JUDGMENT : Both the Second Appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment. These appeals were filed as First Appeals and were accordingly registered (F.A. No. 272 of 2002 & F.A. No. 743 of 2002). They were converted into Second Appeals in view of dictum rendered by Division Bench in "Shivprasad Shankarlal Pardeshi since deceased by his heirs Shrikant Shivprasad and others V/s. Leelabai Badrinarayan Kalwar since deceased by her heirs and others" 1998(1) Mh.L.J.444. 2. The appellants in both these appeals are original opponent Nos.1,3,5,8,9,11,13& 14. Respondent No.2 - Mahadevappa is original applicant No.1. Respondent Nos. 3 to 9 are original opponent Nos.2,4,6,7,10,12 & 15. 3. The appellants are members of group which was headed by appellant No.1 - Mallikarjunappa Bidve. For sake convenience I may call this group as Group "B". Respondent Nos.3 to 9 are members of another group headed by respondent No.5 (original opponent No.6) Mr. Sambappa Girwalkar, Advocate. This group may be called as Group "G". Admittedly, these two groups were at logger heads. 4. Mahatma Basweshwar Shikshan Sanstha, Latur is registered public trust. There are various schools and colleges run by the said educational trust. An engineering college is also run by the educational trust in the name and style as "M.S. Bidve Engineering College, Latur". 5. The constitution of the trust provides for life term Presidentship and appointment of fifteen (15) trustees. The members of group in Group "B" and the members of group "G" were managing trustees of the said educational trust. Appellant No.1 Mallikarjunappa, appellant No.2 Nagnathappa Kerale and appellant No.4 Nagnathappa Revadkar were the President, Secretary and Treasurer of the trust. 6. Original respondent No.2 Mahadevappa and one Chandrasekar Zade (since deceased) filed application under Section 41D of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, seeking removal of the managing trustees, in particular, President Mallikarjunappa Bidve, Secretary Nagnathappa Kerale and Treasurer Nagnathappa Revadkar. They alleged that the Managing trustees committed dereliction in duty, several misdeeds, malfeasance, misfeasance and misappropriation of funds of the educational trust. It is not necessary to elaborately set out all the charges and averments made by the original applicants in their application. 7. The Joint Charity Commissioner proceeded with the enquiry into the complaint application filed by Mahadevappa Khanapure and another. The enquiry was not, however, without hassles. Initially, the application was decided by the Charity Commissioner only on the basis of affidavits. 7. The Joint Charity Commissioner proceeded with the enquiry into the complaint application filed by Mahadevappa Khanapure and another. The enquiry was not, however, without hassles. Initially, the application was decided by the Charity Commissioner only on the basis of affidavits. Therefore, original applicant Mahadevappa Khanapure and another preferred Writ Petition No.5429 of 1995. Their Writ Petition was allowed by learned Single Judge on 17.04.1998. This Court directed that Joint Charity Commissioner shall allow oral evidence of the parties and others. It was specifically directed that before oral evidence would begin, all the contesting parties would give the Court list of witnesses and also give list of only necessary documents relevant for the purpose. It was specifically clarified "no witness who is not cited and no document which is not given in the list shall be allowed to examine and tender". 8. It appears that, yet, another Writ Petition No.3168 of 1998 was preferred by Mahadevappa Khanapure. This Court again directed that the Joint Charity Commissioner to consider list of witnesses and documents as given by original applicants and no other document shall be allowed to be produced. 9. The Joint Charity Commissioner allowed the parties to lead evidence in the context of various charges levelled against the trustees. As many as 13 charges were framed by the learned Jt. Charity Commissioner. Out of them, only one charge was held as proved. The remaining charges pertaining to payment of less salary to the teaching staff non-teaching staff, purchasing of goods for higher prices, excessive expenditure shown towards construction work etc. were held as disproved. The only charge which was held as proved is thus: "Whether it is proved that the opponent Nos. 1,3,8 and other opponents had collected donations from the students at the time of giving admission to the first year of Engineering College, Latur and at the time of change of faculty in the subsequent years from the period from 1989 to 1992-93 amounting to Rs.60,24,500/-, however, they did not deposit that amount in the account of trust, nor they had utilised that amount for carrying out aims and objects of the trust, nor they had accounted for the same, in the sense they did not show it in unaudited statement of account and thereby they committed act of malfeasance and misfeasance and thereby they can be sacked from the post of trusteeship? . The learned Jt. . The learned Jt. Charity Commissioner believed the evidence tendered by original applicants in support of the above charge. The learned Jt. Charity Commissioner held that original opponent Nos.1,3 & 8 i.e. the President, Secretary and Treasurer indulged in corrupt practice by collecting donations from Engineering College students at time of their admission to the first year of engineering course and also while allowing them to change the faculty during period before completion of the graduation. The learned Jt. Charity Commissioner held, however, that all the managing trustees by their act of omission failed to prohibit above three office bearers from accepting such donations and hence were equally guilty of the charge of committing malfeasance. Consequently, the learned Jt. Charity Commissioner allowed the application and directed removal of all the fifteen (15) trustees i.e. 8 members of Group "B" (Bidve Group) as well 7 members of Group "G" (Girwalkar Group). 10. Feeling aggrieved, members of Group "B" preferred Misc. Application No. 29 of 1999 and members of Group "G" preferred Misc. Application No.52 of 1999 in the Court of District Judge as provided under Section 41(5) of the Bombay Public Trust Act (for short "BPT Act"). Both these applications were heard together and came to be decided by common judgment. The learned Additional District Judge held that the charge of malfeasance and misfeasance was proved only against managing trustees who belong to Group "B" (Bidve Group) i.e. the present appellants. The learned Additional District Judge, however, held that the said charge was not proved against the members of Group "G" (Girwalkar Group). The application filed by Group "G" - M.A. No.52 of 1999 was, therefore, allowed and their removal from trusteeship was quashed whereas the application filed by Group "B" - M.A. No. 29 of 1999 as well cross objection preferred by original applicant No.1 came to be dismissed. Thus, dismissal of the trustees of Group "B" was confirmed by the impugned judgment. The learned Additional District Judge, further proceeded to direct that the trustees from Group "G" shall hold reigns of administration of the trust and take steps for appointment of other trustees according to the provisions of the instrument of the trust or in accordance with provisions of the BPT Act. The learned Additional District Judge, further proceeded to direct that the trustees from Group "G" shall hold reigns of administration of the trust and take steps for appointment of other trustees according to the provisions of the instrument of the trust or in accordance with provisions of the BPT Act. In other words, by the impugned judgment 8 managing trustees of Group "B" were ousted, 7 managing trustees of Group "G" were exonerated from the charge of malfeasance or misfeasance and were further empowered to appoint other eight trustees. 11. The First Appellate Court held that without there being proof to spell out misfeasance of the trustees of Consenting Group (Group "G"), they cannot be held responsible for collection of illegal donations from students or for less payment of salaries to the employees of educational institutions. The First Appellate Court further held that the appellants committed misfeasance by making payments of less salaries to various employees of the educational institutions and embezzled such amounts. 12. Challenge in Second Appeal No.44 of 2004 is to part of impugned judgment whereby the appellants are removed from trusteeship for the reason that charge of malfeasance or misfeasance is held as proved against them. They assert that the said charge is not proved against them and the findings of the Joint Charity Commissioner as well First Appellate Court are perverse and hence unsustainable. They seek exoneration from such charge and pray for setting aside the impugned judgment. 13. Challenge in Second Appeal No.45 of 2004 is to the impugned judgment on the ground that the members of Group "G" are wrongly exonerated from the charges of misfeasance and malfeasance and are illegally allowed to appoint other trustees as well to hold reigns of the administration. 14. At the present, however, as a result of order rendered by learned Jt. Charity Commissioner on 01.12.2006 in another Application No.15 of 2006, an administrative committee is appointed to look after affairs of the trust. The Administrative Committee so appointed has taken charge of affairs of the trust and is said to be managing the administration. That being the fact situation, it is not necessary to decide whether appointees of Group "G" could legally hold office of managing trustees of the educational trust. 15. The Second Appeals were listed for admission. By consent, it was decided to hear them finally at the stage of admission. 16. That being the fact situation, it is not necessary to decide whether appointees of Group "G" could legally hold office of managing trustees of the educational trust. 15. The Second Appeals were listed for admission. By consent, it was decided to hear them finally at the stage of admission. 16. The following substantial questions of law are formulated for decision of these appeals. (i) Whether the appellants have locus standi to challenge part of the judgment of the First Appellate Court to the extent it pertains to exoneration of the managing trustees who are members of Group "G" (called "Consenting Group") when the original applicant has not challenged the same? (ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the First Appellate Court rendered perverse finding that charge of malfeasance is proved against all the appellants as donations were accepted by the then President, Secretary and Treasurer from the students at the time of admission to the Engineering College and/or when change of faculty was being allowed and further that such amounts were not accounted for or were being retained by them or were being misappropriated by them? (iii) Whether the First Appellate Court rendered perverse finding while holding that the appellant No.1 paid less salaries to the employees working in the educational institution of the trust and that the other appellants assisted him or connived with him in doing so? (iv) Whether the First Appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction while directing the members of Consenting Group (Group "G") to take reigns of administration of the public trust and to appoint other trustees as enumerated in Clause (D) of the final order? My findings on the above points are: (i) YES (ii) YES, partly (iii) YES, partly (iv) YES. The reasons are discussed hereinafter. 17. Before I proceedto consider rival submissions, it may be made clear that the Joint Charity Commissioner as well the First Appellate Court rendered concurrent findings of facts as regards other charges of malfeasance or misfeasance and the misconduct attributed to the appellants on various counts. The Jt. Charity Commissioner held that all the trustees were liable to be removed because they had explicitly or impliedly contributed to the illegal acts of the then President, Secretary and the Treasurer. The Jt. The Jt. Charity Commissioner held that all the trustees were liable to be removed because they had explicitly or impliedly contributed to the illegal acts of the then President, Secretary and the Treasurer. The Jt. Charity Commissioner held that the trustees belonging to Group "G" did not take active steps to curb the nefarious activities of the the then President, Secretary and the Treasurer. That was the reason which weighed with the Jt. Charity Commissioner for removal of the trustees belonging to Group "G" (Consenting Group). The said Group was termed as "Consenting Group" because they did not oppose application filed by the original applicants. It has come on record that the application was at the behest of original opponent No.6 - Mr. Girwalkar, Advocate. The finding of Jt. Charity Commissioner was only on the basis of inference drawn by him due to omission of the other trustees to dissuade the President, Secretary and Treasurer from seeking illegal donations from students of the Engineering College. There is no material on the record to show that they were active participants in the alleged misfeasance of demanding donations from students of the Engineering College or that they misappropriated any amount of the Trust. 18. The legal position, which may be kept at back of the mind, is that removal of a trustee is a drastic action. The charge of malfeasance and/or misfeasance is serious one. The proceedings are of quasi civil and quasi criminal nature. Though the proceedings under Section 41D is not criminal proceeding as such, yet, proof required to sustain the charges is of high standard. The standard of proof in such proceedings is some what more than normally required in cases governed by preponderance of probabilities and some what less than required in trials of criminal cases. The degree of proof required in criminal case is such that would prove criminal charge beyond a reasonable realm of doubt. The imputation reflecting on integrity of trustees have to be fortified by proof of high degree which would be somewhere in between standard of proof required in civil proceedings like a suit and criminal proceedings like a trial for offence of criminal breach of trust, or that of cheating. The imputation reflecting on integrity of trustees have to be fortified by proof of high degree which would be somewhere in between standard of proof required in civil proceedings like a suit and criminal proceedings like a trial for offence of criminal breach of trust, or that of cheating. Thus, unless the lapse on part of the trustee is proved to be actuated by dishonesty or active connivance with other trustees, who are guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance, the drastic action under Section 41-D of the BPT Act, may not be warranted. 19. The expression "misfeasance" as used in clause (c) of Section 41-D would imply commission of breach of trust. It is more than mere negligence of the trustee to perform his duty. "Misfeasance" includes breach of duty by the trustee which would result into loss to the trust or would cause unlawful gain to such a trustee, charged with act of misfeasance. Acceptance of donations from students for giving admission to first year Engineering course is not contemplated under the terms of the office of the trusteeship. It requires no mincing of words to say that ordinarily no student will volunteer to pay in excess of the prescribed fees for admission to the professional course. It is only for compelling reasons, that the donations or capitation fees is paid by the students. They are a needy class. The exploitation is made by those who can fleece the easy money. 20. Original applicant No.1 had filed cross-objection against findings of the Jt. Charity Commissioner in respect of the several charges which were held as disproved. The First Appellate Court held that original applicant No.1 cannot file any cross-objection because the relevant provisions under Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted. In this Court too cross-objection was filed by original applicant No.1, but the same was not pressed into service. There is no need, therefore, to consider the contentions of original applicant No.1 in respect of other charges which were held as not proved by the Jt. Charity Commissioner as well as by the First Appellate Court. 21. There is no denial to the fact that there are two groups of trustees. It appears that original applicants were prompted by members of Group "G" to file the application before the Jt. Charity Commissioner. The trustees of Group "B" filed an application (Exh.33) before the Jt. Charity Commissioner as well as by the First Appellate Court. 21. There is no denial to the fact that there are two groups of trustees. It appears that original applicants were prompted by members of Group "G" to file the application before the Jt. Charity Commissioner. The trustees of Group "B" filed an application (Exh.33) before the Jt. Charity Commissioner and prayed for joint trial of the consenting opponents i.e. Group "G". The application was allowed by order dated 17.07.1995. The Jt. Charity Commissioner was pleased to frame as many as 13 charges against all the original opponents on the same day i.e. 17.07.1995. Further application was moved on behalf of the appellants to the effect that separate charges as enumerated in draft charges submitted by them shall also be framed against the trustees of Group "G" (consenting opponents). The learned Jt. Charity Commissioner rejected said application by his order dated 2nd August, 1995. Aggrieved thereby, present appellants had preferred Writ Petition No.4057 of 1995. This Court held that if the Charity Commissioner would find that any of the trustees have done any of the misdeed or is guilty of any acts mentioned from clause (a) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 41-D, the Charity Commissioner would be justified in taking action against him after giving him due opportunity of hearing. But to insist that said draft charge should be included in the enquiry would cause delay and inconvenience to the parties. Therefore, the enquiry was directed to be expedited. 22. There are several acts of misfeasance or those involving moral turpitude which forfeit right of a trustee to remain in the office. Section 41D (1) reads as follows: "41D. But to insist that said draft charge should be included in the enquiry would cause delay and inconvenience to the parties. Therefore, the enquiry was directed to be expedited. 22. There are several acts of misfeasance or those involving moral turpitude which forfeit right of a trustee to remain in the office. Section 41D (1) reads as follows: "41D. (1) The Charity Commissioner may, either on application of a trustee or any person interested in the trust, or on receipt of a report under Section 41B of suo motu may suspend, remove or dismiss any trustee of a public trust, if he,- (a) makes persistent default in the submission of accounts report or return: (b) wilfully disobeys any lawful orders issued by the Charity Commissioner under the provisions of this Act or rules made thereunder by the State Government: (c) continuously neglects his duty or commits any mal-feasance or misfeasance, or breach of trust in respect of the trust: (d) misappropriates or deals improperly with the properties of the trust of which he is a trustee; or (e) accepts any position in relation to the trust which is inconsistent with his position as a trustee: (f) if convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. (1) When the Charity Commissioner proposes to take action under sub-section (1), he shall frame charges against the trustee or the person against whom action is proposed to be taken and give him an opportunity of meeting such charges of testing the evidence adduced against him and of adducing evidence in his favour. The order of suspension, removal or dismissal shall state the charges framed against the trustee, his explanation and the finding on each charge, with the reasons therefor." 23. In the context of present appeals, the acts of the appellants are allegedly that of malfeasance or misfeasance or breach of the trust within the meaning of sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Section 41D or may be to some extent within sub-clause (d). The proceedings under Section 41-D cannot be regarded as adversary trial in stricto sensu. In the context of present appeals, the acts of the appellants are allegedly that of malfeasance or misfeasance or breach of the trust within the meaning of sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Section 41D or may be to some extent within sub-clause (d). The proceedings under Section 41-D cannot be regarded as adversary trial in stricto sensu. For, the Charity Commissioner may take appropriate action in any of the following ways:- i) On application of a trustee which would disclose prima facie substance in respect of any of the act enumerated under the sub-clauses (a) to (f); ii) On application of any person interested in trust, who may be a stranger but has some interest in the functioning of the trust and answers description of interested person within meaning of Section 2(10) of the BPT Act; iii) On receiving a report under Section 41B from the competent authority; or iv) Suo-motu if he finds reason to proceed with such enquiry. 24. Needless to say, the enquiry is of semi-adversary and semi-inquisitive character. Sub-clause (5) of the BPT Act would make it manifest that any trustee aggrieved by the order rendered by the Charity Commissioner under sub-section (1) may apply to the Court against such order. Thereafter, an appeal is provided for under sub-section (6), which shall lie to the High Court. Obviously, an appeal by any trustee, who is aggrieved by the order made against him or against any other trustee can be preferred under sub-clause (6). The appellants are partly aggrieved by the order rendered by the First Appellate Court under sub-clause (5), because the trustees of consenting group "G" have been exonerated and discharged by the impugned judgment. The First Appellate Court reversed the findings of the Jt. Charity Commissioner in this behalf. 25. Mr. Dhorde, learned Advocate for respondent Nos. 3 to 10 would submit that appellants have no locus standi to prefer Second Appeal No.44 of 2004 against finding of First Appellate Court in respect of exoneration of respondent Nos. 3 to 9 from the charges levelled against them. He would submit that when the original applicant No.1 did not prefer any such appeal, then the appeal cannot be filed by present appellants against findings which are favourable to respondent Nos.3 to 9. He would submit that Second Appeal No.44 of 2004 needs to be dismissed in limine. 26. 3 to 9 from the charges levelled against them. He would submit that when the original applicant No.1 did not prefer any such appeal, then the appeal cannot be filed by present appellants against findings which are favourable to respondent Nos.3 to 9. He would submit that Second Appeal No.44 of 2004 needs to be dismissed in limine. 26. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that joint charges were framed against trustees of the consenting group (Group "G") on basis of separate application moved by the present appellants vide Exh.33. Naturally, they were in position of applicants qua the co-trustees belonging to consenting group (Group "G"). It is on basis of their application that the Jt. Charity Commissioner had initiated the proceedings against the co-trustees of Group "G". Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the appellants have no locus standi to challenge the findings of the First Appellate Court, whereby the trustees of Group "G" have been exonerated from charges of misfeasance and malfeasance. I am of the opinion that the appeal preferred by the appellants (S.A. No.44 of 2004) is maintainable. For, they are aggrieved persons qua the Group "G". 27. Mr. P.M. Shah, learned Sr. Advocate would submit that the Jt. Charity Commissioner committed patent error while rejecting the application filed by the appellants for allowing them to lead evidence. He would submit that the impugned judgment is lop sided. He contended that the First Appellate Court applied different yardstick while assessing evidence on record and rendered perverse finding about alleged malfeasance and misfeasance of the appellants. He contended that in absence of any documentary evidence regarding collection of donations from students, the findings of the First Appellate Court are unsustainable. He further submitted that the First Appellate Court failed to see that receipts were executed by respondent Nos.6-Mr.Girwalkar, Advocate about the amounts received by him from alleged account No.2. He argued that the admissions of P.W. Vijaykumar are ignored by the First Appellate Court. He further contended that the First Appellate Court wrongly drew adverse inference against the appellants due to their remaining away from the witness box but the same yardstick was not applied to the trustees of consenting group though they too did not enter the witness box. He further contended that the First Appellate Court wrongly drew adverse inference against the appellants due to their remaining away from the witness box but the same yardstick was not applied to the trustees of consenting group though they too did not enter the witness box. He argued that the First Appellate Court failed to see game plan of original opponent No.6 - Mr.Girwalkar, Advocate, who was string puller behind the curtain and the designed action was to oust the appellants from management of the trust. It is argued that the impugned judgment is unsustainable inasmuchas the findings rendered against the appellants are without material and are based on surmises. 28. Mr. V.D. Salunke, learned Advocate for original applicant No.1 pointed out that so called admission appearing in the statement of P.W.1 Vijaykumar had creeped in due to typographical mistake but was later-on rectified as per order passed on pursis (Exh.249). He argued that no substantial question of law is involved in the second appeals and hence they are not maintainable. He further argued that the findings of the First Appellate Court are legal and proper. Further contention of Mr. Salunke is that when appeal memo does not show any substantial question of law then the Second Appeals are liable to be dismissed in view of "Chadat Singh V/s. Bahadur Rama & Ors." 2004(5) Supreme Today 700. Mr. Dhorde, learned Advocate for the consenting group (Group "G") supported the impugned judgment. 29. Though the present appeals are on par with Second Appeals, yet, it cannot be overlooked that the right to appeal against order made under Sub-section (1) of the Section 41D is governed by statutory provisions. The appeal to High Court is provided for under sub-section (6) of Section 41D, against the decision of the Court under sub-section (5) by treating such decision as a decree from which an appeal would ordinarily lie. The purport of such specific provision under sub-clause (6) of Section 41D is to provide for appellate remedy as a matter of right. In other ordinary cases the right of second appeal is circumscribed by parameters of Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. The well settled legal position is that no Second Appeal would lie to the High Court in case where findings are based only on appreciation of evidence and their exists no substantial question of law. In other ordinary cases the right of second appeal is circumscribed by parameters of Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. The well settled legal position is that no Second Appeal would lie to the High Court in case where findings are based only on appreciation of evidence and their exists no substantial question of law. This barrier is not applicable to the statutory appeal provided under special enactment. Consequently, though the appeal is to be treated as Second Appeal, yet, it cannot be dismissed because there is technical fault, namely, omission to precisely state the substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal. 30. Coming to the evidence on record, it is true that P.W.1 Vijayswami and P.W.6 Guruling bore animus against appellants. As to the testimony of these witnesses, their antipathy towards the appellants, particularly, appellant No.1 Mallikarjunappa, is no secret. Mr. Vijayswami was not pulling on well with the trustees of Group "B" (appellants). He was humiliated as a result of disciplinary action taken against him for illegal purchases made from shop standing in name of his wife and on other charges of misconduct. It is explicit from cross-examination of Mr. Vijayswami that a Show Cause Notice was served on him and he was made to face charges of misconduct. He was suspended and later-on removed from service. He admits that findings in the disciplinary enquiry were confirmed by the University Tribunal on an appeal preferred by him. 31. Though P.W. Vijayswami and P.W. Guruling have some reasons to depose against the appellants, yet, it does not mean that their evidence is worthless. It may be said that their evidence needs to be approached with circumspection. Both of them were actively concerned with the day-to-day functioning of the affairs of the trust. P.W. Vijayswami was Principal of Basveshwar Engineering College, Latur. His version purports to show that there was an Admission Committee comprising of three members. The Admission Committee members used to collect donations from needy students for giving admission to first year Engineering course. According to Mr. Vijayswami, a relative of appellant No.1 Mallikarjunappa Bidve used to collect donations from the students. Initially one Mr. Dhamne who is son-in-law of the appellant No.1, used to collect such donations from the students but later-on Mr.Dharane, who is maternal nephew of the appellant No.1, used to collect such donations. According to Mr. Vijayswami, a relative of appellant No.1 Mallikarjunappa Bidve used to collect donations from the students. Initially one Mr. Dhamne who is son-in-law of the appellant No.1, used to collect such donations from the students but later-on Mr.Dharane, who is maternal nephew of the appellant No.1, used to collect such donations. The modus operandi was to obtain donations from the prospective engineering students by Mr. Dharane and to handover the same to the appellant No.1. A chit used to be given in the name of Principal for admitting the students after such transaction was completed. It is stated by Mr.Vijayswami that donations used to be collected at instance of the appellant No.1, who was the then President, appellant No.2 Nagnathappa who was the then Secretary and appellant No.4 Nagnathappa Revadkar who was the then Treasurer of the trust. It is version of P.W. Vijayswami that the collected amount used to remain in custody of appellant No.1 Mallikarjunappa Bidve. His version also shows that the employees were being paid less salaries. He admits that the admission list used to be sent to the university by his letter. He used to admit the students to engineering courses. His version purports to show that 7 lecturers were appointed in 1990-91 on adhoc basis. 32. The testimony of P.W. Guruling purports to show that he used to work as accountant of the educational trust. He also states that Mr. Dharane, who is closely related to appellant No.1, used to collect donations from students at the time of admission to Engineering course. His version purports to show that a separate account was maintained regarding the amount of such donations. He produced xerox copies of said accounts (Exh.263). It appears that said extract of accounts was prepared for private use to indicate the donation amounts collected from students. Therefore, it was captioned as "No.2 account". The appellants did not produce original documents inspite of sufficient opportunity availed by them. The testimony of P.W. Guruling is corroborated by the documentary evidence. He expressed laboured ignorance regarding signature and handwriting of the then Secretary Mr.Shivsharnappa Chitkote (opponent No.10). 33. The evidence of P.W.4 Aju Jecob and P.W.5 Kamal Prabhudayal Tahreja gives material information regarding the manner in which donations used to be collected from engineering students. Their evidence reveals that Mr. Dharane used to demand the donation. He expressed laboured ignorance regarding signature and handwriting of the then Secretary Mr.Shivsharnappa Chitkote (opponent No.10). 33. The evidence of P.W.4 Aju Jecob and P.W.5 Kamal Prabhudayal Tahreja gives material information regarding the manner in which donations used to be collected from engineering students. Their evidence reveals that Mr. Dharane used to demand the donation. Both of them have stated that they paid donations in cash to Mr. Dharane. Thereafter, Mr. Dharane handed over a chit for its presentation to the Principal. On the basis of such chit, they were admitted to the engineering college. It is pointed out that P.W. Aju Jecob filed two contrary affidavits (Exh.259 & Exh.260). 34. Mr. Shah contended that P.W. Aju Jecob has no regard for truth. His evidence is criticised on the ground that it is without corroboration of any chit or document like receipt in respect of the payment. It is admitted by P.W. Aju Jecob that he could not remember exact date and day of his first visit to Latur. There is some discrepancy in his evidence regarding withdrawal of the amount of Rs.35,000/- which is said to be parted with by him towards donation. He admits that he filed the affidavit (Exh.259) at instance of one advocate. He could not locate name of said advocate. He was asked by the Jt. Charity Commissioner as to why he had filed Second Affidavit (Exh.260). His explanation was that Mr. Dharne had pressurised him to file such affidavit. 35. Both the above referred witnesses were students of the engineering college and got through the said course. They had left Engineering College much prior to entering into witness box. Mr. Shah, would submit that both these ex-students of the Engineering College are got up witnesses. They have no reason to grind axe against the appellants. The version of P.W. Kamal reveals that appellant No.4 - Nagnathappa Revadkar was present when the amount of Rs.15,000/- was paid to Mr. Dharane. His version reveals that a chit was handed over by Mr. Dharane after the payment and on basis of such a chit, the Principal gave him admission to the Engineering College. His version also reveals that his friends by name Mr.Bhatia, Mr.Tripathi, Mr. Trivedi had paid donations to obtain changes in the faculty. Of-course, this is hearsay information. 36. Nothing of much importance could be gathered from cross-examination of P.W. Kamal. Dharane after the payment and on basis of such a chit, the Principal gave him admission to the Engineering College. His version also reveals that his friends by name Mr.Bhatia, Mr.Tripathi, Mr. Trivedi had paid donations to obtain changes in the faculty. Of-course, this is hearsay information. 36. Nothing of much importance could be gathered from cross-examination of P.W. Kamal. He admits, unequivocally, that except his words there is no other evidence to show that Mr. Dharane had issued a chit to him for being presented before the principal. Credibility of both the witnesses is not impaired inspite of searching cross-examination. The Jt. Charity Commissioner and the First Appellate Court were right in holding that documentary evidence cannot be expected in respect of such donations which are outcome of underhand dealings. Ordinarily, needy students will not insist upon any receipt regarding payment of donation. Even assuming that the witnesses could have prepared xerox copies of such chits, yet, it is improbable that they would keep record of such xerox copies for years together. They could not have ventilated any grievance while they were undergoing studies in the Engineering College. Under these circumstances, I do not find any fault with the reasoning of the Courts below. 37. The remaining evidence comprises of testimonies of P.W.2 Mahadev, who is original applicant No.1 and P.W. 3 Somnath Halyale. It is explicit from version of P.W. Mahadeo that he has no personal knowledge as regards collection of donations from the students. His version purports to show that donations were also collected from teachers. He confronted this information to the president i.e. the appellant No.1. Thereupon, he was informed that since beginning it was practice to collect donations and maintain account. Though various mal-practices and charges of misfeasance are levelled by P.W. Mahadeo Khanapure in his examination-in-chief, yet, it is difficult to place implicit reliance on his version. He admits, unequivocally, that whatever he stated in examination-in-chief is based on his hearsay knowledge. He further admitted that Mr. Girwalkar, Advocate, Ramrao Kavthale and Vijaykumar Shete gave instructions to him as per their respective grievances. In another words, they provided him material to file the application. He is a dummy witness, prima facie, putforth by the members of the consenting group i.e. Group "G". He further admitted that Mr. Girwalkar, Advocate, Ramrao Kavthale and Vijaykumar Shete gave instructions to him as per their respective grievances. In another words, they provided him material to file the application. He is a dummy witness, prima facie, putforth by the members of the consenting group i.e. Group "G". His version reveals that his brother-in-law by name Vaijnath Halkunche was appointed as a teacher in a school of the trust on basis of a bogus caste certificate. 38. The version of P.W. Somnath reveals that he was working as peon but later-on was promoted as a clerk. He deposed that he used to collect fees from students and also used to distribute salaries to the teachers. His version reveals that he prepared statements about distribution of the salaries in his own hand. He referred to those statements (page No. 809 to 813 below Exh.5) and stated that the amounts were paid towards salaries of the teachers. His version reveals that he was paid less salary for three years. However, he admits that except his bare words there is no other evidence to show that he was paid less salary. 39. There is sufficient material on record which purports to show that the appellant Nos.1 - 4 were the persons concerned with collection of donations from engineering students. They were working as the President and Treasurer of the trust. It does not stand to reason that the Treasurer had no knowledge, what-so-ever, of the illegal act of collecting donations from students of Engineering College by the President. The First Appellate Court noticed that the statement of account (Exh.244) is corroborated by P.W. Guruling and hence it could be inferred that the employees were being paid less salaries at the instance of Executive Director by name Mr. V.C. Dharane and the President i.e. appellant No.1-Mallikarjunappa. Both the courts have concurrently held that there is sufficient material to reach conclusion that donations were being collected at the instance of appellant No.1 Mallikarjunappa. A xerox copy of account prepared by the opponent No.10 Mr. Chitkote would fortify such conclusion. There is no reason as to why opponent No.10 Mr. Chitkote was not called for cross-examination by the appellants. True, he was in the opposite camp. Still, however, he could be called in the witness box only for purpose of cross-examination. That was not done. Chitkote would fortify such conclusion. There is no reason as to why opponent No.10 Mr. Chitkote was not called for cross-examination by the appellants. True, he was in the opposite camp. Still, however, he could be called in the witness box only for purpose of cross-examination. That was not done. The findings of both the Courts in respect of collection of donation by Mr.Dharane at the instance of the president is quite sustainable. It is based on adequate material. So also, it is duly proved that less salaries were being paid to the employees and a separate account of such transactions used to be maintained as deposed by P.W. Somnath Halyale. 40. The clinching question is whether the evidence on record is sufficient to prove the acts of malfeasance or misfeasance against all the appellants. The First Appellate Court held that respondent Nos.3 to 9 i.e. trustees of Group "G" cannot be held responsible for collection of the donations and the acts of malfeasance. The First Appellate Court held that the said trustees must be exonerated from the charges because they were not involved in collection of the illegal donations or payment of less salaries to the employees. The First Appellate Court did not apply the same yardstick to those appellants of Group "B" who are not directly involved in such acts of malfeasance. It bears out from record that only appellant No.1 and the appellant No.4 i.e. the President and the Treasurer were involved in collection of the donations from the students. Though appellant No.2 was working as Secretary at the relevant time, yet, there is no material on record to show his complicity. He and other appellants cannot be lightly roped-in only because they did not oppose misdeeds of appellant No.1 Mallikarjunappa and appellant No.4 Nagnathappa Revadkar. The evidence on record is rather insufficient to reach conclusion that appellant No.2 Nagnathappa Kerale, appellant No.3 Vishwanathappa Hurne and appellant Nos.5 to 8 were involved in the act of alleged misfeasance. It cannot be said that they were concerned with admissions of students to the Engineering College. It also cannot be said on the basis of material produced on record that they were concerned with distribution of the salaries to the employees. It cannot be said that they were concerned with admissions of students to the Engineering College. It also cannot be said on the basis of material produced on record that they were concerned with distribution of the salaries to the employees. In my opinion, the First Appellate Court rendered lop-sided finding while holding these appellants as guilty for alleged malfeasance and misdeeds on par with appellant No.1 and appellant No.4. The First Appellate Court ought to have weighed the evidence in the same scale in respect of involvement of the said appellants likewise that of respondent Nos. 3 to 9. Under these circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion that the concurrent findings of both the Courts are sustainable only to the extent of charge of malfeasance held to have been proved against appellant No.1-Mallikarjunappa Bidve and appellant No.4 Nagnathappa Revadkar. Other appellants must be, therefore, exonerated from the charges of malfeasance and misfeasance. By applying same yard stick, respondent Nos. 3 to 9 also cannot be removed from the trusteeship on the strength of material which is presently available on record. If the appellants or any of them would choose to reiterate the allegations against respondent Nos. 3 to 9 or any of them, then they may separately move the Charity Commissioner for appropriate action under Section 41D of BPT Act, by filing separate proceedings. As the things stand, the appellants, except appellant Nos. 1 and 4 and respondent Nos. 3 to 7 cannot be held responsible for the act of misfeasance committed while giving admissions to the students of Engineering College or making less payment of salaries to some employees. 41. To conclude, I have no hesitation in holding that the charges of alleged malfeasance are sustainable only against appellant Nos. 1 and 4. The removal of other appellants is improper and unsustainable. The findings of the First Appellate Court in this context are without material. Therefore, part of the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. Second Appeal No.44 of 2004 will have to be dismissed as the concurrent findings of both the Courts need not be disturbed in respect of the absolvement of respondent Nos. 3 to 9 from allegations of misfeasance or misappropriation. 42. For the reasons aforestated Second Appeal No. 44 of 2004 is dismissed whereas Second Appeal No.45 of 2004 is partly allowed. 3 to 9 from allegations of misfeasance or misappropriation. 42. For the reasons aforestated Second Appeal No. 44 of 2004 is dismissed whereas Second Appeal No.45 of 2004 is partly allowed. The impugned judgment is confirmed only to the extent of removal of appellant No.1 Mallikarjunappa Bidve and appellant No.4 Nagnathappa Revadkar and is set aside as regards findings against other appellants. Those other appellants are exonerated from the charge of malfeasance and would be entitled to continue as trustees of the trust. The parties to bear their own costs. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.