BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, ACJ. ( 1 ) THESE two suo motu rules alleging criminal contempt of Court were heard together as facts giving rise to issue of those two rules are mostly inter linked. ( 2 ) ON January 15, 2007, this Bench issued the aforesaid two rules on the basis of information given by the learned Registrar-General of this Court that due to the agitation started by the "circuit Bench 0 Sarbik Unnayan dabi Adyay Samannya Committee, Jalpaiguri", (hereinafter referred to as the committee), the learned District Judge and other Judges of the Judgeship at Jalpaiguri were unable to enter the Court building, as a result, the District judges' Courts at the Headquarter of the District Jalpaiguri were not functioning at all for the last one month, this Court issued two suo motu rules, one against the 16 persons actively associated with the aforesaid committee and the other against (1) the Director-General of Police, West bengal, (2) the District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri, (3) the District Superintendent of Police, Jalpaiguri and (4) the Inspector-in-Charge, Kotwali Police Station, jalpaiguri. ( 3 ) FOR avoiding unnecessary repetition of the facts leading to the issue of the previously mentioned rules, we quote hereunder, our entire order dated january 15, 2007, which will speak for itself: "the learned Registrar-General of this Court has drawn attention of this court to the fact that due to agitation started by the "circuit Bench 'o' sarbik Unnyayan Dabi Adyay Samannaya Committee, Jalpaiguri," the judicial officers in the District of Jalpaiguri including the learned District judge, Jalpaiguri, are unable to enter into the Court premises from december 15, 2006. Office of the learned District Judge immediately drew attention of such fact to the Inspector-in-Charge, Kotwali Police Station, Jalpaiguri Sadar, but no action was taken. Subsequently, the learned District Judge brought the matter to the notice of the learned Registrar-General of this Court, who in terms of the order by the then Hon'ble Chief Justice of this 'court, instructed the learned District Judge to ask the Superintendent of Police, jalpaiguri to take immediate action, so that the judicial officers can enter into the Court premises for doing their duties. Although the learned District Judge, Jalpaiguri conveyed the decision of this Court to the Superintendent of Police, Jalpaiguri, so that the judicial officers can enter into the Court, building and function, the superintendent of Police, Jalpaiguri paid deaf ears to the request of the learned District Judge. Subsequently, the learned District Judge was directed to approach the District Magistrate of the District, so that the judiciary in the District can function. In spite of such communication, no action was taken from the end of the District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri. It appears from the note given by the learned Registrar-General of this court that on January 05, 2007, the then Hon'ble Chief Justice of this court directed the Director-General of Police, West Bengal over phone to ensure proper functioning of the Jalpaiguri Court by taking effective steps without further delay and as a follow-up action, the learned registrar-General also talked to the Director-General of Police, West bengal and enquired as to what effective steps had been taken for bringing back the normal situation, so that the learned District Judges' Court could function properly. The Director-General of Police, however, informed the learned Registrar-General of this Court that he would take up the matter with the Home secretary, Government of West Bengal and in the meantime, the learned district Judge, Jalpaiguri should be asked to write to the District magistrate, Jalpaiguri requesting him to take steps for ensuring proper functioning of the Courts in Jalpaiguri with a copy to the Superintendent of Police, Jalpaiguri. As pointed out earlier, in spite of written communication given by the learned District Judge to the District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri, till today the Judges in the District Judges' Court at Jalpaiguri are unable to enter into the Court building. It appears from the various papers submitted by the learned District judge through fax message to the learned Registrar-General of this Court that the "circuit Bench 'o' Sarbik Unnyayan Dabi Adyay Samannaya committee, Jalpaiguri" took a resolution of obstructing the ingress and egress to the Court building by various resolutions taken from time to time. It appears from the various papers submitted by the learned District judge through fax message to the learned Registrar-General of this Court that the "circuit Bench 'o' Sarbik Unnyayan Dabi Adyay Samannaya committee, Jalpaiguri" took a resolution of obstructing the ingress and egress to the Court building by various resolutions taken from time to time. From the resolution allegedly taken on December 23, 2006 which has been sent to the learned Registrar-General of this Court by the learned district Judge concerned, it appears that in a meeting held at Nababbari premises the following persons participated and unanimously took a resolution to continue with the agitation: (1) Sri Mukulesh Sanyal , President (2) Sri Sri Jiten Das , Ex. M. P. (C. P. M.) (3) Sri Sri Debaprasad Roy, M. L. A. (Congress) (4) Smt . Pratima Bagchi (R. S. P.) (5) Sri Prabal Saha (Forward Block) (6) Sri Pabitra Bhattacharyya (C. P. I.) (7) Sri Somenath Pal (T. M. C.) (8) Sri Amal Roy (C. P. I. M. L.) (9) Sri Subhas Kumar Dutta , C. P. I. M. L (Liberation) (10) Sri Rdbindra Lal Chakraborty , (B. J. P.) (11) Sri Chitta De (Convenor , Co-ordination Committee of Plantation Works) (12) Sri Sadhan Bose, (Merchant Association) (13) Sri Samarendra Prasad Biswas ( North Bengal Chamber of Commerce) (14) Sri Biswajit Das , (Federation of Chamber of Commerce, Siliguri ) (15) Sri Sanjoy Chakraborty , (Jalpaiguri Welfare Organisation ) It further appears from the resolution of the meeting dated December 18, 2006 of the said "jalpaiguri 'o' Sarbik Unnyayan Dabi Adyay samannaya Committee" that one Sri Benoy Kanta Bhowmick, presided over as President, supported the said illegal act of the committee. In our view, the aforesaid act on the part of those persons abovenamed, acting on behalf of the said committee, has resulted in Constitutional breakdown in the District of Jalpaiguri, as a result, the citizens of jalpaiguri District are immensely prejudiced and such act interferes with and obstructs administration of justice in the said District. In our view, the aforesaid act on the part of those persons abovenamed, acting on behalf of the said committee, has resulted in Constitutional breakdown in the District of Jalpaiguri, as a result, the citizens of jalpaiguri District are immensely prejudiced and such act interferes with and obstructs administration of justice in the said District. We are also prima facie convinced that inaction on the part of the Director-General of Police, West Bengal, District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri, the superintendent of Police, Jalpaiguri and I. C. , Kotwali Police Station, jalpaiguri Sadar amounts to aiding and abetting the members of the said committee, as a result of which, the judiciary is unable to function in that District for the last one month and all those persons are prima facie guilty of criminal contempt of a serious nature. Accordingly, let a Rule of Contempt be issued calling upon all those 15 persons and Sri Benoy Kanta Bhowmick, abovenamed, to show cause why they should not be penalised or otherwise dealt with for committing criminal contempt as defined in section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts act, 1971 by creating impediment in functioning the judiciary in the district of Jalpaiguri for the last one month by restraining the judicial officers from entering into the Court building. Similarly, a Rule be also issued upon the Director-General of Police, west Bengal, District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri, Superintendent of Police, jalpaiguri, Inspector-in-Charge, Kotwali Police Station, Jalpaiguri Sadar to show cause why they should not be penalised or otherwise dealt with for aiding and abetting the aforesaid criminal contempt by remaining as silent spectators in spite of repeated directions not only given by the learned District Judge of the District, but also by the learned Registrar-General and the Former Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court. Let these rules be immediately served upon all the concerns through the Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal by tomorrow. The Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal, is directed to communicate to this Court what action the District administration or the State administration has taken for removing the impediments creating by those persons. Let these rules be immediately served upon all the concerns through the Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal by tomorrow. The Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal, is directed to communicate to this Court what action the District administration or the State administration has taken for removing the impediments creating by those persons. Having regard to the serious nature of a criminal contempt prima facie found by this Court, we direct the Chief Secretary, Government of West bengal to see that in course of this day proper step is taken, so that the learned District Judge and all the judicial officers including the staff of the District Court may enter into the building and function normally. The Chief Secretary will further ensure that no obstruction takes place in the matter of proper functioning of the Court in any part of the said district. Office is directed to see that this order is communicated to the Chief secretary, Government of West Bengal by 2 p. m. of this day. Let rules be also issued by the office in course of this day. The rules are returnable on January 19, 2007 at 10. 30 a. m. On the returnable date, the alleged contemners abovenamed are directed to be present in Court at 10. 30 a. m. " ( 4 ) THERE were mistakes in two of the names of the respondents of the rule, which, however, were, subsequently corrected. All the respondents entered appearance through their learned Advocates and they filed separate affidavits answering the allegations contained in our order dated January 15, 2007 on the basis of which the rules were issued. ( 5 ) AFTER going through the affidavits filed by (1) the Director-General of police, West Bengal, (2) the District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri, (3) the superintendent of Police, Jalpaiguri and (4) the Inspector-in-Charge, Kotwali police Station, we found that some of their statements were inconsistent with the materials on record and for the above reason, we passed an order on February 5, 2007 for examining the aforementioned four persons in Court on February 9, 2007. Accordingly, those persons were examined by this court and the copy of their depositions including various documents admitted by the District Magistrate to have been sent by the learned District Judge, jalpaiguri to the learned Registrar-General of this Court through the office of the District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri by way of fax messages, which were marked as exhibits, were served upon the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respondents in these matters and this Court fixed the cases for further hearing on February 16, 2007. ( 6 ) ON February 16, 2007, when the matters came up for hearing of the argument by the learned Counsel for the respondents, Mr. Roy, the learned advocate-General appearing on behalf of the four respondents who were earlier examined in Court pressed two applications, one on behalf of Sri R. Ranjit, the District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri and the other, on behalf of Sri P. Chanda, the Inspector-in-Charge of the Kotwali Police Station. In the application filed by the District Magistrate, he prayed for allowing his learned counsel to ask a few questions to him for the purpose of clarification of some of his statements made earlier on February 9, 2007. In the body of the said application, no indication was given as to the nature of the questions. The learned Advocate-General, however, submitted before the Court that the District Magistrate wanted to clarify his earlier statements to this effect that the fax machine through which the learned District Judge, Jalpaiguri sent the various fax messages to the Registrar-General of this Court, was not situated within his "view" and that he had no knowledge that those fax messages were sent through his office. In view of such submission of Mr. Roy, instead of examining him further for the purpose of explaining his earlier statement, we recorded an order that the aforesaid explanation of the District Magistrate that the fax machine was not within his "view" and that he did not know the fact that those fax messages were sent through his office should be kept with the records as the statements true to his knowledge as he was present in Court. Regarding the other application, filed by Sri P. Chanda, Mr. Regarding the other application, filed by Sri P. Chanda, Mr. Roy submitted that Sri Chanda wanted to clarify that as no general Diary or information was received by him as regards commission of any cognizable offence, he did not feel the necessity of starting any case. We, similarly, recorded such submission of the learned Advocate-General as the statements of Sri Chanda as an explanation to his earlier statements. ( 7 ) MR. Roy, the learned Advocate-General, appearing on behalf of the respondents in one of the rules, at the very outset, has raised a pure question of law as regards the maintainability of the Rule against his clients. Mr. Roy submits that even if all the allegations contained in our order dated January 15, 2007 are taken to be true, those facts do not constitute any criminal contempt within the meaning of section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). According to Mr. Roy, in order to constitute criminal contempt within the meaning of the Act, there must be some positive "act" on the part of the contemner. Mr. Roy contends that mere inaction on the part of his clients in not taking step facilitating the entry of the Judges in the Court building cannot be described, by itself, as an act of criminal contempt within the meaning of the Act. Mr. Roy submits that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that his clients remained as "silent spectators" and did not take any action against the agitators, such fact cannot be a ground for issuing a rule for criminal contempt against his clients although if those allegations are correct, those can justify other penal actions against his clients in accordance with the law of the land. Mr. Roy further submits that "aiding or abetting" the acts of the other respondents cannot amount to Criminal Contempt within the meaning of the Act. Mr. Roy in this connection strongly relies upon the definition of criminal contempt provided in section 2 (c) of the Act and submits that the said definition not being an inclusive one but having been started with the word "means", the meaning of the definition cannot be extended by addition of any words or idea. In support of such contention, Mr. Roy in this connection strongly relies upon the definition of criminal contempt provided in section 2 (c) of the Act and submits that the said definition not being an inclusive one but having been started with the word "means", the meaning of the definition cannot be extended by addition of any words or idea. In support of such contention, Mr. Roy relies upon the following decisions: a) Feroze N. Dotivala vs. P. M. Wadhatvani and Ors. , reported in 2003 (1)SCC 433 ; b) P. S. Kashilingam vs. P. S. College of Technology and Ors. , reported in air 1995 SC 1395 . ( 8 ) MR. Roy further contends that the proceedings for criminal contempt being one in the nature of criminal proceedings as provided in the Code of criminal Procedure, this Court was not justified in asking his clients to take oath before examining in Court. ( 9 ) BEFORE entering into the merit of the rule, we propose to deal with the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Roy as regards the maintainability of the rule against his clients. ( 10 ) AS pointed out earlier, the sum and substance of the allegations made against the clients of Mr. Roy is that the agitators prevented the Judges from entering into the Court building from December 15, 2006 and that obstacle continued till January 15, 2007 when the present rule was issued. It is specifically stated that the learned District Judge requested the District magistrate to see that no obstruction took place in performing the duties of the Judges but in spite of such request, the District Administration gave no assistance. It was pointed out that on the instruction of the learned District judge, a G. D. was lodged in the local police station complaining prevention of ingress of the employees to the Court building. The District Magistrate in his affidavit, however, stated that until January 10, 2007, the learned district Judge never sought for any assistance from him although on January 2, 2007 and January 5, 2007 he had met the learned District Judge on "different functions". In view of such statements made on oath by way of affidavit, we decided to examine the District Magistrate in Court. In view of such statements made on oath by way of affidavit, we decided to examine the District Magistrate in Court. We had handed over to him various fax messages sent by the learned District Judge to the learned Registrar-General of this Court from December 19, 2006 till january 12, 2007 wherein the learned District Judge or the two different judges-in-charge of the District had complained that the agitators were not permitting the judicial officers to enter the building. Those fax messages were, however, sent through the office of the District Magistrate itself as the learned District Judge was unable to use his own fax machine situated in the Court building and the District Magistrate admitted before us that those fax messages were actually sent from his office. We, accordingly, marked those fax messages as exhibits in these proceedings. On the date fixed for argument, however, the District Magistrate came up with an application for further explaining his earlier statement by saying that he was not aware of the fact that the learned District Judge sent those fax messages from his office as the fax machine was not within his "view". We have already indicated that we have kept such explanation on record. While considering the merit, we shall consider the veracity of such supplementary statement. The further allegation made in the order dated January 15, 2007 was that on January 5, 2007, the then Chief Justice of this Court over telephone directed the Director-General of Police, West Bengal to see that the judicial officers could enter the Court building but in spite of such direction, the Director-General took no step. In the said order, complaint made to the local police station alleging obstruction to the entry of the employees of the Court and the inaction on the part of the police had also been mentioned. ( 11 ) IN the affidavit affirmed by the Director-General of Police, he has merely stated that the then Chief Justice asked him to "monitor" the situation and he did it. In answer to our question put to him before this Court he, however, stated that he conveyed the message of the Hon'ble Chief Justice to the Home Secretary orally and the Home Secretary told him that he would get in touch with the District Magistrate. In answer to our question put to him before this Court he, however, stated that he conveyed the message of the Hon'ble Chief Justice to the Home Secretary orally and the Home Secretary told him that he would get in touch with the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate in his deposition, however, admitted that he did not get any instruction from the Secretariat for handling the situation and he also did not seek for any instruction. The Director-General of Police admitted in his deposition that he could not recollect whether any case was registered on the basis of the allegation of obstruction or whether any arrest was made although according to him he "monitored" the situation every day. The District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police admitted that no case was registered based on the allegation of the learned District Judge or the G. D. made on December 18, 2007. The Inspector-in-Charge of the local police station has by way of clarification even gone to the extent that as no cognizable offence was committed, he did not feel the necessity of starting any case. It is needless to mention that there has been no arrest in connection with obstruction and only on January 15, 2007, after we issued these rules, a few persons were detained under section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We put specific question to the District Magistrate whether he was aware of the fact that due to the agitation, the provisions contained in Article 22 (2) of the constitution of India were not complied with in the said District for the last one month and whether he informed the Secretariat in Kolkata about the incident and in answer to such questions, he simply said that he did not know. ( 12 ) FOR the purpose of dealing with the preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate-General, we shall presume all the allegations made in our order dated January 15, 2007 to be true and we shall decide whether such allegation, if found to be true, constitutes commission of criminal contempt on the part of Mr Roy's clients. ( 13 ) IT is true that the definition of criminal contempt given in section 2 (c)of the Act starts with the word "means" and the general rule of interpretation in such a case as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to by Mr. ( 13 ) IT is true that the definition of criminal contempt given in section 2 (c)of the Act starts with the word "means" and the general rule of interpretation in such a case as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to by Mr. Roy is that ordinarily, the word or phrase used or defined in a Statute must be taken to have been used in its ordinary sense and only in case of vagueness or ambiguity, occasion would arise for interpreting such definition so as to add something to the statutory language. However, the Supreme court had the occasion to consider the effect of the words "criminal contempt" as used in section 2 (c) of the Act in the case of Delhi Judicial Service association vs. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1991 SC 2176 , where the apex Court in paragraph 42 of the judgement made the following observations: "what constitutes Contempt of Court? The Common Law definition of contempt of Court is : 'an act or omission calculated to interfere with the due administration of justice'. [bowen L. J. in Helmore vs. Smith, 1886 (35) Chd 449 at 455]. The Contempt of Court as defined by them contempt of Courts Act, 1971 includes civil and criminal contempt. Criminal contempt as defined by the Act: Means the publication whether by words spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends tc lower the authority of any Court, or prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or interferes, or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. ' The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person which would tend to interfere with the administration of justice or which would lower the authority of Court. The public have a vital stake in effective and orderly administration of justice. ' The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person which would tend to interfere with the administration of justice or which would lower the authority of Court. The public have a vital stake in effective and orderly administration of justice. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the community in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for Contempt of Court, not to protect the dignity of the court against insult or injury, but to protect and vindicate the right of the public so that the administration of justice is not perverted, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. "it is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage". (Frank furter, J. in Offutt vs. IJ. S. , (1954) 348 US 11 ). The object and purpose of punishing contempt for interference with the administration of justice is not to safeguard or protect the dignity of the Judge or the Magistrate, but the purpose is to preserve the authority of the Courts to ensure an ordered life in society. In Attorney-General vs. Times Newspapers, 1974 ac 273 at p 302, the necessity for the law of Contempt was summarised by Lord Morris as : "in an ordered community Courts are established for the pacific settlement of disputes and for the maintenance of law and order. In the general interests of the community it is imperative that the authority of the courts should not be imperilled and that recourse to them should not be subject to unjustifiable interference. When such unjustifiable interference is suppressed it is not because those charged with the responsibilities of administering justice are concerned for their own dignity: it is because the very structure of ordered life is at risk if the recognised Courts of the land are so flouted and their authority wanes and is supplanted. When such unjustifiable interference is suppressed it is not because those charged with the responsibilities of administering justice are concerned for their own dignity: it is because the very structure of ordered life is at risk if the recognised Courts of the land are so flouted and their authority wanes and is supplanted. " ( 14 ) IN view of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court regarding the scope of criminal contempt as provided in section 2 (c) of the Act, we have no hesitation in concluding that if the allegations contained in the order dated January 15, 2007 are found to be true, the inaction on the part of the District administration in paying deaf ear to the G. D. as well as the request of the learned District Judge for facilitating entry of the judicial officers in the Court building definitely comes within the purview of the aforesaid section. We are unable to accept the contention of Mr Roy, the learned Advocate-General that in order to constitute criminal contempt there must be some "positive act" on the part of the contemner. In the case before us, the three officers of the District administration in spite of request by the learned District Judge and in spite of lodging of a G. D. disclosing commission of a cognizable offence provided under the Indian Penal Code, refused to even start any case for investigation. The Inspector-in-Charge of the local police station has even asserted before this Court that as there was no information of commission of any cognizable offence, he did not feel the necessity of starting any case for investigation by intentionally overlooking the provisions at least contained in sections 340 and 141 of the Indian Penal code and the consequent sections providing punishment thereof which are quoted below: "section- 340: Whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits, is said "wrongfully to confine" that person. Section 341 of the Code provides punishment for such offence and according to the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the same is a cognizable offence. Section 341 of the Code provides punishment for such offence and according to the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the same is a cognizable offence. Section- 141: An assembly of five or more persons is designated an unlawful assembly', if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is -First.- To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or second.- To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process: or third.- To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or fourth.- By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or fifth.- By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do. Explanation.- An assembly, which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly. " (Emphasis Supplied) ( 15 ) SIMILARLY, section 143 of the Code providing punishment makes the offence cognizable under the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 16 ) THEREFORE, by disobeying the mandate of law in spite of specific request of