JUDGMENT H.S. Bhalla, J.:- Having remained unsuccessful on the point of limitation before the courts below, plaintiff-appellant knocked at the door of this Court by filing the present appeal praying for acceptance of the appeal and setting aside the judgments and decrees passed by them. 2. Briefly the facts required to be noticed for the disposal of this appeal are that a suit for declaration was filed by the plaintiff­ appellant to the effect that order dated 11.7.1998 passed by Superintendent of Police, Panchkula by virtue of which the punishment of stoppage of four increment with cumulative effect have been imposed and also the order passed by Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ambala Range, Ambala Cantt, by virtue of which appeal of the plaintiff has been rejected, are illegal and are also against the principles of natural justice. Plaintiff-appellant has also prayed that he is entitled to all consequential benefits under Order 7, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. 3. The facts required to be noticed for the disposal of this appeal are that plaintiff-appellant had joined services in the police department as a constable on 14.11.1975 and was promoted as Head Constable in the year 1986 and the appellant had been performing his duties to the best of his ability. But to his utter surprise, he was served with the summary of allegations regarding the incident of 27.1.1997. It has been further pleaded by the plaintiff ­that inquiry was conducted against the plaintiff and he was issued a show cause notice dated 25.5.1998 proposing the punishment of stoppage of five future increments with cumulative effect. Plaintiff­ appellant filed a reply to the show cause notice, but without considering his reply, punishment of stoppage of four increments with cumulative effect was imposed. Appellant filed an appeal against the order, but the same was rejected. It has been further pointed out that impugned orders were passed without affording any reasonable opportunity and the impugned orders are based on no legal evidence. It has been further pleaded that plaintiff-appellant was compulsorily retired from service vide letter dated 7.3.2002 wherein impugned orders were also referred. 4. It has been further pointed out that impugned orders were passed without affording any reasonable opportunity and the impugned orders are based on no legal evidence. It has been further pleaded that plaintiff-appellant was compulsorily retired from service vide letter dated 7.3.2002 wherein impugned orders were also referred. 4. Suit of the plaintiff-appellant was resisted by filing reply denying the pleas taken up by the appellant in his plaint and raising pleas therein that suit is time barred; that plaintiff-appellant was awarded punishment of stoppage of four annual increments with permanent effect, that the suit is not maintainable since the plaintiff­ appellant has been compulsorily retired on completion of 25 years duly conveyed to him. On merits, it was pleaded that the annual confidential reports for the period 1993-94, 1.7.1997 to 31.3.1998 and 1.4.1998 to 28.7.1998 were not upto the mark and his retention in service was not considered desirable and therefore, he was retired Compulsorily by the order of the Director, General of Police, Panchkula, Haryana. 5. The learned trial Court after framing necessary issues and evaluating the evidence available on the record, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff holding that it is hopelessly time barred vide Judgment and decree dated 16.2.2005 . Feeling dissatisfied, appellant preferred an appeal before the learned lower appellate court, who, vide his judgment and decree dated 22.5.2006 dismissed the appeal affirming the findings recorded by the trial Court. It is against these judgments and decrees passed by the courts below that the appellant has come up in Regular Second Appeal before this Court. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case minutely. 7. The real battle took place between the parties on the battle field of limitation. In view of the facts of the case in hand before I proceed further I am also to observe that justice is not one sided. It has many facets and the Court is to draw a nice balance between conflicting rights and duties. While it is incumbent upon the Court to see that the right of delinquent official is not thrown away merely on technicalities and it is even more necessary to see that the State or the Corporate Body do not suffer in any manner. While it is incumbent upon the Court to see that the right of delinquent official is not thrown away merely on technicalities and it is even more necessary to see that the State or the Corporate Body do not suffer in any manner. Denying relief to the plaintiff-appellant on the ground of limitation in the instant case where is recurring loss of wages and certainly the recurring cause of action arises every month in such dispute would be throwing the delinquent official at slow fire. The learned counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that the orders in question have not been challenged within the time prescribed under the Limitation Act and since the suit has been filed on 20.9.2002 and the impugned orders withholding four increments with cumulative effect were passed on 11.7.1998 and 31.5.1999 respectively, it is beyond the period of three years. In order to lend support of his arguments, he has referred to the law contained in State of Punjab and others Vs. Gurdev Singh & Ashok Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 111 and Randhir Singh Vs. The State of Haryana and others, 1994 (4) Service Law Reporter 44. I have gone through the law quoted above and examined the same in view of the facts of the instant case and for the reasons to be recorded in this part of the judgment, I am of the opinion that the same are not applicable to the facts of the case in hand and are rather distinguishable particularly in view of the Full Bench Judgment of the Apex Court consisting of five Judge Bench reported in AIR 1962 S.C. 8 and before I proceed further I am also to observe that the judgment of the Larger Bench is to be followed and this is what has been laid down in case titled as Union of India Vs. K.S. Subramonian, 1976 (2) S.L.R. 519 wherein it was laid down by the Apex Court as under:-­ “ We do not think that the difficulty before the High Court could be resolved by it by following what it considered to be the view of a Division Bench of this Court in two cases and by merely quoting the views expressed by larger benches of this Court and then observing that these were insufficient for deciding the point before the High Court. It is true that, in each of the cases cited before the High Court, observations of this Court occur in a context different from that of the case before us. But, we do not think that the High Court acted correctly in skirting the views expressed by larger benches of this court in the manner in which it had done this. The proper course for a High Court in such a case is to try to find out and follow the opinions expressed by larger benches of this Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court. That is the practice followed by this Court itself. The practice has now crystallized into a rule of law declared by this Court. If, however, the High Court was of opinion, that the views expressed by larger benches of this Court were not applicable to the facts of the instant case, it should have said so giving reasons supporting its point of view.” 8. Any order which is passed contrary to the mandatory provision of the Rules and the principles of natural justice is null and void. It is not necessary for a party to get it set aside. He can claim the relief ignoring the void order. In the present case, the claim of the respondent-plaintiff in substance is for the release of four increments. A servant is entitled to annual increments as a matter of course unless the increment is stopped. If the order of imposing stoppage of increment is passed in contravention of the mandatory provisions of the rules and the principles of natural justice, such an order can be ignored by the official and he can claim arrears of pay and allowances which became due and were not given to him on account of the void order. For claiming arrears of pay, the limitation for filing a suit is three years. Right to claim wages arises at the end of every month because wages are payable monthly. It continues to arise to a servant upto the age of superannuation. A right to salary cannot be interrupted by a void order. There has to be a valid order in order to deprive the Government servant of his right to claim Salary. If such an order is passed contrary to the provisions of rules it could be an order which could be termed as illegal and invalid. A right to salary cannot be interrupted by a void order. There has to be a valid order in order to deprive the Government servant of his right to claim Salary. If such an order is passed contrary to the provisions of rules it could be an order which could be termed as illegal and invalid. I am also to observe that employee can ignore such an order and he need not secure declaration if such an order is void. He can enforce his claim of salary which became due to him preceding the date of the institution of the suit at any time. Applying this principle the claim of the respondent-Plaintiff for arrears of pay and allowances preceding the date of institution of the suit was plainly within limitation. 9. Such a principle was also laid down by five Judge Bench of the Apex Court while deciding the case of Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe Vs. State of Mysore (AIR 1962 S.C.8). The relevant portions applicable to the facts of the case in hand is reproduced as under:­ “ Eventually, the appellant retired from service on superannuation with effect from November 28, 1953. He filed his suit against the State of Bombay on August, 1954 for a declaration that the Order of the Government, dated August 11, 1948 was void in operative, wrongful, illegal and ultra vires, and for recovery of Rs.12,800 addition account of his arrears salary, allowances etc., with interest and future interest. The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, at Bangalum came to the conclusion that the first part of the departmental enquiry held against the plaintiff loading upto the finding, against him was free from any defect, but that he had not been given the opportunity of showing cause against the Punishment proposed to be inflicted upon him as a result of those findings, in so far as no show cause notice was given to him nor a copy of the enquiry report showing the grounds on which the findings had been based. There was, thus, according to the finding of the Trial Court, no full compliance with the requirements of S.240(3) of the Govt. of India Act, 1935. The Court also held that the Order of Reversion amounted to a penalty imposed upon the plaintiff as a result of the enquiry. There was, thus, according to the finding of the Trial Court, no full compliance with the requirements of S.240(3) of the Govt. of India Act, 1935. The Court also held that the Order of Reversion amounted to a penalty imposed upon the plaintiff as a result of the enquiry. The Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the Order aforesaid passed by the Government reverting him to the substantive rank was void and granted him that declaration, but dismissed his suit, with costs, in respect of the arrears claimed by him as aforesaid on the ground that it was based on tort and not on contract. There was an appeal by the plaintiff in respect of the dismissal of his claim for arrears, and cross-objections by the State in respect of that part of the judgment and decree which had granted declaration in favour of the plaintiff. The High Court dismissed the appeal by the plaintiff and allowed the cross-objections of the defendant-respondent in respect of the declaration, but made no orders as to the costs of the appeal and the cross-objections. The High Court held that the Order of Reservation, even assuming that it was a punishment as a result of the departmental enquiry against the appellant, was not a punishment within the meaning of 5.240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. It also held that the Order of Reversion was not a punishment at all. ……… ……… ……… ……… The question then arises whether he is entitled to any relief in respect of his claim for arrears of salary and dearness allowance. He has claimed Rs.10,777 odd as arrears of pay, Rs.951 off as arrears of dearness allowance, as also Rs.688 odd as arrears of daily allowance plus interest of Rs.471 odd, thus aggregating to the sum of Rs.12,886 odd. This claim is spread over the period August 1946 to November 1953, that is to say, until the date of his retirement from Government Service, plus future interest also. .......... ……… ……… ……… On the question of limitation, he held that the suit would be governed by Art. 102 of the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908) as laid down by the Federal Court in the case of Punjab Province v. Tara Chand, 1947 FCR 89; (AIR 1947 FC 23). .......... ……… ……… ……… On the question of limitation, he held that the suit would be governed by Art. 102 of the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908) as laid down by the Federal Court in the case of Punjab Province v. Tara Chand, 1947 FCR 89; (AIR 1947 FC 23). In view of the matter, the learned Judge held that adding the period of two months of the statutory notice under S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure given to Government his claim would be in time from June 2, 1951. Hence the trial Court, while giving the declaration that the Order impugned was void, dismissed the rest of the claim with a direction that the plaintiff was to pay 3/4th of the costs of the suit to the defendant. The High Court dismissed the suit in its entirety before allowing the cross-objections of the State. The appellant contended that his suit for arrears of salary would not be governed by the three years’ rule laid down in Article 102 of the limitation Act and that the decision of the Federal Court in Tara Chand’s case 1947 FCR 89; (AIR 1947 FC 23) was not correct. The sole ground on which this contention was based was that “salary was not included within the term “wages”. In our opinion, no good reasons have been adduced before us for not following the aforesaid decision of the Federal Court. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part, that is to say, the declaration granted by the trial Court that the Order of the Government impugned in this case is void, is restored in disagreement with the decision of the High Court. The claim as regards arrears of salary and allowance is allowed in part only from the 2nd of June, 1951, until the date of the plaintiffs retirement from Government service. There will be no decree for interest before the date of the suit, but the decretal sum shall bear interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the suit until realisation. The plaintiff­ appellant will be entitled to three-fourth of his costs throughout in view of the fact that his entire claim is not being allowed.” 10. Similar view regarding recurring cause of action was also , laid down by the Apex Court while deciding a case titled as P.L. Shah Vs. The plaintiff­ appellant will be entitled to three-fourth of his costs throughout in view of the fact that his entire claim is not being allowed.” 10. Similar view regarding recurring cause of action was also , laid down by the Apex Court while deciding a case titled as P.L. Shah Vs. Union of India and another, 1989 (1) S.L.R. 573. As per the facts of the quoted case the appellant was suspended in the year 1975 and he knocked the door of the Court after a lapse of 13 years, i.e., in the year 1989 challenging his order of suspension and he also claimed wages over and above the subsistence allowance and the relief was denied only in respect of the period which was beyond three years, meaning thereby that as per the law in such like cases the cause of action arises to the delinquent official after filing a suit for the arrears of wages every month when the salary is received by him. It was held by the Apex Court as under:­ “In the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that even though no relief could be given to the appellant in respect of the period which was beyond three years from the date on which the Tribunal commenced to exercise its powers under the Act, it was quite open to the Tribunal to consider whether it was proper for the Government to continue to give effect to the Order dated 6.5.1982 from any subsequent date and if the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Order dated 6.5.1982 was required to be revised it could pass an appropriate order notwithstanding the fact that a period of five years had elapsed from the date on which the order reducing the subsistence allowance was passed. While doing so it was open to the Tribunal to fix a date within the period of the said three years from which the appellant should be paid the subsistence allowance at the revised rate of course, having due regard to the date of the application also. In the alternative, the Tribunal could have asked the authority concerned to review the order. In the alternative, the Tribunal could have asked the authority concerned to review the order. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was not right in rejecting the application solely on the ground that the order reducing the subsistence allowance having been passed on 6.5.1982 the Tribunal could not entertain an application for directing the Government to revise the Order dated 6.5.1982 even in respect of any period within three years from the date on which the Tribunal commenced to exercise its powers having due regard to the date of the application also since we feel that the cause of action in respect of such prayer arises every month in which the subsistence allowance at the reduced rate is paid. We, therefore, set aside the order of the Tribunal and remand, the case to it to dispose of the application made by the appellants on merits. We make an order accordingly. There is no order as to costs. 11. In view of my detailed discussion on the basis of the law laid down by the Apex Court in cases Madhav Laxman Varkunthe V. State of Mysore (supra) and P.L.Shah Vs. Union of India and another (supra) I am also to observe that in case of State of Punjab and others Vs. Gurdev Singh and Ashok Kumar (supra) the point with regard to the recurring cause of and continuous loss when the order of increment with cumulative effect is passed was not raised before the Apex Court rather the observation of the Apex Court in Gurdev Singh’s case (supra) in para No.4 “that court’s function on the presentation of the plaint is simply to examine whether, on the assumed facts, the plaintiff is within time. The Court has to find out when the “right to sue” accrued to the plaintiff helps the case of the appellant with regard to the recurring loss and continuous cause of action which arises every month when the salary is received by him. Rather I am of this opinion that the right to sue accrues to the delinquent official every month when salary is received and in case, the suit is filed after three years on the basis of the order than in that event the delinquent official loses the arrears of his salary if the order is struck down by the court, but in case of Govt. official he is entitled to the payment of arrears of salary, but for a period of 38 months preceding the date of the filing of the suit including the period of two months under section 80 CPC. It is further crystal clear from the cases of State of Punjab V. Gurdev Singh and Randhir Singh Vs. State 9f Haryana and others (supra) that the law quoted in cases P.L.Shah Vs. Union of India and Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe (supra) were not cited nor were brought to the notice of the Hon’ble High Court and the Apex Court and moreover in case of Randhir Singh (supra) relates to writ jurisdiction and the petitioner was non-suited on the ground of delay and laches and the point with regard to continuous cause of action and recurring loss were not raised before the Hon’ble High Court and accordingly, it was not considered. Moreover, in case of Punjab State Vs. Gurdev Singh and Ashok Kumar (supra) the order of termination was involved before the Apex Court and the question of any continuous cause of action or recurring loss was not required to be raised before the Apex Court. 12. In view of all this, the instant case does not fall within the ambit of the case law referred by the learned counsel for the respondent and as such I am of the opinion that the suit is not liable to be thrown out on the ground of limitation and the appellant is certainly entitled to his increments regularly and also the withheld amounts with interest at the rate of 12% per annum on each months’ due and consequential relief thereof. However, it is made clear that amount beyond the period mentioned above are barred by limitation to which the respondent is not entitled. 13. Order dated 11.7.1998 is liable to be struck down on another ground that the complainant was Deputy Superintendent of Police, Kalka, but the Inspector was appointed as Inquiry Officer, who was lower in rank to the complainant and as such, the inquiry is vitiated. Although inquiry was conducted, but the plaintiff-appellant was not afforded an opportunity of being heard before the impugned order was passed. Appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant against the inquiry report was also dismissed. Although inquiry was conducted, but the plaintiff-appellant was not afforded an opportunity of being heard before the impugned order was passed. Appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant against the inquiry report was also dismissed. Penalties are provided under Rule 5 of the ibid rules and comparative reading of sub rules 4 and 5 shows that while under sub rule 4 only withholding of increments of pay is permissible, under sub rule 5, this is major penalty, there is reduction to lower stage in the time scale of pay for a specified period and is to be specified in the order whether the employees will be earning increments during the period of reduction and whether the reduction will or will not have effect of postponing future increments to his pay. As the provisions have been made under sub rule 5, similar provisions could have been made under sub rule 4 also if different eventualities were considered to flow by passing different kind of orders and in that case the rules framers would have specifically provided so. Thereafter it appears that rule framers only wanted to provide imposition of minor penalty under rule 4 of withholding of increments without cumulative effect so that there is temporary loss to the employee not having permanent effect on his increments whereas sub rule 5 provides for making permanent loss for the increments and that is why it was included in the category of major penalty and in the instant case since no reasonable opportunity was afforded to the plaintiff-appellant before the impugned order was passed by the inquiry Officer who was lower in rank thereby awarding major penalty in the shape of stoppage of four increments with cumulative effect. This reasoning of mine is supported by Full Bench of the Apex Court and while deciding Kulwant Singh Gill Versus State of Puniab, Civil Appeal No. 2960 of 1987, it was held by their Lordships thus: “ withholding of increments of pay simpliciter undoubtedly is a major penalty within the meaning of Rule 5(iv). This reasoning of mine is supported by Full Bench of the Apex Court and while deciding Kulwant Singh Gill Versus State of Puniab, Civil Appeal No. 2960 of 1987, it was held by their Lordships thus: “ withholding of increments of pay simpliciter undoubtedly is a major penalty within the meaning of Rule 5(iv). But sub rule (v) postulates reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a specified period with further discretion as to whether or not the Government employees shall earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay. It is an independent head of penalty and it could be imposed as punishment in an appropriate case. It is one of the major penalties. The impugned order of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect whether would fall within the meaning of Rule 5(v)? if it so falls Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules require conducting of regular enquiry. Withholding of increments of pay simpliciter without any hedge over it certainly comes within the meaning of Rule 5(v) of the Rules. But when, penalty was imposed withholding two increments, i.e., for two years with cumulative effect, it would indisputably mean that the two increments earned by the employee was cut off as a measure of penalty for ever in his upward march of earning higher scale of pay. In other words the clock is put back to a lower stage in the time scale of pay and on expiry of two years the clock starts working from that stage afresh. The insidious effect of the impugned order by necessary implication, is that the appellant employee is reduced in his time scale by two places and it is in perpetuity during the rest of the tenure of his service with a direction that two years’ increments would not be counted in his time scale of pay as a measure of penalty. The words are skin to the language which if pealed off its true colour or its resultant effects would become apparent. When we broach the problem from this perspective the effect is as envisaged under rule 5(v) of the Rules. The words are skin to the language which if pealed off its true colour or its resultant effects would become apparent. When we broach the problem from this perspective the effect is as envisaged under rule 5(v) of the Rules. Rule 5(iv) does not empower the disciplinary authority to impose penalty or withholding increments of pay with cumulative effect except after holding inquiry and following the prescribed procedure. Then the order would be without jurisdiction or authority of laws and it would be per se void. Considering from this angle we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order would come within the meaning of this rule 5(v) of the Rules, it is a major penalty and imposition of the impugned penalty without inquiry is per se illegal.” 14. Before I part with this judgment of mine, I am also to observe that it is unfortunate that the Haryana State should, in all morality and justice, take up such a plea to defeat a just claim of the citizen. It is high time that the State adopts the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of delinquent official. Of course, if it takes up a technical plea, the Court has to decide it and if the plea is well founded, it has to be upheld by the Court but normally such a plea when there is recurring cause of action should not ordinarily be taken up by the State, unless of course, the claim is not well founded by reason of delay in filing it, the evidence for the purpose of resisting such a claim has become unavailable. In the instant case the claim of the plaintiff-appellant was a just claim with regard to the arrears pertaining to 38 months preceding the filing of the suit. 15. No other point was raised nor any survives for consideration. For the reasons recorded above, appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant succeeds and is hereby allowed. Accordingly. Impugned judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are set aside. 15. No other point was raised nor any survives for consideration. For the reasons recorded above, appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant succeeds and is hereby allowed. Accordingly. Impugned judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are set aside. The suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant before the trial court is decreed with costs declaring the impugned order dated 11.7.1998 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Panchkula, withholding four increments with cumulative effect and that of the order passed by Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ambala in an appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant as illegal and null and void. Plaintiff-appellant is entitled to claim all past benefits admissible under the rules. However, the plaintiff-appellant will be entitled to claim arrears only for a period of 38 months preceding the date of filing of the suit, including the period of two months of the notice given’ under section 80, Civil Procedure Code. The arrears of amount, so calculated by the respondent-department, shall be paid to the plaintiff-appellant within period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. —————————————-