JUDGMENT This is a second defendant's second appeal challenging the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below that the plaintiff has established the agreement of sale and therefore, he is entitled to the decree for specific performance. 2. The subject-matter of the suit is the land bearing Sy. No. 51, measuring 8 acres and 30 guntas situated in Bellahalli Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. The plaintiffs case is that he is in the possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property for more than 30 years. The defendant is none other than his elder brother. The defendant managed to secure the pahani entries in respect of the suit schedule property in his name as he was the eldest in the family. On the basis of such entries: he attempted to interfere with the plaintiffs possession. On 16-9-1978, the defendant and his children started felling the casurina trees raised by the plaintiff in the suit schedule property. They also assaulted the plaintiff which resulted in hospitalisation of the plaintiff. Plaintiff preferred a complaint to the police. Investigation was taken up. At that stage, defendant stated that he had obtained a decree against the plaintiff. The plaintiff coming to know of this, made enquiries and then came to know that an ex parte decree had been passed against him in 0.8. No. 672 of 1973 on 31-7-1978. The plaintiff contended that no suit summons was served on him in the said suit. On the basis of an endorsement of refusal, the decree has been obtained. Plaintiff filed Misc. Case No. 180 of 1978 for setting aside the said ex parte decree and he is prosecuting the matter. It is during the pendency of the said miscellaneous case, several well-wishers interested in both the parties, convened panchayat on 18-11-1978 at the village. In the said meeting, the defendant in no uncertain terms admitted that plaintiff alone has been in possession of the suit schedule property. He further undertook to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff for a total consideration of Rs. 8,000/-. He received the entire sale consideration of Rs. 8,000/- in cash on the same day. The terms of the said agreement are reduced to writing. In terms of the agreement, the plaintiff also purchased the necessary non-judicial stamp papers and requested the defendant to execute the sale deed. The defendant evaded to do so. 8,000/-. He received the entire sale consideration of Rs. 8,000/- in cash on the same day. The terms of the said agreement are reduced to writing. In terms of the agreement, the plaintiff also purchased the necessary non-judicial stamp papers and requested the defendant to execute the sale deed. The defendant evaded to do so. In view of the aforesaid agreement entered into, the plaintiff contends that the decree passed in O.S. No. 672 of 1978 is no longer binding on him, it is not enforceable. The defendant is harassing the plaintiff. Police have colluded with the defendant. Therefore, the plaintiff is constrained to seek for a declaration about the non-executability of the judgment in O.S. No. 672 of 1978. As he has paid the entire consideration under the agreement and the admission by the defendant about the plaintiffs undisputed possession over the property, he is entitled to a decree for specific performance of the agreement. He is always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is the defendant who is evading to perform his part of the contract. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an amendment application to amend the plaint to bring on record the subsequent event. Subsequent event was that during the pendency of the above suit, with a view to defraud the plaintiff of the fruits of the judgment and decree to be passed in the above case and with ulterior motive, the defendant has sold the plaint schedule property in favour of Mrs. Mariyam Hussain W/o. Mr. Zahed Hussain for a sum of Rs. 49,000/- under a registered sale deed dated 18-8-1982. The said sale deed is not binding on him. The purchaser was made a party to the suit as second defendant. Therefore, he sought for a declaration that the decree in O.S. No. 672 of 1978, dated 31-7-1978 is infructuous, inexecutable and no longer binding on the plaintiff and for a direction to the defendant to execute the sale deed in terms of the agreement dated 18-11-1978 and for consequential relief of permanent injunction. 3. After service of summons, the first defendant entered appearance and filed his written statement. He denied the plaintiff's possession over the schedule property for more than 30 years. It was his specific case that defendant's correct name is Syed Basha and not Pasha. 3. After service of summons, the first defendant entered appearance and filed his written statement. He denied the plaintiff's possession over the schedule property for more than 30 years. It was his specific case that defendant's correct name is Syed Basha and not Pasha. He was a permanent tenant under Jodidar Murthuza Sab in respect of the suit schedule land and also other Sy. Nos., as all of them belong to the erstwhile Jodi of Bellahalli Village. The defendant and the plaintiff had become divided long before and there was no interest of each other in their respective properties. They remained separate and lived separately. They ceased to be a family as pleaded in the plaint. The pahanis came to be entered in the name of the defendant as he was and is the actual cultivator of the suit schedule land. After the abolition of Inams in the State of Mysore, defendant filed an application under Section 9 of the Act for grant of occupancy rights of the suit schedule property along with other Sy. Nos. 51, 52, 54, 60 and 70. By an order dated 5-7-1965, the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams, Bangalore, treating the defendant as a permanent tenant, granted occupancy rights, he also waived premiums payable. As the plaintiff did not have any interest in the said property, he did not intervene in those proceedings nor did he challenge the grant of occupancy rights in favour of the defendant, till today. The katha has been made out in his name. He has been paying tax regularly. At the time of the change of katha, the land was actually measured and the suit schedule property measured 8 acres 30 guntas. When the plaintiff who has no right over the property, tried to obstruct the enjoyment of the property by the defendant, he was constrained to file a suit in O.S. No. 672 of 1978. The plaintiff refused to receive the suit summons. Service was held sufficient. After examining the first defendant and his witnesses, the Court granted a decree on 30-7-1978 restraining the plaintiff from interfering with defendants possession over the suit schedule property. No appeal was filed. However, the plaintiff has filed an application under Order 13, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for setting aside the same and it is pending consideration. After examining the first defendant and his witnesses, the Court granted a decree on 30-7-1978 restraining the plaintiff from interfering with defendants possession over the suit schedule property. No appeal was filed. However, the plaintiff has filed an application under Order 13, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for setting aside the same and it is pending consideration. The order of injunction sought for in the petition was refused. The said decree is fully binding on the plaintiff. The defendant specifically averred that there was no panchayat convened at any time, much less during the proceedings in Misc. Case No. 180 of 1978. The defendant never admitted that the plaintiff has been in possession of the suit schedule land. He never undertook to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff for a total sale consideration of Rs. 8,000/-. He has not received any consideration. He has not entered into any such agreement to convey the suit land to the plaintiff. Plaintiff has managed to fabricate the alleged agreement. The suit property is worth more than Rs. 50,000/-. There is no necessity for him to collude with the police to harass the plaintiff. On a complaint given by the first defendant, police after investigation have filed a charge-sheet against the plaintiff in accordance with law. He further stated that when he came to know that, the plaintiffs name was entered in the RTC pahanis, he filed a petition to the Tahsildar to remove the name of the plaintiff and to enter his name. Accordingly, after enquiry the Tahsildar passed an order restoring the name of the first defendant on 27-6-1981. Aggrieved by the same, plaintiff preferred an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner which came to be dismissed on 14-9-1981. The appeal against the order of the Deputy Commissioner also came to be dismissed on 5-11-1982. A further revision to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal by the plaintiff was also dismissed. All these clearly go to show that the first defendant is in possession of the property and plaintiff is not in possession. The second defendant also has filed a written statement on similar lines, supporting the first defendant. 4. During the pendency of the suit, first defendant died. His legal representatives were brought on record. All these clearly go to show that the first defendant is in possession of the property and plaintiff is not in possession. The second defendant also has filed a written statement on similar lines, supporting the first defendant. 4. During the pendency of the suit, first defendant died. His legal representatives were brought on record. The legal representatives have filed a written statement, contending that the deceased plaintiff and the deceased defendant and two more brothers by name Syed Mohammed and Syed Johni filed Form 7 claiming occupancy rights in respect of the suit schedule property. The Land Tribunal was pleased to reject their claim first and granted occupancy right only to the defendant in respect of the suit schedule property. Challenging the said order, Writ Petition No. 35983 of 1982 was filed before the Hon'ble High Court which was transferred to the Karnataka Land Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore District and it came to be dismissed. Miscellaneous case filed by the deceased plaintiff to set aside the ex parte decree in O.S. No. 672 of 1978 is allowed but the said order is a nullity as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to pass the said order. Plaintiffs have not acquired any right whatsoever under the alleged agreement of sale dated 18-11-1978 or under any document. The alleged agreement is concocted, created and manipulated by the plaintiffs with ulterior motive. The first defendant being the absolute owner of the property has sold the schedule property to the second defendant under a sale deed dated 18-8-1982. The revenue officials have given a finding that it is the first defendant who is in the possession. It was contended that the first defendant has not executed any agreement of sale either on 18-11-1978 or of any other date. The said agreement do not bear the signature of the deceased plaintiff. There is no offer and acceptance of the alleged sale transaction. The alleged agreement of sale is not a concluded contract. In the absence of the concluded contract, the alleged agreement of sale cannot be enforced and the suit based on the said agreement is not maintainable. The alleged right of the plaintiff is not hereditary and the legal representatives have not inherited any such right. 5. In the meanwhile, the plaintiff also died and his legal representatives were also brought on record. Plaintiffs have also filed a rejoinder to the amended written statement. The alleged right of the plaintiff is not hereditary and the legal representatives have not inherited any such right. 5. In the meanwhile, the plaintiff also died and his legal representatives were also brought on record. Plaintiffs have also filed a rejoinder to the amended written statement. They admit the proceedings initiated by the 1st defendant in the Revenue Courts to get his name restored in respect of the schedule land and they contend the dismissal of the appeals and revisions of the deceased plaintiff do not show that the plaintiff is not in possession or that the first defendant is in possession. They reiterated their earlier stand. 6. On these aforesaid pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following Issues: "1. Whether the plaintiff proves that he is in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property as alleged in para 2 of the plaint? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that on 18-11-1978 a panchayat was conveyed by the well-wishers of the parties and that the defendant admitted his possession over the suit schedule property and that he agreed to execute a sale deed in his favour for consideration of Rs. 8,000/- and received the entire consideration of Rs. 8,000/- in pursuance of the said agreement on 18-11-1978 if so, 3. Whether the decree in O.S. No. 672 of 1978 is not binding on the plaintiff? 4. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant has unlawfully interfered with his possession? 5. Is the plaintiff entitled to the declaration and injunction and for specific performance of the agreement? 6. To what order and decree? Issues 4(A) and 4(B) framed on 7-12-1985: 4(A) Whether defendant 2 is purchaser of suit schedule property during pendency of the suit? 4(B) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the reliefs against defendant 2?" 7. The plaintiff Syed Mustafa was examined as P.W. 1. He also examined 4 other witnesses as P.Ws. 2 to 5, produced 15 documents which are marked as Exs. P. 1 to P. 15. On behalf of the defendants, the son of the deceased first defendant was examined as D.W. 1, the son of second defendant was examined as D.W. 2 and he has produced 42 documents which are marked as Exs. D. 1 to D. 42. 8. 2 to 5, produced 15 documents which are marked as Exs. P. 1 to P. 15. On behalf of the defendants, the son of the deceased first defendant was examined as D.W. 1, the son of second defendant was examined as D.W. 2 and he has produced 42 documents which are marked as Exs. D. 1 to D. 42. 8. The Trial Court on consideration of the aforesaid documentary and oral evidence on record, held that the plaintiff has proved that he is in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property as alleged in paragraph 2 of the plaint. Further, it held that the plaintiff has proved that on 18-11-1978, a panchayat was convened by the well-wishers of the parties and that the defendant admitted his possession over the suit schedule property and that he agreed to execute a sale deed in his favour for consideration of Rs. 8,000/- and received the entire sale consideration of Rs. 8,000/- in pursuance of the said agreement on 18-11-1978. It further held that the decree in O.S. No. 672 of 1978 is not binding on the plaintiff and that the plaintiff has proved the interference by the' defendant and therefore the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration and specific performance as sought for. It further held that the second defendant is the purchaser of the suit schedule property during the pendency of the suit and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to relief even against second defendant. Thus, it decreed the suit of the plaintiff as prayed for. 9. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, legal representatives of the first defendant did not prefer any appeal. However, it is the second defendant who preferred the regular appeal. The lower Appellate Court on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record formulated the following points for consideration.- "1. Whether the appellant proves that the finding recorded by the Trial Court on Issue Nos. 1 to 4 and 4(A) and 4(B) are erroneous and improper and hence the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Court below is liable to be set aside? 2. What order?" The lower Appellate Court held that no case for interference with the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is made out. Therefore, it dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by these two judgment and decrees, the second defendant is in second appeal. 10. 2. What order?" The lower Appellate Court held that no case for interference with the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is made out. Therefore, it dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by these two judgment and decrees, the second defendant is in second appeal. 10. The following substantial questions ,were framed at the time of admission of this appeal: "1. Whether the findings of the Courts below that the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance is contrary to the pleading and the materials on record and therefore is perverse? 2. Whether the findings of the Courts below that the second defendant being a purchaser during the pendency of the suit is not a bona fide purchaser for value is contrary to the materials on record and is perverse and arbitrary?" After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, the Court formulated the following additional substantial question of law. "3. Whether the concurrent finding recorded by the Court below that Ex. P. 1, the agreement of sale is duly executed by 1st defendant is based on statements which are in the nature of admissions, would constitute admission under Section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as the maker of the statements had no proprietary interest in the subject-matter of the suit on the date of statement?" The learned Counsel were heard on the said substantial question of law• also. 11. Learned Counsel for the appellant Sri Ashok Haranahalli, assailing the judgment and decrees of the Courts below contended a reading of the plaint as a whole, would show that the plaintiff is asserting his title to the suit schedule property and he do not admit that the first defendant is the owner of the suit schedule property. If that being the case, the question of first defendant entering into an agreement of sale agreeing to convey the property in. favour of the plaintiff would not arise and this aspect has been completely missed by both the Courts, and erroneously decreed the suit of the plaintiff. Secondly, he contended the evidence on record clearly point out that no panchayat was convened as contended by the plaintiff and no panchayat took place which resulted in suit agreement coming into existence and that first defendant executing the same. Secondly, he contended the evidence on record clearly point out that no panchayat was convened as contended by the plaintiff and no panchayat took place which resulted in suit agreement coming into existence and that first defendant executing the same. Thirdly, he contended the material on record clearly shows the first defendant was in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property from the date of the grant which is supported by revenue records and other records and the Courts below have completely ignored this material evidence on record in recording a finding that the plaintiff is in possession of the property. Lastly, he contended in Ex. P. 7 it purports to contend the admission by the first defendant about execution of the suit agreement. If the entire evidence is read as a whole, it is clear that the word "not" is missing and therefore, it cannot be taken as an admission at all. Even otherwise, the said admission is said to be on 7-8-1984 on which day the first defendant had no proprietary interest in the suit schedule property and therefore his admission contrary to the stand taken in the written statement and against his interest, would not constitute an admission under Section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act. Similarly, he contended the admissions of D.W. 1 regarding the signatures found in the suit document which is made 14 years after the date of the sale of the schedule property in favour of second defendant is not an admission under Section 18 of the Act as on that day, he had no proprietary interest in the property. If these admissions are excluded, the other material on record do not prove the execution of the suit agreement. In that view of the matter, the Courts below committed serious error in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 12. Per contra, Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the L.Rs of the plaintiffs contended that the suit is based on an agreement which came into existence in a panchayat. When the defendants have denied the very existence of the document, what the plaintiff was expected to prove is, due execution of that agreement. The plaintiff has produced the original document and got it marked as Ex. P. 1, which has come from proper custody. This is a primary evidence which he is expected to produce. When the defendants have denied the very existence of the document, what the plaintiff was expected to prove is, due execution of that agreement. The plaintiff has produced the original document and got it marked as Ex. P. 1, which has come from proper custody. This is a primary evidence which he is expected to produce. Insofar as proof of execution of the agreement is concerned, P.W. 1 has identified the signature thereon. The other witness to the said document who have been examined also have spoken about the signature of D. 1 to the said document. Coupled with that D. 1, son, who is examined as D.W. 1 to the said document also has identified his father's signature. Therefore, Ex. P. 1 stands proved. Once Ex. P. 1 is proved, the contents are also proved. Therefore, the Courts below committed no error in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. Further, he submitted that the question whether the suit agreement is duly executed or not being a purely question of fact, when two fact finding authorities have concurrently recorded a finding, it is not open to this Court in second appeal to interfere with the said finding of fact and no substantial question of law do arise for consideration in this second appeal. Alternatively, he submitted that, assuming that both D. 1 as well as D.W. 1 had no proprietary interest in the suit schedule property on the date they deposed, in the sale deed executed by them in favour of the second defendant, they have undertaken to indemnify the second defendant for any breach of the terms of the sale and therefore they have retained the interest to that extent of indemnifying the second respondent and therefore, it cannot be said that they had no interest at all. Further, he submitted that the evidence given in proof of signature cannot be construed as evidence given in respect of interest in immovable property and therefore, the said evidence was admissible and the Courts committed no error in acting on the same. Lastly, he contended that even if the evidence of D.W. 1 is to be excluded, the other material on record clearly establishes the due execution of the agreement. Therefore, he submits that no case for interference is made out. 13. Lastly, he contended that even if the evidence of D.W. 1 is to be excluded, the other material on record clearly establishes the due execution of the agreement. Therefore, he submits that no case for interference is made out. 13. As it was contended that this Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact namely Ex. P. 1 the agreement of sale, stands proved, it is necessary to look into the law governing exercise of the power by this Court under Section 100 of the CPC. 14. The Supreme Court in the case of Madan Lal v Mst. Gopi and Another, held that in an appeal against the concurrent finding of fact, where both Courts below ignored the weight of preponderating circumstances and allowed their judgments to be influenced by inconsequential matters, the High Court would be justified in re-appreciating the evidence and in coming to its own independent conclusions. 15. The Supreme Court in the case of Dilbagrai Punjabi v Sharad Chandra, held that the High Court while hearing the appeal under Section 100 of the CPC has no jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence and reverse the conclusion reached by the First Appellate Court, but at the same time its power to interfere with the finding cannot be denied if when the lower Appellate Court decides an issue of fact a substantial question of law arises. The Court is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises is of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorised to set aside the finding. 16. The concurrent finding of fact cannot be interfered with by the High Court in a routine and casual manner by subsisting its subjective satisfaction in the place of the lower Courts Karnataka Board of Wakf v Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan. 17. 16. The concurrent finding of fact cannot be interfered with by the High Court in a routine and casual manner by subsisting its subjective satisfaction in the place of the lower Courts Karnataka Board of Wakf v Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan. 17. The Supreme Court in the case of Hafazat Hussain v Abdul Majeed, held as under: "No doubt, it has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court that concurrent findings recorded by the Trial Judge as well as the First Appellate Judge on proper appreciation of the materials on record should not be disturbed by the High Court, while exercising second appellate jurisdiction, but at the same time, it is not an absolute rule to be applied universally and invariably since the exceptions to the same also were often indicated with equal importance by this Court, and instances are innumerable where despite such need and necessity warranting such interference, if the second Appellate Court mechanically declined to interfere, the matter has been even relegated by this Court to the second Appellate Court to properly deal with the claims of parties in the second appeal objectively keeping in view the parameters of consideration for interference under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code". 18. The Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Mohan Kul alias Nani Charan Kul and Another v Pratima Maity and Others, held that the scope for interference with concurrent findings of fact while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC is very limited, where the Trial Court and/or the First Appellate Court misdirected themselves in appreciating the question of law and placed the onus on the wrong party certainly, there is a scope for interference under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 after formulating a substantial question of law". 19. In the case of Neelakantan and Others v Mallika Begum, Supreme Court held that, the findings of fact recorded must be set aside where the finding has no basis in any legal evidence on record or is based on a misreading of evidence or suffers from any legal infirmity which materially prejudices the case of one of the parties. 20. In the case of Neelakantan and Others v Mallika Begum, Supreme Court held that, the findings of fact recorded must be set aside where the finding has no basis in any legal evidence on record or is based on a misreading of evidence or suffers from any legal infirmity which materially prejudices the case of one of the parties. 20. The Supreme Court in the case of Yadarao Dajiba Shrawane (dead) by L.Rs v Nanilal Harakchand Shah (dead) and Others, has held as under: "The position is well-settled that when the judgment of the final Court of facts is based on misinterpretation of documentary evidence or on consideration of inadmissible evidence or ignoring material evidence the High Court in second appeal is entitled to interfere with the judgment. The position is also well-settled that admission of parties or their witnesses are relevant pieces of evidence and should be given due weight-age by Courts. A finding of fact ignoring such admissions or concessions is, vitiated in law and can be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal". Therefore, the law on the point is well-settled. The concurrent findings recorded by the Trial Judge as well as the First Appellate Judge on proper appreciation of the material on record should not be disturbed by the High Court while exercising its second appellate jurisdiction. However, it is not an absolute rule to be applied universally and invariably. When the Courts below ignore the weight of preponderating circumstances, allow the judgments to be influenced by inconsequential matters, when their judgment is based on misinterpretation of documentary evidence or on consideration of inadmissible evidence or ignoring the material evidence, or misdirected themselves in appreciating the question of law and place the onus on the wrong party, or when their finding has no basis in any legal evidence on record or on a misreading of evidence or suffers from any legal infirmity, the High Court would be justified in re-appreciating the evidence and coming to its own and independent conclusion. However, the High Court should not in routine or casual manner by substituting its subjective satisfaction in place of the lower Courts, interfere with the concurrent finding offact. 21. Let me examine the findings of the Court below keeping in mind the aforesaid legal principles to find out whether a case for interference is made out. 22. However, the High Court should not in routine or casual manner by substituting its subjective satisfaction in place of the lower Courts, interfere with the concurrent finding offact. 21. Let me examine the findings of the Court below keeping in mind the aforesaid legal principles to find out whether a case for interference is made out. 22. From the aforesaid facts set out above, it is clear that the relationship between the parties is not in dispute. It is also clear that the plaintiff and the first defendant were not the members of the joint family. The material on record shows that the suit schedule property were inam lands. The first defendant made an application under Section 9 of the Act for grant of occupancy rights. Admittedly, the deceased plaintiff did not make any application for grant of occupancy rights in respect of the said land. The suit schedule land was granted to first defendant by Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore on 5-7-1965 along with the other lands in Sy. Nos. 51, 52, 54, 60 and 70 in Case No. 19/60-61, under Section 5 of the Act, treating him as permanent tenant. He paid the premium. His name was mutated in the revenue records. He has been paying taxes regularly. At the time of making out katha, the property was measured and it was found that it measured 8 acres 30 guntas. However, somewhere in the year 1980, plaintiff's name appeared in the mutation register in respect of the suit schedule property. On coming to know of the same, the first defendant made an application to the Tahsildar to delete his name. Accordingly, the Tahsildar after enquiry passed an order deleting the name of the plaintiff in column 12(2) of the RTC and inserted the name of first defendant by order dated 27-6-1981. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the Assistant Commissioner. Appeal came to be dismissed on 14-9-1981. Against the said order, the plaintiff preferred a second appeal to the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, which came to be dismissed on 5-11-1982. The plaintiff preferred a revision to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal which also came to be dismissed. That is how those proceedings have reached the finality. 23. Appeal came to be dismissed on 14-9-1981. Against the said order, the plaintiff preferred a second appeal to the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, which came to be dismissed on 5-11-1982. The plaintiff preferred a revision to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal which also came to be dismissed. That is how those proceedings have reached the finality. 23. It is also on record that, complaining that the plaintiff is interfering with the first defendant's possession over the suit schedule property, he filed a suit in O.S. No. 672 of 1978, on the file of the Additional Second Munsiff, Bangalore. Suit summons were refused by the plaintiff. The Court held that the service is sufficient, recorded the evidence of first defendant and his witness, after going through the oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the suit on 30-7-1978 restraining the plaintiff from interfering with the first defendant's possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. The plaintiff filed Misc. No. 180 of 1978 for setting aside the said order. Now the said miscellaneous number is allowed and that ex parte decree and injunction is set aside. It is submitted that subsequently, the said suit came to be dismissed for non-prosecution. 24. It is in this background, we have to appreciate the case of the plaintiff. A reading of the plaint clearly shows that he is claiming possession of the suit schedule property 30 years prior to the date of the suit. He do not whisper his source of tile to the property. It is his specific case that the first defendant being his elder brother, managed to get the mutation entries made in his name. Now the proceedings referred to supra shows that there is no truth in the said allegation. The suit schedule property was granted to the first defendant. On the basis of the said grant, his name was mutated and that mutation was challenged by the plaintiff in all forums and failed. Therefore, it is clear that the plaintiff who is seeking relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale is not admitting the first defendant's title to the suit schedule property. It is his specific case that because of this dispute between the brothers, a panchayat was held on 18th November, 1978, during the pendency of the miscellaneous case, at the instance of several well wishers interested in both the parties. It is his specific case that because of this dispute between the brothers, a panchayat was held on 18th November, 1978, during the pendency of the miscellaneous case, at the instance of several well wishers interested in both the parties. In order to appreciate this case of panchayat being convened, who were the panchayatdars, what transpired in the panchayat and what is the agreement entered into, it is necessary to look into the evidence on record. 25. The plaintiff examined himself as P.W. 1. In the evidence recorded on 1-9-1989, he has deposed that the suit property came to his share in the partition, a case which is not pleaded by him in the plaint. However, he admits that Bellahalli is a Jodi Village. The suit land was earlier Jodi property. The said property was regranted in favour of the first defendant. He is cultivating the lands personally. He has been cutting the survey trees once in five years. When the first defendant and his son wanted to cut the survey trees, the dispute arose between the parties, which resulted in assault, criminal case and admission of the plaintiff to the hospital. It is during the pendency of the miscellaneous case, the elders of the village interfered and panchayat was held. According to him, the panchayat was held in Bellahalli School. The Chairman of Panchayat, Nagaraj, Vice-Chairman of the Panchayat, Mehaboob the Sub-Inspector of Police, Nagaraj, Akbar Ali-Member of the Panchayat, Syed Mehamood, Nanjundappa, Syed Gulab and Chairman of Hosakote Panchayat-Muniswamappa, were all present at the panchayat. In that panchayat it was decided that the plaintiff has to pay Rs. 8,000.00 to the defendant and the first defendant should execute conveyance deed. The proceedings of the panchayat was reduced into writing on white paper. Ex. P. 1 is the agreement entered into. The Secretary of the Panchayat, one Venkatarao is the scribe of Ex. P. 1. The scribe also has signed the said document. After execution of Ex. P. 1 it was deposited with the Chairman, Nagaraj. The plaintiff paid Rs. 8,000.00 to the first defendant. On the date of Ex. P. 1, the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, first defendant, plaintiff and Syed Pasha went to the Sub-Registrar's Office for registering the sale. The first defendant purchased stamps for which the plaintiff paid the amount and the sale deed was drafted on the same day, which is marked as Ex. P. 2. 8,000.00 to the first defendant. On the date of Ex. P. 1, the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, first defendant, plaintiff and Syed Pasha went to the Sub-Registrar's Office for registering the sale. The first defendant purchased stamps for which the plaintiff paid the amount and the sale deed was drafted on the same day, which is marked as Ex. P. 2. The Secretary, Venkatarao drafted the sale deed which runs to four sheets. After drafting, the first defendant went away and did not enter the Sub-Registrar Office for registering the sale deed. Thereafter, a legal notice was issued as per Ex. P. 3. Reply was sent as per Ex. P. 4. Then he filed miscellaneous petition, which was allowed. The order passed in miscellaneous case is confirmed by the High Court. He has further deposed that the first defendant also had lodged a complaint against him, which was registered as C.C. No. 3744 of 1980 which came to be dismissed. In the said proceedings, he has given evidence as per Ex. P. 7. The second defendant is the resident of Bangalore. He has purchased the land adjoining the plaintiff's land prior to the dispute between him and the first defendant. 26. It is his specific case in the cross-examination that in partition with his brothers he got 20 acres of land including the suit land. He denied his knowledge about the application made by his brother before the Special Deputy Commissioner for grant of occupancy right in respect of several other survey numbers. He admits the proceedings before the Tahsildar, Assistant Commissioner and the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. He admits that after division of the property about 45 years ago, he and his brothers have started living separately. It may be in the year 1944. According to him, the panchayat was convened at about 11.00 a.m. It is the first defendant who brought the panchayatdars. P.S.I. who has signed in Ex. P. 1 brought the Chairman of the Village. The Village Accountant signed in Ex. P. 1 is the Village Accountant. He says that he cannot identify the signatures in Ex. P. 1 since he do not know how to read and write English. He cannot identify any of the signatures in Ex. P. 1, since he is an illiterate. 27. According to him Exs. P. 1 and P. 2 were executed on the same date. He kept Rs. 8,000.00 in his house. P. 1 since he do not know how to read and write English. He cannot identify any of the signatures in Ex. P. 1, since he is an illiterate. 27. According to him Exs. P. 1 and P. 2 were executed on the same date. He kept Rs. 8,000.00 in his house. He had kept about Rs. 15,000.00 in his house. The Secretary of the Village Panchayat brought the stamp paper. He purchased the stamp papers from the Sub-Registrar's Office, Bangalore. He further deposed that he do not know the date of Ex. P. 1 and he cannot say the date and month of Ex. P. 1. On the date of Ex. P. 1 only the negotiations took place. According to him Exs. P. 1 and P. 2 are executed on the same day. Ex. P. l(d) is stuck off by one Akbar Ali, the brother of Guljar Ali who had signed. 28. He has examined P.W. 2, one of the attesting witness to Ex. P. 1 by name Nanjundappa. He has deposed that the suit property is in possession of the plaintiff since 30 years. He has seen him cultivating the lands. About 15 or 16 years back, one day he had been to Kannur Village. There, he heard that in Bellahalli the plaintiff and the first defendant had quarrelled and the police had visited the village. Out of curiosity, as he knew the plaintiff, in order to know his condition, he went to Bellahalli. He went near the school building, there were about 20 to 30 persons assembled in the school building. The plaintiff, defendant, Sub-Inspector of Police, Village Accountant, Chairman of the Village and other police were gathered there. A panchayat was held and it was decided in the panchayat that the plaintiff should pay a sum of Rs. 8,000.00 to the defendant and the defendant has executed an agreement in respect of the land in favour of the plaintiff. He is one of the witness to the agreement. Therefore, he is the panchayatdar. He has affixed his L.T.M. on the agreement. The said agreement is at Ex. P. 1. He was the only person who has affixed his L.T.M. and the other persons have signed on the agreement. In his presence the defendant and his children affixed their signatures on the agreement. Therefore, he is the panchayatdar. He has affixed his L.T.M. on the agreement. The said agreement is at Ex. P. 1. He was the only person who has affixed his L.T.M. and the other persons have signed on the agreement. In his presence the defendant and his children affixed their signatures on the agreement. The Secretary and the S.I. Chairman of the Village Panchayat and Vice-Chairman also have signed on the agreement. It was agreed by the parties that the defendant has to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. In his presence the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 8,000.00 to the defendant and thereafter he has signed the document. In the cross-examination, he has deposed that the panchayat was held on Sunday, he had gone to that panchayat at 10 a.m. Basha had invited him to panchayat. Nobody was present at that time. Panchayat started after he reached there. Basha had told him that there is some galata in his house and that he had invited him to advise parties and he did not inform about the panchayat to anybody else at Kannur Village. When he reached the panchayat place, two persons of Kannur were present and the Chairman was also there. He does not know about the other two persons. About 10 to 15 members of Bellahalli Village were present. He cannot give their names. He do not know the scribe of the document. Pyarusab read over and explained the document to him. Somebody signed at the first instance and he do not know them. He affixed his L.T.M. after the signature of the scribe. He do not know whether the deceased plaintiff had signed the document or not. The said document was written between 10.30 a.m. and 11 a.m. The panchayatdars, himself and Sub-Inspector had decided the value of the land. Thereafter, plaintiff went to his house and brought the money. On the date of panchayat a police complaint was lodged. Due to the complaint the Sub-Inspector was present there. He do not know whether constables were present or not. The S.L was in uniform. He came to know that the complaint was filed against the deceased first defendant. Immediately, after affixing his LTM it was attested by somebody else, and he do not remember his name. After the execution of the document all of them returned back to their houses. The S.L was in uniform. He came to know that the complaint was filed against the deceased first defendant. Immediately, after affixing his LTM it was attested by somebody else, and he do not remember his name. After the execution of the document all of them returned back to their houses. Except the agreement, no other document was executed on that day. 29. P.W. 3 the Superintendent of Police, has deposed that he knows about Ex. P. 1 which is an agreement of sale executed by the deceased first defendant in favour of deceased plaintiff. According to him, the said agreement was executed on 18-11-1978. He identifies Ex. P. 1. He says that he is one of the witnesses to Ex. P. 1. He identifies his signature of Ex. P. l(a). He further admits that Ex. P. 1 was executed at Bellahalli school building before the village panchayatdars. The panchayat Chairman and others such as document writer and witnesses have signed Ex. P. 1. He identified the signature of the deceased defendant which is at Ex. P. l(a). He admits that there are several complaints, counter complaints between the deceased plaintiff and the defendant. Criminal cases were registered against the defendants and he has deposed that plaintiff was in possession of the property during his period. In cross-examination he has deposed that he do not remember whether there was any complaint by any of the parties on the date of execution of Ex. P. 1. According to him Bellahalli was a factious village. In his routine course, he visited that village on that day. He was in uniform. He had been to that village on that day on his official duty. He do not remember as to whether he had gone alone or along with his staff on that day. There was no prior intimation to him about the panchayat. When he went there, the panchayat had already commenced. Before he went to the spot, he was not aware of the proceedings of the panchayat. The document was written only after he went there. The panchayatdars who were present at that time gave instructions to draft the agreement. It was written on Sunday. There were no talks about execution of another document on that day itself. Before he went to the spot, he was not aware of the proceedings of the panchayat. The document was written only after he went there. The panchayatdars who were present at that time gave instructions to draft the agreement. It was written on Sunday. There were no talks about execution of another document on that day itself. GuIzar Ali who was one of the signatory to the agreement struck of his signature and returned back as he has some urgent work in the temple. He was not present till the completion of the panchayat. He had signed the document after it was drafted. He do not know whether the plaintiff had signed the agreement or not. The President of the panchayat was the first signatory to the document. The first defendant has signed as a second witness to the document. After the signature of the panchayatdars, the first defendant has signed the document. Syed Gulzar Ali, Pyaru Sab, Syed Akbar Ali and his brother Mehamood, Vice-President, Nagaraju and the document writer have also signed on the document. The said Nagaraju drafted the• agreement as per Ex. P. 1. Regarding payment of amount is concerned, it was decided in his presence only. On the date of agreement itself, money was brought from the house and paid to the defendant. He do not remember who had identified the LTM of P.W. 2. He do :not know the experience of Nagaraj in deed writing who had drafted Ex. P. 1. There were no notes prepared earlier and straight away the agreement was drafted on a white paper as per the decisions of the panchayatdars. P.W. 2 came to the spot after he reached there. 30. Then we have the evidence of P.W. 4. He has stated that he knows about the panchayat and the execution of the agreement by the deceased defendant in favour of the deceased plaintiff. He was present when the agreement was written. He has affixed his signature as witness to the said agreement. He has identified his signature. According to him, the said agreement was written in the primary school of Bellahalli. Nagaraj, Chairman and Vice-Chairman, Mehaboob, Sub-Inspector, Govindaraj and many people were present. They have signed it. He has deposed that he knows Kannada and his signature is at Ex. P. l(a). One Nanjundappa has affixed his thumb impression and he was also present on that day. According to him, the said agreement was written in the primary school of Bellahalli. Nagaraj, Chairman and Vice-Chairman, Mehaboob, Sub-Inspector, Govindaraj and many people were present. They have signed it. He has deposed that he knows Kannada and his signature is at Ex. P. l(a). One Nanjundappa has affixed his thumb impression and he was also present on that day. When the panchayat was held and agreement was written, he was the Chairman of the village. The children of the plaintiff and the plaintiff had invited him for the panchayat. On the date of panchayat, it was decided in the panchayat that the plaintiff should pay a sum of Rs. 8,000.00 to the deceased defendant and in turn the defendant has to execute a registered sale deed in respect of the suit property in favour of the plaintiff within 15 days. Accordingly, the terms and conditions were reduced to writing. The deceased plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 8,000.00 to deceased defendant as per the terms of the agreement. He identifies his signature at Ex. P. l(f). In cross-examination he has deposed that about 5 days earlier to the panchayat, the son of the plaintiff came to him and invited him to the panchayat. He was informed the date of panchayat by the son of the plaintiff. 31. P.W. 5 identifies Ex. P. 1 and says that he was present when it was executed. The plaintiff and his children Govindaraj, Muniswamappa, Nanjundappa, Nagaraj, himself and many villagers were assembled at that time. Defendant and his children executed of Ex. P. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant had agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff. The defendant had agreed to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within 15 days. The deceased defendant had affixed his signature at Ex. P. 1 in his presence which is at Ex. P. 1 (a). The children of the defendant also have signed the said document. According to him, the plaintiff had kept ready the drafted sale deed, but the defendant failed to execute the registered sale deed. The original sale deed was prepared near Taluk Office. He was present on that day. The defendant was present and he gave instructions for drafting the original sale deed. On that day, the children of the first defendant were not present. The original sale deed was prepared near Taluk Office. He was present on that day. The defendant was present and he gave instructions for drafting the original sale deed. On that day, the children of the first defendant were not present. Therefore, the first defendant told that the document will be registered in the presence of his children on next day and he returned back to village thereafter. He never turned up. In cross-examination, he has deposed that there was a panchayat in the village and it was decided in the panchayat that' the plaintiff was cultivating the suit land and the defendant has executed the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and accordingly, the plaintiff has paid Rs. 8,000.00 and the amount was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant and the defendant had executed the agreement. The agreement was executed in Bellahalli. The agreement was read over and explained thereafter. Ex. P. 2 was not written near the Taluk Office. They requested the defendant to affix the signature on Ex. P. 2. He refused to do so on the pretext that his children have not come. The panchayat was held on Sunday and he was in his house. The defendant invited him to the panchayat. It was about 10 a.m. and he do not remember who were present when he was invited to panchayat. At the time of Panchayat the deceased defendant, his children, the plaintiff and children, Chairman, Nagaraj, Vice-Chairman, Mehaboob, himself, Nanjundappa, Muniswamappa and other villagers were also present. In the meanwhile, Sub-Inspector had also come there. The agreement was drafted on a white paper. It was written by one person of Yelahanka. He do not know his name. He do not remember who gave instructions to draft the agreement. The signature of his elder brother Gulzar Ali was struck off. The Sub-Inspector had come there in uniform: He came thereafter he reached the spot. He has not seen whether the plaintiff has affixed his signature to the agreement. The scribe of the agreement read over the agreement after it was drafted. 32. The reason for setting out the evidence of these witnesses on which the plaintiff relies on is only to find out whether the Courts below who are the final Courts of facts have carefully considered these oral evidence on record. The scribe of the agreement read over the agreement after it was drafted. 32. The reason for setting out the evidence of these witnesses on which the plaintiff relies on is only to find out whether the Courts below who are the final Courts of facts have carefully considered these oral evidence on record. From the aforesaid oral evidence it is clear that the plaintiff has not stated in what circumstances, how and why the Panchayat was convened. He is unable to identify the signatures in Ex. P. 1, since he do not know-how to read and write. According to him the Secretary, Venkatarao, drafted the agreement as well as the sale deed. From the evidence of P.W. 2, it is clear that he was not a panchayatdar invited by the plaintiff and the first defendant. In fact, he was not aware of the panchayat. He was only a curious onlooker who went there to know what is happening, as he had heard that the plaintiff and the first defendant had quarreled and the police had visited the village and therefore, he is not the panchayatdar. His further evidence discloses that on the date of the panchayat, the Sub-Inspector was at the spot because of the complaint lodged against the first defendant. That explains his presence, not as a panchayatdar. On that day, no other document other than Ex. P. 1 came to be executed and after the Panchayat, everyone went back to their houses. It is clear that the Sub-Inspector, P.W. 3 was also not the panchayatdar. He had no notice of the panchayat. He went to that village for his official work and then he came to know about the panchayat and then he went to the place• where panchayat was taking place and he has also attested Ex. P. 1. He says that Ex. P. 1 is the only document which was drafted on that day. However, according to him the agreement was drafted by Nagaraj and not Venkatarao, the Secretary. The other two witness P.WS. 4 and 5 also state that it is Nagaraj who wrote the agreement in the primary school of Bellahalli and it is children of the plaintiff who had invited him to the panchayat. A reading of the aforesaid evidence makes it clear that except P.Ws. The other two witness P.WS. 4 and 5 also state that it is Nagaraj who wrote the agreement in the primary school of Bellahalli and it is children of the plaintiff who had invited him to the panchayat. A reading of the aforesaid evidence makes it clear that except P.Ws. 4 and 5, the other three witnesses were not aware of the panchayat at all, let alone they being requested to be the panchayatdars. The plaintiff is unable to identify the signature of anyone on Ex. P. 1. If his evidence is to be believed according to him, the document is drafted by the Village Accountant by name Venkatarao. According to other witnesses, it is drafted by the scribe by name Nagaraju. Their evidence do not disclose who gave instruction to the scribe to draft. Their evidence do not disclose the discussion which took place in the panchayat, what was the rival contentions, what was the agreement entered into and in what context the agreement was reduced into writing. In fact, nobody speaks about the rival contentions between the parties at all. All of them admit the pendency of civil litigation, pendency of criminal case and police complaints between the parties. Before the validity of the agreement can be gone into, as it is the specific case of the plaintiff that in order to resolve the dispute between the parties, the panchayat was convened and in the panchayat, the dispute was resolved and then this agreement came into existence. If the evidence of these witnesses taken as a whole, it do not establish that as contended by the plaintiffthat any panchayat was convened by the well-wishers interested in both the parties, any discussion took place, what was the dispute, what was the decision of the panchayatdars, and whether parties agreed to such desecration and then excludes Ex. P. 1, the alleged agreement of sale. On the contrary, P.Ws. 2 and 3 were not aware of the panchayat, they came to the panchayat on that day for some other purpose and they were curious onlookers. But at the time of drafting of Ex. P. 1, they were present and attested the document. P.W. 4 says that he was requested to be present by the plaintiff and his children. P.W. 5 says that he was requested to be present by the first defendant and his children. But at the time of drafting of Ex. P. 1, they were present and attested the document. P.W. 4 says that he was requested to be present by the plaintiff and his children. P.W. 5 says that he was requested to be present by the first defendant and his children. Therefore, it is clear that this evidence of five witnesses do not establish the case of the plaintiff that the well-wishers interested in parties convened the panchayat to resolve the dispute. The discrepancy in the evidence of each one of the witnesses is too wide to be ignored. Not one witness corroborates the evidence of another witness. It is full of inconsistency. The evidence of none of these witnesses do infuse confidence which can be acted upon by the Court. The Courts below has clearly misread the evidence, did not notice the glaring contradictions in the evidence are influenced by inconsequential matters, ignored the weight of preponderating circumstances and recorded findings which has no basis in any legal evidence. Therefore, the evidence of these witnesses neither establishes the convening of the panchayat, resolution of the dispute in the panchayat or execution of Ex. P. 1 in the said panchayat. It is to be noticed here that Ex. P. 1, is not a simple agreement of sale entered into between the parties voluntarily where one party is interested in selling his property and the other interested in purchasing the property, after mutual discussion and negotiation agreed on a price and then reduce the terms in writing. It is a case of want of consensus ad idem. Similarly, execution of a document does not mean signing of a document. The word "execution" has a definite connotation in law. The person signing the document must be aware of the contents of document and consciously sign the document in token of acceptance of the contents of the said document. If the execution of a document is denied it is for the party who alleges the due execution to prove by acceptable evidence that the executant affixed his signature to the document after being aware of the contents of the document and in token of its acceptance so as to bind him. If the execution of a document is denied it is for the party who alleges the due execution to prove by acceptable evidence that the executant affixed his signature to the document after being aware of the contents of the document and in token of its acceptance so as to bind him. When it is stated that the executant executed an agreement of sale, it must be shown that the executant had agreed to sell the property and in token of acceptance of such agreement he has affixed his signature on the said agreement of sell. The evidence on record do not disclose that the defendant affixed his signature to the suit document agreeing to sell the schedule property in favour of the plaintiffs or in view of the decision of panchayatdars or on the basis of what was agreed to in the said panchayat. Therefore, the finding of the Courts below that the agreement of sale is duly executed by the first defendant, as it bears his signature on the document is illegal. 33. It is in this context, it is necessary to see the evidence of D.W. 1, the son of the first defendant. 34. It is to be remembered that prior to the filing of the suit a legal notice was sent. Reply was sent to the legal notice. The first defendant categorically denied convening of the panchayat, execution of any agreement and his signature in the said agreement. In the wlitten statement which is filed in the Court the said stand has been reiterated. After the death of the first defendant, his L.Rs who were brought on record also filed a written statement reiterating the said stand. D.W. 1 was examined on 28-10-1986, 12 years after the execution of the sale deed in favour of the second defendant. In his examination-in-chief he has categorically stated that his father has not executed any agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff on 18-11-1978 in respect of suit schedule property. But he admits that there was a panchayat in respect of the suit schedule property in the school. He do not remember the proceedings of the panchayat. However, in cross-examination, he admits that on 18-11-1978 the panchayat was convened in their village in the school in connection with the dispute between his father and the deceased plaintiff. He can identify the signature of his father. He do not remember the proceedings of the panchayat. However, in cross-examination, he admits that on 18-11-1978 the panchayat was convened in their village in the school in connection with the dispute between his father and the deceased plaintiff. He can identify the signature of his father. His father was an illiterate, he used to affix his signature in Kannada. He identifies the signature of his father in the vakalath, which is marked as Ex. D. 1(a). Thereafter, he identifies the signature of his father at Ex. P. 1(a) and his signature at Ex. P. 1(b). He has deposed that Muniswamappa, Nagaraj, Syed Akbar Ali, Nanjundappa and Muniswamappa, were all present in that panchayat. His younger brother was also present and he can identify his signature. He states that there might have been an agreement on the date of panchayat and his father knows about it. On that date panchayat was convened in respect of the suit schedule property. One Sub-Inspector of Police was also present at that time and he do not remember his name. Ex. P. 1 might have been written on the date of panchayat. Himself, his father and his brother had affixed their signature in the school on that day. The panchayatdars also signed on Ex. P. 1 in their premises. His father might have signed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property, but his father knows about it. The fact of holding of panchayat was known to the entire village and also the neighbourers of the land and their village is a small village. He further states that, it is true that his father has not delivered the property to the second defendant. He do not know about the preparation of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff by his father near the Sub-Registrar's Office as per Ex. P. 2. The second defendant had put up barbed wire fencing along with the stone pillars around the property. There is no barbed wire fencing to the suit schedule property. He admits that his father sold the suit property to the second defendant. He has deposed that there was no publication of litigation in respect of the suit schedule property in their village earlier to the sale in favour of the second defendant. The panchayat in the school was held on one Sunday. He admits that his father sold the suit property to the second defendant. He has deposed that there was no publication of litigation in respect of the suit schedule property in their village earlier to the sale in favour of the second defendant. The panchayat in the school was held on one Sunday. The panchayat was commenced from 10 a.m. and completed by 12 p.m. He do not know who is the scribe who wrote the document. The plaintiff did not publish the fact of panchayat after the panchayat. He denies having filed any written statement stating that the property was not delivered to the second defendant. Towards western side of the second defendant has constructed a farm house and has raised coconut trees, guava and sapota trees. He admits that immediately after the purchase of the land from his father towards western side of the suit schedule property, the second defendant has put up fence .around her property. 35. Therefore, the son has given a go by to the stand taken by his father in the written statement. He has admitted the panchayat, signing of Ex. P. 1, his father and himself signed the said agreement and he asserted, possession was not delivered to the second respondent under the sale deed. The stand which is totally contrary to what has been pleaded by them before the Court affecting interest of the second defendant. In addition to that we have the evidence of D. 1 on which reliance is placed which is at Ex. P. 7. Ex. P. 7 is the certified copy of the evidence of D. 1 which he has given in the criminal case filed against the plaintiff. The relevant portion on which reliance is placed is extracted hereunder for proper appreciation: "It is not true to suggest that we were jointly cultivating the lands before the partition of our lands. We were separated about 30 years ago. It is true that I executed an agreement before the panchayatdars agreeing to sell Sy. No. 51 in favour of the accused' 1 in the year 1978. It is not true to suggest that received Rs. 8,000.00 in the presence of panchayatdars in that respect. It is false to suggest that I delivered possession of the said land to accused 1 on that day itself'. (emphasis supplied) 36. No. 51 in favour of the accused' 1 in the year 1978. It is not true to suggest that received Rs. 8,000.00 in the presence of panchayatdars in that respect. It is false to suggest that I delivered possession of the said land to accused 1 on that day itself'. (emphasis supplied) 36. Relying on this evidence and evidence of D.W. 1, it was contended that execution of Ex. P. 1 is admitted and therefore the finding recorded by the Courts below cannot be found fault with. 37. Insofar as Ex. P. 7 is concerned, the evidence is written in the handwriting of the learned Judge. If the entire evidence is read as a whole, the word 'not' is missing in that sentence, where the first defendant has admitted to have executed the agreement. In the earlier sentence and the subsequent sentence the word 'not' is mentioned. In this sentence the word 'not', is not mentioned. In the context in which the evidence is recorded, it is clear that it is a mistake committed by the learned Judge in not mentioning 'not' and if it is read as 'not', there is no admission at all. 38. Even otherwise, this evidence is recorded on 7-8-1984, when the defendant had no interest in the suit schedule property. It is not in dispute between the parties that on 18-8-1982 during the pendency of the suit, the first defendant sold the suit property in favour of the second defendant under a registered sale deed dated 18-8-1982 which is marked as Ex. P. 10. Both the first defendant when he was giving evidence on 7-8-1984 and D.W. 1 who was giving evidence on 28-10-1986, they had no interest in the suit schedule property. The question is whether these admissions made by a person who had no proprietary interest in the property could be treated as admission so as to record a finding that the suit document is executed. 39. The question is whether these admissions made by a person who had no proprietary interest in the property could be treated as admission so as to record a finding that the suit document is executed. 39. In this regard, it is necessary to have a look at Section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act, which reads as under: "Admission by party to proceeding or his agent; by suitor in representative character, by party interested in subject-matter; by person from whom interest derived.-Statements made by a party to the proceeding, or by an agent to any such party, whom the Court regards, under the circumstances of the case, as expressly or impliedly authorised by him to make them, are admissions. Statements made by parties to suits, suing or sued in a representative character, are not admissions, unless they were made while the party making them held that character. Statements made by.- (1) persons who have any proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject-matter of the proceeding, and who make the statement in their character of persons so interested; or (2) persons from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest in the subject-matter of the suit, are admissions, if they are made during the continuance of the interest of the persons making the statements". 40. In fact, the learned Author Sri Woodroffe while interpreting this provision has observed as under: "Statements whether made by parties interested, or by persons from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest, are admissions only if they are made during the continuance of the interest of the persons making the statement. It would be manifestly unjust that a person, who has parted with his interest in property, should be empowered to divest the right of another claiming under him, by any statement which he may choose to make". 41. Oudh Court in the case of J.C. Galstaun v Abid Husain, held as under: "This statement however is not admissible as an admission against the plaintiff under Section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act. Statements made by persons from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest in the subject-matter of the suit are admissible as admissions, only when the admissions are of a date prior to the date of the transfer. Statements made by persons from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest in the subject-matter of the suit are admissible as admissions, only when the admissions are of a date prior to the date of the transfer. Statements made by persons in possession of property and qualifying or affecting their title thereto are receivable against the persons claiming through them by title subsequent to the admission". 42. The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in the case of Hardatt Sharma v Jaikishen Shamlal and Sons and Others, held as under: "... . True, under Section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act, statements made by persons from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest in the subject-matter of the suit, are binding on such parties as their admissions, nevertheless, before the same may bind them, it has further to be shown that the statements were made by those persons during the continuance of their interest in the subject-matter, and obviously so, because, it would be highly unjust and improper to divest a person of his right in the property, lawfully acquired by him from another, on the basis of the latter's admission after his own interest in the property has ceased to exist". 43. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Chironjilal v. Khaton Bi , para 11: "Under Section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act. The admission of a person could be an admission only if it would be made during the continuance of his interest but once he has parted with his interest in the property his admission is not admissible. That would be manifestly unjust that a person who has parted with his interest in property should be empowered to divest a right of another claiming in him by any statement which he may choose to make subsequently". 44. Therefore, it is clear that from the aforesaid statutory provisions, statement of law and the decisions that, statements made by the parties to the proceedings or their agents are admission in the suit. However, in order to become admissions, the party should be a person interested in the subject-matter. The statement should be made in their character as persons so interested, then only their statements could be treated as admissions. However, in order to become admissions, the party should be a person interested in the subject-matter. The statement should be made in their character as persons so interested, then only their statements could be treated as admissions. Before the Court can act on the statement of a party to the proceedings and in holding that the said statement is an admission, the said statement should have been made by a person who has proprietary interest or a pecuniary interest in the schedule property on the date of the statement. A statement made by a person after parting with his interest in the schedule property so as to harm the interest of the person who owns the property on the date of the statement, cannot be treated as admission. If on the day the statement were made he has no pecuniary or proprietary interest, the said statement cannot be treated as admission under Section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act. It would be manifestly unjust that a person, who has parted with his interest in property, should be empowered to divest the right of another claiming under him, by any statement which he may chose to make. Otherwise, it encourages dishonesty, and the legal proceedings would loose its solemnity. "During the continuance of interest" mentioned in Section 18 only means while the interest was subsisting and before that interest was parted with. Admissions in order to be relevant must be made during the continuance of the interest of the person making them. Statements by person from whom the parties have derived interest are admissible only when the admissions are of a date prior to the date of the transfer. A purchaser is not bound by an admission of his vendor subsequent to the purchase. 45. In this background, if we look at the evidence of D.W. 1, he has deposed before the Court 14 years after conveying the property in favour of the second defendant. He has given evidence contrary to the stand taken by them in the legal notice prior to the date of the suit and stand taken by them in the written statement and in fact, the stand taken by them in the examination-in-chief. He has given evidence contrary to the stand taken by them in the legal notice prior to the date of the suit and stand taken by them in the written statement and in fact, the stand taken by them in the examination-in-chief. Therefore, it is clear that much water has flown in these 14 years and D.W. 1 has joined hands with the plaintiff and has given evidence which is favourable to them so as to defeat the right of the second defendant to the suit schedule property. 46. Therefore, both the Courts committed serious error in acting on the so-called admissions of D.W. 1 in coming to the conclusion that the suit agreement bears the signature of the first defendant and therefore, it is duly executed. As both the Courts below have not only misread the evidence on record, ignored the material evidence on record and relied on the evidence which is inadmissible in evidence and recorded the said finding though it is a concurrent finding of fact, this, Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 is duty-bound to interfere with the said perverse finding in order to do justice between the parties. 47. The material on record discloses that this property was granted to the first defendant 30 years prior to the date of the suit. Mutation entries were made in his name. Attempt to delete the said mutation entry by the plaintiff was not successful. The defendant also obtained a decree of permanent injunction against the plaintiff. The material on record shows that he was cultivating the land and he has raised casurina trees and on 18-8-1982 he has handed over possession to the second defendant who is in actual possession of the property from that day till today. Ignoring all these material evidence on record only relying on the interested/testimony of the plaintiff and his witness, whose evidence, as already stated do not infuse confidence, the Courts below have recorded a finding that the plaintiff is in possession and the first defendant is not in possession. The said finding is perverse and capricious and cannot be sustained. 48. In that view of the matter the judgment and decree of the Courts below cannot be sustained, liable to be set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed. Appeal is allowed. The said finding is perverse and capricious and cannot be sustained. 48. In that view of the matter the judgment and decree of the Courts below cannot be sustained, liable to be set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed. Appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree of the Trial Court and the lower Appellate Court are set aside. Plaintiffs' suit is dismissed. Parties to bear their own cost.