JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—By means of this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the validity and legality of the order passed by the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of Industrial Disputes Act. 2. Briefly stated, the respondent No. 2 raised a claim alleging that he was appointed as a Steno on 18.12.1989 and that there were other Stenos who were performing similar duties as performed by the workman and whereas other Stenos were being paid the wages @ Rs. 3245/- per month, the workman was only getting a fixed amount of Rs. 1200/- per month and therefore, the workman was entitled to receive the difference of wages amounting to Rs. 44,990/- for the period 1.1.1994 to 31.10.1995. The said application was opposed by the petitioner contending that the workman was never appointed as a Stenographer and that, the workman was appointed as a clerk on daily wages and that, he was paid the wages which was payable to a daily wager. The workman was never appointed as a Stenographer nor was he discharging the duties which a regular Stenographer was discharging. The petitioner further submitted that the claim raised by the workman could not be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 33-C(2) and that, such a dispute could only be adjudicated upon a reference being made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 3. The Labour Court without adverting itself to the nature of the dispute raised and without considering the fact as to whether the claim of the workman could be adjudicated in a proceeding under Section 33-C(2), held that on the principle of equal pay for equal work, the workman was entitled to the difference of wages on the post of Stenographer. The Labour Court found that the workman was performing the work of a Steno and that the work which he was performing was also being performed by a regular Steno. Aggrieved, by the aforesaid order of the Labour Court, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 4. Heard Sri A.K. Misra, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri K.P. Agarwal, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. Sumati Rani Gupta, the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. The moot question which arises for consideration is, what is the scope of the proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act? 4. Heard Sri A.K. Misra, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri K.P. Agarwal, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. Sumati Rani Gupta, the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. The moot question which arises for consideration is, what is the scope of the proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act? Whether the claim of the workman is a benefit which could be adjudicated under Section 33-C(2) of the Act? Whether the present dispute could be adjudicated in a proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act or not? 6. The scope of Section 33-C(2) was considered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan etc., AIR 1964 SC 743 . The Supreme Court held : “In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of sub-section (2) it is clear that if a workman’s right to receive the benefit is disputed, that may have to be determined by the Labour Court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money, the labour Court inevitably has to dead with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit. If the said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money; but if the said right is disputed the Labour Court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making the necessary computation can arise.” And further held : “The claim under Section 33-C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-section (2). As Maxwell has observed “where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it immediately also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. As Maxwell has observed “where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it immediately also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. We must accordingly hold that Section 33-C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers.” 7. In Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Limited v. Rameshwar and others, AIR 1968 SC 218 , the Supreme Court held : “It is clear that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer. Since the scope of sub-section (2) is wider than that of sub-section (1) and the sub-section (2) is not confined to cases arising under an award, settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, there is no reason to hold that a benefit provided by a statute of a Scheme made thereunder, without there being anything contrary under such statute or Section 33-C(2), cannot fall within sub-section (2). Consequently, the benefit provided in the bonus scheme made under the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948 which remains to be computed must fall under sub-section (2) and the Labour Court therefore had jurisdiction to entertain and try such a claim, it being a claim in respect of an existing right arising from the relationship of an industrial workman and his employer.” 8. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and another, 1995 (1) LLJ 395 , the Supreme Court after reviewing its earlier decisions held : “The ratio of these decisions clearly indicates that where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workman to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen’s entitlement and then proceeded to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C(2) of the Act.” 9. In the aforesaid case, the daily rated/casual workers of the Delhi Municipal Corporation had claimed the same pay as paid to the regular employees on the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ on the ground that they were doing the same kind of work as regular employees were doing. The very basis of the claim was disputed by the Corporation as there was no earlier adjudication of the claim. Since the dispute relating to the entitlement was not incidental to the benefit claimed, the Supreme Court held that it was outside the scope of Section 33-C(2) and, that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide the workmen’s entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated. The Supreme Court further observed : “It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognized by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation’s that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court’s power under Section 33-C(2) like that of the Executing Court’s power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. And at another place held : “The workmen’s claim of doing the same kind of work and their entitlement to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workmen on the principle of `equal pay for equal work’ being disputed, without an adjudication of their dispute resulting in acceptance of their claim to this effect, there could be no occasion for computation of the benefit on that basis to attract Section 33-C(2). The mere fact that some other workmen are alleged to have made a similar claim by filing writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution is indicative of the need for adjudication of the claim of entitlement of the benefit before computation of such a benefit could be sought. Respondents’ claim is not based on a prior adjudication made in the writ petitions filed by some other workmen upholding a similar claim which could be relied on as an adjudication enuring to the benefit of these respondents as well. Respondents’ claim is not based on a prior adjudication made in the writ petitions filed by some other workmen upholding a similar claim which could be relied on as an adjudication enuring to the benefit of these respondents as well. The writ petitions by some other workmen to which some reference was casually made, particulars of which are not available in these matters, have, therefore, no relevance for the present purpose. It must, therefore, be held that the Labour Court as well as the High Court were in error in treating as maintainable the applications made under Section 33-C(2) of the Act by these respondents." 10. The right to money which is sought to be calculated or the benefit which is sought to be computed under Section 33-C(2) must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between the industrial workman and his employer. The Labour Court cannot entertain a claim which is not an existing right and which could be made the subject matter of an Industrial dispute in a reference under Section 10 of the Act. Where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workman to a certain benefit is disputed and there being no earlier adjudication or recommendation thereof by the employer, a dispute relating to such entitlement which is not incidental to the benefit claimed would be clearly outside the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 11. In the present case, the workman was appointed on a daily rated basis and claimed wages which is being paid to regular workman on the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’. Such claim is not maintainable under Section 33-C(2), inasmuch as, the claim falls under the category of adjudication. In the opinion of the Court, the present case is squarely covered by the decision in the case of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra). 12. Such claim is not maintainable under Section 33-C(2), inasmuch as, the claim falls under the category of adjudication. In the opinion of the Court, the present case is squarely covered by the decision in the case of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra). 12. From the aforesaid decisions, the position of law which emerges is that whenever a workman is entitled to receive any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and is denied such benefit by the employer, a workman could approach the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) for the recovery of monetary or non-monetary benefits which can be computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer. The benefit must necessarily be a pre-existing benefit or a benefit flowing from a pre-existing right. The workman who filed a claim under Section 33-C(2) for the enforcement of a right or benefit must point out to some pre-existing right or benefit which he seeks to enforce. However, if the workman seeks some new right or benefit in the conditions of service or some new benefit which had neither been acquired nor granted, in that event, his remedy is by way of a reference under Section 10 of the Act not under Section 33-C(2). 13. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion, that the application of the workman under Section 33-C(2) of the Act was not maintainable. Consequently, the order of the Labour Court passed under Section 33-C(2) was without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed. 14. The writ petitions stands allowed. ————