Judgment :- This Civil Revision Petition has been filed challenging the order dated 09.10.2006, made in I.A.No.279 of 2005, in A.S.No.72 of 2005, on the file of the learned District Judge, Karur. 2. Brief facts of the case are as follows:- The petitioner herein has filed the suit in O.S.No.73 of 2003, on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Kulithalai, against the respondents herein for specific performance on the basis of an alleged written agreement dated 20.01.2003. The respondents herein have filed a detailed written statement, wherein they have denied the execution of the sale agreement and alleged that the said document has been fraudulently created by committing forgery. Ultimately, on completing the trial, the learned Subordinate Judge, decreed the suit by an order dated 30.09.2004 in favour of the plaintiff. Challenging the said decree, the first respondent herein has filed an appeal in A.S.No.72 of 2005, before the learned District Judge, Karur. During the pendency of the said appeal, the first respondent who is the first defendant in the said suit has filed I.A.No.279 of 2005, praying for an appointment of Advocate Commissioner to take Ex.A.1, original sale agreement dated 20.01.2003, for comparison by the Hand Writing Expert namely, the Superintendent of Police (FD), Tamilnadu Finger Print Bureu, Mylapore, Chennai – 4. In support of the said application, the first respondent has filed an affidavit wherein, he has stated that even while the suit was pending before the trial Court, a similar application in I.A.No.141 of 2004, was filed seeking to send the document for comparison and the same was dismissed on the ground that it was filed after the commencement of the trial. He has further averred that he has intended to file a revision challenging the said order of dismissal by obtaining a certified copy. But, before the same could be done, the trial was completed by the trial Court. He has further averred that a stay petition filed by him before the lower Court was also dismissed and judgment was pronounced in the suit. He has further averred that, because of the above said reasons, he could not file any revision, challenging the order of the trial Court refusing to send the document for comparison and hence, I.A.No.279 of 2005, has been filed at the appellate stage. He has further averred that, because of the above said reasons, he could not file any revision, challenging the order of the trial Court refusing to send the document for comparison and hence, I.A.No.279 of 2005, has been filed at the appellate stage. He has further averred that, the dismissal of the earlier application and non filing of any revision would not operate as res judicata to maintain the present petition. 3. The petitioner herein has filed a detailed counter in I.A.No.279 of 2005, wherein he has stated that it is untenable to prefer the said application at the stage of appeal, in view of the fact that there is no revision filed challenging the order in I.A.NO.141 of 2004, passed by the trial Court, refusing to send the document for comparison. He has further stated that, the trial Court itself has compared the admitted signature found in the other records and it has come to the right conclusion that the signature has been made only by the first defendant and therefore, it does not require any more comparison by an Expert. He has further stated that while exercising the power of appeal, even the appellate Court can very well compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature, and come to a right conclusion. Therefore appointment of an Advocate Commissioner is not at all sustainable. 4. I have considered the rival contentions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the respondents and also perused the records. According to the plaint averments the disputed sale agreement was executed by the first respondent/first defendant on 20.01.2003. The first respondent/first defendant in the written statement has denied the execution of the said document and he has made a specific plea that the said sale agreement is a forged, fabricated, concocted and created one. It is also the admitted case that before the trial Court, the first respondent herein has filed I.A.No.141 of 2004, requesting the Court to send the disputed document Ex.A.1, to an Expert viz, The Superintendent of Police (FP), Tamilnadu Finger Print Bureu, Mylapore, Chennai – 4. Admittedly, the said application was dismissed. 5. The order of the learned Subordinate Judge dated 23.09.2004, made in I.A.No.141 of 2004, has been produced for perusal of the Court. Admittedly, the said application was dismissed. 5. The order of the learned Subordinate Judge dated 23.09.2004, made in I.A.No.141 of 2004, has been produced for perusal of the Court. In the operative portion of the said order, the learned Subordinate Judge has stated that the prayer for comparison of the document in question by an Expert cannot be allowed since the Interlocutory Application has been filed at the belated stage that too after the evidence was closed. The learned Subordinate Judge has further stated that the disputed signature of the document can very well be compared by the Court itself with the admitted signature of the first defendant and therefore, appointing an Advocate Commissioner to take the document to the Expert is unnecessary. The learned Subordinate Judge has further stated that from the evidence of the witnesses and the circumstances of the case, it can be safely concluded, whether the disputed signature was made by the first respondent or not. On these three grounds, the learned Subordinate Judge has dismissed the application. Of course, the first respondent should have preferred a revision against the said order but the same has not been done. In the affidavit, filed in support of I.A.No.279 of 2005, the first respondent has explained the reasons for not preferring such a revision challenging the order of the learned Subordinate Judge. He has specifically stated that he has obtained the certified copy of the said order with an intention to file revision, but before he could file a revision, the trial was completed. There is some force in the statement made by the first respondent in his affidavit. A perusal of the order of the learned Subordinate Judge would show that the order in I.A.No.141 of 2004 was delivered on 23.09.2004 and the suit was decreed on 30.09.2004, i.e., within seven days which includes two weekly holidays. Thus, the reasons stated in the affidavit for failure to file revision, before the suit was decreed, is not only reasonable but also acceptable. 6. After the suit was decreed, we cannot expect the first respondent to prefer any revision challenging the order of the learned Subordinate Judge made in I.A.No.141 of 2004, as the same would be only a futile exercise as it would be infructuous. Therefore, he has raised this point as one of the grounds of appeal. 7. 6. After the suit was decreed, we cannot expect the first respondent to prefer any revision challenging the order of the learned Subordinate Judge made in I.A.No.141 of 2004, as the same would be only a futile exercise as it would be infructuous. Therefore, he has raised this point as one of the grounds of appeal. 7. It could be seen from the records that without any further delay, during the pendency of the appeal, the I.A.No.279 of 2005, has been filed before the learned District Judge, Karur, with the same prayer asked for in the earlier application in I.A.No.141 of 2004. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the earlier order dismissing the prayer of the first respondent made in I.A.No.141 of 2004, operates as res judicate for making the present application in I.A.No.279 of 2005. The said plea cannot be accepted for the following reasons:- (i) The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment reported in AIR 1960 Supreme Court 941 (V 47 C 167) wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph Nos.7, 8, 21 and 22 has held as follows:- The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decision. What is says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter – whether on a question of fact or a question of law – has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is emboddied in relation to suits in S.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but even where S.11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. 8. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. 8. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Does this however mean that because at an earlier stage of the litigation a court has decided an interlocutory matter in one way and no appeal has been taken there from or no appeal did lie, a higher court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the matter again ?” 9. In the same Judgment, the Hon’ble Suprement Court in paragraph Nos.21 and 22, has held as follows:- “21......Interlocutory orders which have the force of a decree must be distinguished from other interlocutory orders which are a step towards the decision of the dispute between parties by way of a decree or a final order. Moheshur Singh’s Case, Forbes’ Case and Sheonath’s case dealt with interlocutory judgments which did not terminate the proceedings and led up to a decree or final order. Ram Kirpal Shukul’s Case, Bani Ram’s Case and Hook’s case deal with judgments which though called interlocutory, had, in effect, terminated the previous proceedings. These cases are therefore of no assistance to the learned counsel for the respondent in his argument that the order of remand made by the High Court not having been appealed from to this Court the correctness of that order cannot be challenged now. 22. In our opinion the order of remand was an interlocutory order which did not terminate the proceedings and so the correctness thereof can be challenged in an appeal from the final order........” (ii) On the strength of the said Judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that since in I.A.No.141 of 2004, a similar request of the first respondent has been rejected by the trial Court, applying the principle of res judicata, the lower Appellate Court ought to have dismissed the present I.A.No.279 of 2005. But, in the case on hand, the said principle of law cannot be applied as the facts are entirely different. But, in the case on hand, the said principle of law cannot be applied as the facts are entirely different. To apply the principle of res judicata, first of all, the matter whether on a question of fact or in a question of law should have been decided finally on an earlier occasion by 9. Here in my view, the earlier order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge is not on merits. As pointed out earlier, the said order has been passed on the three grounds namely, (1) the application has been filed belatedly; (2) the Court itself can compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature and (3) the signature could be proved by means of oral evidence or other circumstances. The order of the learned Subordinate Judge on these three grounds cannot be considered to be a final order on the question of fact so as to apply the rule of res judicata. 10. Further, the order of the learned Subordinate Judge has not terminated the litigation. The order dismissing the application to send the document for comparison by the learned Subordinate Judge also has not decided the question whether the disputed signature was made by the first respondent/first defendant or not. Therefore, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge cannot be construed to be a final order with reference to the facts involved in the instant case to apply the principle of res judicata. The learned counsel for the petitioner would rely on the another Judgment reported in AIR 1964 Supreme Court 993 (V 51 C 128) (Arjun Singh Vs. Mohindra Kumar and others) the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.13 has held as follows:- “13. It is needless to point out that interlocutory orders are of various kinds; some like orders of stay, injunction or receiver are designed to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceedings before the court usually take. They do not, in that sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not, of course, put an end to it even in part. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. As they do not impinge upon the legal rights of parties to the litigation the principle of res judicata does not apply to the findings on which these orders are based, though if applications were made for relief on the same basis after the same has once been disposed of the court would be justified in rejecting the same as an abuse of the process of Court. There are other orders which are also interlocutory, but would fall into a different category. The difference from the ones just now referred to lies in the fact that they are not directed to maintaining the status quo, or to preserve the property pending the final adjudication, but are designed to ensure the just, smooth, orderly and expeditious disposal of the suit. They are interlocutory in the sense that they do not decide any matter in issue arising in the suit, nor put an end to the litigation.” 11. I have gone through the above Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Instead of supporting the case of the petitioner, it supports only the case of the respondent. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorised the orders into two grounds. Those orders in the Interlocutory Applications which do not finally decide any matter, any issue arising in the suit, or put an end to the litigation form the first category. With reference to those orders, falling under the said category there is no question of applying the principle of res judicata. The second category is that, which finally decide the issue arising in the suit and put an end to the litigation. In the case on hand, the order made by the learned Subordinate Judge has neither finally decided the issue involved in the case nor terminated the suit. Therefore, this order would not fall within the second category of the order as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but it would certainly fall within the first category of Interlocutory order against which the rule of res judicata cannot be applied. 12. Therefore, this order would not fall within the second category of the order as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but it would certainly fall within the first category of Interlocutory order against which the rule of res judicata cannot be applied. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents would rely on the Judgment reported in AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1436 (Smt. Sukhrani v. Hari Shanker) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.5 has held as follows:- 5. It is true that at an earlier stage of the suit, in the proceeding to set aside the award, the High Court recorded a finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to seek reopening of the partition on the ground of unfairness when there was neither fraud nor misrepresentation. It is true that the plaintiff did not further pursue the matter at that stage by taking it in appeal to the Supreme Court but preferred to proceed to the trial of his suit. It is also true that a decision given at an earlier stage of a suit will bind the parties at later stages of the same suit. But it is equally well settled that because a matter has been decided at an earlier stage by an interlocutory order and no appeal has been taken there from or no appeal did lie, a higher Court is not precluded from considering the matter again at a later stage of the same litigation.” 13. The above principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court also supports the case of the respondents that the rule of res judicata is not applicable to the case on hand. 14. At this juncture, it is to be rememberd that substantial justice should be rendered in any case and the same should not be allowed to fail only on a technical ground. In this case, when there is a serious dispute regarding the author of the signature found in the sale agreement, it is decirable that the disputed signature is examined by an expert so as to assist the Court to come to a right conclusion. Of course, the Court can very well compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature to come to a conclusion, but it does mean that the Court should always compare the signature without getting the assistance of an Expert for the said purpose. Of course, the Court can very well compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature to come to a conclusion, but it does mean that the Court should always compare the signature without getting the assistance of an Expert for the said purpose. In this regard, the lower Court has rightly relied on the Judgment of this Court reported in 2003 (3) L.W 649 (Palaniammal v. Palanisamy) and has come to the correct conclusion that, it is better to send the document for comparison by an Expert to decide whether the disputed signature was made by the first respondent or not. 15. If it is the case of the petitioner that the I.A., has been filed only with a view to drag on the proceedings by the respondents, it can be certainly considered. But in the case on hand, even during the pendency of the suit, as well as during the pendency of the appeal, the first respondent has made the request to send the document for comparison, so as to establish that the disputed signature was not made by him. By getting the assistance of an Expert, whether the disputed signature and the admitted signature is tally with each other or not, the case of the petitioner is no way going to be prejudiced. As a matter of fact, to render justice it is always desirable to have the assistance of the Expert to offer his opinion, which would be certainly helpful for the Court. Thus, none of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner could be countenanced. 16. For all these reasons, I do not find any irregularity or illegality in the order of the learned District Judge warranting interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the result, the order of the learned District Judge, Karur dated 09.10.2006, made in I.A.No.279 of 2005 in A.S.No.72 of 2005, is hereby confirmed. The civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected M.P is closed.