JUDGMENT Hon’ble Vijay Kumar Verma, J.—Challenge in this revision is to the judgment and order dated 21.4.2005 passed by Sri D.K. Tyagi, the then Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 5, Ghazipur, in Criminal Revision No. 458 of 2004 (Ranvindra Nath Vishwakarma v. State of U.P. and another), whereby allowing the revision, the order dated 1.11.2004 passed by the S.D.M. Sadar, Ghazipur, under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. has been set aside. 2. The relevant facts as emerging from the record are that Narendra Nath Vishwakarma had moved an application in the Court of S.D.M. Sadar, Ghazipur to initiate the proceeding under Section 145, Cr. P. C. in respect of the house situated in Mohallah Saklenabad, P.S. Kotwali, District Ghazipur. On that application, a report was submitted by S.H.O. P.S. Kotwali, Ghazipur on 26.7.2004, in which it was stated that Sri Krishna Murari Vishwakarma and Sri Ashok Kumar Vishwakarma r/o village Pasidih @ Bikapur, Paragana and District Ghazipur, presently residing at Maru chak pasi Line District Bhagalpur (Bihar), were the owners of the house situated in Mohallah Saklenabad, P.S. Kotwali. District Ghazipur. They had executed a Mukhtarnama on 14.6.1995 regarding that house in favour of Nagendra Nath Vishwakarma, but in contravention of that Mukhtarnama, Ravindra Nath Vishwakarma has illegally occupied the house, due to which there is tension between the parties. Being satisfied with the report of S.H.O., P.S. Kotwali, Ghazipur, the S.D.M. Sadar, Ghazipur, passed preliminary order under Section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. on 1.11.2004 in Case No. 26 of 2004 and issued notice to the parties to appear in his Court and file documents in respect of ownership and possession over the disputed house by 19.11.2004. On the same date viz. 1.11.2004, an order under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. was also passed by the learned S.D.M., whereby the disputed house was attached and S.H.O. P.S. Kotwali was directed to give the house in the supurdagi of some neutral person. Feeling aggrieved by the order of attachment of the disputed house, Ravindra Nath Vishwakarma (opposite party No. 2 herein) preferred Criminal Revision No. 458 of 2004, which has been allowed vide impugned judgment dated 21.4.2005, hence this revision. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the order of attachment of the disputed house, Ravindra Nath Vishwakarma (opposite party No. 2 herein) preferred Criminal Revision No. 458 of 2004, which has been allowed vide impugned judgment dated 21.4.2005, hence this revision. 3. I have heard Sri Ankit Gaur, learned Counsel for the revisionist, learned AGA for the State of U.P. (opposite party No. 1) and Sri A.K. Singh, Advocate, holding the brief of Sri R.K. Yadav, learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2 Ravindra Nath Vishwakarma. Arguments on the point of maintainability of the revision against preliminary order under Section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. and order of attachment under Section 146 (1), Cr.P.C. were only heard and merit of the case was not considered. 4. Placing reliance on the case of Maan Babu Dubey v. State of U.P. and another, 2006 (55) ACC 489 it was straneously contended by learned Counsel for the revisionist that revision against the order dated 1.11.2004 passed by the S.D.M. Sadar, Ghazipur, under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C, thereby, making attachment of the disputed house during pendency of the proceeding under Section 145, Cr.P.C. was not legally maintainable, being barred by the provisions of Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C., and the learned lower Revisional Court has committed jurisdictional error by entertaining and allowing the revision and hence the impugned judgment being illegally is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. The submission made by learned Counsel for the revisionist was that rights of the parties have yet not been decided by the S.D.M. Sadar, Ghazipur, while passing the order dated 1.11.2004, under Section 146 (1) Cr.P.C. and hence the order being interlocutory in nature is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction in view of the bar created by sub-section (2) of Section 397, Cr.P.C. 5. On the contrary, it was submitted by the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 that rights of the parties are seriously affected by making attachment under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C., hence the order of attachment, which comes in the category of intermediate orders, can be challenged in revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. rival contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties, I find force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the revisionist that revision against the order under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. is not legally maintainable. P. C. is not legally maintainable. This Court in the case of Maan Babu Dubey v. State of U.P. (supra) has held that revision against preliminary order passed by the Executing Magistrate under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. and order of attachment under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. is not maintainable, being barred by sub-section (2) of Section 397 Cr. P. C. The matter of maintainability of the revision against preliminary order passed by the Executive Magistrate under Section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. and order of attachment under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. came up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Indra Deo Pandey v. Smt. Bhagwati Devi, 1981 (18) ACC 316. The Division Bench in that case held that the order of attachment of property under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. made during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. is an order purely of an intermediate or temporary nature, which cannot be challenged in revision. In the case of Indra Deo Pandey (supra), the Division Bench of this Court disagreeing with the law propounded by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sohan Lal Burman v. State of U.P., 1977 (14) ACC 10, has held that the law laid down in Sohan Lal Burman (supra) could not be held to be good law any more. The following observations of the Division Bench in the case of Indra Deo Pandey (supra) are quite noteworthy : “While making an order under Section 146 for attaching the property in dispute, the Magistrate is not required to make any inquiries or to adjudicate the rights of any person to remain in possession of the property in dispute or to make any other adjudication of any other type. All that he has to be satisfied is that there is a case of emergency namely, that breach of peace is likely to occur even before he has been able to hold a proper inquiry with regard to possession under Section 145 of the Code and if that be so, he can take steps to attach the properties and to arrange for its management with the twin object of avoiding breach of peace being committed by either of the two parties and to safeguard the interest of the party which may be found to be entitled to its possession either in accordance with final orders made under Section 145 or a decision given by competent civil Court. Viewed in this light, it is apparent that the order for attachment of property under Section 146 (1) of the Code made during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 145 is an order purely of an intermediate or temporary nature. It neither decides nor purports to effect any legal right of any of the parties. The order is made for the purpose of effective adjudication of proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Code. It does not result in the disposal of any part of the controversy between the parties or the proceedings under Section 145. In such a case a question of proceedings being concluded one way or the other if the plea of one party or the other is accepted arises. Accordingly applying the test laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Amarnath Chawala v. State of Haryana (supra) in the light of the observations made by that Court in Madhu Limaye’s case (supra) are, of opinion that an order made during the pendency of proceeding under Section 145 of the Code for attaching property in dispute under Section 146(1) of the Code is purely an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 (2) of the Code.” 7. In view of the aforesaid observations made by the Division Bench in the case of Indra Deo Pandey (supra), the revision preferred by opposite party No. 2 against the order dated 1.11.2004 passed by S.D.M. Sadar, Ghazipur for attaching the house in dispute under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. during the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. was not maintainable. P. C. during the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. was not maintainable. Recently in the case of Rewati Raman & others v. State of U.P. and others, 2007 (57) ACC 73, also this Court has held that the order of attachment passed under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. is an interlocutory order and revision against such order is barred by sub-section (2) of Section 397, Cr. P. C. 8. While passing order under Section 146 (1), Cr.P.C. for attachment of property during the proceedings under Sections 145, Cr. P. C, no adjudication of the rights of the parties regarding that property is made. Such order is made for the purpose of effective adjudication of the proceedings and it does not result in disposal of any part of the controversy between the parties. The order of attachment under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. is made if the Magistrate considers the case to be one of emergency or if he decides that none of the parties was then in possession as is referred to in Section 145, Cr.P.C., or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was than in such possession of the subject of dispute. The attachment made under Section 146 (1), Cr.P.C. may be withdrawn at any time, if the Magistrate is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of peace with regard to the subject of dispute. The order made by the Magistrate for attachment of property is an interim measure. It is a discretionary power of the Magistrate based on his satisfaction that emergency exists for passing an order under Section 146 (1), Cr.P.C. That being so, the order of attachment passed under Section 146 (1), Cr.P.C. is certainly an order purely of interlocutory nature, revision against which will be barred by sub-section (2) of Section 397, Cr. P.C. 9. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, the impugned judgment has to be set aside and the order passed by the SDM Sadar Ghazipur deserves to be restored. The proper course for the aggrieved party is to file objections before the SDM narrating all facts including the fact of pendency of civil litigation regarding disputed house. If such objections are filed, the learned SDM has to decide those objections first and the aggrieved party may challenge that order in revision. 10. The proper course for the aggrieved party is to file objections before the SDM narrating all facts including the fact of pendency of civil litigation regarding disputed house. If such objections are filed, the learned SDM has to decide those objections first and the aggrieved party may challenge that order in revision. 10. In the result, the revision is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 21.4.2005 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 5, Ghazipur, in Criminal Revision No. 458 of 2004 are set aside and order dated 1.11.2004 passed by the S.D.M. Sadar, Ghazipur, in Case No. 26 of 2004 is restored. ————