Judgment :- Challenging concurrent findings of courts below, granting Permanent Injunction in favour of Respondent/Plaintiff, unsuccessful Third Defendant has preferred this Second Appeal. 2. Various Items of landed properties in Kadapparai Village, Karur Taluk are the Suit Properties. First Defendant was owner of the Suit Properties. Appellant/Third Defendant has purchased the Suit Properties from the First Defendant under Ex.B.1 – Sale Deed dated 03.06.1977. 3. Case of Plaintiff is that the First Defendant leased out the property to the Second Defendant under Ex.A.2 – Lease Deed (unregistered) dated 02.04.1974. The Second Defendant sub-leased the properties to the Plaintiff under Ex.A.1 (unregistered) dated 05.11.1974. According to the Plaintiff, he is in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties as sub-lessee. Alleging interference with his possession by Third Defendant in collusion with Defendants 1 and 2, the Plaintiff has filed the Suit for Permanent Injunction. 4. Subsequent to the Suit, the Plaintiff was recorded as cultivating Tenant under the Tamil Nadu Record of Cultivating Tenancy Act in the year 1986 under Ex.A.7 dated 24.11.1986. 5. D-1 is the Father-in-law of the Plaintiff. D-2 is close relative of the Plaintiff. D-1 and D-2 did not contest the Suit and remained exparte. 6. Denying the Plaint averments, Appellant/D-3 filed Written Statement contending that from the date of his purchase under Ex.B.1, he has been in possession and enjoyment of the Suit Properties. According to D-3, Plaintiff being Son-in-law of the First Defendant colluded with Defendants 1 and 2 and concocted Exs.A.1 and A.2 for the purpose of filing the Suit and harassing D-3. It was further alleged that relationship between D-3 and the Plaintiff and D-1 was strained. 7. On the above pleadings, four issues were framed in the Trial Court. Plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and marked Exs.A.1 to A.11. On the side of the Third Defendant, D-3 examined himself as D.W.1 and marked Exs.B.1 to B.11. 8. Mainly placing reliance upon Ex.A.7 under which Plaintiff was recorded as cultivating tenant, the Trial Court concluded that the Plaintiff is in possession of the properties and hence, he was held entitled to Permanent Injunction. It was held that D-3 has not produced documents like Adangal, showing his possession. The Suit was decreed and Permanent Injunction was granted mainly on the premise that the Plaintiff was registered as cultivating tenant in Ex.A.7. 9. It was held that D-3 has not produced documents like Adangal, showing his possession. The Suit was decreed and Permanent Injunction was granted mainly on the premise that the Plaintiff was registered as cultivating tenant in Ex.A.7. 9. Aggrieved by the Judgment, the Third Defendant/Appellant has preferred Appeal in A.S.No.99 of 1988. Laying emphasis upon Ex.A.7 – Record of Tenancy, the lower Appellate Court confirmed the Judgment of the Trial Court and dismissed the Appeal. 10. The Second Appeal was admitted on the following Substantial Question of law:- "Have not the courts below exceeded the jurisdiction in declaring the tenancy set by the Respondent/Plaintiff?" During the course of hearing the arguments, it was felt necessary to formulate the following Additional Substantial Questions of Law:- (i) Have not the courts below committed an error of law in holding that the Respondent/Plaintiff has proved his possession to entitle himself to a decree for Permanent Injunction? (ii) Have not the courts below committed an error of law in not considering the vital documents viz., Patta issued by the Government in favour of the Appellant and Electricity Charges Bills produced by the Appellant to prove his possession? 11. Assailing the concurrent findings, learned Counsel for Appellant has contended that Courts below have committed serious errors of law in placing reliance on Ex.A.7, which Order is per-se illegal and subsequent to the Suit. Learned Counsel for the Appellant inter-alia raised the following contentions:- "The Plaintiff is not the cultivating Tenant under Section 2(aa) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act; "As per the decision in 2003 (4) L.W. 129 , the Plaintiff has to prove that he continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the property and possession of the suit property is not a matter of assumption or presumption; "The Courts below erred in shifting the burden upon D-3 to prove his possession; "The Courts below ignored the principle of documents like patta, Electricity Bills etc., produced by the Appellant. 12. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents has submitted that the Courts below have recorded concurrent findings that the Plaintiff is a cultivating Tenant and the Plaintiff was inducted into possession of the Suit Property in 1974 and that concurrent findings cannot be interfered with. 12. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents has submitted that the Courts below have recorded concurrent findings that the Plaintiff is a cultivating Tenant and the Plaintiff was inducted into possession of the Suit Property in 1974 and that concurrent findings cannot be interfered with. It was further submitted that the Plaintiff being a statutory holder of tenancy rights, the Appellant has to take steps for taking possession under due process of law. Learned Senior Counsel mainly urged that once Plaintiff is declared as the cultivating tenant by competent authority, Plaintiffs possession and enjoyment is entitled to be protected against any forcible eviction. 13. Concurrent findings of fact by the lower Appellate Court and the Trial Court cannot be interfered with in Second Appeal. Interference with concurrent findings of Courts below by the High Court under Section 100 C.P.C must be avoided unless warranted by compelling circumstances. In the decision reported in Jai Singh Vs Shakuntala ( 2002 (3) S.C.C. 634 = 2002 A.I.R. S.C.W 1280), it was held that in Second Appeal the scrutiny of evidence is not totally prohibited, however, is permissible in exceptional circumstances and upon proper prospection. In the decision reported in Rohini Prasad Vs Kasturchand (A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1283 = 2000 (3) S.C.C. 668 ), it was held that where the findings of the lower courts are based on misreading of evidence or are based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering in Second Appeal. In Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji Vs Mahadev Channabasappa ( 2000 (6) S.C.C. 120 = A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 2108) it was held that where the decision of the First Appellate Court is based on no evidence or is perverse, the same is liable to be set aside in second appeal, it does not amount to re-appreciation of evidence by the High Court. When lower Courts ignored evidence on record and weight of circumstances, High Court can interfere with concurrent findings. As demonstrated infra, the concurrent findings of Courts below are perverse, contrary to the evidence on record. 14. Before adverting to the findings and evidence on record, certain aspects are relevant to be noted. D-1 is the owner of large extent of property in suit survey numbers. The Plaintiff is none other than Son-in-law of D-1. D-2 is close relative of the Plaintiff and D-1. 14. Before adverting to the findings and evidence on record, certain aspects are relevant to be noted. D-1 is the owner of large extent of property in suit survey numbers. The Plaintiff is none other than Son-in-law of D-1. D-2 is close relative of the Plaintiff and D-1. D-1 and his Son - Vyapuri have sold certain extent of the properties in S.Nos.67, 61, 63, 62, 66 and 68 of Kadapparai Village, Karur Taluk to D-3 under Ex.B.1 – Sale Deed dated 03.06.1977 for Rs.8,000/-. By reading of recitals of Ex.B.1 – Sale Deed, it is seen that out of Sale Consideration, D-3 has to discharge various Promissory Note debts payable by D-1. The amount payable for discharging Promissory Notes was adjusted towards Sale Consideration payable by Purchaser – D-3. 15. Purchaser – D-3 is said to have executed Promissory Note in favour of D-1 and that Promissory Note was made over to the Plaintiff. For recovery of the amount under the said Promissory Note, earlier the Plaintiff has filed O.S.No.2086 of 1978 and the said suit was dismissed. Appeal preferred by the Plaintiff was allowed. For recovery of the decretal amount, the Plaintiff herein has filed Execution Petition. In the said Execution Petition, D-3 was arrested and committed to Civil Prison and D-3 also served sentence in the Civil Prison. From the above, two things emerge:- (a) Strained relationship between Plaintiff and D-3 is evident from the filing of earlier suit in O.S.No.2086 of 1978 and filing of E.P and committing D-3 to Civil Prison. (b) Money Suit was filed in 1978 and relationship was very much strained and present suit was filed in 1982. 16. It is to be noted that in the present suit, the Plaintiff has not referred to the earlier litigation between him and D-3 and the strained relationship between them. In the Plaint, it was only averred as ".....the Third Defendant seems to have purchased a portion of the Suit Property recently ...... Defendants 3 and 5 have joined hands with First Defendant and thereby conspiring together to oust the Plaintiff from the Suit Property...." The Plaintiff has suppressed the material facts that D-3 is his Father-in-law and strained relationship between the Plaintiff and D-3. Having referred to the strained relationship between the parties, suppression of material facts, the Courts below ought to have considered the case of the Plaintiff with care and circumspection. Having referred to the strained relationship between the parties, suppression of material facts, the Courts below ought to have considered the case of the Plaintiff with care and circumspection. But, the Courts below appear to have ignored the weight of circumstance and over simplified the issues as if the suit is for Permanent Injunction simpliciter of a tenant, who seeks protection against unjust and forcible eviction. 17. Injunction being the discretionary form of relief, the same may not be granted ipso facto for mere asking for. The Plaintiff seeking for equitable relief of Permanent Injunction should come to the court with clean hands. Suppression of material facts by him is a ground for refusal of the relief of Injunction. The Court may refuse to grant Injunction if the Plaintiff by his conduct has disentitled himself to such a relief. 18. Under Ex.B.1, D-3 has purchased S.Nos.67 – 0.36/4.32 acres, 61 – 1.56 ½/9.25 acres, 63 – 0.14/3.92 acres, 62 – 0.55 2/6/3.32 acres, 66 – 0.30/6.46 acres and 68 – 0.02 ¼/4.27 acres of Kadapparai Village, Karur Taluk. Suit Survey Numbers tally with Survey Numbers in Ex.B.1. Only extent differs. Even according to the Plaintiff, Appellant has purchased portion of the Suit Property from D-1. There is no gain saying that Appellant/D-3 is the lawful owner of the Suit Property or a portion of the Suit Property by virtue of the Sale Deed dated 03.06.1977. 19. It is not the case of the Plaintiff that he has attorned his tenancy to D-3 nor paid Kuthagai to D-3. As noted earlier, between 1978 – 82, the parties were at loggerheads entangled in litigation on the Promissory Note Suits. 20. Plaintiff seeks Permanent Injunction as against the lawful owner. It is well settled that Injunction would not be issued against the true owner. One of the elements to be considered in exercising judicial discretion is whether grant of injunction would be prejudicial to the lawful owner in the circumstances of a particular case. In the Suit, the Plaintiff has prayed for Permanent Injunction restraining the Defendants from in any manner interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The relief sought for is Permanent Injunction simpliciter. Nowhere in the prayer, Permanent Injunction is sought for till the Plaintiff is evicted under due process of law. In the Suit, the Plaintiff has prayed for Permanent Injunction restraining the Defendants from in any manner interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The relief sought for is Permanent Injunction simpliciter. Nowhere in the prayer, Permanent Injunction is sought for till the Plaintiff is evicted under due process of law. Courts below failed to take note of the misguided prayer sought for by the Plaintiff. 21. Vagueness of the stand of the Plaintiff as regards D-3 is also relevant to be noted. The question as to whether attornment is necessary or not, to create relationship of Landlord and Tenant between the Transferee - Landlord and Tenant were the subject for consideration before various courts. The question whether attornment by Tenant to Transferee Landlord is necessary to establish the relationship of Tenant and Landlord between them stands answered by Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. This Court is not proposed to determine as to whether there was attornment of Tenancy or not, since the very tenancy of the Plaintiff is disputed by D-3. But, the question is when the Plaintiff seeks Permanent Injunction on the premise that he is the cultivating Tenant, it was for the Plaintiff to clarify his position regarding the Transferee Landlord (D-3). 22. Case of the Plaintiff is that D-2 had become a lessee under D-1 under Ex.A.2 – Unregistered Lease Deed (dated 02.04.1974). According to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff had become a sub-lessee under D-1 as per Ex.A.1 (05.11.1974) unregistered sub-lease Agreement. Categorically denying Exs.A.1 and A.2, the Appellant had taken a definite plea that Exs.A.1 and A.2 have been concocted, after dispute arose between him and the family of D-1. Exs.A.1 and A.2 being unregistered document, Courts below ought to have scrutinised them with care and caution. When D-3 had taken specific plea denying the genuineness of Exs.A.1 and A.2, Courts below committed serious error in not adverting to that plea taken by D-3. 23. By a reading of Exs.A.1 and A.2, it is seen that they are written by one and the same person. The Plaintiff is said to have paid Kuthagai to the Second Defendant (stated to be Principal Lessee) under Exs.A.3 to A.6 – Kuthagai Receipts. Even a mere look at Exs.A.3 to A.6 would show that they must have been written at one and the same point of time. The Plaintiff is said to have paid Kuthagai to the Second Defendant (stated to be Principal Lessee) under Exs.A.3 to A.6 – Kuthagai Receipts. Even a mere look at Exs.A.3 to A.6 would show that they must have been written at one and the same point of time. Both Witnesses and the scribe are one and the same persons in Exs.A.3 to A.6. The Trial Court though expressed doubts about Exs.A.3 to A.6, ignored weight of that circumstance and proceeded to act on the basis of Ex.A.7 and that approach cannot be endorsed with. On the basis of Exs.A.1 to A.6, it is not possible to conclude that the Plaintiff is the lawful Tenant. 24. While the Courts below viewed Exs.A.3 to A.6 with doubt, lower courts committed grave error in basing its Judgment solely upon Ex.A.7. Ex.A.7 is the Order passed by Record Officer and Tahsildar pursuant to the Petition filed by the Plaintiff under Section 152 C.P.C for inclusion of names of Respondents 2 and 3 i.e., Kaliappan and Periyasamy in the order already issued on 20.12.1985 in FV47/82. Ex.A.7 Order reads as under:- "I perused the entire records carefully and found that the request of the learned lawyer for the petitioner as genuine and accordingly the names of 2nd and 3rd Respondents are included in the Order already issued on 20.12.1985 in FV 47/82 with this modification the Order issued on 20.12.1985 in FV 47/82 admitting the petitioner as cultivating tenant for the above lands will hold good." Original Proceeding/Order under which the Plaintiff was admitted as cultivating tenant was not produced. No material was produced showing that the Third Defendant effectively participated in the proceeding. Ex.A.7 is only an Order of rectification passed by the Authority invoking Section 152 C.P.C. While so, the Courts below committed serious error in basing its Judgment solely upon Ex.A.7 and presuming Plaintiffs possession of the Suit Property. 25. D-3 is said to have challenged the Order of the Tahsildar by filing Appeal before the Special Deputy Collector. After giving three adjournments, that Appeal was dismissed on 30.09.1987 – vide Ex.A.8. It is stated that D-3 could not contest the Appeal, as he was committed to Civil Prison. Whatever it is, Ex.A.7 remains unchallenged for more than one reason. Ex.A.7 cannot conclusively determine status of the Plaintiff. After giving three adjournments, that Appeal was dismissed on 30.09.1987 – vide Ex.A.8. It is stated that D-3 could not contest the Appeal, as he was committed to Civil Prison. Whatever it is, Ex.A.7 remains unchallenged for more than one reason. Ex.A.7 cannot conclusively determine status of the Plaintiff. Firstly, Ex.A.7 is only an Order of rectification including the names of the Second and Third Defendant in the Order FV47/82 dated 20.12.1985. Secondly, the Order in FV47/82 dated 20.12.1985 and Ex.A.7 are subsequent to the suit and the same cannot form the basis for upholding the possession of the Plaintiff on the date of filing of the Suit. 26. Learned Senior Counsel has contended that Ex.A.7 is the sheet anchor of the case and the Plaintiff seeks relief of Permanent Injunction on the basis of Ex.A.7, the Plaintiffs possession is to be protected. It was further contended that when the Plaintiff seeks bare injunction, jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not taken away. Learned Senior Counsel further urged that on the basis of Ex.A.7, Courts below have recorded concurrent findings that the Plaintiff is the cultivating Tenant and his possession is to be protected by Permanent Injunction and the same cannot be interfered with. 27. Contending that the Register of record of tenancy is a vital document, on the basis of which the Civil Court is to grant Permanent Injunction, learned Senior Counsel has drawn my attention to one of my decisions reported in Subbiah Pillai Vs M.A. Thirunavukkarasu Pillai ( 2003 (3) L.W. 745 ). In the said case, the main point for consideration was the status of the Plaintiff as cultivating tenant and as the status was denied, suit itself was held not maintainable. In the said case, the Plaintiff was not registered as a cultivating Tenant and Defendants taken the stand that the Plaintiff was engaged for irrigating the lands on wages. Under those factual situation, observing that the Suit was instituted under the colour of bare suit for Permanent Injunction and that jurisdiction of Civil Court is not attracted, I have held as follows:- "....In the light of categorical denial of the status of the Plaintiff, the main point that arose for determination in the suit was pertaining to status of the Plaintiff. Admittedly, Plaintiff is not registered as a cultivating tenant under the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act, 1969 (Act X of 1969). As per the known procedure of law, Plaintiff, who claims to be in possession of the suit property, in his capacity as cultivating tenant, the best attainable evidence would be Registration of his name in the Record of Tenancy Rights or at least entry of his name in Column 6(a) of the Adangal maintained by the Revenue Officials. No such evidence of acceptable character is forthcoming. Suit is instituted on the bare statement of the Plaintiff that he is in possession of the Suit Property as cultivating tenant. It is not as if the Plaintiff was not aware of the necessity to get himself registered under Act X of 1969. Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act (X of 1969) enables interested persons making application to the Record Officer for inclusion of particulars relating to such land in the approved record of Tenancy Rights. ......" 28. Laying emphasis on the above observations, learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff has submitted that in this case, the Plaintiff was registered as the cultivating tenant under the record of tenancy rights and when that formidable evidence of proof of record of tenancy right has been produced, Courts below rightly held that the Plaintiff is the cultivating tenant whose protection is to be protected by an order of Permanent Injunction. 29. As noted earlier, Ex.A.7 is subsequent to the suit and it cannot form the basis for grant of Injunction for the suit filed in the year 1982. The main issue before the Courts below was whether on the date of the suit, the Plaintiff was in possession of the Suit Property as a cultivating tenant. Admittedly, on the date of the Suit, the Plaintiff was not a registered cultivating tenant and hence, it was incumbent upon the courts to incidentally decide the question whether the Plaintiff was a cultivating tenant or not on the date of the Suit. The courts below erred in solely placing reliance upon Ex.A.7 without incidentally going into the question whether the Plaintiff was in possession of the Suit Property as a cultivating tenant. 30. The courts below erred in solely placing reliance upon Ex.A.7 without incidentally going into the question whether the Plaintiff was in possession of the Suit Property as a cultivating tenant. 30. In the decision reported in Periathambi Goundan Vs The District Revenue Officer (A.I.R. 1980 MADRAS 180 = 1980 (2) M.L.J. 89) the Full Bench has held as under:- "....36. ..... A controversy may arise whether the land has been let for cultivation by a tenant at all. The question to be considered is, whether the determination of that controversy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act so as to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 16-A. From the language of Section 3(2) it cannot be stated that the determination of that controversy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act, though the determination of that controversy is basic and fundamental to the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Record Officer and the other authorities under the Act. The very object of the Act is to provide for the preparation and maintenance of record of tenancy rights in respect of agricultural lands and therefore if there is no tenancy in respect of a land, there is no question of any further particulars being determined. This aspect is made clear even from the definition of the expression "landowner" occurring in Section 2(5) of the Act, because according to the said definition, "landowner" means the owner of the land let for cultivation by a tenant and includes the heirs, assignees or legal representatives of such owner or person deriving rights through him. Consequently, the controversy as to whether a particular piece of land has been let for cultivation by a tenant or not is one constituting the jurisdictional issue which a Record Officer has to decide before he can determine any other matter under the Act. But, that controversy cannot be said to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act, because to hold so will enable the statutory authorities to assume jurisdiction by erroneously deciding the jurisdictional issue....." 31. The well settled position could be summarised thus:- For the purpose of granting the relief of Injunction claimed in the Suit, the Court has to incidentally go into the question as to who is in possession of the suit property and in what capacity. The well settled position could be summarised thus:- For the purpose of granting the relief of Injunction claimed in the Suit, the Court has to incidentally go into the question as to who is in possession of the suit property and in what capacity. The fact that the Court has to consider an incidental question for the purpose of granting main relief claimed in the Suit will not make the suit incompetent in the Civil Court. (1976 (1) M.L.J. 287) Where the relief sought for is a declaration of status or where there is denial of status of Plaintiff and where the preliminary issue is to determine the status of the Plaintiff, the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction. (Full Bench decision in 1980 (2) M.L.J. 89) On the available evidence, duty is cast upon the Court to incidentally determine whether the Plaintiff is the cultivating tenant or not dehors the record of tenancy. The record of tenancy may be a relevant piece of evidence in considering the status of the Plaintiff and the possession. 32. Without going into the incidental question whether the Plaintiff was the cultivating tenant or not on the date of filing of Suit, Courts below grossly erred in basing its decision upon the subsequent document Ex.A.7. The contention that Ex.A.7 alone would be sufficient to enable the Plaintiff to obtain an Order of Permanent Injunction for protection cannot be countenanced. Permanent Injunction being equitable and discretionary relief, only if the Plaintiff proves his possession and the balance of convenience is in his favour, the Plaintiff could seek Injunction. 33. As noted earlier, the Plaintiff claims to be the sub-lessee under Second Defendant as per Ex.A.1. Cultivating Tenant is defined in Section 2(aa) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act as under:- ".... 33. As noted earlier, the Plaintiff claims to be the sub-lessee under Second Defendant as per Ex.A.1. Cultivating Tenant is defined in Section 2(aa) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act as under:- ".... "Cultivating Tenant" – (i) means a person who contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of any land belonging to another, under a tenancy agreement, express or implied; and (ii) includes - (a) any such person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement; (b) the heir of such person, if the heir contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of such land; (c) a sub-tenant he contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of such land; or (d) any such sub-tenant who continues in possession of the land notwithstanding that the person who sublet the land to such sub-tenant ceased to have the right to possession of such land....." 34. To be a cultivating Tenant within the meaning of Section 2(aa) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, in the decision reported in Tamalarasi Vs S. Kumarasamy Gounder (2003 (4) L.W. 129), a Division Bench of this Court has held as follows:- ".....Thus in this case, applying the principles laid down by various courts, if could be seen, the words "such person" refer to a person referred earlier. The person referred earlier in Section 2(aa)(i) is one who contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in cultivation of any land. Or in other words, Section 2(aa)(ii)(a) has to be understood as any person who contributes his own physical labour in the cultivation or that of any member of his family in the property in which he is in possession even after determination of tenancy agreement. If mere possession is sufficient the Law makers would not have employed the word "such" in Section 2(aa)(ii)(a). Can a person, who after the expiry of the lease period continues to be in possession, but runs petty betel nut shop or an arrack shop instead of cultivating the land, claim the status of a cultivating tenant. The answer is emphatically "No". The Act is to protect only a cultivating tenant. Can a person, who after the expiry of the lease period continues to be in possession, but runs petty betel nut shop or an arrack shop instead of cultivating the land, claim the status of a cultivating tenant. The answer is emphatically "No". The Act is to protect only a cultivating tenant. Any interpretation has to be in consonance with justice and reason and should not be absurd......" 35. When the Plaintiff pleads he is a sub-lessee of the land or a cultivating tenant as defined in Section 2(aa) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, it is for the Plaintiff to prove that the suit property was leased to the Second Defendant, who in turn had sub-leased to the First Defendant. Apart from the inter-se document between the Defendants 1 to 3, the Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence to prove his case. Defendants 1 and 2 have neither filed Written Statement nor got into the box to speak about Exs.A.1 and A.2. The Plaintiff had also not produced any Adangal for the period 1974 till the time of filing of the Suit, showing that his name has been entered in Column 6(a) of Adangal showing his name as a cultivating tenant. No acceptable evidence was adduced by the Plaintiff showing his possession as the cultivating tenant. 36. Stating that he has paid Electricity Consumption charges, the Plaintiff has produced Exs.A.9 to A.11. By perusal of Ex.B.11 – Patta, it is seen that the Plaintiff is one of the joint pattadar for some of the suit survey numbers. When the Plaintiff is the joint pattadar for some of the suit survey numbers, it is not possible to correlate Exs.A.9 to A.11 to that of the suit property. In any event, it cannot be said that payment of electricity charges would establish status of the Plaintiff as the cultivating tenant of the suit property. 37. Exs.A.1 and A.2 are respectively for a period of one year. The Plaintiff has to plead and prove that even after expiry of the term of Tenancy Agreement, he continues to be in possession and cultivating the land contributing his own physical labour. It would not be sufficient merely to say that he is in possession nor such possession held to be proved by producing Ex.A.7. 38. The Plaintiff has to plead and prove that even after expiry of the term of Tenancy Agreement, he continues to be in possession and cultivating the land contributing his own physical labour. It would not be sufficient merely to say that he is in possession nor such possession held to be proved by producing Ex.A.7. 38. In the recitals in Ex.B.1 – Sale Deed in favour of D-3, it is clearly stated that possession has been handed over to D-3 - TAMIL Absolutely there is no mention about any lease or sub-lease. The Courts below committed substantial error in brushing aside the definite recitals in Ex.B.1 – Sale Deed. 39. After his purchase, D-3 has paid kist for the suit property for various faslies – Exs.B.2 to B.6 (Fasli 1389 to 1396 i.e., 1979 to 1986). Third Defendant has also produced the Electricity Bills Exs.B.7 to B.10. Ex.B.11 – Patta issued to the Third Defendant also supports the case of Third Defendant. Courts below ignored the material evidence adduced by D-3 and the impugned findings are contrary to the evidence on record. Ex.A.7 substantially weighed in the minds of the Courts below and in that process, the Courts below were obdurate in disbelieving the material evidence adduced by D-3. 40. On the date of filing of the Suit, the Plaintiff has neither proved his possession. Ex.A.7, which is subsequent to the suit cannot form the basis for granting equitable relief of Permanent Injunction. If any Injunction is granted, it would cause irreparable loss to the true owner and D-3. The concurrent findings of the Courts below are perverse and the Judgments of the Courts below are to be set aside. 41. The Judgment and decree dated 22.03.1990 made in A.S.No.99 of 1988 by the Subordinate Judge, Karur (arising out of O.S.No.1332 of 1982 on the file of Principal District Munsif, Karur) are set aside and this Second Appeal is allowed with costs.