J.M. MALIK, J. 1. Vide order dated 17th September, 1998, the trial court dismissed theapplication under Order 22 Rule 3 CPC for impleadment of legal heirs of the plaintiff and other applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act read withOrder 22 Rule 4(5) and Section 151 CPC for condonation of delay in filing theabove-said application and under OrderIRule 10 CPC moved by applicant NadirShah. Adumbrated in brief, the factsof the case are these. Secunder Shah expired on 7th February, 1994, leaving behind him, his wife,Gulshan Ara Begum, three daughters, Shamshad Sultana, Munwar Sultana and Tajbar Sultana and oneson, Nadir Shah. According to the plaintiffs/applicants, the right to suesurvived in their favour and therefore, they moved the above-said applicationson April, 1996. There was a delay of 739 days in filing the application underOrder 22 Rule 3. 2. The appellants have explained the delay as follows. Secunder Shahpurchased the suit property for the benefit of his family including himself. The respondent/defendant illegally occupied the above-mentioned property. In order to recover the possession of the property from the said trespassers, a suit for recovery of possession was filed. Secunder Shah was a resident ofNorth Lakhimpur, Assam. He was unable to personally look after his interest inthe property, therefore, he handed over the original title deed and otherdocuments to Aimil Shah, his son-in-law with the instructions to proceed with the above-said litigation and look after his interest in the suit property. Nadir Shah, his son, due to his pre-occupation in his business in Assam alsorequested Aimil Shah to proceed with the above-said litigation on behalf of his father-in-law. Initially, the suit was filed before the Honble High Court. Thereafter, due to enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court,it was transferred to the District Court. Since the case was dragging for morethan 10 years, therefore, Aimil Shah lost track of the above litigation.Secunder Shah gave Power of Attorney dated 6th January, 1994, whereby hegranted authority to Aimil Shah to prosecute the above-said matter and deposefacts on his behalf before the Court.However, Aimil Shah misplaced the above-said power of attorney dated 6th January, 1994. With the bona fide intention ofnot to display the above-said matter, another Power of Attorney dated 30thAugust, 1995 was prepared. With the bona fide intention ofnot to display the above-said matter, another Power of Attorney dated 30thAugust, 1995 was prepared. In the meantime, original Power of Attorney dated 6th January, 1994 was traced out but due to inadvertence power of attorney dated30th August, 1995 was filed before this court at the time of recording of evidence. It is also explained that Secunder Shah suffered burn injuries and ultimately succumbed to those on 7th February, 1994. 3. Shamshad Sultana, daughter of Secunder Shah was suffering from kidneydisease and her both kidneys were not functioning. She was in Delhi along withher mother for her treatment in Ganga RamHospital. The doctors had advised tokeep her away from any kind of tension and mental pain. The certificate issuedby the doctors was annexed with the application. Nadir Shah with the benevolentintention to not to cause any pain to her sister, Shamshad Sultana and for herwelfare had quiet funeral of his father.He did not inform about the death ofhis father to Aimil Shah with the bona fide intention that he might inform thedeath of their father to Shamshad Sultana and Gulshan Ara his sister and motherrespectively, who would not be able to tolerate the shock and pain as Aimil Shahwas looking after Shamshad Sultana staying in Delhi for continuoustreatment/dialysis. Neither Aimil Shah nor his wife, Munwar Sultana attendedthe funeral of Secunder Shah. 4. Again, during the settlement talks for the sale of the case propertybetween Aimil Shah and defendant it was agreed that on the next date of hearing,Secunder Shah would also be present. On 18th February, 1996, Aimil Shah calledthe counsel for the plaintiff and informed her that due to his preoccupation hecould not visit Lakhimpur and requested her to take a short date. He also askedher that he was leaving for Lakhimpur on 19th February, 1996 and will bring Secunder Shah to Delhi somewhere in the next week. On 20thFebruary, 1996 whenthe matter was called for hearing, defendant himself informed the Court about the death of Secunder Shah and the case was adjourned to17th May, 1996. On 20th February, 1996 Aimil Shah reached Lakhimpur and apprised Nadir Shah of the status of the present matter and enquired him about Secunder Shah. At thisstage, Nadir Shah informed him about the death of Secunder Shah. Aimil Shahcalled counsel for the plaintiff on 27th February, 1996 and informed her aboutthe death of Secunder Shah. On 20th February, 1996 Aimil Shah reached Lakhimpur and apprised Nadir Shah of the status of the present matter and enquired him about Secunder Shah. At thisstage, Nadir Shah informed him about the death of Secunder Shah. Aimil Shahcalled counsel for the plaintiff on 27th February, 1996 and informed her aboutthe death of Secunder Shah. Counsel for the plaintiff informed Aimil Shah thatlegal heirs of Secunder Shah were required to be brought onrecord and told himthat he should bringNadir Shah to Delhi to discuss the matter. On 6th April, 1996 Aimil Shah andNadir Shah visited the counsel for the plaintiff and gave all the details with regard to the legal heirs of Secunder Shah. On 8thApril, 1996 an application for impleadment of legal heirs and condonation of delay was given to Nadir Shah for getting the signatures of other legal heirs. Nadir Shahleft for Assam on 13th April, 1996 for getting the signatures of other legalheirs. On 16th May, 1996, counsel for the plaintiff received the papers signedby the legal heirs and accordingly, the application was filed on 17th May, 1996.It is prayed that under these circumstances the delay in filing the application for impleadment of legal heirs should be condoned. 5. In the meantime, an application under Order 1 Rule 10CPC was moved byNadir Shah. It was averred that Nadir Shah is a co-owner of the suit property and therefore, he is necessary and proper party to be impleaded as plaintiff in .the above said suit so as to protect the rights of other legal heirs in the suitproperty and to bring all necessary facts before this Court to adjudicate theabove matter. Again, his right as co-owner is independent and continuing right in the suit property and therefore, there lies no legal impediment in impleadingapplicant as plaintiff in the above-said suit. He also cited authority of PrivyCouncil in Mahmmedally Vs. Safiabai, AIR 1940 SC 215 and authority by the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Swaroop and Others Vs. Mool Chand and Others, AIR 1983SC 355. 6. The respondent contested this application tooth and nail. The respondentmade payment of rent in the sum of Rs.26,000/-through cheques dated 17.12.1994to October 1995, in the name of Secunder Shah. These cheques were duly encashedthough Secunder shah died on 07.02.1994. Mool Chand and Others, AIR 1983SC 355. 6. The respondent contested this application tooth and nail. The respondentmade payment of rent in the sum of Rs.26,000/-through cheques dated 17.12.1994to October 1995, in the name of Secunder Shah. These cheques were duly encashedthough Secunder shah died on 07.02.1994. On 20.11.1995Aimil Shah appeared inthe Court as general power of attorney of Late Secunder Shah and made statementas PW-I. In his statement he stated : “ I have brought the power of attorney dated 30.09.1995. At point A I, identify the signatures of the plaintiff. This power of attorney has beenattested by First Class Magistrate, Kamrup, District Guhati.This document has been attested by Magistrate as no notary public is available in Guhati. Thepower of attorney is Ex.PWI/I.” The trial court observed: “From a perusal of Ex. PWI/I. It is clear that Late Secunder Shah andAimil Shah are both residents of NorthLakimpur. The signature of SecundarShah at point A are absolutely different from the signatures of Secunder Shah onthe plaint, verification and vakalatnama. It is also clear that the attestingMagistrte has attested this power of attorney on 30th dayof August 1995 with the endorsement that Secundar Shah hassigned this deed on 30th day ofAugust 1995 in his presence.” 7. On 9th February, 2005, my learned brother Justice (Retd.) O.P.Dwivediordered, “Let appellant file affidavit of widow and the three daughters ofdeceased Secunder Shah regarding the knowledge of his death and delay.”Accordingly, all the above-said legal heirs of Secunder Shah filed theiraffidavits. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel forthe respondent vehemently argued that the stands set up by the appellant from time to time are poles apart and hetrogenous. In his affidavit dated 29thApril, 2005, Nadir Shah stated that he did not inform his relatives, who were inDelhi, about the death of his father, Secunder Shah. He also stated that herequested his sister Munwar Sultana not to tell about the death of their fatherto her husband Aimil Shah, who frequently visited Delhi to see Shamshad Sultana,who was hospitalised. 9. Now, I advert to the affidavit of Tajwar Sultana. She has also supportedthe case put forward by Nadir Shah. She also pointed out that as the situationdemanded, Nadir Shah informed his sister Shamshad Sultana and mother Gulshan Araabout the death of his father in April 1996. 9. Now, I advert to the affidavit of Tajwar Sultana. She has also supportedthe case put forward by Nadir Shah. She also pointed out that as the situationdemanded, Nadir Shah informed his sister Shamshad Sultana and mother Gulshan Araabout the death of his father in April 1996. She stated that as apprehended, her mother could not take the death of her father and after having heard about his death, her health deteriorated and she also expired on 19th August, 1998. Shamshad Sultana and Munwar Sultana, have supported the above said story intheir respective affidavits. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent vehemently argued that there isgross negligence on the part of the appellants. He also pointed out that the story propounded by the appellants is not worthy of credence. He submittedthat this story is made out of whole cloth and deserves no consideration. He argued that it stands proved the Aimil Shah had forged power of attorney dated 30.09.1995. In order to buttress his case, he has cited a number of following authorities. (a) In Ram Kala Vs.Deputy Director (Consolidation) and Others, [JT1997(8)SC8], the Supreme Court observed that they are not at all satisfied with the reasons given in the application for condoning the delay of 5 years inbringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased. It was pointed out that reasons were neither satisfactory nor reasonable and no sufficientcause had been formulated for condoning the delay. .(b) In State of Gujarat Vs. Sayed Mohd. Baquir El Edross, 1982 (1) SCR 551, itwas held that no grounds for condonation of delay were made out and the ApexCourt refused to set aside the abatement order. .(c) In Nandi Verdhan Jain Vs. Chander Kanta Jain and Another, 2002 (9) SCC 471 it was held that delay of 394 days is not satisfactorily explained and the review application was dismissed. .(d) In K Sreedharan vs.Chief Security Commissioner and Others, JT 2000 (10)SC 195, it was held that delay of 589 days is not satisfactorily explained. .(e) In Ajay Saxena Vs. Rachna Saxena, 135(2006) Delhi Law Times 314 (DB), the delay of 35 days in filing the appeal in respect of grant of medicalreimbursement to wife was not condoned. .(f) In Escorts Finance Ltd. Vs. Nielcome Ltd. And Anr., 85(2000) Delhi Law Times 773, there was a delay of 33 days in appearance which was not condoned. Rachna Saxena, 135(2006) Delhi Law Times 314 (DB), the delay of 35 days in filing the appeal in respect of grant of medicalreimbursement to wife was not condoned. .(f) In Escorts Finance Ltd. Vs. Nielcome Ltd. And Anr., 85(2000) Delhi Law Times 773, there was a delay of 33 days in appearance which was not condoned. It was a case of leave to defend. .(g) In Rama Krishna Exports and Others (M/s) Vs. Sh. Bharat Kumar Seth and Others, 2007 IIIAD (Delhi) 727, the ex parte decree was not set aside due tolack of sufficient ground. .(h) In Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Babu Ram, 2007 IIIAD (Delhi) 563, the appeal itself was filed after more than five years. An application forcondonation of delay was filed claiming ignorance of judgment of First AppellateCourt, restraining the MCD from demolishing the room filed by the appellant. The court held that the appellant hasfailed to prove that it has sufficientground for condonation of delay. .(i) In Satish Yadav andOthers Vs. Vijay Pal and Others, 2007IIIAD (Delhi) 525, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was dismissed. It washeld that no sufficient cause was pleaded at all. .(j) Lastly, the counsel for the respondent also drew my attention towardsSatish Yadav and Others Vs. Vijay Pal and Others,[2007 IIIAD (Delhi) 525],wherein the Tribunal dismissed the claim on the ground of delay and laches.There was a delay of 13 days. The court held that no justification orexplanation was put forward. The order passed by the Tribunal was confirmed. 11. I see force in these arguments in a measure. This is a peculiar case.Prima facie it appears that power of attorney, who happens to be the son-in-lawof the deceased adduced false evidence before the Court. The concerned SDM, incase his signatures are genuine, worked in cahoots with the said power of attorney. This is a serious matters, which cannot be dismissed out of hand.It is too early to speak my piece on this knotty problem. It cannot be said inwhich way the wind will blow. This matter requires evidence and investigation. The trial court is directed to decide the application moved under Section 340Cr.P.C. as per lawand take action against all the concerned parties including the SDM in case his involvement stands proved. 12. It cannot be said inwhich way the wind will blow. This matter requires evidence and investigation. The trial court is directed to decide the application moved under Section 340Cr.P.C. as per lawand take action against all the concerned parties including the SDM in case his involvement stands proved. 12. However, there is not even an iota of evidence which may goes to showthat the real legal representatives were aware of the abovesaid proceedingsconcerning production of false evidence before the court or the same were doneat their instance. The Court is bound to take a down toearth view. Certain harsh realities of life cannot be glossed over. The evidence discussed above that one of the legal representatives was suffering from kidney problem and was to be put on dialysis every now and then does not give a flavour of suspicion or doubt. This version is admittedly supported by medical evidence. All the legal representatives appear to have no quile. Their story has an aura of dependability. It is difficult to fathom as to why the legal representativesshould suffer for the omissions and commissions ofa power of attorneyparticularly when the law leans in their favour. No fault can be attributed onthe part of Nadir Shah, and wife of Aimil Shah who were keeping this fact asecret in order to save their sister. Under these circumstances, the courtwould assume that they had no knowledge about the death of their father. It must be borne in mind that if the court accepts the plea that suit standsabated, it would cause an irreparable loss to the legal representatives ofSecunder Shan and unlawful gain to the respondent. Should a trespasser or atenant be permitted to become the absolute owner of the suit property? 13. In Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji, 1987 Rajdhani Law Reporter, itwas held, “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enactingSection 5 of theIndian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts todo substantial justice to parties by disposing of matter on merits. 13. In Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji, 1987 Rajdhani Law Reporter, itwas held, “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enactingSection 5 of theIndian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts todo substantial justice to parties by disposing of matter on merits. Theexpression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elasticto enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves theends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institutionof Courts.” It was further held :- .(1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; .(2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrownout at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against thiswhen delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would bedecided on merits after hearing the parties; (3) “Every days delay must beexplained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not everyhours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rationalcommon sense pragmatic manner; (4) When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right ininjustice being done because a non-deliberate delay; (5) There is no presumptionthat delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact heruns a serious risk; (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technicalgrounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” 14. In Bhagwan Swaroop and others Vs. Mool Chand and others, AIR 1983 SC 355 ,the facts were these. In a suit for partition one of the respondents died onFeb 10, 1977. Application Under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC was moved on September 4,1981. It was held : “6. In Bhagwan Swaroop and others Vs. Mool Chand and others, AIR 1983 SC 355 ,the facts were these. In a suit for partition one of the respondents died onFeb 10, 1977. Application Under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC was moved on September 4,1981. It was held : “6. Having meticulously examined the contention advanced by the learned counsel on behalf of respondent No. 2Mool Chand, who isthe only contestingrespondent, we are satisfied that the application made by the appellants as wellas the one moved by the heirs and legal representatives of deceased respondent No. 1 should have been allowed and the heirs and legal representatives of deceased should have been substituted after setting aside abatement andcondoning the delay in making the application.” 15. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 , it was held, 9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can beexercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is nomatter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delayof the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptableexplanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts theexplanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less inrevisional jurisdiction, unless theexercise of discretion was on whollyuntenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior courtwould be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open tosuch superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. xxxxx 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They aremeant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek theirremedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damagecaused by reason of legal injury. Thelaw of limitation fixes a lifespan forsuch legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time isprecious and wasted time would never revisit. They aremeant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek theirremedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damagecaused by reason of legal injury. Thelaw of limitation fixes a lifespan forsuch legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time isprecious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy byapproaching the courts. So a lifespanmust be fixed for each remedy. Unendingperiod for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty andconsequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy.It is enshrined in the maxim interest republic up sit finis lithium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation. Rules of limitation arenot meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are ment to see thatparties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek theirremedy promptly. Theidea is that everylegal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay inapproaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive aliberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala DeviJain v. Kuntal Kumari and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down hisplea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of malafides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must showutmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to thinkthat the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning thedelay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite largelitigation expenses. While condoning thedelay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite largelitigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condonethe delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensatethe opposite party for his loss.” 16. In Mithailal Dalsangar Singh and Others Vs. Annabai Devram Kini andOthers, AIR 2003 SC 4244 , it was held, “In as much as the abatement results indenial of hearing on the merits of the case, the provision of abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other hand, the prayer for setting aside an abatement and the dismissal consequent upon an abatement, have to be consideredliberally.” 17. In K.Rudrappa Vs. Shivappa, 2004 (7) Scale 293 , the appellant was notaware of the pendency of the appeal. In this case, the Supreme Court held, “10............In such circumstances, in our opinion, the learned counsel forthe appellant is right in submitting that a hyper-technical view ought not tohave been taken bythe District Court in rejecting the application inter alia observing that no prayer for setting aside abatement of appeal was made andthere was also no prayer for condonation of delay. In any case, when separate applications were made, they ought to have been allowed. In our opinion, suchtechnical objections should not come in doing full and complete justice betweenthe parties. In our considered opinion, the High Court ought to have set asidethe order passed by the District Court and it ought to have granted the prayerof the appellant for bringing them on record as heirs and legal representatives of deceased Hanumanthappa and by directing the District Court to dispose of the appeal on its own merits. By no doing so, even the HighCourt has also notacted according to law. 11. Very recently, almost an identical case came up for consideration beforeus. In Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan Lahoti (D) by LRs. v. SanjeevprasadJamnaprasad Chourasiya and Anr., Civil Appeal No. 5255 of 2004, decided onAugust 16, 2004, the appellants heirs and legal representatives of deceasedGaneshprasad were not aware of an appeal filed by the deceased in the DistrictCourt, Jalagaon against the decree passed by the Trial Court. In Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan Lahoti (D) by LRs. v. SanjeevprasadJamnaprasad Chourasiya and Anr., Civil Appeal No. 5255 of 2004, decided onAugust 16, 2004, the appellants heirs and legal representatives of deceasedGaneshprasad were not aware of an appeal filed by the deceased in the DistrictCourt, Jalagaon against the decree passed by the Trial Court. When the appealcame up for hearing, the advocate engaged by the deceased wrote a letter toGaneshprasad which was received by the appellants find immediately, they made anapplication for bringing them on record as heirs and legal representatives ofthe deceased. The application was rejected on the ground that there was legalrepresentatives of the deceased. The application was rejected on the ground that there was no prayer for setting aside abatement of appeal nor for condonation of delay. The appellants, therefore, filed separate applications which were also rejected and the order was confirmed by theHigh Court. We had held that the applications ought to have been allowed by the courts below. We, therefore, allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the District Court aswell as of the HighCourt and allowed the applications. In our opinion, thepresent case is directly covered by the ratio in the said decision and theorders impugned in the present appeal also deserve to be set aside.” 18. In Ram Nath Sao Vs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors, (2002) 3 SCC 195 , it was held, 12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the code or any othersimilar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advancesubstantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide isimputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependant upon facts of each case.There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanationfurnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that thecourts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the causeshown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposaldrive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bone fide can beimputed to the defaulting party. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bone fide can beimputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matterthe courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within thetime prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should notbe lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However, bytaking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanationfurnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the list terminates either by default orinaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.” (emphasis supplied) 19. In Malik Bhupinder Singh and Others Vs. Raj Gupta andOthers [ 2006 (88)DRJ 590 ], the legal representatives of one of the co-owners of the property werenot brought on record within the stipulated time in a suit for recovery forspecific performance of contract. It was held that that was not a sufficientground for declining the condonation of delay and holding that the suit hadabated in its entirety. It was further held that no motive or gross negligenceon the part of the plaintiff could be attributed. The delay was found to befree from mala fide intent. The delay was condoned. 20. In Bhag Mal (alias)Ram Bux and Others Vs. Munshi (Dead) by Lrs. AndOthers, JT 2007 (4) SC 14, it was held, “The provisions of statute of limitation cannot be construed in a pedantic manner. This is now a well knownprinciple.” In this case, the court read liberal trend on setting aside theabatement and the issue of finality of decision on abatement together. It washeld that considerable leeway has been accorded to proceedings to set aside abatement because abatement leads to serious consequences and the emphasis onample opportunity to set aside abatement has been laid down. 21. In Niamat Kaur Vs. Union of India, 1973 Rajdhani Law Reporter, it was heldthat the petitioner could not file regular first appeals in the High Courtwithin the period of limitation. 21. In Niamat Kaur Vs. Union of India, 1973 Rajdhani Law Reporter, it was heldthat the petitioner could not file regular first appeals in the High Courtwithin the period of limitation. She made miscellaneous application forcondonation of delay giving plausible reasons which cause the delay in filingthe appeals. It was further held on consideration of AIR 1925, Lah. 439; AIR1972 Lah. 49; AIR 1960 S.C. 375; 1970(2) S.C.R. 90 ; I.L.R. 1971 Delhi 358;1972(1) S.C.R. 336 that the word sufficient cause in section 5 of theLimitation Act should be given a liberal construction so as to advance thesubstantial justice when no negligence nor inaction, norwant of bona fide isimputable to the appellant. The explanation given by the appellant was foundsufficient and applications were allowed. 22. In view of the abovesaid discussion and in the interests of justice, Iallow FAONo. 421/1998 and set aside the order passed by the trial court. Theapplication under Order 22 Rule 3 CPC for impleadment of legal heirs of the plaintiff and another application under Section 5 of theLimitation Act readwith Order 22Rule 4 (5) and Section 151 CPC are hereby allowed subject topayment of Rs.10,000/- as costs, to be paid by the appellants to the respondentbefore the trial court on the date, to be fixed hereinwith. 23. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the requestmade by the appellants to enhance the rent/mesne profits is not being consideredfor the time being.However, nothing in this order would debar the appellantsto move another application with this prayer before the trial court after theexpiry of one year from the date of this order. 24. The appellants are directed to file the amended memo of parties before thetrial court. The trial court is directed to decide the case as well asapplication under Section 340 Cr.P.C. on merits. Both the parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 1st August, 2007. The trial court recordalong with a copy of this order be sent back forthwith.