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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 142 (HP)

Tejinder Singh v. State of H. P.

2007-04-27

RAJIV SHARMA

body2007
JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, J. 1. This petition has been filed against the orders dated 13.8.2001 (Annexure P-3), 3.10.2001 (Annexure P-4) and 5.11.2001 (Annexure P-6). 2. The brief facts necessary for adjudication of this petition are that the Petitioner has been issued a certificate of bona fide Himachali by the Executive Magistrate, Poanta Sahib on 12.8.1997. One Sh. Balraj Malhotra filed a complaint before the Tehsildar, Poanta Sahib for the cancellation of Himachali bona fide certificate issued in favour of the Petitioner on 12.5.1998. In sequel to the complaint, the proper inquiry was conducted by the Tehsildar, Poanta Sahib after framing the following two issues: 1. Whether proper procedure was adopted to issue the certificate. 2. Whether the applicant Shri Tejinder Singh was residing in H.P. for the last 15 years prior to issuance of this certificate. 3. The parties were directed by the Tehsildar to produce their respective evidence. The Tehsildar, Poanta Sahib after going through the evidence oral as well as documentary came to the conclusion that the Executive Magistrate while issuing Himachali bona fide certificate to the Petitioner has adopted the valid procedure and the instructions issued by the Government from time to time and no irregularity has been committed. Consequently, the application of Sh. Balraj Malhotra was rejected. 4. It appears that not satisfied with the out come of the inquiry Annexure P-2 dated 27.9.1999, Mr. Balraj Malhotra again filed complaint before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) Paonta Sahib, who ordered the Tehsildar, Poanta Sahib to again look into the matter. The Tehsildar, Poanta Sahib after inquiring into the matter furnished the report to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) on 14.1.2000. Even after the completion of two inquiries in favour of the Petitioner, the Deputy Commissioner has issued memo to the SDO (Civil), Poanta Sahib on 13.8.2001. The contents of the same are required to be reproduced for better appreciation of the facts which read as under: On the inquiry report submitted to the Government by this office, the Government has desired the following action against Sh. Tejinder Singh: 1. The Bona fide Himachali Certificate issued in favour Sh. Tejinder Singh may be considered for cancellation. 2. Action to register criminal case against Sh. Tejinder Singh for producing fake affidavit may be taken. You are therefore, directed to take action for canceling the Bona fide Himachali Certificate of Sh. Tejinder Singh: 1. The Bona fide Himachali Certificate issued in favour Sh. Tejinder Singh may be considered for cancellation. 2. Action to register criminal case against Sh. Tejinder Singh for producing fake affidavit may be taken. You are therefore, directed to take action for canceling the Bona fide Himachali Certificate of Sh. Tejinder Singh after affording reasonable opportunity to him and to register a Criminal Case accordingly under intimation to this office. 5. In sequel to Annexure P-3 dated 13.8.2001, notice was issued to Petitioner on 3.10.2001. The contents of the same are reproduced as under: Whereas an inquiry report submitted to the Government has desired the following action: 1. The Bona fide Himachali Certificate issued in favour of Sh. Tejinder Singh may be considered for cancellation. 2. Action to register criminal case against Sh. Tejinder Singh for producing fake affidavit may be taken. You are directed to appear before the undersigned on 16.10.2001 to explain your position. 6. The Petitioner filed detailed reply to notice dated 3.10.2001 on 16.10.2001. The Executive Magistrate without taking into consideration the reply furnished by the petitionor cancelled the Himachali bona fide certificate on 5.11.2001 and the Petitioner was directed to submit the certificate issued to him in the office on 7.11.2001. The Executive Magistrate has also issued separate notice to the Petitioner to deposit the Himachali bona fide certificate No. 1318 dated 12.5.1997 in the Court on 7.11.2001. It will be pertinent to note that the Petitioner had also filed application seeking adjournment on 5.11.2001 which is placed on record at page 51. Thereafter the matter came up on 7.11.2001 and in this order it is mentioned that the Petitioner has deposited the certificate and for the purpose of institution of criminal case against the Petitioner, the opinion of Assistant District Attorney was sought. 7. The Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have filed reply to the writ petition persuant to notice dated 20.5.2002. 8. Mr. M.S. Chandel, learned Advocate General has drawn the attention of this Court to para 3 of the reply filed to the writ petition to substantiate the plea that there was no violation of principles of natural justice. The relevant portion of para 3 reads as under: A inquiry was conducted which concluded that the certificate was wrongly been issued and the. same was cancelled. 9. I have heard the parties and perused the record. 10. The relevant portion of para 3 reads as under: A inquiry was conducted which concluded that the certificate was wrongly been issued and the. same was cancelled. 9. I have heard the parties and perused the record. 10. The Petitioner has been issued Himachali bona fide certificate on 12.8.1997. Two inquiries were conducted by the competent authorities to look into the veracity of the allegations made by one Sh. Balraj Malhotra with regard to Himachali bona fide certificate issued to the Petitioner. The inquiry conducted by the Tehsildar Poanta Sahib was very exhaustive. The parties have led their respective evidence. The Tehsildar, Poanta Sahib has come to a definite conclusion while rejecting the application of Sh. Balraj Malhotra that the procedure as prescribed for the issuance of Himachali bona fide certificate was gone into and the instructions issued by the State from time to time with regard to issuance of Himachali bona fide certificate were complied with. 11. It appears that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) has directed the Tehsildar, Poanta Sahib on 5.1.2000 to inquire into the allegations of Mr. Balraj Malhotra. The Tehsildar, Poanta Sahib has furnished the report to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) on 14.12000 after concluding that the complainant has failed to produce any evidence or even a single witness, who could testify that the Petitioner was not living in Himachal. The report of the Tehsildar furnished to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) dated 14.1.2000 was based on the report of the Patwari, Secretary, Municipal Committee, Poanta Sahib as well as on the basis of statement of the witnesses. Consequently it was concluded that the issuance ot Himachali bona fide certificate to the Petitioner was correct and valid. The matter should have rested here after the same was inquired into by two authorities separately. 12. It appears that after two reports have gone against Mr. Balraj Malhotra, he has forwarded the application to the Chief Minister for cancellation of the certificate issued in favour of the Petitioner. The Respondent No. 2 has issued a memorandum to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil), Poanta Sahib on 13.8.2001. The contents of the same have already been noted above. What appears from this memorandum is that some inquiry was conducted by the office of Deputy Commissioner and the same was sent to the Government and in sequel thereto following action was directed to be taken against the Petitioner: 1. The contents of the same have already been noted above. What appears from this memorandum is that some inquiry was conducted by the office of Deputy Commissioner and the same was sent to the Government and in sequel thereto following action was directed to be taken against the Petitioner: 1. The Bona fide Himachali Certificate issued in favour of Sh. Tejinder Singh may be considered for cancellation. 2. Action to register criminal case against Sh. Tejinder Singh for producing fake affidavit may be taken. 13. The Petitioner has averred in his petition that no inquiry except two inquiries i.e. Annexures P-2 and P-10 were held against the Petitioner. The report mentioned in memorandum dated 13.8.2001 was neither supplied to the Petitioner nor at any given time, the Petitioner was associated during the course of inquiry as mentioned in this memorandum. The Respondent-State, has also not placed on record the copy of the inquiry report as mentioned in memorandum dated 13.8.2001. The following questions require consideration by this Court. 1. At whose instance the inquiry was instituted as mentioned in memorandum dated 13.8.2001? 2. Who was the Inquiry Officer? 3. Was a notice at any given time issued to the Petitioner? 4. Whether at any given time the Petitioner was associated during the course of inquiry which has been made the basis for issuance of memorandum dated 13.8.2001? 14. It was incumbent upon the authorities to issue show-cause notice to the Petitioner, if any, inquiry was instituted. The Petitioner was required to be associated during the course of inquiry. The Petitioner was also required to be supplied with the adverse material collected against him. The copy of the report was required to be supplied to the Petitioner. None of these steps admittedly have been taken by the Respondents in complete defiance of the principles of natural justice. The inquiry report has been sent by the Deputy Commissioner to the Government as per the contents of memorandum dated 13.8.2001. In the memorandum dated 13.8.2001 there is a direction to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil), Poanta Sahib to cancel the Himachali bona fide certificate issued in favour of the Petitioner as well as to take action to register criminal case against the Petitioner for producing fake affidavit. It is specifically mentioned in memorandum dated 13.8.2001 that the certificate was to be cancelled after affording reasonable opportunity to the Petitioner. It is specifically mentioned in memorandum dated 13.8.2001 that the certificate was to be cancelled after affording reasonable opportunity to the Petitioner. The Petitioner in sequel to memo dated 13.8.2001 was issued show-cause notice. The contents of the same have already been reproduced above. The Petitioner has filed the reply to notice on 3.10.2001 and has specifically mentioned therein that the matter has already been looked into on the basis of the two inquiry reports and the issuance of notice was not in accordance with law. The Executive Magistrate, Poanta Sahib in a most illegal and arbitrary manner on the basis of the memorandum dated 13.8.2001, has cancelled the Himachal bona fide certificate issued to the Petitioner and he was further directed to submit the certificate in his office on 7.11.2001. The Executive Magistrate has not applied, his mind before cancelling the Himachali Bona fide certificate issued to the Petitioner. It is evident that the reply filed by the Petitioner to the show-cause notice has not been taken into consideration in the order dated 5.11.2001. The Executive Magistrate has issued order dated 5.11.2001 mechanically at the instance of State Government. Every statutory authority has to apply its independent mind before issuing any order having civil consequences. The competent authority to cancel the Himachal bona fide certificate was the Executive Magistrate, but in the present case, he has abdicated his duties and merely on the basis of the dictation of the State, cancelled the certificate issued in favour of the Petitioner. 15. What emerges now is that two inquiries were held against the Petitioner. One as mentioned in memorandum dated 13.8.2001 conducted by the Deputy Commissioner, which was sent to the State Government on the basis of which the memorandum was issued. Second, inquiry as per the reply of the Respondents was conducted after the issuance of memorandum dated 13.8.2001. The Respondents-State has neither placed the copy of the report as mentioned in memorandum dated 13.8.2001 sent to the State Government nor the copy of the report as mentioned in para 3 of the reply after issuance of memorandum dated 13.8.2001. The Petitioner has averred in the petition that he was never supplied with a copy of the inquiry report as mentioned in memorandum dated 13.8.2001. The Petitioner has averred in the petition that he was never supplied with a copy of the inquiry report as mentioned in memorandum dated 13.8.2001. The specific averments made by the Petitioner in sub-para (5) of para 4 of the petition with regard to the non-supply of the copy of the report, have not been denied in the reply. If the inquiry as mentioned in memorandum was conducted, the same cannot be permitted to be used against the Petitioner since the Petitioner has not been issued any show-cause notice nor he was associated during the course of this inquiry. Similarly, it is evident from the record that no enquiry report held in sequel to order dated 13.8.2001 was the Petitioner. The entire issue was pre-judged by the Deputy Commissioner. The directions issued by the State were to cancel the Himachali bona fide certificate of the Petitioner and to file criminal case against the Petitioner. The Executive Magistrate has not applied his mind and mechanically cancelled the Himachali bona fide certificate issued in favour of the Petitioner. Even the reply of the Petitioner has not been taken while issuing order dated 5.11.2001. 16. The upshot of the above discussion is that the cancellation of the Himachali bona fide certificate issued in favour of the Petitioner dated 12.8.1997 has been cancelled in an arbitrary manner. The cancellation of the Himachal bona fide certificate is in violation of principle of natural justice. Once two inquiries have been held there was no occasion to hold fresh inquiry again that too without associating the Petitioner with the same. The copies of the inquiry reports were required to be supplied to the Petitioner as mentioned in memorandum dated 13.8.2001. Neither the Deputy Commissioner nor the Executive Magistrate have applied their independent minds and have abdicated their statutory functions on the directions of the State Governments. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji AIR 1962 SC 16, that public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them and persons to whose detriment orders are made are entitled to know with an exactness and precision what they are expected to do or forbear from doing and exactly what authority is making the order. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have opined as under: It is clear to us from a perusal of these rules that the only reason vested with authority to grant or refuse a licence for the erection of a building to be used for purposes of public amusement is the Commissioner of Police. It is also clear that under Rule 250 he has been Vested With the absolute discretion at any time to cancel or suspend any licence which has been granted under the rules. But the power to do so is vested in him and not in the State Government and can only be exercised by him at his discretion. No other person or authority can do it. 18. In B. Rajagopala Naidu v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal Madras and Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1573, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in discharging their quasi-judicial functions, the Tribunal constituted under the Act must act absolutely free to deal with the matter according to their best judgments. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held as under: In reaching this conclusion, we have been influenced by certain other consideration which are both relevant and material. In interpreting Section 43A, we think, it would be legitimate to assume that the legislature intended to respect the basic and elementary postulate of the rule of law, that in exercising their authority and in discharging their quasi-judicial function the Tribunals constituted under the Act must be left absolutely free to deal with the matter according to their best judgment. It is of the essence of fair and objective administration of law that the decision of the Judge or the Tribunal must be absolutely unfettered, by any extraneous guidance by the executive or administrative wing of the State. If the exercise of discretion conferred on a quasi-judicial tribunal is controlled by any such direction that forges fetters on the exercise of quasi-judicial authority and the presence of such fetters interest would make the exercise of such authority completely inconsistent with the well-accepted notion of judicial process. It is true that law can regulate the exercise of judicial powers. It may indicate by specific provisions on what matters the tribunals constituted by it should adjudicate. It may by specific provisions lay down the principles which have to be followed by the Tribunals in dealing with the said matters. It is true that law can regulate the exercise of judicial powers. It may indicate by specific provisions on what matters the tribunals constituted by it should adjudicate. It may by specific provisions lay down the principles which have to be followed by the Tribunals in dealing with the said matters. The scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunals constituted by statute can well be regulated by the statute and principles for guidance of the said tribunals may also be prescribed subject of course to the inevitable requirement that these provisions do not contravene the fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. But what law and the provisions of law may legitimately do cannot be permitted to be done by administrative or executive orders. This position is so well established that we are reluctant to hold that in enacting Section 43A the Madras Legislature intended to confer power on the State Government to invade the domain of the exercise of judicial power. In fact, such had been the intention of the Madras Legislature and had been the true effect of the provisions of Section 43A. Section 43A itself would amount to a unreasonable contravention of fundamental rights of citizens and may have to be struck down as unconstitutional. That is why the Madras High Court in dealing with the validity of Section 43A had expressly observed that what Section 43A purported to do was to clothe the Government with authority to issue directions of an administrative character and nothing more. It is somewhat unfortunate that though judicial decisions have always emphasised this aspect of the matter, occasion did not arise so long to consider the validity of the Government order which on the construction suggested by the Respondent would clearly invade the domain of quasi-judicial administration. 19. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the State of Punjab and Anr. v. Hari Kishan Sharma AIR 1966 SC1081, that the State Government has no jurisdiction which has been conferred on licencing authority with Section 5(1) and (2) of the Punjab Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1952. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held as under: The question which we have to decide in the present appeal lies within a very narrow compass. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held as under: The question which we have to decide in the present appeal lies within a very narrow compass. What Appellant No. 1 has done is to require the licensing authority to forward to it all applications received for grant of licences, and it has assumed power and authority to deal with the said applications on the merits for itself in the first instance. Is Appellant No. 1 justified in assuming jurisdiction which has been conferred on the licensing authority by Section 5(1) and (2) of the Act? It is plain that Section 5(1) and (2) have conferred jurisdiction on the licencing authority to deal with applications for licences and either grant them or reject them. In other words, the scheme of the statute is that when an application for licence is made, it has to be considered by the licensing authority and dealt with under Section 5(1) and (2) of the Act. Section 5(3) provides for an appeal to Appellant No. 1 where the licensing authority has refused to grant a licence; and this provision clearly shows that Appellant No. 1 is constituted into an appellate authority in cases where an application for licence is rejected by the licensing authority. The course adopted by Appellant No. 1 in requiring all applications for licences to be forwarded to it for disposal, has really converted the Appellate Authority into the original authority itself, because Section 5(3) clearly allows an appeal to be preferred by a person who is aggrieved by the rejection of his application for a licence by the licensing authority. It is, however, urged by Mr. Bishen Narain for the Appellants that Section 3(2) confers very wide powers of control on Appellant No. 1 and this power can take within its sweep the direction issued by Appellant No. 1 that all applications for licences should be forwarded to it for disposal. It is, however, urged by Mr. Bishen Narain for the Appellants that Section 3(2) confers very wide powers of control on Appellant No. 1 and this power can take within its sweep the direction issued by Appellant No. 1 that all applications for licences should be forwarded to it for disposal. It is true that Section 5(2) provides that the licensing authority may grant licences subject to the provisions of Section 5(1) and subject to the control of the Government, and it may be conceded that the control of the Government subject to which the licensing authority has to function while exercising its power under Section 5(1) and (2), is very wide; but however wide this control may be, it cannot justify Appellant No. 1 to completely oust the licensing authority and itself usurp his functions. The Legislature contemplates a licensing authority as distinct from the Government. It no doubt recognises that the licensing authority has to act under the control of the Government; but it is the licensing authority which has to act and not the Government itself. The result of the instructions issued by Appellant No. 1 is to change the statutory provision of Section (2) and obliterate the licensing authority from the Statute-book altogether. That, in our opinion, is not justified by the provision as to the control of Government prescribed by Section 5(2). 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. Union of India 1970 (3) SCC 76, that the assessing authority exercises the quasi-judicial functions and they have to act in judicial and independent manner and if the judgment is controlled by the directions given by the Collector, it cannot be said to be their independent judgment in any sense of the word. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have opined as under: According to the learned Attorney-General the assessment proceedings are not of a quasi-judicial nature nor is the assessing authority a quasi-judicial authority. We are unable to agree. It is apparent from the judgment referred to above and numerous other decisions of this Court delivered in respect of various taxation laws that the assessing authorities exercise quasi-judicial functions and they have duty cast on them to act in a judicial and independent manner. We are unable to agree. It is apparent from the judgment referred to above and numerous other decisions of this Court delivered in respect of various taxation laws that the assessing authorities exercise quasi-judicial functions and they have duty cast on them to act in a judicial and independent manner. If their judgment is controlled by the directions given by the Collector, it cannot be said to be their independent judgment in any sense of the word. An appeal then to the Collector becomes an empty formality. In the previous decision of this Court mentioned above the appeal and the revision had been rejected by the Collector and the Central Government on the ground that a direction had been issued by the Central Board of Revenue to the effect that the paper in question be treated as belonging to a particular classification. This Court entertained no doubt that the direction given by the Board was invalid and it vitiated the proceedings before the Collector as well as the Government. Similarly, in the present appeal the direction given by the Collector was invalid and the proceedings before the Deputy Superintendent or the Assistant Collector were vitiated. This position obtains in all the appeals although the type and quality of paper are different. The Central Government merely affirmed the order made by the Collector in each case and did not give any independent reasons for upholding the levy of duty made in accordance with the directions of the Collector. 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Purtabpur Co. v. Cane Commissioner, Bihar AIR 1970 SC 1896, has held that the Cane Commissioner could not alter the reservation of cane area on direction of the Chief Minister. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held as under: We have earlier seen that the Cane Commissioner was definitely of the view that the reservation made in favour of the Appellant should not be disturbed but the Chief Minister did not agree with that view. It is clear from the documents before us that the Chief Minister directed the Cane Commissioner to divide the reserved area into two portions and allot one portion to the 5th Respondent. In pursuance of that direction, the Cane Commissioner prepared two lists 'Ka' and 'Kha'. It is clear from the documents before us that the Chief Minister directed the Cane Commissioner to divide the reserved area into two portions and allot one portion to the 5th Respondent. In pursuance of that direction, the Cane Commissioner prepared two lists 'Ka' and 'Kha'. Under the orders of the Chief Minister, the villages contained in list 'Ka' were allotted to the Appellant and in list 'Kha' to the 5th Respondent. The Cane Commissioner merely carried out the orders of the Chief Minister. It is true that the impugned orders were issued in the name of the Cane Commissioner. He merely obeyed the directions issued to him by the Chief Minister. We are unable to agree with the contention of Shri Chagla that though the Cane Commissioner was initially of the view that the reservation made in favour of the Appellant should not be disturbed, he changed his opinion after discussion with the Chief Minister. From the material before us, the only conclusion possible is that the Chief Minister imposed his opinion on the Cane Commissioner. The power exercisable by the Cane Commissioner under Clause 6(1) is a statutory power. He alone could have exercised that power. While exercising that power he cannot abdicate his responsibility in favour of anyone not even in favour of the State Government or the Chief Minister. It was not proper for the Chief Minister to have interfered with the functions of the Cane Commissioner. In this case what has happened is that the power of the Cane Commissioner has been exercised by the Chief Minister; an authority not recognized by Clause (6) read with Clause (11) but the responsibility for making those orders was asked to be taken by the Cane Commissioner. 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja and Anr. v. State of Gujarat (1995) 5 SCC 302, that exercise of discretion in compliance with instructions of some other person or authority amounts to failure to exercise jurisdiction altogether. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held as under: The case against the Appellants originally was registered on 19.3.1995 under the Arms Act. The DSP did not give any prior approval on his own to record any information about the commission of an offence under TADA. On the contrary, he made a report to the Additional Chief Secretary and asked for permission to proceed under TADA Why? The DSP did not give any prior approval on his own to record any information about the commission of an offence under TADA. On the contrary, he made a report to the Additional Chief Secretary and asked for permission to proceed under TADA Why? Was it because he was reluctant to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by the provision of Section 20A(1)? This is a case of power conferred upon one authority being really exercised by another. If a statutory authority has been vested with jurisdiction, he has to exercise it according to its own discretion. If the discretion is exercised under the direction or in compliance with some higher authority's instruction, then it will be a case of failure to exercise discretion altogether. In other words, the discretion vested in the DSP in this case by Section 20A(1) was not exercised by the DSP at all. Reference may be made in this connection to Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanjil 1952 SCR 135: AIR 1952 SC 16, in which the action of Commissioner of Police in cancelling the permission granted to the Respondent for construction of cinema. In Greater Bombay at the behest of the State Government was not upheld as the rules concerned had conferred this power on the Commissioner, because of which it was stated that the Commissioner was to bear his own independent and unfettered judgment and decide the matter for himself, instead of forwarding an order which another authority had purported to pass. It has been stated by Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn. at pp. 358-59 under the heading "Surrender; Abdication, Dictation": and sub-heading "Power in the wrong hands" as below: Closely akin to delegation, and scarcely distinguishable from it in some cases, is any arrangement by which a power conferred upon one authority is in substance exercised by another. The proper authority may share its power with someone else, or may allow someone else to dedicate to it by declining to act without their consent or by submitting to their wishes or instructions. The effect then is that the discretion conferred by Parliament is exercised, at least in part, by the wrong authority, and the resulting decision is ultra vires and void. So strict are the Courts in applying this principle that they condemn some administrative arrangements which must seem quite natural and proper to those who make them.... The effect then is that the discretion conferred by Parliament is exercised, at least in part, by the wrong authority, and the resulting decision is ultra vires and void. So strict are the Courts in applying this principle that they condemn some administrative arrangements which must seem quite natural and proper to those who make them.... Ministers and their departments have several times fallen foul of the same rule, no doubt equally to their surprise.... The present was thus a clear case of exercise of power on the basis of external dictation. That the dictation came on the prayer of the DSP will not make any difference to the principle. The DSP did not exercise jurisdiction vested in him by the statute and did not grant approval of the recording of information under TADA in exercise of his discretions. 23. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed. The writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the order dated 5.11.2001. The Petitioner is held entitled to costs which are quantified at Rs. 25,000/-.