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2007 DIGILAW 1503 (PNJ)

Ranjodh Singh v. State Of Haryana

2007-08-20

MAHESH GROVER

body2007
Judgment Mahesh Grover, J. 1. This is an appeal against judgment/order of sentence dated 12.3.1996 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra (hereinafter described as `the trial Court) by which the appellant was convicted under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, `the Act) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs. one lac. In default of payment of fine, he was directed to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years. 2. The prosecution version as reflected in the F.I.R. is that on 3.6.1994, Ram Chander, Sub Inspector/Station House Officer of Police Station, Pehowa was present along with Tara Chand, Assistant Sub Inspector and other police officials on the Markanda bridge in the area of village Karah Sahib in connection with patrol duty. There, he received a secret information that the appellant was indulging in the sale of poppy straw from his fields. Accordingly, a raid was conducted and allegedly the appellant was apprehended with 45 Kgs. of poppy husk which he had kept concealed in 1-1/2 bags. Shri Kuldeep Singh Sihag, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Pehowa, who was intimated about the secret information, had also reached the spot. Out of the bags, two separate samples of 200 grams each were separated. The samples and the remaining poppy husk in the two bags containing 29 Kgs. 600 grams and 14 Kgs. and 600 grams, respectively, were separately sealed with the seals of `TCS & `KSS and were taken into possession vide recovery memo EX-PE. The Sub Inspector, on reaching the police station, deposited the case property with the Moharrir Head Constable. The samples were thereafter sent for chemical analysis. 3. On receipt of the report of the Chemical Examiner and on completion of investigation, the appellant was challaned. 4. The trial Court, finding a prima facie case against him, charged the appellant for having committed an offence under Section 15 of the Act to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 5. The prosecution, in order to establish its case against the appellant, examined as many as six witnesses and also tendered in evidence the report of the Chemical Examiner. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant claimed that he had been falsely implicated. However, he led no evidence in his defence. 6. 5. The prosecution, in order to establish its case against the appellant, examined as many as six witnesses and also tendered in evidence the report of the Chemical Examiner. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant claimed that he had been falsely implicated. However, he led no evidence in his defence. 6. The trial Court, on appraisal of the entire material on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner indicated hereinabove. 7. While assailing the findings recorded by the trial Court, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the samples in this case were seized on 3.6.1994, but the same were sent to the Chemical Examiner only on 30.6.1994, i.e. after 27 days and, therefore, it has erred in convicting and sentencing the appellant as tampering with the samples during the interregnum period could not be ruled out. That apart, learned counsel for the appellant made a reference to the statement of PW5- Tara Chand, Assistant Sub Inspector, who was one of the members of the raiding party and who testified that the case property which was produced in the Court did not contain any F.I.R. number and that both the bags were in torn condition. On the strength of this, learned counsel contended that the evidence against the appellant was not trust-worthy and the delay in sending the samples for chemical analysis had prejudiced the case of the prosecution beyond redemption. 8. Learned counsel for the State could not effectively controvert the factual aspect of the matter as reflected from the record. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 10. Concededly, the samples were seized on 3.6.1994 and the same were sent for chemical examination on 30.6.1994 after a delay of 27 days which has remained unexplained. The adequate safe-guards which have been prescribed in the procedure and which require the sending of samples promptly, have obviously been given a complete go-bye. 11. The result of the aforesaid delay and its impact on the prosecution case is adequately reflected in the testimony of PW5-Tara Chand, who, in his cross-examination, has stated as under :- "There is no chit on both the bags, Exhs. P1 and P2 and there is also no FIR number written on both the bags containing the alleged case property. Both the bags are in torn conditions. P1 and P2 and there is also no FIR number written on both the bags containing the alleged case property. Both the bags are in torn conditions. After depositing the case property with the MHC I saw it for the first day on the day when I came last time in the court to appear as a witness. During the intervening period I had no occasion to see the case property. It is also perhaps that name of the accused or parentage or his village is not mentioned in either of the two bags containing alleged poppy-straw. The bags in which case property contains are wet. Now the bags are dry. Their condition shows that the bags got drenched in water (objected to as the reply of the witness is hypothetical and imaginary). It is correct that the picking up of bags result in oozing out of poppy-straw contained in it. It is incorrect that the contents of Exh. P1 and P2 are wrongly stated by me to be of poppy straw. It is also correct that only one seal is legible, whereas other seals are not legible. It is incorrect that only two seals are visible on the bag. Volunteered three seals are visible. This is the position regarding Exh. P-1. It is also correct that there is no seal at all on Exh.P2 which is a bigger bag. It is also correct that in Ex.P2 contents can be taken out and put it again from the torn portion thereof." 12. It is a glaring case where the prosecution has stooped and swerved to beneficially help the appellant. The case property was obviously tampered with to deprive the prosecution of the benefit of a successful conviction and at the same time, to help the appellant in going scot-free. 13. The Court cannot, but express its anguish at the way in which the prosecution has dealt with the evidence in this case. 14. In view of the glaring defect in the case of the prosecution, there is no alternative but to acquit the appellant of the charge framed against him. Accordingly, the appeal is accepted, the impugned judgment and order of sentence are set aside and the appellant is acquitted.