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2007 DIGILAW 1495 (BOM)

PAWAN s/o NANDLAL AGRAWAL v. ASIAN DYE CHEMICALS

2007-10-12

VASANTI A.NAIK

body2007
JUDGMENT:- This appeal is preferred by the original defendant against the judgment passed by the District Judge, Akola, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 114 of 2001, whereby the judgment passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Akola, in Special Civil Suit No. 51/1997 was reversed and the suit filed by the plaintiff-Firm was decreed. 2. This Court, by the order dated 5th March, 2003, admitted this second appeal on the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether the respondent firm stood dissolved on account of the death of one partner and whether it continued to be a registered firm within the meaning of section 69(2) of the Partnership Act, since the change was not reported to the Registrar within the time prescribed by sections 60 to 63 of the Partnership Act and consequently whether the suit to enforce a right by such firm would be maintainable? (2) Whether, in view of the contention of the respondent that the appellant is a tenant in respect of the part of the premises and a trespasser in respect of the remaining portion of the premises, the notice of termination issued by the respondent would be a valid notice? 3. To consider the controversy involved in this second appeal as also the substantial questions of law, it is necessary to refer to a few facts: The respondent is the original plaintiff. The respondent firm named and styled as "Asian Dye Chemicals" had instituted Special Civil Suit No. 51/1997, against the appellant/defendant for a decree for possession of the entire property described in para 1 of the plaint. The plaintiff also sought a direction against the defendant to pay an amount of Rs. 1,46,000/ - along with interest @ 21 % per annum thereon from the date of the suit till its actual realisation. According to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was an al10ttee of the suit plot which was situated beyond the municipal limits of Akola. The plaintiff had installed a shed for machines, equipments, storage tank, etc. and the shed admeasured about 2800 sq. ft. The defendant approached the plaintiff in the month of December, 1992 and represented to the plaintiff that the defendant was required to vacate the godown which was previously used by him for storing cotton and he be allowed to store the cotton in one of the corners of the godown owned by the plaintiff. ft. The defendant approached the plaintiff in the month of December, 1992 and represented to the plaintiff that the defendant was required to vacate the godown which was previously used by him for storing cotton and he be allowed to store the cotton in one of the corners of the godown owned by the plaintiff. It was pleaded that the defendant executed an agreement dated 21-12-1993, agreeing to use the premises for some time and remove his goods and articles from the premises by 20th July, 1994. The defendant, however, failed to remove the goods as promised by the defendant. It is then pleaded that on 17-8-1994, there was a lengthy discussion between the partners of the plaintiff and the defendant and as a result of those discussions, the defendant removed the articles from the godown and the plaintiff locked the godown after the removal of the articles by the defendant. According to the plaintiff on 18-8-1994, the defendant forcibly entered into the premises and the plaintiff was required to lodge a police report on 18-8-1994. In view of the aforesaid facts, the plaintiff required to file Regular Civil Suit No. 541/1994 for grant of permanent injunction against the defendant. An application was filed by the plaintiff in the said suit for grant of temporary injunction. The temporary injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff by the trial Court. However, the defendant had falsely stated in the reply that there was an agreement of lease between the plaintiff and the defendant. The order of temporal injunction granted by the trial Court was, however, set aside in an appeal filed by the defendant and a civil revision application was filed by the plaintiff against the order passed by the Appellate Court in Misc. Appeal No. 128 of 1994. The civil revision application was pending at the time of institution of appeal. According to the plaintiff, in view of the rejection of the application for grant of temporary injunction, the defendant was occupying the entire premises. Appeal No. 128 of 1994. The civil revision application was pending at the time of institution of appeal. According to the plaintiff, in view of the rejection of the application for grant of temporary injunction, the defendant was occupying the entire premises. Since the decision of the revision application would take its own time, to avoid further complications and without prejudice to the rights of the plaintiff to continue the Civil Suit No. 541/1994, the plaintiff issued a legal notice to the defendant on 12-9-1996, informing the defendant that he had no right to occupy the suit property, but, however, to avoid the technical objections, the tenancy alleged by the defendant in reply Exh.l0 in Regular Civil Suit No. 541/1994 was terminated with effect from midnight of 20th October, 1996. The defendant was called upon to deliver the vacant possession of the premises before the sunrise of 21st October, 1996. It was then pleaded by the plaintiff that the defendant was un-authorisedly occupying a portion of the premises owned by the plaintiff in spite of termination of the tenancy so also he was occupying the other portion of the premises as a trespasser. According to the plaintiff, the cause of action to file the suit arose on 12-9-1996 when the notice was issued by the plaintiff to the defendant and also on 21-10-1996 when the defendant failed to hand over the possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff. 4. The defendant resisted the claim of the plaintiff. It was denied by the defendant that the defendant was occupying the premises after the rejection of the temporary injunction application filed by the plaintiff. The defendant denied that he was unauthorisedly occupying the premises. He further denied that the other portion of the godown was occupied by the defendant as a trespasser. The plaint pleadings about the lengthy discussion on 17-8-1994 and the handing over of the possession by the defendant to the plaintiff on 17-8-1994 and the forcible reentry of the defendant on 18-8-1994 were denied by the defendant. The defendant pleaded that he was the tenant of the entire suit premises. The defendant also pleaded that he had not received the notice dated 12-9-1996. According to the defendant, the alleged notice was illegal and the suit was liable to be dismissed. The defendant pleaded that he was the tenant of the entire suit premises. The defendant also pleaded that he had not received the notice dated 12-9-1996. According to the defendant, the alleged notice was illegal and the suit was liable to be dismissed. In the specific pleadings, it was pleaded by the defendant that the plaintiff was not a registered partnership firm and the suit was not tenable in view of the provisions of section 69 of the Partnership Act. It was then pleaded that all the partners of the plaintiff firm were not alive as some of the partners of the firm had expired before filing of the suit and in view of the aforesaid fact, it was further pleaded that the firm stood dissolved in view of the provisions of the Partnership Act. The defendant denied the claim of the plaintiff towards arrears of rent as also mesne profit/damages. 5. On the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the issues and after considering the evidence tendered by the parties on record, held that the plaintiff had succeeded in proving that the plaintiff was a registered partnership firm. The trial Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant unauthorisedly possessed the suit premises. The Court then held that the defendant had succeeded in proving that he was a tenant in the suit premises. The Court further held that the plaintiff firm was not dissolved in view of the death of one of its partners. Having further held that the defendant had succeeded in proving that the notice dated 12-9-1996 was illegal, the trial Court .dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff for eviction and possession. The trial Court, however, decreed the suit to the extent of recovery of amount of Rs. 41,300/- towards the arrears of rent along with interest @ 6% per annum on the said amount from the date of the suit till its realisation. Two separate appeals were preferred by the parties against the judgment passed by the trial Court on 30-3-2001. The defendant had challenged the decree for recovery of Rs. 43,500/- with interest from the defendant and the plaintiff had challenged the judgment so far as it dismissed the suit of the plaintiff for eviction. Two separate appeals were preferred by the parties against the judgment passed by the trial Court on 30-3-2001. The defendant had challenged the decree for recovery of Rs. 43,500/- with interest from the defendant and the plaintiff had challenged the judgment so far as it dismissed the suit of the plaintiff for eviction. The Appellate Court, on a re-appreciation of evidence allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff and dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant, by the common judgment dated 15-10-2001. The appellant/defendant has challenged the part of the judgment dated 15-102001 which decrees the suit of the plaintiff for possession. At the time of admission of the appeal, the two aforestated substantial questions of law were framed by this Court. 6. Shri A. M. Gordey, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the suit filed by the appellant was not maintainable as the partnership firm did not' exist at the time of institution of the suit. According to the learned counsel, initially, four partners constituted the firm. Out of the four partners, one partner, by name Prakash died on 24-12-1992 and on his death, the firm stood automatically dissolved in view of the provisions of section 42 of the Partnership Act, 1932. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit filed by a firm which did not exist. It was then submitted on behalf of the appellant that on the death of one of the partners of the firm, it was necessary for the other partners of the Trust to notify the change with the Registrar of Firms under the provisions of sections 63 and 63(1-A) of the Partnership Act. According to the counsel for the appellant, such a notice was never given to the Registrar of Firms under the provisions of section 63 of the Partnership Act, and hence, it cannot be said that the partnership firm was existing after the death of Prakashchandra in the year 1992. It is further submitted on behalf of the appellant that the Courts should not have relied on the Certificate of Registration of Firm which was produced on record to hold the existence of the firm on the date of institution of the suit. It is further submitted on behalf of the appellant that the Courts should not have relied on the Certificate of Registration of Firm which was produced on record to hold the existence of the firm on the date of institution of the suit. According to the counsel for the appellant, the Certificate of Registration of Firm was not conclusive proof of the fact that the firm was registered, specially when the partnership stood dissolved automatically in view of the provisions of section 42(c) of the Partnership Act. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff had not produced any partnership agreement on record to show that there was any agreement between the partnership to continue with the firm even in case of death of one of its partners. In the absence of any contract to the contrary, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, it was clear that the firm stood dissolved on the death of Prakashchandra when there was nothing to show that the change was ever reported to the Registrar of Firms. 7. According to the counsel for the appellant, the notice did not have the effect of terminating the tenancy and the trial Court has rightly recorded the finding to the aforesaid effect. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff had sought the possession of the suit premises on the basis of the quit notice which was issued on 12-9-1996, but it was pleaded by the plaintiff that the defendant was unauthorisedly occupying the part of the suit premises after the termination of the tenancy and also occupying the other portion of the suit premises as a trespasser. Specially relying on the pleadings in paragraph Nos. 5 and 7 of the plaint, it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff had split the suit premises into two parts; one of the parts was the tenanted premises and the other part was the trespassed portion. According to the counsel for the appellant, notice issued by the plaintiff to the defendant on 12-9-1996 was illegal as it did not relate to the entire suit premises and related only to the premises which was, according to the plaintiff, unauthorisedly occupied by the defendant as a tenant. According to the counsel for the appellant, notice issued by the plaintiff to the defendant on 12-9-1996 was illegal as it did not relate to the entire suit premises and related only to the premises which was, according to the plaintiff, unauthorisedly occupied by the defendant as a tenant. The counsel for the appellant took this Court through the contents of the notice to substantiate that the notice related to the portion of the suit property which was occupied by the defendant as a lessee and decree passed by the Appellate Court for possession of the suit property was liable to be set aside. 8. Shri A. S. Chandurkar, the learned counsel for the respondent, supported the judgment passed by the first Appellate Court and submitted that the suit filed' by the plaintiff could not be dismissed on the ground that the partnership firm was not existing on the date of institution of the suit. The counsel for the respondent relied on Exh. 87, a Certificate of Registration issued to the plaintiff by the Assistant Registrar of Firms, Nagpur, on 23rd September, 1998: According to the counsel for the respondents, the Certificate at Exh. 87 clearly proved that the firm was in existence on the date of institution of the suit. By referring to the provisions of section 42 of the Partnership Act, it was canvassed by the counsel for the respondent that a firm would dissolve on the death of a partner, when there was no contract to the contrary. According to the counsel for the respondent, the contract may not be in writing. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that there was ample evidence on record to show that the firm continued to exist after the death of Prakashchandra and there was a contract to continue the partnership. According to the learned counsel, both the Courts had rightly held that the firm continued to exist even after the death of one of the partners. According to the learned counsel, both the Courts had rightly held that the firm continued to exist even after the death of one of the partners. The counsel for the respondent then submitted that the non-compliance of the provisions of sections 63 and 63(1-A) of the Partnership Act, was not sufficient to hold that the partnership firm was dissolved on the death of Prakashchandra as non-compliance of the provisions of section 63 of the Partnership Act could not result in the cancellation of the registration of the partnership firm and may have only resulted in the imposition of penalty under section 69-A of the Partnership Act. The counsel for the respondent took this Court through the oral evidence of Ajit Kumar to show that the partnership firm continued to exist even after the death of Prakashchandra and the defendant had himself entered into an agreement with the plaintiff on 21-10-1993, after the death of the partner on 27-4-1992. The counsel for the respondent relied on the decision reported in (1998) 1 Mh.L.J. 372 to canvass that it was not necessary to obtain fresh registration whenever change was effected in the constitution of the firm as the change in the constitution of the firm does not affect the registration already made. 9. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the notice dated 12-91996 covered the entire suit premises which was in possession of the defendant and a reading of the notice dated 12-9-1996 clearly shows that the tenant was required to vacate the entire suit premises on the expiry of the notice period. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that though the notice was not strictly clear, the defendant was capable of understanding from the contents of the notice that he was required to vacate the entire suit premises. The counsel for the respondent relied on a decision reported in AIR 1918 Privy Council 102 and AIR 1977 SC 1120 to canvass that a notice cannot be construed with a desire to find fault with it, which would render it defective, but it must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. The counsel for the respondent relied on a decision reported in AIR 1918 Privy Council 102 and AIR 1977 SC 1120 to canvass that a notice cannot be construed with a desire to find fault with it, which would render it defective, but it must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. It was then submitted on behalf of the respondent that the defendant had not pleaded in the written statement that the notice was vague, its contents were ambiguous or that the defendant was confused on reading it and in the absence of pleadings the objection to the notice in that regard, would be deemed to have been waived by the defendant. For the aforesaid proposition, he relied on the decision reported in (2006) 9 sec 216. According to the counsel for the respondent, the trial Court was not justified in holding that the notice did not have the effect of terminating the tenancy of the defendant. It was lastly submitted on behalf of the' respondent that the defendant had failed to enter the witness box and his brother, the power of attorney holder for the defendant, was examined on behalf of the defendant and since it was necessary for the defendant to enter the witness box to prove the facts which were in his special knowledge, an adverse inference needs to be drawn against the defendant, specially, as the trial Court observed that the demeanour of the power of attorney holder showed that he was not ready to answer the questions posed to him. For substantiating the aforesaid submission, the counsel for the respondent relied on a decision reported in (2005) 1 Mh.L.J. 1170 . 10. For answering the first substantial question of law, it would be necessary to consider the evidence tendered by the parties on record. It is not in dispute that one of the partners of the plaintiff firm had expired on 27-4-1992. It is the case of the defendant that the plaintiff firm had entered into an agreement of tenancy with the defendant on 21-12-1993. There is nothing on record to show that the remaining partners of the plaintiff firm had intimated about the change in the constitution of the firm at any point of time to the Registrar of Firms, after 27-4-1992. Though the partnership agreement is produced by the plaintiff on record, the plaintiff had failed to prove the partnership agreement. There is nothing on record to show that the remaining partners of the plaintiff firm had intimated about the change in the constitution of the firm at any point of time to the Registrar of Firms, after 27-4-1992. Though the partnership agreement is produced by the plaintiff on record, the plaintiff had failed to prove the partnership agreement. In view of the provisions of section 42 of the Act a firm would dissolve automatically on the death of one of its partners only in case where there is no contract to the contrary. It is, however, necessary to consider that it is not necessary that the contract between the parties must be express. The contract may be implied and could also be spelt out from the subsequent conduct of the other partners. This may, however, not be the case where one of the partners of the firm consisting of two partners, dies. The witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff clearly deposed that the partnership firm continued to exist after the death of Prakashchandra. Moreover, the defendant had filed a civil suit against the plaintiff firm treating the plaintiff to be a partnership firm. The conduct of the defendant in instituting Regular Civil Suit No. 78/1998 against the partnership firm and the fact that the defendant had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff firm on 21-12-1993 were sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant considered the plaintiff to be a partnership firm and the objection about the non-existence of the partnership firm on the date of the institution of the suit was merely one of the several objections raised by the defendant to the tenability of the suit. The oral evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses, the Certificate of Registration which was issued by the Assistant Registrar of Finns to the plaintiff in the year 1996 as also the agreement dated 21-12-1993 and the certified copy of the plaint in Regular Civil Suit No. 78/l998 clearly showed that the firm was not dissolved and was in existence on the date of the institution of the suit and the defendant also considered the firm to exist on more than a couple of occasions. Both the Courts were, therefore, justified in holding that the partnership firm did exist on the date of the institution of the suit. 11. Both the Courts were, therefore, justified in holding that the partnership firm did exist on the date of the institution of the suit. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down in the judgment reported in 1998(1) Mh.L.J. 372 that the changes in the constitution of the firm will not affect the registration once made and failure to comply with the provisions of section 63 of the Partnership Act attracts the penalties under section 69A of the Act. As rightly pointed out on behalf of the respondent, the effect of noncompliance of the provisions of section 63 of the Act did not have the effect of cancellation of the registration, but could have merely resulted in imposition of penalty under section 69A of the Act. The evidence tendered by the plaintiff and the fact that the defendant entered into an agreement with the firm on 21-3-1993 and further instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 78/1998, showed that the firm was not dissolved after the death of Prakashchandra. Subsequent conduct of other partners in the instant case, clearly proved the contract, though it was not express. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is held that the partnership firm continued to be a registered firm within the meaning of section 69(2) of the Partnership Act though the change might not have been reported to the Registrar within the time prescribed by sections 60 to 63 of the Partnership Act and the suit filed by the plaintiff firm was maintainable. The first part of the first substantial question of law is, therefore, answered in negative and against the appellant. The second part of the first substantial question of law is, however, answered in the affirmative and also against the appellant. 12. As regards the other issue, it is necessary to peruse the contents of the notice issued by the plaintiff to the defendant under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. By the notice dated 12-9-1996 at Exh. 89, it was brought to the notice of the defendant by the plaintiff that the plaintiff treated the defendant as a tenant of a portion of the shed which was leased out to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,500/-. It was further stated in the notice that with a view to avoid technical objection, the tenancy allegedly asserted by the defendant in the reply Exh. 1,500/-. It was further stated in the notice that with a view to avoid technical objection, the tenancy allegedly asserted by the defendant in the reply Exh. 10, in Regular Civil Suit No. 541/1994 was terminated with effect from the midnight of 20-10-1996. The notice further called upon the defendant to vacate and deliver the vacant possession of the premises which was in possession of the defendant before the sunrise of 21-10-1996. Though the defendant had pleaded that the notice was not served on him, the plaintiff had produced the postal certificates at Exhs. 90 to 95 to show that the notice was served on the defendant. 13. It appears that the submission made on behalf of the defendant that, the notice did not purport to terminate the tenancy in respect of the entire suit premises, is based on certain statements in the notice whereby the plaintiff had referred to the contents of the reply filed by the defendant in Regular Civil Suit No. 541/1994 wherein, according to the plaintiff, it was contended by the defendant that as per the agreement between the parties, a portion of the shed was leased out to the defendant at a monthly rent of Rs. 1,500/-. The notice further stated that the. defendant was also unauthorisedly occupying the remaining portion of the premises owned by the plaintiff and the status of the defendant in respect of the rest of the premises was that of a trespasser and the defendant was liable to pay the damages in occupying the remaining portion of the premises @ Rs. 100/- per day. On the basis of the aforesaid statements in the notice, it was canvassed on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiff had split the premises into two parts. One part was occupied by the defendant as a tenant and the other part was occupied by the defendant as a trespasser. It appears that the trial Court considered the contents of a part of the notice without reading the notice as a whole. A reading of the notice at Exh. 89 in its entirety clearly shows that the plaintiff had believed that the defendant was a tenant in respect of a part of the premises and he had occupied the other part of the suit premises unauthorisedly. A reading of the notice at Exh. 89 in its entirety clearly shows that the plaintiff had believed that the defendant was a tenant in respect of a part of the premises and he had occupied the other part of the suit premises unauthorisedly. However, though this fact was mentioned in the notice, the plaintiff had, with a view to avoid any technical objection, by the notice at Exh. 89, sought the termination of the tenancy in respect of the entire premises in possession of the· defendant. Mere reference in the notice about the unauthorised occupation of the defendant over the remaining portion of the premises which was not earlier leased out to the defendant and a claim for damages @ Rs. 100/- per day would not invalidate the notice so as to hold that the plaintiff did not intend to terminate the tenancy of the defendant from the entire suit premises by the notice at Exh. 89. 14. It is apparent from a reading of the notice in its entirety that the plaintiff called upon the tenant to vacate the entire suit premises which was in the possession of the defendant and the intention of the plaintiff was also made clear to the defendant by the contents of the notice. Though the plaintiff had stated in the notice that the plaintiff did not treat the defendant as a tenant in the entire premises, the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was issued to the tenant so as to avoid the technical objection asking the tenant to deliver the vacant possession of the premises to the plaintiff before the sunrise of 21-101996. The plaintiff had mentioned in the notice that the alleged tenant as stated in the reply Exh.l0 in Regular Civil Suit No. 541/1994 was terminated with effect from midnight of 20-10-1996. The judgments reported in AIR 1918 PC 102 and AIR 1977 SC 1120 provide much help for considering the effect of the notice at Exh. 89. The Privy Council has held in the judgment reported in AIR 1918 PC 102 that the statements in the quit notice should be construed not with a desire to find fault which would render them defective but should be construed ur res valeat quam pereat. The Privy Council observed that the aforesaid principle would apply to a notice containing honest and inadvertent mistakes. The Privy Council observed that the aforesaid principle would apply to a notice containing honest and inadvertent mistakes. The same principle is reiterated in paragraph 3 of the decision in AIR 1977 SC 1120 . On an application of the aforesaid principle to the facts of this case, it could be said that the notice was still good and effective in law though the notice may not have been clear to a stranger ignorant of all the facts and circumstances touching the holding to which they purported to refer, but it was clear to the defendant tenant who was conversant with those facts and circumstances. In the instant case, it was not pleaded by the defendant in the written statement that the notice did not cover the entire suit premises, and therefore, it was bad in law. The defendant had merely pleaded that the notice was illegal. The validity of the notice was not challenged on its insufficiency or ambiguity. Hence, it was canvassed on behalf of the respondent that in the absence of a specific plea in the written statement in regard to the aforesaid objections, the said plea would be deemed to have been waived by the appellant tenant. The principle of deemed waiver would not be, however, applicable to the facts of the instant case as the parties were aware about the case they had to meet on the question of validity of the notice on the ground of incorrectness or insufficiency. Hence, though the issue in this regard is not specific, both the Courts have rightly considered this issue on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence tendered by the parties. On a reading of the notice in its entirety, as stated hereinabove, it is clear that the defendant understood by the notice that he was required to vacate the entire suit property which was in his possession. The reply to the temporary injunction application, Exh.10, in Regular Civil Suit No. 541/1994 also disclosed that the tenant had asserted his tenancy over the entire suit premises and by the notice at Exh. 89, the plaintiff terminated the alleged tenancy of the defendant in reply Exh. 10 so as to avoid technical objections. In clear terms, the defendant was asked to deliver the possession of the entire suit premises and the notice sought to terminate the tenancy of the defendant from the entire suit premises. 89, the plaintiff terminated the alleged tenancy of the defendant in reply Exh. 10 so as to avoid technical objections. In clear terms, the defendant was asked to deliver the possession of the entire suit premises and the notice sought to terminate the tenancy of the defendant from the entire suit premises. In the facts and circumstances of the case, though it was pleaded by the plaintiff in a couple of paragraphs in the plaint that the defendant was a tenant in respect of the part of the premises and a trespasser in respect of the remaining portion of the premises, the notice at Exh. 89 terminated the tenancy of the defendant, not only from the part of the premises but, from the entire suit property. Though both the Courts have concurrently held that the defendant was a tenant in the entire suit premises, the claim of the plaintiff cannot fail on the ground that the appellant had pleaded that the defendant was tenant in respect of a part of the premises and a trespasser in respect of the remaining portion. Though the plaintiff had not clearly admitted in the first half of the notice that the defendant was a tenant in respect of the entire suit property, the notice was issued with a view to terminate the tenancy of the defendant as per the claim of the defendant so as to avoid technical objections and difficulties. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the notice of termination was not a valid notice and did not have the effect of terminating the tenancy of the defendant from the entire suit premises. The second substantial question of law is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the plaintiff. The first Appellate Court was justified in rendering a finding that the notice was a valid notice and there was no scope for the defendant to say that the tenancy in respect of part of the premises was only terminated. 15. Since the substantial questions of law are answered in the affirmative, it would not be necessary to consider the effect of the defendant's failure to enter into the witness box and the interference to be drawn therefrom. Since both the substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant, the appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. 16. Since both the substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant, the appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. 16. Shri Gordey, the learned counsel for the appellant, makes an oral request for stay of this judgment for a period of six weeks. Shri A. S. Chandurkar, the learned counsel for the respondent, opposes the request made on behalf of the appellant. However, considering the fact that the appellant is in possession of the suit premises since the year 1993, it would he necessary in the interest of justice to stay the judgment for a period of six weeks from today. The judgment is hereby stayed for a period of six weeks from today. Appeal dismissed.