature. Hence, the Sanction order grated by the Sanctioning Authority is vitiated; thirdly that according to Section 279(1) of the Act, no person can be prosecuted for offences under Sections 276 and Section of the Act except with the previous sanction of the Commissioner or Commissioner (appeals) or the appropriate authority. However, the sanction being passed on wrong set of facts, is illegal. Therefore, no valid sanction has been granted. However, the sanction being passed on wrong set of facts, is illegal. Therefore, no valid sanction has been granted. Hence, the cognizance order is unsustainable; fourthly, that once the Appellate Authority has come to the conclusion that there was no evasion of tax, then the prosecution could not be continued. In order to support this contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of K.C. Builders and anr. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (2004) 2 SCC 731 ; M. Murali Mohan v. State (Income Tax Officer, Nalgonda) 168 ITR 729 ; and G.L. Didwanai and Anr. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr. 224 ITR 687 . 4. On the other hand, Mr. Amar Singh with Mr. K.N. Garg, the learned counsels for he respondent-department, have argued that the departmental adjudication and criminal trial are two different and separate proceedings. According to the learned counsel, criminal complaint was filed on 30.3.1996. However, the ITAT did not decide the case till 20.2.1999. Therefore, prior to filing of the complaint, the department had rightly observed that the tax evaded by the petitioner was to the tune of Rs. 70,00,000/-. Secondly that the veracity of the facts narrated in the application for getting the sanctioned order or narrated in the sanctioned order itself, cannot be examined by this Court in its extra-ordianry jurisdiction under Section Cr.P.C. Thirdly, that the ITAT has not come to the conclusion, that there was "no evasion of tax by the petitioner". It has merely reduced the amount evaded by the petitioner. Therefore, the case law cired by the learned counsel for the petitioner are inapplicable to the present case. Lastly, that the essential ingredients of offences under Sections 276(C)(i) and 277 of the Act do exist. Since prima facie case has been made out against the petitioner, the cognizance order dated 7.5.1996 is legally valid. 5. We have heard both the learned counsels, have perused the record and have considered the case law cited at the Bar. Section 276(C)(1) of The Act deals with the "Wilful attempt to evade tax" and Section 277 deals with the "False statement in verification." Section 276(C)(1) reads as under:- 276(C)(1). 5. We have heard both the learned counsels, have perused the record and have considered the case law cited at the Bar. Section 276(C)(1) of The Act deals with the "Wilful attempt to evade tax" and Section 277 deals with the "False statement in verification." Section 276(C)(1) reads as under:- 276(C)(1). If a person willfully attempts in any manner whatsoever to evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or impossible under this Act, he shall, without prejudice to any penalty that may be imposable on him under any other provision of this Act, be punishable, (i) in a case where the amount sought to be evaded exceeds one hundred thousand rupees, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to seven years and with fine; (ii) in any other case, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to three years and with fine. Section 277 of the Act reads as under:- 277. If a person makes a statement in any verification under this Act or under any rule made thereunder, or delivers an account or statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false, or does not believe to be true, he shall be punishable, (i) in a case where the amount of tax, which would have been evaded if the statement or account had been accepted as true, exceeds one hundred thousand rupees, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to seven years and with fine; (ii) in any other case, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to three years and with fine. 6. Undoubtedly Section 276(C) uses the word "Willful attempt to evade tax" which would import an element of intention into the commission of the crime. However, the existence of the intention can be gathered only by the circumstances surrounding the actus reus. Therefore, the existence of the essential mens rea is a matter of evidence which can be produced, debated and decided only after a full fledged trial. However, the existence of the intention can be gathered only by the circumstances surrounding the actus reus. Therefore, the existence of the essential mens rea is a matter of evidence which can be produced, debated and decided only after a full fledged trial. It is too early in the day for this Court to decide on the existence of the required mens rea in the absence of any evidence produced before this Court. In fact, this court would be over-stepping its jurisdiction if it were to decide this issue at such an early stage. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the mens rea is absent in this case, such a contention is pre-mature and hence unsustainable. 7. In catena of judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is vast in its nature. But, the more vast the power, the more sparingly it should be used. In the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down eight circumstances in which the High Court, would be justified in interfering with the FIR or with the criminal complaint. Although the list of illustration is not exhaustive, but in order to make out a case for quashing of the cognizance order or the criminal proceedings, the petitioner would have to necessarily bring his case within one of these eight circumstances. 8. Furthermore, it is a settled principle of law that while taking cognizance, Magistrate cannot meticulously examine the evidence which has been produced before him. He is merely concerned at that stage to see whether prima facie case exists against the accused person or not? Therefore, his examination of the evidence is extremely limited. If prima facie case is made out, the Magistrate has no option, but to take cognizance of the offence. 9. Considering the facts of the case, it is apparent that the petitioner is an income tax payee. In fact, he has been paying income tax atleast since 1981. The assessment years which are in question, are from 1981-82 to 1990-91. Admittedly, the petitioner's residential and business premises were raided by the department on 25.9.96. During the course of raid, many incriminating documents were recovered. After examining these documents, the department had concluded that the petitioner had evaded income tax to the tune of Rs. 70,00,000/-. The assessment years which are in question, are from 1981-82 to 1990-91. Admittedly, the petitioner's residential and business premises were raided by the department on 25.9.96. During the course of raid, many incriminating documents were recovered. After examining these documents, the department had concluded that the petitioner had evaded income tax to the tune of Rs. 70,00,000/-. Therefore, the department had issued the notice under Section 148 of the Act and had granted the petitioner opportunity to re-submut his return for the respective assessment years. The assessment of the resubmitted returns also revealed that still the petitioner had not disclosed the correct income. 10. Since the department had reason to believe that the petitioner had committed offence under both these provisions, they sought sanction order from the concerned authority. Therefore, they placed the facts which were known to the department on the date the sanctioned order was sought. Thus, the subsequent reduction of the amount evaded by the petitioner would not invalidate the sanctioned order. For, veracity of the facts mentioned in the sanctioned order, have to be tested when the sanctioned order was granted. The veracity of the sanctioned order cannot be affected by the ultimate decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to the validity of the sanction, is unsustainable. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the case of K.C. Builders (supra). However, the said case is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. In that case, penalties were rightly imposed on the assessee on the ground that he has concealed his income. Since he had concealed his income, prosecution was launched for offence under Sections 276(C), 277 and 278(B) of the Act read with Section /34, 193, 196 and 420 IPC. However, subsequently the penalties were cancelled as the ITAT concluded that there is no concealment by the assessee. Therefore, in these circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that once the penalty is cancelled on the ground that there is no concealment, prosecution had to be quashed. 12. Similarly in the case of G.L. Didwania (.supra), the income of the firm was added into the assessee's total income on the ground that the firm was not a genuine one. However, subsequently the ITAT held that such an addition by the department was legally unmaintanable. 12. Similarly in the case of G.L. Didwania (.supra), the income of the firm was added into the assessee's total income on the ground that the firm was not a genuine one. However, subsequently the ITAT held that such an addition by the department was legally unmaintanable. Meanwhile, the prosecution had started against the assessee. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that considering the finding of the ITAT, the prosecution had to be quashed. 13. However, in the, present case, the ITAT has not concluded that there was no evasion of income by the petitioner. In fact, it has concluded that the petitioner owns Rs. 3,92,000/- by way of interest on the income tax payable to the department by the petitioner. Therefore, the ITAT has concluded that there was evasion of tax by the petitioner and the interest needs to be paid by him. Hence, prima facie case of willful evasion of tax does exist against the petitioner. Hence the case laws cited at the Bar, are inapplicable to the present case. 14. Considering the fact that the evasion of tax was discovered by the department after carrying out the raid, considering the fact that the petitioner as an assessee, did not reveal the correct income amount to the department, prima facie there seems to be willful attempt on his part to evade payment of tax. Moreover, both in his initial returns and in second set of returns, the statement made by the petitioner are prima facie wrong. Therefore, the essential ingredients of offence under Section 276(c) and 277 of the Act prima facie seems to exist. Thus cognizance order dated 7.5.1996 is legally valid. 15. In the result, these petitions have no force. They are, hereby, dismissed.Petitions dismissed. *******