Judgment Ghanshyam Prasad, J. 1. Heard. 2. Both the cases heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 3. This application has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding as well as order dated 7.12.2004 passed by Shri N.B. Lal, Judicial Magistrate, Patna in Complaint Case No. 2733(C) of 2003 thereby cognizance under Sections 406, 408 and 418 of the I.P.C. has been taken against the petitioners of both the applications. 4. Christian mission named Baptist Union of North India (BUNI) runs three institutions, one of which is Women Training College, Lodipur, Patna. Petitioner, namely, Mr. Franklin J. Qureshi is the Secretary and Treasurer of Baptist Church Association. Petitioner Smt. Sarla Veena Lyall is Principal of the Angus Girls School and the other petitioner Miss Salomy Mundu is also associated with the School. Complainant-opposite party No. 2 Miss Elizabeth claims herself as warden-cum-Superintendent of Angus Girls School Hostel, Lodipur. 5. Complainants case in brief is that she was initially appointed as teacher in the school in the year 1946. However, later on, on 1.1.1984, she was appointed as Warden-cum-Superintendent of the Girls Hostel by the then Secretary of Rev. Manohar Das and since then she is working as such. The petitioners of both the applications under a conspiracy authorised the Principal on 17.7.2003 to deposite the attendance register and salary payment register before the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner patna. The accused persons/petitioners under a conspiracy changed the entire attendance and payment salary registers for a period from 1995 to 2002 and deposited forged and fabricated registers before the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner in order to deprive the employees of the school including the complainant from the benefit of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme and thereby caused damage to complainants mind. The fact is that the complainant being Warden was in possession of real attendance and salary payment registers. The complainant attempted to deposit the same to Assistant provident Fund Commissioner but he refused to receive due to absence of authorisation by the Secretary. It has further been alleged that the complainant is a Warden-cum-Superintendent of Hostel but the Principal/accused No. 2 with dishonest motive gave the name of accused No. 3. Salomy Mundu as Warden with authorisation for depositing the registers before the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner. Hence this complaint case. 6. It has further been alleged that the complainant is a Warden-cum-Superintendent of Hostel but the Principal/accused No. 2 with dishonest motive gave the name of accused No. 3. Salomy Mundu as Warden with authorisation for depositing the registers before the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner. Hence this complaint case. 6. In course of submission, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the prosecution case is totally false, baseless and vexatious and has been filed at the instance of some persons who want to take illegal control of the BUNI. Actually, the dispute started as back as in the year 1983 when Rev. Manohar Das declared himself illegally as BUNIs Secretary. BUNI has its own memorandum and article of association for running the institution. BUNI constitutes Managing Committee from time to time for each institution under its control. Accordingly, BUNI vide letter dated 23.9.1992 issued by the Secretary. Petitioner Sarla Veen Lyall was appointed as principal and petitioner Salomy Mundu as Warden of the Hostel (Annexure-2). The complainant is not the Warden of the hostel. Rev. Manohar Das had no power to appoint the complainant as Warden. In fact, in garb of this complaint case, the complainant wants to take illegal control of the institution which is abuse of process of the court. It is further submitted that on very face of the allegation contained in complaint case, no criminal offence is made out against these petitioners. 7. In both the Cr.Misc. cases, the opposite party No. 2 has filed counter affidavit with almost same allegation. The main contention is that the complainant was duly appointed by the competent authority of BUNI as Warden on 28.2.1978 (Annexure-1). Accused No. 3, Salomy Mundu was never appointed as Warden. She never joined the post as such. The opposite party No. 2 is looking after affairs of the hostel since long. The hostel faught several causes in Provident Fund appellate authority but Miss Salomy Mundu never came in picture nor ever claimed as such. However, in paragraph-9, she has admitted that Secretary is the real custodian of all resisters of the institution and the complainant is only duty bound to produce the same whenever she is asked to do so. The hostel faught several causes in Provident Fund appellate authority but Miss Salomy Mundu never came in picture nor ever claimed as such. However, in paragraph-9, she has admitted that Secretary is the real custodian of all resisters of the institution and the complainant is only duty bound to produce the same whenever she is asked to do so. It is further stated that accused No. 2 has already retired but inspite of that the accused persons are interfering with the affairs and management of the institution, lastly it is submitted that most of the witnesses have already been examined before the charge and hence at this stage, it would not be proper to quash the proceeding. 8. The learned Counsel for the opposite party in course of hearing submitted that scope of quashing of criminal case under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. is very limited. Since the allegations levelled in complaint petition clearly disclose ingredients of criminal offence, it would not be legally permissible to quash the proceeding or order of cognizance. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel has referred a large number of the decision of the apex court as well as this Hon ble Court. Since the matter (scope of inherent power under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C.) has already been settled by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana V/s. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 this Court would like to refer only those decisions which are important for decision of the case. 9. Bhajan Lals case is the leading judgment on the point of limit and scope of inherent power of High Court under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of criminal case. The Supreme Court in paragraph-108 of the judgment has enumerated as many as seven circumstances, though no exhaustive, under which the High Court can exercise inherent power to quash any criminal proceeding. Those are follows: 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Those are follows: 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec. 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Sec. 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 10. The other decision upon which the learned Counsel for the opposite party has relied is Navin Chandra Narayan Majathia V/s. State of Maharashtra, 2000 4 PLJR 200. 10. The other decision upon which the learned Counsel for the opposite party has relied is Navin Chandra Narayan Majathia V/s. State of Maharashtra, 2000 4 PLJR 200. In paragraph-25, the Court has referred the decision reported in with approval in which it has been held as follows: It is also settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. to quash an F.I.R. or complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in complaint petition or the documents accompanying the same per se it has no jurisdiction to exercise power to examine correctness or otherwise of the allegations. 11. The other decision is State of Tamil Nadu V/s. Thirukkural Perumal, 1995 2 SCC 449 . In this case, reliance has been placed on Bhajan Lals case. In paragraph-4 of the judgment, it has been held as follows: 4. The power of quashing an FIR and criminal proceeding should be exercised sparingly by the courts. Indeed, the High Court has the extraordinary or inherent power to reach out injustice and quash the first information report and criminal proceedings, keeping in view the guidelines laid down by this Court in various judgments (reference in this connection may be made with advantage to State of Haryana V/s. Bhajan Lal) but the same has to be done with circumspection. The normal process of the criminal trial cannot be cut short in a rather casual manner. The court, is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability of genuineness of the allegations make in the FIR or the complaint on the basis of the evidence collected during investigation only while dealing with a petition under Sec. 482 CrPC seeking the quashing of the FIR and the criminal proceedings. The learned Single Judge apparently fell into an error in evaluating the genuineness and reliability of the allegations made in the FIR on the basis of the evidence collected during the investigation. The order of the learned Single Judge cannot, therefore, be sustained. This appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is hereby set aside. 12. Three more decisions of the Patna High Court have been cited by the learned Counsel for the opposite party. The order of the learned Single Judge cannot, therefore, be sustained. This appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is hereby set aside. 12. Three more decisions of the Patna High Court have been cited by the learned Counsel for the opposite party. All those decisions are reported in 2007 (2) PLJR at pages 54, 69 and 114. All decisions are of a single judge and are based on general principle of inherent power of the High Court, they do not require to be quoted in face of decision of Bhajan Lals case. 13. There is another set of decisions upon which the learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon. Those are Municipal Corporation of Delhi V/s. Ramkishan Rahtagi and Ors., AIR 1983 SC 67 , Dr. Sharda Prasad Sinha V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1754 and the recent decision of the apex court Minu Kumari and Ors. V/s. State of Bihar, , 2006 4 SCC 359 . In paragraph-10 of the decision reported in 1983, it has been held as follows : 10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stage can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint is they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Sec. 482 of the present Code. 14. Similarly in paragraph-2 of the decision reported in 1977, it has been held as follows: 2. It is now settled law that where the allegations set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute any offence, it is competent to the High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. 15. In decision reported in in paragraph-19, the apex court has dealt with extent of inherent power to be exercised by the High Court to do real and substantial justice and to prevent abuse of process of the court. It runs as follows : 19. The section does not confer any new power on the High Court. 15. In decision reported in in paragraph-19, the apex court has dealt with extent of inherent power to be exercised by the High Court to do real and substantial justice and to prevent abuse of process of the court. It runs as follows : 19. The section does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. 16. Now coming to the merit of this case, in this case the cognizance has been taken under Sections 406, 408 and 418 I.P.C. Sections 406 and 408 provide punishment of breach of trust. Sec. 406 I.P.C. is a general in nature and Section 408 I.P.C. is for clerk or servant. Breach of trust has been defined under Sec. 405 of the I.P.C. which runs as follows: 405. Criminal breach of trust.- Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust". 17. From the above definition, it is quite cler that two dominent ingredients of criminal breach of trust are (i) entrustment of property and (ii) dishonest mis-appropriation thereof. Thus, before a person can said to have committed breach of trust it must be established that he was entrusted with dominion over property which he said to have converted to its own use. 18. Sec. 418 I.P.C. provides punishment aggravalid form of cheating. Cheating has been defined under Sec. 415 of the I.P.C. It runs as follows: 415. Thus, before a person can said to have committed breach of trust it must be established that he was entrusted with dominion over property which he said to have converted to its own use. 18. Sec. 418 I.P.C. provides punishment aggravalid form of cheating. Cheating has been defined under Sec. 415 of the I.P.C. It runs as follows: 415. Cheating.- Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat". 19. Thus, in order to constitute an offence of cheating the person must dishonestly or fraudulently induce the complainant to deliver any property. 20. Now examine the complaint petition in order to know where it contains sufficient allegations which are required to constitute either offence of breach of trust or cheating. After going through the contents of the allegation of the complaint petition I have no doubt in mind that it does not contain sufficient averments to constitute any of the offence under which cognizance has been taken. There is no allegation of entrustment of any property to the accused by the complainant nor there is any allegation of mis-appropriation of any property. Similarly ingredient of cheating is also completely absent. There is no allegation that the complainant was induced by the accused to deliver any property nor any property was delivered by the complainant to accused persons. Actually the dispute in this case is for the post of Warden of the Hostel. Both parties are claiming themselves as legally appointed Warden. 21. Thus, from the facts stated above, it is quite clear that this case is squarely covered under Sub Paragraphs 1 & 7 of paragraph-108 of the Bhajan Lals case as also the principle laid down in Minu Kumaris case for the purpose of quashing of the proceeding. 22. Both parties are claiming themselves as legally appointed Warden. 21. Thus, from the facts stated above, it is quite clear that this case is squarely covered under Sub Paragraphs 1 & 7 of paragraph-108 of the Bhajan Lals case as also the principle laid down in Minu Kumaris case for the purpose of quashing of the proceeding. 22. The last submission is that most of the witnesses have already been examined under Sec. 244 of the Cr.P.C. and, therefore, the proceeding should not be quashed and it is allowed to continue till final decision. 23. The above submission is not tenable in the eve of law. Why the petitioners should be allowed to be harassed when no offence is made out against them? Under the circumstances, stage of the trial has got no sense for application of inherent power. It can be exercised at any stage to prevent abuse of process of the court or for ends of justice. 24. Accordingly, this application is allowed and the impugned order of cognizance alongwith entire criminal proceeding is hereby quashed.