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Andhra High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 148 (AP)

CHIKATIMARLA SATYA SAI v. STATE OF A. P.

2007-02-12

G.YETHIRAJULU

body2007
( 1 ) THE petitioner, who is accused in C. C. No. 249 of 2006 on the file of Additional Judicial Magistrate of I Class, avanigadda for the offences punishable under sections 379, 463 and 465 IPC, filed this application under Section 482 Cr. P. C. to quash the proceedings as there is a violation procedure prescribed under Section 244 cr. P. C. and on the ground of delay of three years for taking up the trial after taking cognizance of the offence. ( 2 ) A private complaint was filed under sections 379, 463 and 465 IPC against the petitioner alleging that he has stolen a cheque and presented to the bank, which was bounced. ( 3 ) THE petitioner contended that he filed a case against the de facto-complainant under Section 138 of the Negotiable instruments Act. The accused in the said case took a specific plea that the petitioner has stolen a cheque from him and presented the same before the bank. By accepting the said contention, the accused. e. , the complainant herein was acquitted by the said Court and an appeal is pending against the said judgment. During the pendency of the said case, the complainant filed the present complaint before the lower Court and the Court took cognizance of the offences and examined the complainant and his witnesses and the petitioner also cross-examined the witnesses and charges have been framed and the matter is posted for trial. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that under Section 244 Cr. P. C. there is no right to cross-examine the witnesses at this stage, but the lower court allowed the accused to cross-examine the witnesses and thereby he was deprived of an opportunity of pleading discharge at the time of framing of the charges. As the court failed to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 244 Cr. P. C. , the proceedings are liable to be quashed. ( 5 ) AFTER verification of the record, it is disclosed that the petitioner voluntarily cross-examined the witnesses after the chief-examination conducted by the complainant and there is no indication that the Court compelled the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses before framing of the charges. When he volunteered to cross-examine the witnesses, the Magistrate cannot prevent him from cross-examining, otherwise he will claim that his right of cross-examination has been denied. When he volunteered to cross-examine the witnesses, the Magistrate cannot prevent him from cross-examining, otherwise he will claim that his right of cross-examination has been denied. In the section, it is not mentioned that the chief-examinations of the witnesses have to be conducted. It was mentioned that the evidence has to be recorded. Evidence includes chief-examination and the cross-examination. Therefore, in my considered view, there is no bar to allow the accused to cross-examine the witnesses at the stage of taking cognizance of the offence. If there is a prima facie material he cannot be discharged at the time of framing of charges. When once the charges are framed, he can avail the opportunity of further cross-examining the witnesses and, after completion of such exercise, the Court will give its judgment on merits. ( 6 ) IN the light of the above circumstances, I do not feel that there was any irregularity in following the procedure prescribed under law. Therefore, the proceedings are not liable to be quashed on that ground. So far as the delay in the trial is concerned, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on a judgment of the supreme Court in State through C. B.. v. Dr. Narayan Waman Nerukar and another, 2002 (2) ALD (Crl.) 468 (SC) = air 2002 SC 2977 , wherein, when the speedy trial of criminal case has come for consideration, the Supreme Court observed that the Court has to see whether the prolongation on account of any delaying tactics adopted by the accused and some other relevant factors contributing delay. Each case has to be judged in its own background and special features, if any. The Court further observed that the order of the High Court quashing the proceedings merely on the ground that there was unnecessary delay in conclusion of the trial would not be proper. So, the Supreme court made it very clear that the question of delay in trial depends upon the facts and circumstances of each and every case. The mere delay itself is not a ground to quash the proceedings. In the present case, the case was posted for trial in 2006. Though, there is a delay of three years in commencing the trial, in the light of the nature of offence and the pendency in courts, it cannot be treated as an inordinate delay which caused prejudice to the accused. In the present case, the case was posted for trial in 2006. Though, there is a delay of three years in commencing the trial, in the light of the nature of offence and the pendency in courts, it cannot be treated as an inordinate delay which caused prejudice to the accused. ( 7 ) IN the light of the above circumstances, I do not find any grounds to quash the proceedings on the ground of delay. In the light of the above circumstances, the proceedings are not liable to be quashed. ( 8 ) IN the result, the quash petition is, accordingly, dismissed.