P. C. :- By this Civil Revision Application the petitioner takes exception to the judgment and order dated 5-4-2007 passed by the Ad hoc District Judge (II), Jalgaon dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner above named and thereby confirming the judgment and decree dated 24-7-2003 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division in Regular Civil Suit No. 373 of 1990 and Misc. Application No. 69 of 1988. 2. The petitioner is the heir of one Padmakar Dattatraya Mane. The petitioner and the said Padmakar are the sons of Dattatraya Mane who was the tenant of two rooms and a galary on the upper floor of Municipal house No. 416 (old)/67 (new) which is owned by the respondent to the above Civil Revision Application. The said original tenant Dattatraya died in the year 1978. It is the case of the petitioner that the said Padmakar and he were residing with Dattatraya i.e. their father at the time of his death. Padmakar had filed an application for fixation of standard rent under section 11 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act" for the sake of brevity) bearing No. 69/88 in the Competent Court at Bhusaval. Whilst the said application was pending, the respondent landlord had issued a notice to Padmakar on 16-1-1989 terminating his tenancy and seeking possession from Padmakar. The said notice was replied by Padmakar by letter dated 24-1-1989 and denied the claim made in the said notice. It was further stated in the said reply that his elder brother i.e. Arvind is also a tenant. The said application for fixation of standard rent being Misc. Application No. 69/88 was opposed by the respondent/landlord who had filed his say to the said application. 3. On Padmakar refusing to vacate the tenanted premises, the respondent landlord filed Regular Civil Suit No. 373 of 1990 against Padmakar under the provisions of the said Act on the ground of bona fide requirement and acquisition of suitable alternate accommodation by the said Padmakar. Padmakar, who was the defendant in the said suit, filed his written statement wherein he again contended that his elder brother Arvind is also a tenant along with him after the demise of their father Dattatraya. The said Padmakar opposed the prayer made in the said suit. Padmakar, who was the defendant in the said suit, filed his written statement wherein he again contended that his elder brother Arvind is also a tenant along with him after the demise of their father Dattatraya. The said Padmakar opposed the prayer made in the said suit. The trial Court framed issues and from the point of view of the present petition, the Issue No.3 was relevant namely: "Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party?" was answered in the negative. The trial Court, on the basis of the evidence adduced before it, came to a conclusion that the suit premises are required reasonably and bona fide by the landlord for his personal use and occupation and also held that the defendant/tenant i.e. Padmakar had acquired alternate accommodation during the pendency of the said suit and, therefore, directed the eviction of the said Padmakar from the tenanted premises. 4. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 24-7-2003 passed by the trial Court, the said Padmakar filed an appeal being Regular Civil Appeal No. 199 of 2007. During the pendency of the said appeal, the said Padmakar expired on 6-7-2006 and the petitioner since the said Padmakar was unmarried being the brother and the only legal heir was brought on record of the said appeal by an order passed in that regard. The appeal was considered by the learned Ad hoc District Judge (II), Jalgaon and by his judgment and order dated 5-4-2007 confirmed the judgment and decree dated 24-7-2003 passed by the trial Court on all the counts. 5. It is the principal contention on behalf of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the decree could not be executed against the petitioner abovenamed i.e. Arvind as he was not a party to the said Regular Civil Suit No. 373 of 1990. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that on the death of the original tenant Dattatraya both the sons i.e. Padmakar and Arvind had become tenants of the property in view of section 5(11)(c) of the said Act. The said fact was made known to the landlord in the reply sent by Dattatraya to the notice terminating the tenancy given by the landlord. It was further contended on behalf of the petitioner that the said fact was also mentioned in the written statement filed by Dattatraya. The said fact was made known to the landlord in the reply sent by Dattatraya to the notice terminating the tenancy given by the landlord. It was further contended on behalf of the petitioner that the said fact was also mentioned in the written statement filed by Dattatraya. It was further contended that though both the brothers had become tenants, the said Padmakar had on his own filed Standard Rent Application No. 69 of 1988 which was without the knowledge and consent of the petitioner abovenamed i.e. Arvind. It was further contended that the landlord in , the absence of the agreement between the heirs of the original tenant had not taken any steps to get the tenancy declared in respect of anyone of the heirs of the original tenant and, therefore, the landlord was enjoined to join all the heirs of the original tenant as parties to the said suit and having not joined the petitioner above named i.e. the Arvind, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the said decree could not be executed. The learned Counsel for the petitioner to buttress his submission, relied upon a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court reported in 1996 Bom.R.C. 233 in the matter of Moro Vinayak Sathe Trust vs. Smt. Mangal Gour Mohanlal Maniyar wherein the learned Single Judge relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Textile Association (India) vs. Bal Mohan Gopal Kurup, reported in AIR 1990 SC 2053 held that in a suit filed for eviction of a tenant after his death, all the heirs residing with the deceased tenant at the time of the death of the tenant, became co-tenants and therefore, all the co-tenants ought to be made parties to the suit for eviction and suit filed only against the widow would not be maintainable. Relying upon the said judgment, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that in the instant· case on the death of Dattatraya i.e. the original tenant, the petitioner and the said Padmakar had become tenants as the heirs who were living with the original tenant at the time of death and, therefore, the suit filed only against Padmakar was defective and the decree passed in the said suit could not be executed against the petitioner abovenamed. 6. 6. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent landlord contended that in view of the fact that the said Padmakar had filed the application for standard rent being Misc. Application No. 69/88 prior to the said suit, an agreement would have to be inferred between Padmakar and Arvind that Padmakar was to be the tenant of the premises in question after the death of the original tenant Dattatraya. The learned counsel further submitted that after the death of original tenant, the rent receipts were also issued in the name of the said Padmakar and the petitioner Arvind never did once object to the same. The learned Counsel further submitted that though it is claimed that both Padmakar and family of Arvind were staying together with original tenant Dattatraya, on his death, there was no division of tenancy or rent was not paid separately by Arvind to the landlord. The learned Counsel further submitted that the present objection is being taken merely to stall the execution of the decree that has been passed against the said Padmakar. The learned Counsel further submitted that insofar as the issue of hardship was concerned, it was open to the said Padmakar to bring such facts including the fact that the said Arvind and his family were residing in the said premises in question for contesting the issue of comparative hardship· having not done so, it would not now open for the petitioner abovenamed to agitate the said issue at this stage. 7. The learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord submitted that both the Courts below, applying the well settled test for evicting the tenant on the ground of bona fide and reasonable requirement of the landlord, have decreed the said suit on the said ground also. The learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in 2001 AIR SCW 2142 in the matter of Ashok Chintaman Juker vs. Kishore Pandurang Mantri and another in support of his submission that the present petitioner i.e. Arvind was not a necessary party to the said suit. The facts in the case before the Apex Court were closer to the facts mentioned in the present case. The facts in the case before the Apex Court were closer to the facts mentioned in the present case. The facts before the Apex Court were that after the death of the original tenant Chintaman, the rent bills in respect of the premises in question were issued in the name of his elder son Kesrinath Juker and on his death the rent bills were issued in the name of his widow Smt. Kishori Juker. A suit was filed against the respondent No.2 wherein said Smt. Kishori Juker was impleaded by the landlord as representing all the tenants. One of the sons of the landlord who was the appellant before the Apex Court contended that the said decree was not binding on him as he was not impleaded to the said suit. The Apex Court in the facts and circumstances of the said case held that Smt. Kishori Juker represented all the tenants and the decree passed in the said suit was binding on all the family members covered by the tenancy. This was on the basis that the tenancy being one and all the members of the family of the original tenant residing with him at the time of his death succeeded to the tenancy together. Both the Courts below in the said case had also held that the appellant No. 1 before the Apex Court was not residing in the premises in question when his elder brother Kesrinath was alive. 8. The learned Counsel for the respondent also relied upon the judgments of the learned Single Judge of this Court reported in 2005(3) Mh.L.J. 1109 in the matter of Motor Cycle House and Metro Cottage Industries, Pune and another vs. Kamalabai Dattatraya Kale and others and the judgment reported in 2007(4) Mh.L.J. 129 in the matter of Sara Raul and another vs. Durgashankar Ganeshlal Shroff and others, wherein it has been held that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purposes and has complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord, how, and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him residential standard of their own and that the bona fide need or genuine need of the landlord need not be forced for other ulterior purpose. 9. I have considered the rival contentions. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord, how, and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him residential standard of their own and that the bona fide need or genuine need of the landlord need not be forced for other ulterior purpose. 9. I have considered the rival contentions. Here it is significant to note that Padmakar had filed the application for fixing of standard rent i.e. the Misc. Application No. 69 of 1988. Though thereafter the said Padmakar had informed the landlord that both he and his brother had succeeded to the tenancy on the death of their father Dattatraya, the rent receipts were issued in the name of the said Padmakar. It is pertintent to note that the petitioner had never questioned the filing of the standard rent application by Padmakar or issuance of the rent receipts by the landlord in his name. It is unbelievable that though it is claimed that the petitioner i.e. Arvind was residing with Padmakar, he was not aware of the application filed by Padmakar for the rent receipts issued in his name by the landlord. Therefore, either the petitioner was not residing with the said Padmakar or it would have to be inferred that the petitioner had acquiesced in the Padmakar being treated as a tenant of the premises in question. A useful reference could be made to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court which has been referred to in the judgment relied by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Bom.R.C. 233 (supra). The said judgment is reported in 1993 Mh.L.J. p. 1521 in the matter of Kanti Bhattacharya and others vs. K. S. Parmeshwaran and another, wherein the learned Single Judge has held that for the purpose of section 5(11)(c) of the Bombay Rent Act, an agreement amongst members of the tenant's family need not be in writing and that the said agreement can be inferred on the basis of the conduct of the parties. Applying the said test laid down in the said judgment to the facts of the present case wherein the petitioner has not questioned the application being filed by Padmakar for fixation of standard rent as well as the rent receipts being issued in his name by the landlord, it would have to be inferred that there was an agreement between the heirs of the said original tenant Dattatraya that Padmakar was to be treated as a tenant in respect of the premises in question. The suit, therefore, did not suffer from the defect of non-joinder of necessary parties as held by both the Courts below. 10. Both the Courts below have also considering the evidence before them held that the requirement of the landlord was bona fide and reasonable. The said finding of fact has been recorded by both the Courts below on the basis of the accommodation available with the landlord at the time of filing of the suit and the number of members of the family of the landlord to be provided for. Both the Courts below .have also on the evidence before them come to a conclusion that the defendant tenant Padmakar had acquired suitable alternate accommodation and in spite of the same had not vacated the premises. The said finding of fact in the facts and circumstances of the present case, in my view, cannot be faulted with. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that since the reasonable needs of the petitioner and his family members' have not been considered, the decree passed cannot be sustained. The comparative hardship has to be considered between the landlord and the tenant. In view of the fact that Padmakar was rightly treated as a tenant by the Courts below and the issue of non-joinder of necessary party having been decided accordingly, there is no merit in the said submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The contention of the petitioner that the findings of both the Courts below that the petitioner Arvind was not residing in the tenanted premises is perverse, in the teeth of the ration card in my view, has no merit. The contention of the petitioner that the findings of both the Courts below that the petitioner Arvind was not residing in the tenanted premises is perverse, in the teeth of the ration card in my view, has no merit. Except the said ration card where the name of the petitioner and the name of the other family members appear, there is no other material produced by the petitioner in the Courts below in support of his case that he was residing with the said Padmakar. Taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner never objected to the application for standard rent being filed by the said Padmakar and the rent receipts being issued in the name of the said Padmakar, it would have to be held that the said finding of the Courts below cannot be faulted with. In that view of the matter, I do not find any error of jurisdiction committed by the Courts below for this Court to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction. The Civil Revision Application is accordingly dismissed. 11. At this stage, the learned Counsel for the petitioner prays for time to vacate the tenanted premises. The learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord submits that reasonable time may be granted. In the facts and circumstances of the case, on the petitioner Arvind filing usual undertaking in this Court within 2 weeks, time to vacate the tenanted premises is granted upto 31st May, 2008. The said undertaking to cover the other family members also. In the event such an undertaking is not filed within the time stipulated by this Court, the respondent landlord would be entitled to execute the decree. Application dismissed.