MANAGEMENT OF ADITYA HOROWGICALS LIMITED, DODDABALLAPUR v. D. K. NARAYANASWAMY
2007-02-27
SUBHASH B.ADI
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER This writ petition is directed against the award dated 16-3-2002 in Reference No. 49 of 1994, LD. Nos. 4/94, 5/94, 6/94, 7/94 and 23/94 passed by the Labour Court, Bangalore. Respondents 1 to 11 sought for reference of their dispute under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The State Government by its order dated 22-8-1994 referred the dispute of respondents 1 to 11. Some of the respondents namely, respondents 12 to 16, who were also party in the reference made by the State Government, also raised individual dispute under Section 10(4-A) of the Act. The State Government referred the point of dispute as under: "1. Are the Management of M/s. Adithya Horologicals Limited, Doddaballapur justified in retrenching the following workmen after declaring the lay off.- 1. D.K Narayanaswamy; 2. K V. Ramanjinappa; 3. M. Rajanna; 4. N. Shivashankar; 5. T. Prakash; 6. T.D. Venkatachalaiah; 7. B. Shivakumar; 8. M.A. Shivakumar; 9. M.P. Suresha; 10. KH. Ravikumar; 11. B.M. Rangaswamy. 2. If not, to what relief the workmen are entitled?" Respondents 12 to 16 in their dispute also raised the identical issue. 2. Case of the respondents is that, they have been working in the petitioner-Management continuously from 1986 onwards and they are the workmen within the' meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. They were working in various departments like Crowns Buffing, Crowns Segregation, Crowns Assembling, Crowns M.S. Segregation and Crystals. It is the case of the respondents that immediately after the formation of the Union, the Management laid off the respondents with effect from 27-9-1993 and retrenched them with effect from 1-1-1994 and which action of the Management, according to the respondents, is illegal, inoperative, bad in law and is in violation of principles of natural justice. The alleged that such retrenchment is violative of Sections 25-N, 25-G" 25.H and 25-F of the Act and also Rule 77 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). 3. Respondents alleged that no notice has been issued to them and they are all senior workmen experienced in respective sections. They were transferred from one department to another department and the entire establishment is one unit and the principle of 'last come first go' is required to be applied to comply with the requirement of Section 25-G of the Act.
Respondents alleged that no notice has been issued to them and they are all senior workmen experienced in respective sections. They were transferred from one department to another department and the entire establishment is one unit and the principle of 'last come first go' is required to be applied to comply with the requirement of Section 25-G of the Act. It is also alleged that the petitioner-Management has adopted unfair labour practice, victimization of the workman for their trade union activities. Further alleged, that Rule 77 of the Rules requires, the preparation and publication of list of all workers in different categories at least 7 days' advance of the retrenchment, so as to achieve the object of Section 25-G in a proper, justifiable manner in order to avoid discrimination amongst the workmen. They also alleged, that the said retrenchment is violative of Section 25-H of the Act. 4. Petitioner contested the claim of the respondents mainly on the ground that respondents are not the members of Karnataka Employees' Federation, nor the dispute is expoused by the Union and same is required to be rejected. It is also contended that workmen's individual applications are not maintainable. Further, it is submitted, that all the respondents were trained in the department of Acrylic Crystal with tension rings and they were working exclusively in the said department having no exposure to any other work and, the said unit is closed with effect from 7-9-1993 and there is no victimisation of the workmen. The main customers of the petitioner were the HMT and 'TITAN and the HMT was the only customer buying Acrylic Crystal with tension rings, whereas the TITAN was purchasing only Crowns. In the light of HMT cancelling the orders of Acrylic Crystal glass, the work in the said department of manufacturing Acrylic Crystal was closed IInd the workmen were laid off with effect from 27-9-1993. Thereafter, there being no improvement in the order situation of the manufacturing of Acrylic Crystal glass, the Management was constrained to retrench the respondents-workmen with effect from 1-1-1994. The petitioner-Management denied that the workmen were entrusted to work in all the sections of the factory and the workmen have experience to work in the other sections of the factory. It is also submitted that the workmen have been paid the wages for one month and the retrenchment compensation as provided in law.
The petitioner-Management denied that the workmen were entrusted to work in all the sections of the factory and the workmen have experience to work in the other sections of the factory. It is also submitted that the workmen have been paid the wages for one month and the retrenchment compensation as provided in law. As far as the permission required, the petitioner-Management contended that, since the number of employees engaged in the petitioner-Management being less than 100, the' permission is not required. It is also stated, that the list of entire workmen working in Acrylic Crystal section was prepared and exhibited on the factory notice board on 15-12-1993 itself and the petitioner-Management has not engaged the services of casual labour in the said department. As such, there is no violation of Section 25-F of the Act. 5. In support of the case of the respondents-workmen, they examined one K.V. Ramanjinappa as W.W. 1 and documents Exs. W. 1 to W. 29 were marked and on behalf of the Management, three witnesses were examined as M.Ws. 1 to 3 and Exs. M. 1 to M. 45 were marked. 6. The Labour Court framed points for determination as under: (1) Whether the lay-off declared by the Management with effect from 27-9-1993 and thereafter the retrenchment made by it with effect from 1-1-1994 as against the first party-workmen is valid and justified? (2) If not, to what relief the workmen are entitled? 7. The Labour Court on elaborate consideration of the grounds urged by both the parties, arrived at a finding, that the strength of the workmen in the petitioner-factory is less than 100 employees and the permission under Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not required. 8. As far as the compliance of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, the case of the Management is that the workmen were engaged in a separate department of manufacturing of Acrylic Crystal with or without tension rings, and the entire section having been closed, the question of going into the principle of 'last come first go' does not arise, is concerned, the Labour Court found that the workmen were appointed as general workmen and their appointment is subject to transfer from one department to another department and subject to working in any of the department.
This finding is arrived at by the Labour Court on the basis of the evidence of M.W. 2, who is working as Accounts Officer and who, in his evidence, admitted that the workmen were appointed as general workmen and they were allowed to work in all the sections. The Labour Court also found that there is no proof, that the petitioner-Management has made available the seniority list seven days before the order of retrenchment. It also found that, no such list was produced even before the Labour Court. Considering the evidence of both the parties, a categorical finding was given by the Labour Court that the petitioner-Management has not complied with the requirement of Sections 25-G and 25-F in the matter of retrenchment of the respondents-workmen and it also found that the retrenchment of the workmen by the Management is illegal. Based on these findings, the Labour Court passed an award for reinstatement and 50% of back wages and also granted 25% of the wages for the lay-off period with continuity of service and all other consequential benefits. 9. Sri S.Y. Shastry, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that 11 persons i.e., respondents 1 to 11 have individually signed the reference application and the Conciliation Officer and the State Government referred the dispute in Reference No. 49 of 1994 as a collective industrial dispute and in respect of the point under dispute, if that is the reference made by the State Government, in respect of the same issue, the individual workman filing a claim petition under Section 10(4-A) of the Act is not maintainable. He also submitted that the cause of collective dispute can be expoused only by the Union and not by individual and in this case, the cause having been collectively expoused by 11 persons, the respondents 12 to 16, who were applicants in Reference No. 49 of 1994, cannot maintain a separate application for the same cause in an independent application under Section 10(4-A) of the Act. 10.
10. He submitted that these respondents were specially trained by the petitioner-Management to work in the departmental of Acrylic Crystal with tension rings and the said department was closed on account of main customers namely, HMT having cancelled the orders and the other customer having stopped purchasing and there being no improvement in the position, the petitioner-Management closed that section and the department and in view of the closure, the question of following Sections 25-G and 25-H does not arise. He further submitted that one month's wages and retrenchment compensation has been paid and there is full compliance with the requirement of Section 25-F of the Act. 11. He further submitted that no permission under Section 25-0 is necessary as the number of employees engaged by the petitioner is less than 100 and he also pointed out, in respect of the said issue, the Labour Court has found in favour of the petitioner. As far as the award relating to grant of compensation of 25% for the laid-off period is concerned, learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to para 12 of the writ petition and pointed out, that the certified standing order does provide for retrenchment of the workman. He particularly referred to Clause 17(e) and submitted that, if during a period of one calendar year, lay-off exceeds 45 days then lay-off beyond the first 45 days shall be without any compensation and/or the management may retrench the laid-off workmen at the end of 45 days lay-off and/or at any later date and also shall have the right to set-off the lay-off compensation paid towards retrenchment compensation. Relying on the said clause, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Labour Court was not justified in awarding lay-off compensation when the clause does not provide for payment of lay-off compensation beyond 45 days and he also submitted, that the respondents having been retrenched, the question of paying laid-off compensation also does not arise. 12. As far as compliance with Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, learned Counsel submitted that, since the entire section having been closed, the question of compliance with Section 25-G or 25-H of the Act does not arise. He also submitted that compliance with Rule 77 of the Rules also is not required, under the facts and circumstances of the case, as the unit itself is closed.
He also submitted that compliance with Rule 77 of the Rules also is not required, under the facts and circumstances of the case, as the unit itself is closed. In regard to relief, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the one month's notice, the wages has been paid and also retrenchment compensation having been paid, the Labour Court was not justified in directing the petitioner-Management to reinstate the workmen and also payment of 50% of wages and payment of 25% lay-off compensation. 13. Learned Counsel in support of his contention relied on judgments reported in Hotel Ambassador v Its Workmen and Others Managing Director, Haryana Seeds Development Corporation Limited v Presiding Officer and Others, Deepak Industries Limited and Another v State of West Bengal and Others and State of Punjab and Others v Des Bandhu. 14. Sri K Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that, the question as to whether respondents 1 to 11 collectively seeking reference of the dispute and thereafter some of them raising individual dispute does not require to be, gone into by this Court. In this regard, he pointed out from para 9 of the award and submitted, that the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents workmen before the Labour Court gave up the contention of, as to whether the individual claim petition of the workmen under Section 10(4-A) of the Act is maintainable or not. He submitted that once such a contention having been given up by the respondents and allowed the Labour Court to record that submission and thereafter, in this writ petition raising some question is impermissible. It is in this regard, he strongly relied on a judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra v Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Another and submitted that the Judges' record is conclusive, neither a lawyer nor the litigant may claim to contradict it, except before the Judge himself, but nowhere else. The Court should not launch into an enquiry, as to what transpired in the Labour Court. In this regard, he referred to paragraph 4 of the judgment and pointed out that the Privy Council in a decision reported in Somasundaran v Subramanian2, itself has held the Court is bound to accept the statement of Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in Court.
In this regard, he referred to paragraph 4 of the judgment and pointed out that the Privy Council in a decision reported in Somasundaran v Subramanian2, itself has held the Court is bound to accept the statement of Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in Court. The Court cannot allow the statement of Judges to be contradicted by a statement at Bar or by affidavit or other evidence. He also pointed out that even if a party thinks that the happenings in Court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges to call attention of the very Judges, who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in en-or. Referring to para 4 of the said judgment, learned Senior Counsel submitted that it is not now open to the learned Counsel for the petitioner to raise an issue as regard the maintainability of the individual disputes raised by the workmen after having raised a collective dispute by the State Government or any collective dispute is not maintainable. 15. As regards to compliance with Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, learned Senior Counsel submitted that it is an admitted case of the petitioner-Management that the respondents are the workmen and it is also admitted by M.W. 1 and M.W. 2 in their evidence that these workmen were appointed as general workmen and not for specific or special purpose. He also pointed out from the said evidence that these workmen were required to work in all the departments. If that is so, it is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that closing of one section or not, it does not affect the rights of the workmen, particularly when the retrenchment is not in accordance with law. He also pointed out that the seniority list, which is required to be prepared under Rule 77 of the Rules is admittedly not prepared nor has been produced before the Labour Court.
He also pointed out that the seniority list, which is required to be prepared under Rule 77 of the Rules is admittedly not prepared nor has been produced before the Labour Court. Further, he also submitted that not following the principle of 'last come first go' and retrenching the workmen in violation of the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H would necessarily attract the setting aside the retrenchment order and also requires the Labour Court to pass an appropriate award including direction for reinstatement. He further submitted that the question as to whether the section of the factory is closed, the question as to whether the seniority list is prepared, the question as to whether the principle 'last come first go' are concerned, are all the matters of question of fact and the Labour Court on appreciation of the evidence, has given' elaborate, cogent and valid reasons and he also submitted that this' Court exercising its power under Article 226 or 2270f the Constitution does not sit in appeal over the finding of facts of the Labour Court. He further submitted that those findings even otherwise have been' arrived based on the evidence on record. 16. Ai; far as the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there is no reference of dispute on the point, as to whether there is violation of Sections 25-G and 25-H is concerned, learned Senior Counsel submitted, that what is required to be seen from the point in dispute is, not the words, but the substance of point in dispute. It is in this regard, he also relied on a decision in the matter of Management of Express Newspapers (Private) Limited, Madras v Workers and Others and referred to para 19 of the judgment and submitted that, the Courts must attempt to construe the reference not too technically or in a pedantic manner, but fairly and reasonably, even the inelegant phraseology in framing the issue cannot conceal the fact that in dealing with the issue, the main point which the Labour Court is required to consider. He also submitted that the principle of 'last come first go', more so, cannot be departed without valid reason. In this regard, he also referred to the decision in the matter of M/s. Swadesamitran Limited, Madras v Their Workmen.
He also submitted that the principle of 'last come first go', more so, cannot be departed without valid reason. In this regard, he also referred to the decision in the matter of M/s. Swadesamitran Limited, Madras v Their Workmen. By relying on these decisions and• also- the findings of the Labour Court, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the award does not call for interference. 17. In reply, Sri S.V. Shastry, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Reference No. 49 of 1994 is concerned, in law, it is not maintainable, as it is not the union, which has expoused the collective cause of the workmen. He pointed out that all the 11 workmen have• signed the reference application. He further submitted that having referred the dispute, the question of 5 persons amongst 11 persons cannot maintain an, individual dispute before the same Court on the same issue does not arise. He also submitted that when there is no point for dispute in respect of the requirement of Sections 25-G and 25-H, the question of the Labour Court passing an award, directing the petitioner-Management to reinstate and pay the back wages and also lay-off compensation. and service benefits does not arise, as this issue was not under reference before the Labour Court. On these submissions, learned Counsel for- the petitioner submitted that the writ petition requires to be allowed. 18. After concluding the argument, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that from amongst 11 persons, 5 persons have settled their dispute. 19. In the light of the contention of both the parties, the questions that arise for consideration in this writ petition are.- (1) Whether the Reference No. 49 of 1994 collectively raised by 11 persons, is maintainable in the absence of an Union raising the dispute? (2) Whether in the light of the Reference No. 49 of 1994, whether the same workmen would also maintain an individual dispute? (3) Whether without there being point of reference in regard to compliance with Sections 25-G and 25-H, the Labour Court could give a finding on the said issues? (4) Whether the relief of reinstatement could be granted by the Labour Court? 20.
(3) Whether without there being point of reference in regard to compliance with Sections 25-G and 25-H, the Labour Court could give a finding on the said issues? (4) Whether the relief of reinstatement could be granted by the Labour Court? 20. As regards to the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that 11 persons approaching the Conciliation Officer and getting the dispute referred collectively in Reference No. 49 of 1994, some of them raising individual dispute is concerned, this aspect of the matter may not be necessary to be gone into by this Court particularly in the light of the findings arrived at by the Labour Court at para 9 wherein, the Labour Court has not gone into the said question, in view of the submission made by the learned Counsel representing the respondents-workmen, which reads as under: "9. The learned Counsel Sri J.K representing the management in his arguments, did not press the contentions raised by it with regard to the non-maintainability of the present proceedings of reference on the ground that there was no proper 'espousal of the dispute by the first party union and that reference is bad as already I.D. Applications were filed by some of the workmen challenging the retrenchment order. Therefore, those contentions are answered as not pressed.....". Once the Management gives up its contention and makes the Labour Court not to go into the question as to whether the dispute is maintainable or not, the said question cannot be gone into by this Court particularly when the Labour Court has given that finding based on the submission made by the learned Counsel for the Management. It is not open to this Court to know as to what transpired before the Labour Court and what made the learned Counsel for the Management to give up such contention. 21. That is required to be seen is, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is purely a legal question and requires to be considered. It is not in dispute, that the point in dispute is, as to whether the retrenchment of 11 workmen is justified or not.
21. That is required to be seen is, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is purely a legal question and requires to be considered. It is not in dispute, that the point in dispute is, as to whether the retrenchment of 11 workmen is justified or not. In this regard, both the parties on merit have adduced evidence before the Labour Court and have allowed themselves to join the issue on merit and have invited the findings on the issue as to whether the retrenchment of 11 workmen is justified or not. Even assuming that 11 persons together have sought reference of their dispute and thereafter, they also filed individual dispute. It does not in any way prejudice as far as the case of the Management is concerned, as the Management has led evidence on the question whether the retrenchment of the workmen is justified or not. Having done so, and particularly having given up that contention, I find there is no reason for this Court to sit in appeal as to whether such a statement has been made or whether the question requires to be considered again. There is no reason for the Labour Court to go into such question, which is not pressed into service. If that is so, there is no reason to reconsider the same. 22. As far as contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that following of or complying with the requirement of Sections 25-G and 25-H the Act is concerned and 11 workmen were specially and exclusively trained by the Management in the department of Acrylic Crystal with tension rings and they had no exposure to any other work and that department having been closed for want of orders from the customer and there being no improvement, the question of maintaining the seniority list or complying with Sections 25-G and 25-H does not arise is concerned, the Management has led the evidence of three witnesses and M.W. 2, who is an Accounts Officer, in his oral statement has admitted that the respondents-workmen were appointed as general workmen and they were allowed to work in all the sections. It is also admitted that the service of the workmen is transferable from one department to another department.
It is also admitted that the service of the workmen is transferable from one department to another department. If that is so, the closure of one section of the industry will not affect the service conditions of the workmen is concerned, particularly from the appointment order and also from the admission of the Management that they were not' only appointed as general workmen, but they were subjected to work in all the departments. That being so, it cannot be said that the section of the industry is closed and on account of the closure, the Management does not require to comply with Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act. 23. It has come in the evidence of M.W. 2, that in compliance of Rule 77 of the Rules, a list is maintained. However, no such list is produced nor evidence is produced for having published such list 7 days before the retrenchment. It has also come in the evidence of the Management that 'last come first go' principle has not been followed mainly on the ground that the entire section has been closed, apart from the findings of the Labour Court, that these workmen are not subjected or specialized only for a particular department. It is clear from the evidence on record, that if the workmen were appointed as general workmen and they were subjected to transfer from one department to another department, then any of the workman is required to be retrenched from the service on any ground, then, the Management is required to comply with requirement of Section 25-G of the Act, inasmuch as Section 25-G provides procedure for retrenchment where any workman in an industrial establishment is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of the workmen in the establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person employed in that category, for reasons to be recorded, the employer retrenches the workman. This provision is clear that, in the event if the Management wants to retrench its workmen, it can do so only by following Section 25-G and in view of the evidence of the petitioner-Management, that it has not followed the provisions of Section 25-G and has retrenched the workmen, it is clear case of illegal retrenchment. 24.
This provision is clear that, in the event if the Management wants to retrench its workmen, it can do so only by following Section 25-G and in view of the evidence of the petitioner-Management, that it has not followed the provisions of Section 25-G and has retrenched the workmen, it is clear case of illegal retrenchment. 24. Section 25-H of the Act assumes importance in the matter where the workman is retrenched in compliance with Section 25-G, is required to be re-employed. The fact that there is no seniority list maintained, the fact that the principle 'last come first go' is not followed, the workmen having been retrenched, the retrenchment, in my view, amounts to illegal retrenchment and workmen so retrenched are entitled for consequential benefits of illegal retrenchment. 25. Learned Counsel had relied on a decision in the case of Deepak Industries Limited, which relates to distinction between Sections 2-A and 2-K of the Act in regards to individual dispute and the industrial dispute. This judgment is relied in the light of the collective dispute raised by 11 persons. As I have held that the said issue was not pressed into service by the petitioner-Management before the Labour Court, I do not find any reason to consider the said decision or apply the same to the facts and circumstances of this case. Insofar as the decision relied by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the case of Managing Director, Haryana Seeds Development Corporation Limited. This decision relates to closure of an industry. In case of closure of an industry, the question of giving notice or salary in lieu thereof imposed by Section 25-F is not attracted and it does not amount to retrenchment. The said judgment is applicable only in the event if the industry is closed or part thereof is closed, but in this case, it is not the workmen, who were engaged in a particular section of the industry, but their appointment itself is in respect of all the departments and the industry having not been closed, the question of closure theory is not attracted in this case. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on another decision in the matter of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v Om Prakash Sharma, in order to point out that compliance with Section 25-H for violation of Rule 77 is not warranted.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on another decision in the matter of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v Om Prakash Sharma, in order to point out that compliance with Section 25-H for violation of Rule 77 is not warranted. It is necessary to notice the facts of the said case. In the said case, the workman had not established that he had completed 240 days of continuous service nor the termination of workman was in issue. What was in issue was, whether the list as required under Rule 77 of the Rules is prepared or not. As such, the principle enunciated in the said decision on fact is not applicable to the-facts and circumstances of this case. He also pointed out that in the matter of granting relief under Section 25-F, he pointed out, from the findings of the Apex Court in a pending matter in the case of Des Bandhu, that whether a direction for reinstatement could be granted is required to be reconsidered and submitted that the issue as to granting direction for reinstatement of workman is a matter still not decided by the Apex Court and the said issue is still pending. In terms of the judgment referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, what is required to be noticed here is that, the said matter is not decided. The Apex Court only has deferred the matter for consideration of the said issue. The Apex Court has referred to the judgment of three Judges in the matter of Manager, Reserve Bank of India v S. Mani, wherein the Apex Court has held that non-compliance of Section 25-F includes the direction for reinstatement. 26. In this case, it is not in dispute that all these workmen were appointed by the Management. It is also not in dispute that they have been retrenched without following the procedure or complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. If their retrenchment is illegal, then they are required to be restored to their original position and I find no reasons to differ with the finding of the Labour Court or the award passed by the Labour Court for reinstatement.
If their retrenchment is illegal, then they are required to be restored to their original position and I find no reasons to differ with the finding of the Labour Court or the award passed by the Labour Court for reinstatement. As such, even on the question of relief, the Labour Court having found that the retrenchment is illegal, the only course that was open to the Labour Court was to reinstate the workmen to the original position and to grant relief of back wages. However, the Labour Court taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, has found that the workmen are not entitled for full back wages and has restricted to 50% back wages. To this extent, I find no reason to interfere with the award. 27. As regards to the grant of 25% lay-off compensation is concerned, the Labour Court at para 14 has granted award of lay-off mainly on the ground that the retrenchment of workmen is having been held illegal, they are entitled for the lay-off compensation. In my view, the grant of lay-off compensation, in the facts and circumstances of the case, does not arise as it was not the issue, which was dealt into by the Labour Court. The main issue before the Labour Court was, whether the retrenchment of the workmen is illegal or not. Once the retrenchment is found to be illegal and consequential relief having been granted, the question of granting relief of lay-off compensation does not arise and to this extent, the award requires to be modified and it is necessary to be noticed that the workmen have mainly agitated their grievances only in respect of their retrenchment. If that is so, the award to this extent is required to be modified. 28. At this stage, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that insofar as workmen namely, respondent 1-D.K. Narayanaswamy, respondent 6-T.D. Venkatachalaiah, respondent 8-H.A. Shivakumar, respondent 9-N.P. Suresha and respondent 11-B.M. Rangaswamy, they have settled their dispute and in this regard, he referred to an agreement entered as per Annexure-E produced along with rejoinder and the receipts signed by each of these workmen. He further submitted that insofar as all these persons are concerned, the dispute is required to be rejected and the award to this extent is required to be set aside. 29.
He further submitted that insofar as all these persons are concerned, the dispute is required to be rejected and the award to this extent is required to be set aside. 29. Learned Senior Counsel Sri K Subba Rao submits that he has no instructions as to whether these workmen have entered into such a settlement and is not in a position to either admit or deny the said agreement. 30. If the workmen have signed the agreement and have received the benefits under the agreement, it is needless to state that to the extent of their dispute is concerned, it is deemed to have been settled. However, if the workmen dispute the agreement or the receipt of amount under the relevant receipts, it is a matter required to be considered. To this extent, a direction is necessary to be issued to the Labour Court to go into the question as to whether those workmen have settled their dispute or not. If the dispute is settled in terms of the agreement, then the Labour Court to close the proceedings, if the dispute is not settled, then they will be entitled for the benefit along with these persons in terms of the order passed by this Court. Accordingly, I pass the following order.- The writ petition is partly allowed. The award of reinstatement with back wages with continuity of service and consequential benefits is concerned, same is confirmed. The award granting 25% of the wages for the lay-off period is concerned, is set aside. A direction is issued to the Labour Court to issue notice to respondents-workmen viz., respondent 1-D.K Narayanaswamy, respondent 6-T.D. Venkatachalaiah, respondent 8-H.A. Shivakumar, respondent 9-N.P. Suresha and respondent 11-B.M. Rangaswamy. Sub hash B. Adi, J. W.P. No. 26592 of 2002 15-3-2007 On 27-2-2007, this matter was heard and order was also dictated in the open Court and after the completion of the order, a submission was made to find out, as to whether the five workmen have signed the settlement or not, and today, the learned Counsel for the respondents-workmen submits that there is no settlement. However, I have already made it clear in the order that, if the workmen have signed the settlement and if the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the signatures are of those workmen, then the settlement binds them.
However, I have already made it clear in the order that, if the workmen have signed the settlement and if the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the signatures are of those workmen, then the settlement binds them. In case, the Labour Court comes to a conclusion that the settlement is not signed by the workmen, then the order in this writ petition also covers the case of those five workmen. In the light of the order already passed on 27-2-2007, writ petition stands disposed of.