Respondents. JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—When the appeal was taken up for hearing none appeared in support of the respondents. After waiting for a considerable period we have called out the appeal and heard in merit. In earlier it was heard on two occasions but to fulfil the principles of audi alteram partem we wanted to hear the matter in presence of the respondents. Therefore, we fixed the appeal today with the direction to the appellant to inform the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents in writing to appear before this Court and make his submission. However, inspite of information none appeared. It appears from the noting in the notice that Sri Rajesh Kumar, learned Advocate, on tendering notice denied to take the same by saying that if he will get the file in his chamber, he will bring it and come before the Court to make his submission. In any event, no one appeared today on behalf of the respondents in spite of such information. Therefore, it can be safely presumed that the respondents are disinterested litigants. 2. So far as the merit of the appeal is concerned, the sole point of consideration is about applicability of either old Act i.e. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or new Act i.e. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 at the relevant point of time. 3. It is an admitted position that the accident took place in 1987 while the new Act i.e. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force w.e.f. 1st July, 1989. The claim petition was filed in the year 1996 in respect of the accident took place in 1987. According to Mr. A.B. Saran, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, as per the scope and ambit of Section 95 (2)(b)(ii) of the old Act, i.e. Act, 1939, the Insurance Company has limited liability and that limited liability is in effect of fifteen thousand rupees for each individual passenger. Therefore, when the Insurance Company was made liable for a limited amount and that too before coming into force the new Act, the liability of the Insurance Company will be restricted only to such amount as prescribed in the law. 4. Now the question arose, if a claim petition is filed in the year 1996 when the new Act has already came into force, whether such claim petition will be governed by the new Act or by the old Act. 5. 4. Now the question arose, if a claim petition is filed in the year 1996 when the new Act has already came into force, whether such claim petition will be governed by the new Act or by the old Act. 5. In the aforesaid circumstances, we have gone through Section 217 of the new Act i.e. Act 1988 having repealing and savings clause. Sub-section 2(b) of such Section is as follows : “(b) any certificate of fitness or registration or licence or permit issue or granted under the repealed enactments shall continue to have effect after such commencement under the same conditions and for the same period as if this Act had not been passed; (c) any document referring to any of the repealed enactments or provisions thereof, shall be construed as referring to this Act or to the corresponding provision of this Act.” 6. In Ramesh Singh and another v. Cinta Devi and others, AIR 1996 SC 1560 it was held as follows : “2 We have heard learned Counsel for the appellant and have perused the relevant provisions of the Old Act as well as the New Act bearing on the question whether or not the appellant was required to make the deposit and we may state that the repealing clause, namely sub-section (4) of Section 217, preserves Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. We may at this stage reproduce Section 217 preserves Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. We may at this stage reproduce Section 217 (4) of the New Act and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. “Section 217 (4).—The mention of particular matters in this section shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), with regard to the effect of repeals.” “Section 6. “Section 217 (4).—The mention of particular matters in this section shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), with regard to the effect of repeals.” “Section 6. Effect of repeal.—Where this Act, or any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not— (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture liability or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.” Suffice it to say that the New Act does not expressly or by necessary implication make the relevant provisions retrospective in character.” 7. At the time of discussion we have also considered a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2000 (7) SCC 137 , National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Behari Lal and others, in respect of applicability of both the Acts. It appears to us that such judgment is factually distinguishable in nature in the context of this case. In this particular case, it is specified that the insurance policy covered a period of four months and that too when old Act was in existence. But in the referred case the insurance policy was renewed and continued for a period when new Act came into force. The insurance of the Motor Vehicle, unlike other insurance policies renewable annually. Therefore, each and every annual agreement is a separate contract to be executed by the parties. Therefore, the policy, if not renewed by the fresh agreement between the parties, the insurance company cannot be held liable to pay the compensation as per the new Act having any superseding effect. Therefore, each and every annual agreement is a separate contract to be executed by the parties. Therefore, the policy, if not renewed by the fresh agreement between the parties, the insurance company cannot be held liable to pay the compensation as per the new Act having any superseding effect. Therefore, when a contract is governed by an Act, which is repealed during the existence of the contract and substituted by a new Act, definitely the new Act will come into force but not otherwise, meaning thereby that if contract is in existence during the operation of the particular Act, such Act will be applicable. Therefore, these judgments have negative value of applicability in the present case. 8. Against this background, we have to consider when the cause of action arose. Admittedly it arose in 1987 when the accident took place. Although there is no question of limitation but an application before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal will be filed as expeditiously as possible, since the factum of the accident will be backed by various evidences including filing of FIR and police action etc. By the passage of time many evidences may be extinguished. It is beyond the stretch of imagination that when an accident took place in 1987 and claim petition will be filed in 1996. In any event, in such case the claimant/s cannot get benefit of the new Act i.e. Act, 1988 since the cause of action arose prior thereto when the old Act i.e. Act, 1939 was in operation. Therefore, principle is that when there is no time limit for the purpose of making an application under the Motor Vehicles Act, relevant law will be made available only when cause of action will arise. Since in this case the cause of action arose prior to commencement of the new Act, the claim petition of the claimant will have to be governed by the old Act i.e. Act, 1939 as per Section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act read with Section 217 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Thus, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. 9. The order of the Tribunal impugned herein being dated 17th August, 1996 stands set aside. Let the lower Court record be sent back to the Court below, 10. No order is passed as to costs. 11. Thus, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. 9. The order of the Tribunal impugned herein being dated 17th August, 1996 stands set aside. Let the lower Court record be sent back to the Court below, 10. No order is passed as to costs. 11. However, since the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has very fairly submitted that he does not want to get back the money already paid on the basis of the award, we direct that the amount so paid will not be recovered from the Insurance Company towards the final payment. Honble V.C. Misra, J.—I agree. ————