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2007 DIGILAW 1456 (MAD)

Parthi Balaiah Chetty (Deceased) & Others v. Prema Sudhamani & Others

2007-04-24

V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN

body2007
Judgment : 1. O.P. No.92 of 2007 has been filed under Section 232 and 276 of the Indian Succession Act for the grant of Letters of Administration with the Will of the deceased-Thallam Leelavathi. Originally, the Original Petition was filed by Patthi Balaiah Chetty, the brother of the deceased testatrix. But he passed away resulting in his children, who were respondents 1 to 4 being transposed as petitioners 2 to 5, by virtue of an order passed on 09.01.2007 in Application No.10 of 2007 in O.P. Diary No.13069 of 2006. The Original Petition itself was numbered only after such transposition. 2. After evidence was taken in the Original Petition, it was represented that a caveat had been filed by a group of persons through their power agent by name Mrs. Munaga Sukumari. However, the petitioners in the Original Petition filed an Application in O.A. No.3055 of 2007 praying for rejecting the caveat on the ground that the caveat had been filed under Section 148-A, C.P.C. and it was not in accordance with Form No.69 under the Indian Succession Act. In view of the said objections, the caveators withdrew the earlier caveat and filed a fresh caveat in Form No.69. Therefore, Application No.3055 of 2007 has virtually become in fructuous. Therefore, it is closed. 3. The second caveat was admittedly filed in Form No.69. Therefore, the petitioners in the Original Petition have come up with a fresh Application for discharging the caveat in Application No.3644 of 2007. The caveat is sought to be discharged on the following three grounds namely: .(a) that the Power of Attorney given by all the caveators in favour of one person, was for the purpose of getting another Will dated 210. 2004 probated and that therefore, the same Power of Attorney cannot be used for opposing the later Will in respect of which the present Original Petition has been filed. .(b) that the Power of Attorney is allegedly executed by various persons residing at various places and that it has been merely notarised resulting in no proper authentication of the Power of Attorney; and .(c) that under Clauses 5 and 6 of the deed of Power of Attorney, an interest in immovable property is created and that therefore the Power of Attorney is inadmissible in as much as it has not been registered. 4. I have heard Mr. 4. I have heard Mr. S.Y. Raghuraman, learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners and Mr. P.B. Balaji, learned counsel for the caveators. 5. Taking up the first contention of the learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners, it is seen that the said contention emerges out of Clause 1 of the deed of Power of Attorney which reads as follows: "1. To probate the above Will dated 216. 2004 before a competent Court of Law by engaging an Advocate on our behalf." Taking cue from Clause 1 of the Power of Attorney, the learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners contended that the Power of Attorney was for the particular purpose of getting another dated 210. 2004 probated and that therefore, the caveators are not entitled to use the very same Power of Attorney to oppose the present proceedings arising out of a different Will. In support of his contention, the learned counsel-for the applicants/petitioners relied upon a decision of this Court in P.M. Desappa Nayanim Varu and Others v. Ramabhaktula Ramlah and Others, AIR 1952 Mad. 559 . In para 3 of the said Judgment, this Court had held that Power of Attorney must be strictly construed, and that the operative part of the deed is controlled by the recitals. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners, where an authority is given to do particular act, the Power of Attorney should be construed as authorising the agent only to do that particular act. 6. However, I am unable to agree with the said submission of the learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners. The last preamble portion of the deed of Power of Attorney says that the Power of Attorney was being executing for probating the above said Will and "for doing connected deeds". If the preamble portion alone contained such a recital, I might have agreed with the learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners. However, the recitals contained in the Power of Attorney also proceed on to give a general power in favour of the agent to do various acts including the power to appear and act in all Courts whether Original or Appellate side and in the Registration Offices. Thus, the power conferred upon the agent appears to be an omnibus one and hence I am unable to sustain the first submission of the learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners. 7. Thus, the power conferred upon the agent appears to be an omnibus one and hence I am unable to sustain the first submission of the learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners. 7. Coming to the second contention of the learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners, it is seen from the Power of Attorney that it has been notarised by an Advocate and Notary Public. Out of the persons who have executed the Power of Attorney, four persons are from Chennai, three persons are from Andhra Pradesh and one person is from Bangalore. The person in whose favour the power has been given is a resident of Chennai. The fact that some of the principals are residing outside Chennai at different places is also recited in the preamble portion. Therefore, the question as to whether all of them had assembled at Chennai on a particular date or not may be a question of fact which can be established only by oral and documentary evidence. What is required at this stage is a prima facie satisfaction about the execution of such Power of Attorney. Since a Notary Public has attested the Power of Attorney, the caveators have passed this prima facie test. Ultimately, if the Original Petition is converted into a Testamentary Original Suit, it is always open to the petitioners to challenge the validity of the Power of Attorney. But at this stage, it is not enough to throw the caveat lodged by the caveators on the ground that it was not duly authenticated, which has been in my considered view duly authenticated and hence the second contention cannot also be accepted. 8. The learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners relied upon a decision, of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in M/s. Electric Construction and Equipment Co. Ltd v. M/s Jagjit Electric Works, Sirsa, Haryana, AIR 1984 DELHI 363, for the proposition that presumption under Section 85 cannot be raised in this case. However, it is seen from the said Judgment that for raising a presumption under Section 85 of the Evidence Act, two conditions are to be satisfied. The first is that the document should have been executed before the Notary Public and the second is that the Notary Public should authenticate it. In this case, the document shows the execution by all the principals and the Notary Public in all the pages attests it. The first is that the document should have been executed before the Notary Public and the second is that the Notary Public should authenticate it. In this case, the document shows the execution by all the principals and the Notary Public in all the pages attests it. Therefore, Section 85 of the Evidence Act is prima facie satisfied in this case. As I have earlier observed, it is always open to the respondents in the course of trial of the Testamentary Original Suit to show that the caveators had neither assembled at Chennai, and executed the power nor was it authenticated, but at this stage the presumption under Section 85 of the Evidence Act is in favour of the Caveators and the rebuttal of such presumption can be done by the applicants/plaintiffs only by proper evidence at the stage of trial of the TOS. 9. Coming to the third contention that the Power of Attorney cannot be admitted due to non-registration, in view of the prohibition contained in Section 17 of the Registration Act, it is seen that Clauses 5 and 6 of the Power of Attorney do not create any interest in immovable property. These Clauses read as follows: "5. To appear and act in all Courts, Civil, Revenue and Criminal whether Original or Appellate Sides and in the Registration Offices and in other offices of the Government, District Board, or any other local authority including the competent authority. 6. To represent before the Corporation of Chennai, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority and local bodies and other competent bodies for the purpose of obtaining plan sanction and other service connections." 10. The learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners contended that since the power authorises the agent even to collect the rents, an interest in immovable property is created. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners relied upon the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Corporation Bank, Bangalore v. Lalitha H. Holla and Others, AIR 1994 Kar. 133 . In para 17 of the said Judgment, relied upon by the applicants/petitioners it was held that if an instrument creates a right or interest in the rents, profits, benefits and income from an immovable property, it is a document, which requires compulsory registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act. 133 . In para 17 of the said Judgment, relied upon by the applicants/petitioners it was held that if an instrument creates a right or interest in the rents, profits, benefits and income from an immovable property, it is a document, which requires compulsory registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act. There is no quarrel with the proposition that if a document created an interest in immovable property it is compulsorily registrable. However, what is to be seen is the purport of the recital contained in the document. In the Power of Attorney in question, the agent has not been authorized to collect rents for appropriation to himself. If a power had been created empowering the agent to collect the rents and appropriate it to himself, then it is a document creating an interest in immovable property. Here, he has been authorized merely to go and collect it from the tenants and hence, this document and the recitals contained therein cannot be construed as a documents, I am unable to agree even with the third submission of the learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners. 11. In view of the above, I am unable to countenance all the three submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners. Therefore, Application No.3644 of 2007 is rejected. The caveat is taken on record and the office is directed to convert O.P.No.92 of 2007 as Testamentary Original Suit.