JUDGMENT : Heard Mr.Meghe, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.Jaiswal, learned A.G.P., for respondents. Rule. Rule returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of parties. 2. By the present petition, the petition has challenged the order made by the Labour Court on 20.5.2005 dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioner/ complainant under M.R.T.U. & PULP Act as well as the revisional order and judgment made by the Industrial Court on 16.2.2207 in Revision (ULP) No. 137/05. 3. It was the case of the petitioner/complainant that he was engaged on daily wages basis as a driver with the respondents with effect from 24.12.1991 on daily wages of Rs.59=75 intermittently. It was his case that lastly he came to be terminated/discontinued with effect from 31.3.1993. He thus completed 240 days of continuous service and, as such, was entitled to the protection of Section 25-B read with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to him, and admittedly the mandatory procedure that is required to be followed under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, was not followed inasmuch as the petitioner was not paid the retrenchment compensation before his discontinuance/ termination from service. That was the only ground that was considered by the Courts below. 4. Per contra, Mr.Jaiswal, learned A.G.P., vehemently opposing the writ petition, submits that in his reply he has clearly pointed out that the petitioner was a daily wager and he was being provided with the work intermittently as and when available. According to him, in view of the decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi - 2006 (4) SCC 1 , a daily wager employee has absolutely no right to claim protection under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. He argued that there is a concurrent finding of fact by the courts below that the petitioner did not complete 240 days of continuous service in one year prior to the date of his discontinuation/ termination. He, therefore, argued that this Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below in its extra ordinary jurisdiction. He, therefore, prayed for dismissal of writ petition. 5. He, therefore, argued that this Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below in its extra ordinary jurisdiction. He, therefore, prayed for dismissal of writ petition. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and having gone through the writ petition as well as the impugned order, I find that unfortunately the courts below, namely the Labour as well as Industrial Court, who are supposed to be careful in calculating 240 days in accordance with law, have failed in their duty to do so. In the case of Mohanlal v. M/s Bharat Electronics Ltd. - 1981 (3) SCC 225 , in para 12, the apex Court held thus : .Sub-section (2) incorporates another deeming fiction for an entirely different situation. It comprehends a situation where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of sub-section (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer for a period of one year or six months, as the case may be, if the workman during the period of 12 calendar months just preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days. Sub-section (2) specifically comprehends a situation where a workman is not in continuous service as per the deeming fiction indicated in sub-section (1) for a period of one year or six months. In such a case he is deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year if he satisfies the conditions in sub-clause (a) of clause (2). The conditions are that commencing (sic) the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, in case of retrenchment the date of retrenchment, if in a period of 12 calendar months just preceding such date the workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purposes of Chapter VA. It is not necessary for the purposes of clause (2)(a) that the workman should be in service for a period of one year. It is not necessary for the purposes of clause (2)(a) that the workman should be in service for a period of one year. If he is in service for a period of one year and that if that service is continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) his case would be governed by clause (1) and his case need not be covered by clause (2). Clause (2) envisages a situation not governed by clause (1). And clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction to treat a workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered service for a period of 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment. In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant date, i.e. The date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained, move backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the period of 12 months, the workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively answered in favour of the workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed that the workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification enacted in Section 25-F. On a pure grammatical construction the contention that even for invoking clause (2) of Section 25-B the workman must be shown to be in continuous service for a period of one year would render clause (2) otiose and socially beneficial legislation would receive a set back by this impermissible assumptions. The contention must first be negatived on a pure grammatical construction of clause (2). And in any event, even if there be any such thing in favour of the construction, it must be negatived on the ground that it would render clause (2) otiose. The language of clause (2) is so clear and unambiguous that no precedent is necessary to justify the interpretation we have placed on it.. And in any event, even if there be any such thing in favour of the construction, it must be negatived on the ground that it would render clause (2) otiose. The language of clause (2) is so clear and unambiguous that no precedent is necessary to justify the interpretation we have placed on it.. Applying the said procedure in the instant case, there is documentary evidence submitted in the form of certificates showing number of days on which the petitioner was paid the wages. Reading of the certificates show that the exact number of days for which the workman worked and was paid in each month have been mentioned therein. The certificates are at Annexures F-1 and F-2 (page 57 & 58 of writ petition). Taking into consideration the date of termination, namely 31.3.1993, one will have to go back exactly by one year from the date of termination. Calculating number of days on the basis of these two certificates, which I have made, are shown below : Year Month No. of days worked 1992 : March = 01 1993 : April = 27 May = 21 June = 17 July = 27 August = 16 September = 21 October = 22 November = 21 December = 28 January = 22 February = 15 March = 07 ------------------------------- Total = 245 These are the figures which I have taken from the aforesaid two documents, Annexures F-1 & F-2, which show the exact number of days on which the petitioner worked in a particular month. From the above, it is clear that the petitioner thus completed 245 days in one year of continuous service prior to date of his termination. Admittedly the respondents did not at all comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act. The apex court in the case of Krishna Bahadur v. Purna Theatre & ors - 2004 (8) SCC 229 in paragraphs 12, 13 & 14 held as under : 12. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the provision of Section 25-F(b) is imperative in character. The apex court in the case of Krishna Bahadur v. Purna Theatre & ors - 2004 (8) SCC 229 in paragraphs 12, 13 & 14 held as under : 12. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the provision of Section 25-F(b) is imperative in character. The provision postulates the fulfilment of the following three conditions : (i) one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or wages in lieu of such notice; (ii) payment of compensation equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (iii) notice to the appropriate Government in the prescribed manner. 13. The requirement to comply with the provision of Section 25-F(b) has been held to be mandatory before retrenchment of a workman is given effect to. In the event of any contravention of the said mandatory requirement, the retrenchment would be rendered void ab initio. 14. In Workmen v. Sudder Workshop of Jorehaut Tea Co. Ltd. whereupon reliance had been placed by the Division Bench, this Court held : (SCC p. 408, para 3) .That apart, if there be noncompliance with Section 25-F, the law is plain that the retrenchment is bad.. In that case, however, compensation had been computed on the basis of wages previously paid and not on the basis of the Wage Board Award. The retrenchment had taken placed on 5.11.1966. No plea as regards non-payment of compensation calculated on the basis thereof had been taken before the Tribunal. Even the award did not proceed on that basis. The new plea based on the facts was not permitted to be raised by the High Court. This Court noticed that the Wage Board Award was subsequent to the retrenchment; although it was applied retrospectively i.e. with effect from 1.4.1966. In that situation, it was observed : (SCC p. 409, para 3) . In the absence of any basis for this new plea we are unable to reopen an ancient matter of 1966 and, agreeing with the High Court, dismiss the appeal. But the 16 workmen, being eligible admittedly for the Wage Board scale, will be paid the difference for the period between 1.4.1966 to 5.11.1966.. In the absence of any basis for this new plea we are unable to reopen an ancient matter of 1966 and, agreeing with the High Court, dismiss the appeal. But the 16 workmen, being eligible admittedly for the Wage Board scale, will be paid the difference for the period between 1.4.1966 to 5.11.1966.. It has also been held that for violation of provision of Section 25-F the relief of reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service must follow unless exceptional circumstances are made out by the employer. 6. In the instant case, there is absolutely no evidence on record from the employer for refusing the order of reinstatement or for other reliefs. In view of the above, I find that there is failure of exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the courts below in correctly calculating the number of working days of the petitioner. It appears that Labour and Industrial Court both have in ignorance of the law laid down by the apex court in the case of Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labourt Court & anr. . 1980(4) SCC 443 and in the case of Mohan Lal, cited supra, landed in error in applying the provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. 7. In the result, the writ petition must succeed. Writ petition is thus allowed. The impugned judgments and orders are quashed and set aside. The complaint filed by the complainant before the Labour Court is allowed. Impugned order of discontinuance/termination of petitioner is quashed and set aside. It is declared that the respondents engaged in unfair labour practice by terminating the services of the petitioner with effect from 31.3.1993. It is further ordered by way of affirmative relief that the respondents shall reinstate the petitioner in service within a period of three months from today with continuity of service and full back wages. Rule accordingly. No order as to costs.