JUDGMENT Permod Kohli, J.:- This common order will dispose of CM No.20034-CII/2005 in FAO No.4548 of 2005 and CM No.8314-CII/2006 in FAO No. 1796 of 2006 as the same arise out of common award dated 17.11.2001 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Mansa (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”). 2. These are two applications seeking condonation of delay in filing these two appeals. The applicant/appellant in both these applications/appeals is the owner of offending vehicle which caused accident resulting in death of one Sukhwinder Singh alias Chhinder Singh in a motor accident on 6.5.2000. Two claim petitions came to be filed-one by the mother of the deceased and the other by his widow and minor son. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal passed an award dated 17.11.2001 against the owner, driver and the Insurance Company. The liability for the payment of compensation was fastened jointly and severally upon all the respondents for an amount of Rs.3.80 lacs. However, a further direction was issued that if the amount is paid by the Insurance Company, in that eventuality the owner being insured shall indemnify it for the amount paid by the Insurance Company. This direction was issued in view of the fact that the driving licence of the driver Manjit Singh was found to be fake and according to the Tribunal, there was breach of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy. No appeal was preferred by the appellant who is the owner of the vehicle within the prescribed period of limitation. F AO No.4548 of 2005 arises out of the claim petition preferred by the mother whereas FAO No.1796 of 2006 arises out of the claim petition filed by widow and minor son. In FAO No.4548 of 2005, there is delay of 1318 days whereas in the second appeal, there is delay of 1528 days. This long delay is sought to be condoned on the ground that the appellant was given legal advice not to prefer any appeal as the final position regarding the liability would emerge only when the Insurance Company will prefer an appeal to challenge the award. It is further stated that the Insurance Company filed the appeal, but the same was dismissed, without any notice to the applicant/appellant and hence he could not file any counter­ appeal, as advised. It is further stated that the Insurance Company filed the appeal, but the same was dismissed, without any notice to the applicant/appellant and hence he could not file any counter­ appeal, as advised. It is further mentioned that the Insurance Company filed a suit for recovery against the appellant and when he received summons of the suit, he sought legal advice and now he has been advised to file appeal. It is accordingly stated that non­ filing of appeals within specified time is on account of mistaken legal advice and the applicant could not be made to suffer due to bona fide mistake on account of mistaken legal advice of the counsel. 3. No reply has been filed to these applications by the Insurance Company, though counsel for the Insurance Company has argued these applications. The question needs to be considered is as to whether the ground mentioned constitutes “sufficient cause” for condoning the delay in filing these two appeals. Mr. Chopra has referred to the following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:­ 1. Badlu and another vs. Shiv Charan and others, 1980 P.L.J. 214 2. The State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and others etc., AIR 1972 Supreme Court 749 3. Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1353 4 N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 123. 4. In the case of Badlu (supra), an appeal was preferred before a wrong court on the legal advice. On objections being raised, regarding the competence/jurisdiction of the court, memo of appeal was returned to be filed in the proper court. The proper court i.e. Senior Sub Judge, Narnaul condoned the delay on the ground that the party acted on the bona fide advice of the counsel and pursued the remedy in a wrong court in good faith. High Court in appeal set aside the order of the Senior Sub Judge condoning the delay. In appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court, following observations were made:­ “2…………There could be no doubt that if the appellants filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge due to mistake of law or fact resulting from a bona fide but mistaken advice given to them by their lawyer, this would be a good ground for condoning the delay.” 5. In appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court, following observations were made:­ “2…………There could be no doubt that if the appellants filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge due to mistake of law or fact resulting from a bona fide but mistaken advice given to them by their lawyer, this would be a good ground for condoning the delay.” 5. In the case of State of West Bengal (supra), while considering the expression “sufficient cause” occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under: “30. From the above observations it is clear that the words “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 37……….If a party had acted in a particular manner on a wrong advice given by his Legal Adviser, he cannot be held guilty of negligence so as to disentitle the party to plead sufficient cause under S.5 of the Limitation Act………….” 6. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court, while considering the scope of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, observed as under: “3.The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting S.5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on “merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts..... xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 2.Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 4.When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other,cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 4.When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other,cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6.It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” 7. In the case of N. Balakrishnan (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:­ “9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory:... ..” 10....... The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 13.1t must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of explanation...... If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of explanation...... From the ratio of law laid down in various judgments noticed here-in-above, the principle that emerges is while considering the question of “sufficient cause” in condoning the delay the Court should adopt a liberal approach. It should not be prompted or persuaded by mere technicalities. The primary job of the court is to do justice. Justice means “substantial justice” which decides the, substantive rights of the litigating parties. However, there is a word of “caution” i.e. it is equally the duty of the court to ensure that a party seeking condonation is not taking the benefit of law to prolong the litigation for the purposes of delaying its record and the action should not be actuated by mala fides or gross negligence. 8. It is in the light of above principles enunciated by the Apex Court that the case of the applicant needs to be examined. From the award dated 17.11.2001 passed by the Tribunal, it is evident that the liability to pay compensation was joint and several on all the respondents including the present appellant. This direction was further with a rider that in the event Insurance Company is made to discharge the liability, it shall be at liberty to recover the same from the owner i.e. the appellant herein. It appears that the appellant might have been advised to remain silent and wait till the Insurance Company decides to challenge the award. It has been specifically mentioned in the application that the Insurance Company did file an appeal, but the said appeal came to be dismissed in limine, without issuing any notice, at least to the applicant/appellant herein. There is no rebuttal to this averment. Under the given circumstance, it is quite possible that the appellant might have been advised to respond only when the appeal is filed by the Insurance Company. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled out that mistaken advice may form a valid basis to infer “sufficient cause”. There is no rebuttal to this averment. Under the given circumstance, it is quite possible that the appellant might have been advised to respond only when the appeal is filed by the Insurance Company. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled out that mistaken advice may form a valid basis to infer “sufficient cause”. It has also been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme that once “sufficient cause” is found, then the length of delay may not be an impediment in condoning the delay. 9. I have also examined’ the merits of the controversy but without commenting upon the same at this stage, suffice it to say that the issues need an examination. It is for the First Appellate Court to consider the same if the appeal is entertained. There is another aspect of the matter. The Insurance Company has already filed a suit against the appellant for recovery as admittedly, the Insurance Company has discharged the liability under the award. The claimants are not likely to suffer in any manner. The dispute remains between the owner and the Insurance Company regarding their inter-se liability. If the delay is condoned, the interest of the Insurance Company will not be put to jeopardy straightway, as a consequence of condonation. The liability has to be decided either by the First Appellate Court or the court which is seized of the suit. 10. Under the totality of the circumstances, I am inclined to condone the delay. These two applications for condonation i.e. CM No.20034-CII/2005 in FAO No.4548 of 2005 and CM No.8314­ CII/2006 in FAO No.1 796 of 2006 are accordingly allowed. Delay in filing these two appeals i.e. FAO No.4548 of 2005 and FAO No.1796 of 2006 is condoned, subject to payment of Rs.5000/- as costs in each case to be paid to the Insurance Company. The costs be paid within four weeks. It is further directed that in the event of success of the appellant/applicant in the appeals, the appellant shall also be liable to pay the court fees incurred by the Insurance Company in filing the suit against the appellant as the Insurance Company has filed the suit in absence of there being any appeal or direction from any competent court. The appellant will also file an undertaking before this Court within four weeks to pay the court fees in the event of success of the appellant in these appeals. 11. The appellant will also file an undertaking before this Court within four weeks to pay the court fees in the event of success of the appellant in these appeals. 11. Let these two appeals (FAO No.4548 of 2005 and FAO No.1796 of 2006) be listed for consideration on 4.10.2007. ———————————