TARUN AGARWALA, J. ( 1 ) RESPONDENT No. 3 was appointed as a Supervisor in the petitioners federation, which is a Co-operative Federation Authority constituted under section 123 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act to supervise the working of the co-operative Societies in U. P. The services of the respondent No. 3 was terminated since he was appointed on a purely temporary basis. The respondent No. 3 filed a writ petition No. 1855 of 1981 in which a counter affidavit was called for and after the exchange of the affidavits, the writ petition was dismissed by a judgment dated 6-5-1982. ( 2 ) NOTWITHSTANDING the dismissal of the writ petition, the respondent No. 3 raised an Industrial Dispute under section 4k of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner contested the matter and filed its written statement and submitted that the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act could not be invoked, inasmuch as, the respondent No. 3 was not a workman as defined under section 2 (z) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Further, the petitioner was not an Industry and therefore, no industrial dispute could be referred for adjudication under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act nor was the Act applicable upon the petitioner. The petitioner also contended that the dispute referred for adjudication before the labour Court was barred by the principle of constructive res judicata since all the pleas relating to the order of termination was challenged in a writ petition which was dismissed and therefore the same pleas could not be re-agitated in another forum. ( 3 ) THE Labour Court after considering the evidence and the material on the record, rejected the contention of the petitioner and held that the adjudication proceedings under the provisions of U. P. Industrial disputes Act was not barred by the principle of constructive res judicata and that, the petitioner was an industry and, therefore, the provisions of u. P. Industrial Disputes Act was applicable. The labour Court, on merits, found that the order of termination was not correct and therefore, directed reinstatement of respondent No. 3 with full back wages. Aggrieved, the petitioner- has filed the present writ petition. ( 4 ) HEARD Sri A. K. Misra, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ashok Khare, the learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Ravindra Singh for respondent No. 3. Aggrieved, the petitioner- has filed the present writ petition. ( 4 ) HEARD Sri A. K. Misra, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ashok Khare, the learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Ravindra Singh for respondent No. 3. Various arguments were adduced on the merits of the case and on other issues, which in the opinion of the Court, is not required to be considered, since the Court is of the opinion that the writ petition is liable to be allowed on the sole ground that the proceedings initiated by respondent No. 3 before the labour Court under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act was barred by the principles of constructive res judicata. ( 5 ) THE principle of res judicata is enumerated in section 11 of the C. P. C and is not exhaustive. Section 11 is in relation to civil suit but the principle governing the doctrine of res judicata has been applied in various kinds of proceedings in this country. ( 6 ) THE rule of constructive res judicata is engrafted in Explanation IV of section 11 of the C. P. C. If any matter in issue has been decided explicitly by a judgment, the said decision would operate as res judicata and would bar the trial of an identical issue in a subsequent proceedings between the same parties. When a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former proceedings but was not made, an issue being raised in a subsequent proceedings would be deemed to be barred by the principles of constructive res judicata. This is because in order to avoid the multiplicity of the litigation and to bring finality in the matter in dispute between the parties, it would be deemed that the issue that was being raised would have been constructively an issue in the earlier proceedings. ( 7 ) IN State of U. P. v. Nawab Hussain, 1977 (2) SCC 806 the Supreme Court held- "the principle of estoppel per res judicatam is a rule of evidence. As has been stated in marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council, it may be said to be "the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertiqn of a cause of action. As has been stated in marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council, it may be said to be "the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertiqn of a cause of action. " This doctrine is based on two theories: (i)the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of limitation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the Courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle or res judicata. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process and Somervell, L. J. , has answered it as follows in Greenhalgh v. Mallard. Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process and Somervell, L. J. , has answered it as follows in Greenhalgh v. Mallard. I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the Court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. This is therefore another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has some times been referred to as constructive res judicata which in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle. " ( 8 ) IN Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and another, 1978 (37) FLR 85 (SC), the Supreme Court held - "in the instant case the award of the Tribunal, no doubt, was challenged in the special leave petition filed in this Court, on almost all grounds which were in the subsequent writ proceedings agitated in the High Court. There is no question, therefore, of applying the principles of constructive res judicata in this case. What is, however, to be seen is whether from the order dismissing the special leave petition in limine it can be inferred that all the matters agitated in the said petition were either explicitly or implicitly decided against the respondent. Indisputably nothing was expressly decided. The effect of a non-speaking order of dismissal without anything more indicating the grounds or reasons of its dismissal must, by necessary implication, be taken to have decided that it was not a fit case where special leave should be granted. It may be due to several reasons. It may be one or more. It may also be that the merits of the award were taken into consideration and this Court felt that it did not require any interference. It may be due to several reasons. It may be one or more. It may also be that the merits of the award were taken into consideration and this Court felt that it did not require any interference. But since the order is not a speaking order, one finds it difficult to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants that it must be deemed to have necessarily decided implicitly all the question in relation to the merits of the award. A writ proceeding is a different proceeding. Whatever can be held to have been decided expressly, implicitly or even constructively while dismissing the special leave petition cannot be reopened. But the technical rule or res judicata, although a wholesome rule based upon public policy, cannot be stretched too far to bar the trial of identical issues in a separate proceeding merely on a uncertain assumption that the issues must have been decided. It is not safe to extend the principle of res judicata to such an extent so at to found it on mere guesswork. To illustrate our view point, we may take an example. Suppose a writ petition is filed in a High Court for grant of a writ of certiorari to challenge some order or decision on several grounds. If the writ petition is dismissed after contest by a speaking order obviously it will operate as res judicata in any other proceeding, such as, of suit, Article 32 or Article 136 directed from the same order or decision. If the writ petition is dismissed by a speaking order either at the threshold or after contest, say, only on the ground of laches or the availability of an alternative remedy, then another remedy open in law either by way of suit or any other proceeding obviously will not be barred on the principle of res judicata. Of course, a second writ petition on the same cause of action either filed in the same High Court or in another will not be maintainable because the dismissal of one petition will operate as a bar in the entertainment of another writ petition. Of course, a second writ petition on the same cause of action either filed in the same High Court or in another will not be maintainable because the dismissal of one petition will operate as a bar in the entertainment of another writ petition. Similarly even if one writ petition is dismissed in limine by a non-speaking one word order dismissed, another writ petition would not be maintainable because even the one-word order, as we have indicated above, must necessarily be taken to have decided, impliedly that the case is not a fit one for exercise of the writ jurisdiction of the High" court. Another writ petition from the same order or decision will not lie. But the position is substantially different when a writ petition is dismissed either at the thresh-hold or after contest without expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter, then no merit can be deemed to have been necessarily and impliedly decided and any other remedy of suit or other proceeding will not be barred on the principle of res judicata" ( 9 ) IN Pondicherry Khadi and Village Industries board v. P. Kulothangan and another, 2003 (99)FLR 1175 (SC) the Supreme Court held.- "the principle of res judicata operates on the court. It is the Courts which are prohibited from trying the issue which was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier proceedings between the same parties, provided the Court trying he subsequent proceeding is satisfied that the earlier Court was competent to dispose of the earlier proceedings and that the matter had been heard and finally decided by such Court. Here the parties to the writ petition filed by the respondent in the Madras High Court and the industrial dispute were the same. The cause of action in both was the refusal of the appellant to allow the respondent to rejoin service. The Madras High Court was competent to decide the issue which it did with a reasoned order on the merits and after a contested hearing. This was not a case where the earlier proceedings had been disposed of on any technical ground as was the case in Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and another, Smt. Pujari Bai v. Madan Gopal (dead)L. Rs. This was not a case where the earlier proceedings had been disposed of on any technical ground as was the case in Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and another, Smt. Pujari Bai v. Madan Gopal (dead)L. Rs. The "lesser relief" of reinstatement which was the subject matter of the industrial dispute had already been claimed by the respondent in the writ petition. This was refused by the High court. The correctness of the decision in the writ proceedings has not been challenged by the respondent. The decision was, therefore, final. Having got an adverse order in the writ petition, it was not open to the respondent to re-agitate the issue before the Labour Court and the labour Court was incompetent to entertain the dispute raised by the respondent and re-decide the matter in the face of the earlier decision of the High Court in the writ proceedings. " ( 10 ) IN Executive Engineer, Z. P. Engg. Division and another v. Digambara Rao and others, 2004 (103)FLR 460 (SC), the Supreme Court held.- "the respondents herein approached the High court with full knowledge that their services had been terminated. Their attempt to show that they were still in service had been disbelieved and it was found as of fact that their services had been terminated on 19-10-1996. The respondents, therefore, while filing the writ application were bound to lay their whole claim having regard to the provisions continued in Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the principles analogous thereto. The very basis upon which the writ petitions were based was found to be incorrect. It was, thus, obligatory on the part of the respondents herein to question their orders of termination upon placing correct facts before the high Court. They did not choose to do so. They did not pray for and obtain any leave of the court to raise the contention about the legality or otherwise of the orders of termination before an appropriate forum. Further more, their plea to the effect that they were entitled to continue in service was specially rejected. In that view of the matter, the proceedings initiated before the labour Court questioning the order of termination passed against them by the appellants praying for their reinstatement with full back wages, in our opinion, were wholly misconceived. Further more, their plea to the effect that they were entitled to continue in service was specially rejected. In that view of the matter, the proceedings initiated before the labour Court questioning the order of termination passed against them by the appellants praying for their reinstatement with full back wages, in our opinion, were wholly misconceived. Such a plea was barred under the principle of res judicata. It is now well settled that the general principle of res judicata applies to an industrial adjudication. " ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid decisions of the supreme Court, it is clear, that respondent No. 3, having got an adverse order in the writ petition, it was no longer open to the said respondents to re-agitate the issue again before the Labour Court. Further, in my opinion, the doctrine of election will come into play. Once the respondent No. 3 has elected to pursue his remedy by filing a writ petition, it was no longer open to the said respondent, to pursue another remedy before another forum on the same issue and on the same cause of action after having got an adverse order in the writ petition. In the opinion of the Court, the proceedings initiated before the Labour Court was cleared barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. The Labour Court was not competent to entertain the dispute. In view of the aforesaid, the award of the Labour court cannot be sustained and is quashed. The writ petition is allowed, petition Allowed. .