JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—This writ petition is made for the purpose of quashing the First Information Report (hereinafter called as F.I.R.) registered under case Crime No. 49 of 2005 under Sections 498-A/304-B, I.P.C. lodged on 24th February, 2006 by the respondent No. 4 at Police Station Nawabganj, District, Kanpur Nagar and not to arrest the petitioner or take any action against the petitioner on the basis of such F.I.R. alongwith incidental prayer in connection thereto. 2. In brief, facts of the case is described herein. The petitioner and the daughter of respondent No. 4 were happily married couple. A male child was born by their wedlock. The petitioner is socially and financially well established. There is no question of any harassment by the petitioner to his wife i.e. the daughter of respondent No. 4 after marriage. But when sister of the wife became widow and wanted to adopt the petitioner’s son, quarrel took place. In the morning of the fateful day i.e. on 31st January, 2006 when the petitioner left the house after exchange of words, he got a telephone call that his wife out of irritation took poison and the condition is deteriorating. He came back and hospitalised his wife, but she could not survive. 3. An F.I.R. was lodged after about 24 days from the date of occurrence just to pressurize the petitioner to hand over the child to the sister of the petitioner’s wife as desired by the petitioner’s wife in the suicide note. The F.I.R. is totally baseless. There is no iota of material evidence. No such relationship arose between him and his wife during the tenure of marriage, which can lead to a situation of committing suicide. 4. It is contended by the petitioner that a suicide note written by the deceased is admissible evidence under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. If the same is implicated someone, it is enough for securing conviction. Similarly when she has not levelled any allegation against the petitioner in her dying declaration either disclosing any evidence under Section 304-B or under Section 306 I.P.C., there is no basis to proceed against the petitioner. The F.I.R. cannot be substantial piece of evidence. It can only be used for contradicting or corroborating the author of the same. Similarly when she has not levelled any allegation against the petitioner in her dying declaration either disclosing any evidence under Section 304-B or under Section 306 I.P.C., there is no basis to proceed against the petitioner. The F.I.R. cannot be substantial piece of evidence. It can only be used for contradicting or corroborating the author of the same. When the F.I.R. has been lodged after inordinate delay of 24 days by a person who is not the eye-witness such F.I.R. cannot be given any weightage. Total absence of external injury upon the deceased in the post-mortem examination demolishes prosecution’s case completely. All the allegations in the F.I.R. are oral while the case of the petitioner is based on documentary evidence. The story of the neglect, torture and harassment is ex facie false. There was no demand of dowry soon before the death of the wife of the petitioner and in such case prosecution under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act does not arise. The right to personal liberty as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 (1) of the Constitution of India is well guaranteed to protect the interest of the person in such situation. The allegation in the F.I.R. is so vague and inherently probable that it would be expedient to quash the F.I.R. and further pleased not to arrest the petitioner or take any action on the basis of such F.I.R. 5. The petitioner, in effect, wanted to take shelter of the ratio of AIR 1994 SC 1349 , Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. and others but it is to be remembered that principle was made applicable in a different situation when a person was illegally taken into the custody. However, the case before us was hotly contested not only by the State but also by the complainant/respondent No. 4. Even when the judgment was reserved for delivery, an application was taken out by the respondent No. 4 under Article 215 of the Constitution of India against this writ petitioner which was dismissed with certain directions. In any event we are not presently concerned with such application but with the merit of the writ petition. 6. In any event the case has got momentum in view of the following judgments. 7. In any event we are not presently concerned with such application but with the merit of the writ petition. 6. In any event the case has got momentum in view of the following judgments. 7. In 2006 (2) A.D.J. 403 (LB)(DB), Dharm Raj Yadav and others v. State of U.P. and others, a Division Bench of Lucknow held that if it is required in the interest of justice to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the Court will do so under its plenary power irrespective of the fact as to whether the provision under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution or of Section 482, Cr.P.C. is invoked. Power of the Court to discharge the accused at the stage of framing of charge or existence of remedy of appeal and revision is not a bar to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Division Bench relied upon the judgment reported in 1998 (5) SCC 749 , Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others. 8. From the judgment of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another (supra) we find that a combined application was made therein under Article 226/227 unlike the present one before us which has been made only under Article 226 of the Constitution of India required to be heard by a Division Bench. By an order of the then Hon’ble Chief Justice applications under Article 227 of the Constitution is placed under separate category. It is available from the communication of the order of the registry of the High Court dated 16th September, 2002. Subsequently again it was directed by the then Hon’ble Chief Justice that the applications under Article 227 of the Constitution of India will be heard by a Judge sitting singly. Such order is effectively implemented. We are following such practice. Practice of the Court is its law. In any event when such practice has been effectively implemented it is to be treated as part and parcel of the High Court Rules framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 225 of the Constitution of India. It is significant to note that the judgment of the Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another (supra) was delivered by the Supreme Court on 4th November, 1997 much prior to giving effect of such Rule. It is significant to note that the judgment of the Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another (supra) was delivered by the Supreme Court on 4th November, 1997 much prior to giving effect of such Rule. Traditionally before such implementation writ petitions were being filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Even Supreme Court was well concerned with the exceptional circumstance available therein and cautioned in paragraph 26 of the judgment saying “Nomenclature under which petition is filed is not quite relevant and that does not debar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise it possesses unless there is special procedure prescribed which procedure is mandatory.” Now “the procedure of filing an application under Article 227 become mandatory for this Court. Hence the ratio of conversion as a matter of course cannot be made available to the writ petitioner. Moreover the Supreme Court clarified the exceptional circumstance by saying “If in a case like the present one the Court finds that the appellants could not invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court can certainly treat the petition as one under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code.” In our view such exception should not be made windfall for the litigation by the Court to achieve popular accolade. It was further held therein “ Provisions of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution and Section 482, Cr.P.C. are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it. In our view High Court should not have adopted such a rigid approach which certainly has led to miscarriage of justice in this case”. From the above observation it is further clear that the judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court only in an exceptional circumstance of that case. Therefore, the ratio was made applicable only to that factum of that case. Hence without ascertainment of individual factum and without following subsequent Supreme Court observations in the relevant cases, we cannot come to a definite conclusion. An exception cannot be the Rule. Much water had been flown by the river after delivery of such judgment. In 2003 (4) SCC 675 , B.S.Joshi v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court held even in dealing with Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another that exercise of such power will depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. 9. An exception cannot be the Rule. Much water had been flown by the river after delivery of such judgment. In 2003 (4) SCC 675 , B.S.Joshi v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court held even in dealing with Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another that exercise of such power will depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. 9. The Division Bench of the High Court in Dharm Raj Yadav and others (supra) did not take into account present applicability of the procedural aspect of the Court nor the subsequent references but blindly followed the ratio of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another (supra) to suit the purpose. It is significant to note that in that judgment, the prayers were worded as under : “(a) issue a writ of prohibition or a writ, order or direction in the nature of prohibition, prohibiting the Opposite Party Number 1 to proceed with Case No. 699 of 1994 (Anurag Narain v. Nitin Sachdeva); (b) issue a writ of certiorari or a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the proceedings in Case No. 699 of 1994 together with the consequential order dated 9.5.1994 and the complaint dated 6.5.1993 insofar as it pertains to the petitioners; (c) issue a writ of mandamus or a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the Opposite Party Number 1 not to proceed with Case No. 699 of 1994 during the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition; (d) issue any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem just and necessary in the circumstances of the case may also be passed; and (e) to allow the writ petition with costs.” 10. From the aforesaid prayers, it is crystal clear that the writ petition was basically made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but not under Article 227 of the Constitution. But when the Court found that the summons were issued by the concerned Magistrate who is party respondent therein as per the availability of the application both under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, converted the same into an application under Article 227 by taking a view that pendency of the matter before the Magistrate does not bar an accused to approach the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, in absence of procedure, Court was in advantageous position to transpose the proceeding from one category to other. Now the Supreme Court is stringent from having applicability of Article 227 where alternative mode of revision is available. In the criminal jurisdiction, applicability of Section 482, Cr.P.C. is highly acceptable power of the High Court for the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of process of the Court. Even in the well celebrated judgment reported in AIR 1992 SC 605, State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, in spite of giving guidelines for interference, Supreme Court held that those guidelines should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. Guidelines are as follows: (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety to do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 156(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can every reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 11. The same was reconsidered by the Supreme Court on several occasions. However, in (2003) 6 SCC 195 , Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja and another the Supreme Court narrowed down the scope of Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra) and held as follows : “The grounds on which power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. can be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings are:—(1) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, (2) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused, (3) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Act concerned to the institution and continuance of the proceedings. But this power has to be exercised in a rare case and with great circumspection.” 12. In 2004 SCC (Cri) 353, State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta and others and held even in an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court should not proceed only on the probabilities. It is observed as follows : "It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete and at that stage it was impermissible for the High Court to look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial Judge. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial Judge. Even when charge is framed at that stage, the Court has to only prima facie be satisfied about existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the Court can evaluate material and documents on records but it cannot appreciate evidence. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. In (1992) 3 SCC 317 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 636 (Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal) it was observed that when the materials relied upon by a party are required to be proved, no inference can be drawn on the basis of those materials to conclude the complaint to be unacceptable. The Court should not act on annexures to the petitions under Section 482 of the Code, which cannot be termed as evidence without being tested and proved. When the factual position of the case at hand is considered in the light of principles of law highlighted, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in quashing the investigation.” 13. The other part the Division Bench failed to appreciate that the ratio of three Judges’ Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 2003 SC 1561 : 2003 (2) TAC (SC), Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and another. It was held that where remedy for filing a revision before the High Court under Section 115 of C.P.C. has been expressly barred by a State enactment, only in such case a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus when the State Legislature has barred a remedy of filing a revision petition before the High Court under Section 115, C.P.C., no petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie for the reason that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is further held that as follows: “ 6. It is further held that as follows: “ 6. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior Court or Tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or the Tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the inferior Court or Tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision.” 14. Ratio of the aforesaid judgment has been followed by a Division Bench (Amitava Lala and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.) in the judgment dated 30th March, 2007 under F.A.F.O. No. 513 of 2007 (Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Manju and others). There it was held that since no revision lies under Section 115 of C.P.C. from a judgment and award of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, an application under Article 227 of the Constitution lies in the High Court. Reference of the aforesaid Supreme Court judgments goes to show that Article 227 applies judicially when alternative remedy under the relevant laws are not available but not simultaneously. Later on even in dealing with Pepsi Foods Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court in 2003 (6) SCC 641 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1545, State v. Navjot Sandhu arising out of criminal matter held ‘where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law’. 15. Primarily a writ petition under Article 226 is made to see constitutionality of the legislation and to review the executive decisions. On the other hand power under Article 227 is a power of superintendence of the High Court over and in respect of judicial and administrative works of the subordinate Courts. By virtue of Article 227 High Court can take cognizance of the matter when the same is applicable amongst two contesting private parties in a Court of subordinate jurisdiction. This aspect is quite distinguishable feature from Article 226. By virtue of Article 227 High Court can take cognizance of the matter when the same is applicable amongst two contesting private parties in a Court of subordinate jurisdiction. This aspect is quite distinguishable feature from Article 226. Above all power of Article 227 can be utilized only when appropriate power is not available in the statute in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. Such limited applicability of the power has also been considered even in Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another (supra). Sometimes only in the exceptional circumstances either from an order of tribunal or quasi judicial authorities power under both the Articles seem to be overlapping. But neither in the Criminal Revisional jurisdiction nor in the Criminal Writ jurisdiction there is any scope to overlap. When one can be controlled by Section 482, Cr.P.C. the other is controlled by Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Section 482, Cr.P.C. The High Court is fully equipped to deliver the justice either before or after taking cognizance by the appropriate Court. No external power of superintendence is necessary to make applicable under Article 227 of the Constitution. An alternative modus cannot be a simultaneous modus. So far as the power under Article 226 is concerned that can only be applied during the course of investigation by the police because it is an action of the State. Even then writ Court does not investigate the facts at any stage far to say when an appropriate Court has taken cognizance. As the power of the High Court is unlimited, the application of the power in its wisdom, is limited. Very wide and very plenitude powers of the High Court requires great caution in its exercise. 16. In the State of Uttar Pradesh, in absence of provision for anticipatory bail, normally litigants are making writ petitions under Article 226 against the police authority to get the order of quashing F.I.R. and not to arrest him/her. But primarily most of the writ petitions are filed to get an order of stay of arrest. At least our experience says so. Court evaluates the prima facie case and passes the necessary orders. But when charge-sheet has been filed by the police to the appropriate Court and such Court takes cognizance, writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution does not interfere with the matter. At least our experience says so. Court evaluates the prima facie case and passes the necessary orders. But when charge-sheet has been filed by the police to the appropriate Court and such Court takes cognizance, writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution does not interfere with the matter. On the other hand an application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. lies to the High Court both before and after filing the charge-sheet. In that way a Full Bench of this High Court held in 1987 (24) ACC 164, Ashok Kumar Dixit v. State of U.P. and another that scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is narrower than Section 482 of Cr.P.C. According to us, a power under Cr.P.C. or C.P.C. (Code of Civil Procedure) is not bare or mere procedural law but substantive procedural law which regulates mechanism of hearing of the Court of evidence to conclude substantial justice. 17. In (2000) 7 SCC 522 , Shama Prashant Raje v. Ganpatrao and others the Supreme Court held that in a proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, is supervisory and not appellate. 18. In AIR 2003 SC 2686 , Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by L.Rs. and another v. B.D. Agarwal and others a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that the High Court derives its jurisdiction in terms of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if an occasion arises therefor, to make judicial review of the order passed by a statutory authority. It is beyond any cavil that no writ can be issued if the disputes involve private law character. Even the Supreme Court declared that such type of orders are without jurisdiction and as such is a nullity. 19. According to us both the civil and criminal disputes are of private nature. The basic difference is when an aggrieved himself brings a civil dispute and accused is brought by the police or complainant in the criminal dispute. But nature of adjudication of trial in both, are private in nature. Therefore once the Court had taken cognizance, casual interference under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is improper. It is far to say about applicability of Article 227 as an alternative measure having presence of remedy under the Statute. But nature of adjudication of trial in both, are private in nature. Therefore once the Court had taken cognizance, casual interference under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is improper. It is far to say about applicability of Article 227 as an alternative measure having presence of remedy under the Statute. Similarly on the other hand at the stage of investigation also, making application under Article 226 for quashing the FIR as a matter of course is improper. We live in system which should not be disbelieved so casually otherwise system will fall down. It is a tactical ploy to make an application both under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution to drive to Court on both sides either about investigation of the police before taking cognizance by the Court or other investigation when cognizance has been taken by the appropriate Court even being forgetful that a separate procedure under Section 482, Cr.P.C. Is available for the High Court. Power under Article 227 cannot be used as a power of convenience. 20. In JT 2003 (6) SC 465 (Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others the Supreme Court held that though the power is akin to that of an ordinary Court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in the appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the Court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. Such powers are akin to the revisional power. 21. It was further held therein that a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdiction stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labeling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. 22. It was also held therein that in order to safeguard against a mere appellate or revisional jurisdiction being exercised in the garb of exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the Courts have devised self-imposed rules of discipline on their power. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. 23. In 2004 (3) SCC 682 , Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, it was held by the Supreme Court that as to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai (supra) that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a Court of appeal. 24. In JT 2001 (9) SC 517, Quseph Mathai and others v. M. Abdul Khadir, the Supreme Court held that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are extraordinary and discretionary powers as distinguished from ordinary statutory powers. No doubt Article 227 confers a right of superintendence over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises the jurisdiction but no corresponding right is conferred upon a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction under the said Article as a matter of right. 25. It is categorically held that extraordinary power cannot be exercised in a routine manner as if the power under Article 227 of the Constitution is the extension of powers conferred upon a litigant under a specified statute. Such an approach and interpretation is unwarranted. 26. In (2002) 8 SCC 400 , Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar, the Supreme Court held that exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited and restrictive in nature. It is so exercised in normal circumstances for want of jurisdiction, errors of law, perverse findings and gross violation of natural justice, to name a few. 26. In (2002) 8 SCC 400 , Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar, the Supreme Court held that exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited and restrictive in nature. It is so exercised in normal circumstances for want of jurisdiction, errors of law, perverse findings and gross violation of natural justice, to name a few. It is merely a revisional jurisdiction and does not confer an unlimited authority or prerogative to correct all orders or even wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Courts below. The finding of fact being within the domain of the inferior tribunal, except where it is a perverse recording thereof or not based on any material whatsoever resulting in manifest injustice, interference under the article is not called for. 27. Visualise borderline distinction between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in general is academic in the sense that primarily a combined application under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution cannot be allowed to proceed in the teeth of having alternative remedy under the law when the Court of competent jurisdiction has taken cognizance. We have to be guided by the legal approach not by the litigant’s approach. Law is mass based but not class based unless specified. There are umpteen number of judgments where the Supreme Court and the High Courts repeatedly held that having alternative and efficacious remedy for adjudication, writ petitions should not be encouraged. Similarly according to us, when the alternative or efficacious or revisional remedy under the statute is available, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution should not be encouraged. 28. Neither of the recent referred cases i.e. AIR 2006 SC 680 , (Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab), AIR 2005 SC 970 , (State of Orissa v. Niranjan Mohapatra and another), 2002 (5) SCC 371 (Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State of M.P.), AIR 1986 SC 752 , (Chanchal Kumari and others v. Union Territory, Chandigarh), 2005 (52) ACC 461, (State of U.P. v. Abdul Sharif and another) dealing with abetment of commit suicide under Section 306 and/or dowry death under Section 498-A alongwith Section 304-B or other Sections in Indian Penal Code (hereinafter called as IPC) do not arise out of constitutional writ or supervisory jurisdiction but from criminal appeals. In Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 2016 of 2006 (Dr. In Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 2016 of 2006 (Dr. Subhash Manchanad v. State of U.P. and others, 2006(9) ADJ 208 with another matter) this Bench held on 28th April, 2006 that “Mens rea” by necessary implication may be excluded from the statute only where it is absolutely clear that implication of object of the statute would otherwise be defeated. We are neither hearing the trial nor any proceeding in connection thereto nor appeal. The nature of mens rea that would be implied in a statute creating an offence depend upon the object of the Act and the provisions thereof which can only be ascertained by the fact finding Court. 29. Hence the judgment of the Division Bench as reported in Dharm Raj Yadav and others (supra) is not well considered and per incuriam by nature. 30. Therefore, we hold that if by the passage of time, the investigation become complete and report has been submitted to the concerned Court and the Court has taken cognizance, it is neither proper to interfere with it nor proper to convert the application under Article 226 to an application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. or under Article 227 of the Constitution. However, making any independent application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. from any action or order of the concerned, if so advised, is not debarred hereunder. In case the investigation is not complete, the Investigating Officer of Case Crime No. 49 of 2005 under Sections 498-A/304-B, I.P.C. Police Station Nawabganj, District Kanpur Nagar will conclude the investigation within a period of three months from the date, on which a certified copy of this order is presented before him. The petitioner is directed to co-operate with the Investigating Officer in all possible manner. However, the petitioner will not be arrested in the above mentioned case crime number till the submission of the charge-sheet/final report, if any. But if the Investigating Officer or informant found himself aggrieved due to falsification, misstatement, fraud, non-cooperation with the Investigating Officer or any other reasons whatsoever relevant for the purpose, he is at liberty to apply for recalling/variation/vacating/modification of this limited order. In any event FIR cannot be treated to be quashed. 31. Accordingly, the writ petition stands disposed of. 32. However, no order is passed as to costs. Hon’ble Shiv Shanker, J.—I agree. ————