Judgment :- R. Basant, J. Is an appeal maintainable under S.29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as " the Act") against an interim exparte order passed under S.23 of the Act? This crucial question is to be decided in this Crl.M.C. The parties are being referred to in this order in the manner in which they are ranked before the learned Magistrate. 2. The petitioners - mother and her child, had approached the learned Magistrate with an application under S.12 of the Act claiming relief under Ss.19 and 20 of the Act. The learned Magistrate passed an exparte interim order, copy of which is produced as Annexure-4, directing the 1 respondent/alleged husband to allow the petitioners to reside in his house and restraining him from causing any disturbance to the peaceful residence of the petitioners in that house. There was also a further exparte interim direction that the 1st respondent must pay an amount of Rs.2,000/- and Rs.1,250/- per mensem to petitioners 1 and 2 respectively. That order was passed on 01.01.2007. The respondents thereupon rushed to the Sessions Court and the Sessions Court after admitting the appeal granted an interim stay. Copy of that order is produced as Annexure-6. The order of the Magistrate was suspended on condition that the petitioner shall execute a bond for Rs.5,000/- with two solvent sureties each for the like sum to the satisfaction of the court below within a period of one month from the date of the said order. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that no appeal under S.29 is at all maintainable against an interim exparte order passed under S.23. In these circumstances, he contends that the entertainment of the appeal by the learned Sessions Judge is not legal and justified. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners further contends that at any rate, the insensitive manner in which the order of suspension/stay (Annexure-6) was granted, is objectionable and the learned Sessions Judge did not apply his mind to the nature of the relief that was granted to the petitioners or the contentions of the parties before the said blanket order of suspension was granted. 5. The contentions call for a detailed consideration of the provisions of-S:29 of the Act. It will be apposite in this context to refer to the scheme of the Act. 5. The contentions call for a detailed consideration of the provisions of-S:29 of the Act. It will be apposite in this context to refer to the scheme of the Act. Reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act clearly show that the Act is a piece of civil law conferring on the victim women civil rights. Provision is also made for the redressal of their grievances through the structure provided under the criminal law. It will be apposite to alertly note that the Act is a piece of civil law which is sought to be implemented through the instrumentality of the courts constituted under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The only penal provision in the Statute against a party - respondent is the one in S.31 of the Act. Chapter 1 containing Sections 1 and 2 deals only with the short title, extent and commencement and the definitions. Shared household is defined in S.2(s) and domestic violence is defined in S.2(g) read with S.3 of the Act. Chapter 2 has only one Section and that (S.3) deals with the definition of the expression `domestic violence'. Chapter 3 containing Sections 4 to 11 deals with the procedure for appointment of protection officers, service providers etc. and their powers and duties. Chapter 4 containing Ss.12 to 29 deals with the reliefs that can be granted and the orders that can be passed and the procedure to be followed by, the Magistrate before passing orders granting such relief. The provision for appeal against such orders are available in S.29. Chapter 5 deals with miscellaneous provisions. 6. We are particularly concerned with Chapter 4. The nature of the orders that can be passed are enumerated in S.18 - which deals with protection orders, S.19 - which deals with residence orders, S.20 - which deals with monetary relief, S.21 - which deals with custody orders and S.22 - which deals with compensation orders. Sections 18 to 22 deal with final orders that can be passed. 7. The legislature was evidently aware of the need in an appropriate case to pass interim and exparte orders. Power to pass interim and exparte orders are mentioned in S.23 of the Act. Relief may be claimed under S.18 to 22, but before final orders are passed under Sections 18 to 22, S.23 clothes the Magistrate with power to grant interim orders. Power to pass interim and exparte orders are mentioned in S.23 of the Act. Relief may be claimed under S.18 to 22, but before final orders are passed under Sections 18 to 22, S.23 clothes the Magistrate with power to grant interim orders. Such interim orders can be granted exparte also. 8. S.24 deals with the manner in which copies of orders are to be furnished free of cost. S.25 deals with the duration of the orders and the procedure for alteration of orders passed. It evidently deals with the duration and alteration, modification or vacation of final orders that may be passed under S.18 to 22 of the Act. It does not according to me, deal specifically with alteration, modification or vacation of interim orders passed under Section 23 of the Act. S.26 deals with reliefs in other suits and legal proceedings and S.27 deals with the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrates who exercise powers under the Act. S.28 deals with the procedure which the Magistrates have to follow and the stipulation in S.28(1) is that the procedure shall be governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Of course, in S.28(2), it is further stipulated that the Magistrate can lay down his own procedure for disposal of application under S.12 or under S.23(2) of the Act. 9. It is thereafter as the last Section of Chapter 4 that S.29 dealing with the provisions relating to appeal appears. I extract S.29 below: S.29: Appeal: There shall lie an appeal to the Court of Session within thirty days from the date on which the order made by the Magistrate is served on the aggrieved person or the respondent, as the case may be, whichever is later. (emphasis supplied) 10. The crucial question to be decided is whether an appeal under S.29 of the Act is maintainable against all orders referred to earlier in the Chapter i.e. from Ss.18 to 23 or whether the provision for appeal is limited to final orders passed under Ss.18 to 22 only. That appeals are maintainable against all final orders under Section 18 to 22 is not disputed. The short question is whether appeal is maintainable against an interim order/an exparte order passed under S.23 of the Act. 11. S.23 reads as follows: S.23. That appeals are maintainable against all final orders under Section 18 to 22 is not disputed. The short question is whether appeal is maintainable against an interim order/an exparte order passed under S.23 of the Act. 11. S.23 reads as follows: S.23. Power to grant interim and ex parte orders - - (1) In any proceeding before him under this, Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper. (2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima ,facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence. He may grant an ex parse order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under S. 18, S. 19, S.20, S.21 or, as the case may be, S.22 against the respondent. (emphasis supplied) 12. S.29 speaks of appeals. It implies that appeal is maintainable against ‘the order', to construe the ambit of the expression `the order' in S.29 of the Act, it will first be necessary to consider the plain language of the statutory provision. It speaks of an appeal against this order. The definite article `the' used in S.29 must certainly have reference to the orders referred earlier. Otherwise, the employment of the definite article `the' would lose its significance. All orders referred to earlier in Chapter 4 of the statute must be held to be fall within the sweep of expression 'the order' as there is no other or better method of understanding the definite article `the' used immediately before the expression `order' in S.29 of the Act. Therefore going by the plain language of S.29, I have no hesitation to agree that the expression `the order' must take within its sweep all orders passed under Ss:18 to 23 and I find no reason to exclude, going by language and semantics, an order passed under S.23 from the sweep of the expression ‘the order' in S.29. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that while understanding the expression `the order', a distinction must be made between final orders passed under Ss.18 to 22 in contradistinction to interim orders passed under S.23 of the Act. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that while understanding the expression `the order', a distinction must be made between final orders passed under Ss.18 to 22 in contradistinction to interim orders passed under S.23 of the Act. The counsel contends that the purpose of the Act, the class of persons/target group to whom relief is sought to be granted under the Act, the sense of expedition which must inform all authorities dealing with proceedings under the Act as reflected in Ss.12(4), 12(5) and 13 must all be borne in mind while considering the sweep of expression `the order'. He also contends that if two views are possible, the one in favour of the target group - the class of persons (victim women in this case) for whom benefit is sought to be conferred under the humane provisions of the Act, cannot be lost sight of. 14. Purely interlocutory orders which deal only with procedure and which do not affect the rights of parties will certainly not fall within the sweep of the expression `the order' in S.29. Any and every order under Chapter 4 of the Act may not fall within the sweep of expression `the order' in S.29. The order has to affect or have a material reflection on the rights of parties in order that such orders would be appealable. It is true that S.23 does not exclude interlocutory orders specifically from the sweep of expression `the order'. But even without such a specific exclusion [as found in provisions of S.19(1) of the Family Courts Act, S.397(2) of the Cr.P.C, S.14 of the Terrorist Affected Areas Special Courts Act, 1984, S.19 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act, 1987 and many other enactments], in S.23 of the Act it has to be held that purely interlocutory orders which do not affect the rights of parties shall not be appealable. 15. It is not necessary to look for specific exclusion in such a provision stipulating the right of appeal to exclude from it purely procedural orders. Notwithstanding the fact that S.29 does not specifically exclude interlocutory orders, it is easy to come to the conclusion that S.29 does not contemplate a challenge in appeal against orders which are purely procedural in nature. Notwithstanding the fact that S.29 does not specifically exclude interlocutory orders, it is easy to come to the conclusion that S.29 does not contemplate a challenge in appeal against orders which are purely procedural in nature. It will not be inapposite in this context to note that the legislature has not thought it fit to specifically exclude even such interlocutory orders from the play of S.23. But however, even in the absence of such specific exclusion, purely procedural orders which are only steps in aid for the final disposal of an application under S.12 claiming reliefs under Ss. 18 to 22, can be excluded from the sweep of the expression `the order' in S.29. What is important to note is that the legislature has not thought it fit to exclude even such purely procedural orders from the sweep of S.29 by employing specific words to that effect. Such a restriction can certainly be inferred from the purpose of the provision for appeal as also from the interpretation of similar and identical provisions in Sumathi v. Devasan (1991 (1) KLT 453) Sidharthan v. Hassankutty Haji (1994 (2) KLT 419). 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that such interim orders under S.23 which are interim to the final orders which may be passed under Ss.18 to 22 cannot be held to affect the rights of parties substantially as to be the subject matter of an appeal under S.29. I am unable to accept this contention at all. A reference to the provisions of Sections 18 to 22 clearly shows that interim orders under Sections 18 to 22, though not final in nature and though they may hold the field only till final orders are passed, will also affect the rights of parties substantially. It is not necessary to advert to the nature of the interim reliefs that can be granted by a Court under S.23 read with Ss.18 to 22. But it is very evident that an interim protection order, an interim residence order, an interim monetary order, an interim custody order or an interim compensation order under Ss.18 to 22 will also substantially affect the rights of parties at least till such orders are altered or modified. S.31 makes it clear that breach of an interim protection order may expose the respondent to even imprisonment for a period of one year and fine. S.31 makes it clear that breach of an interim protection order may expose the respondent to even imprisonment for a period of one year and fine. In this view of the matter, I am unable to agree that interim orders under S.23 must be held, to be not amenable to the appellate jurisdiction under S.29 for the reason that such interim orders would be purely interlocutory (procedural) orders which would not affect the rights of parties at all or substantially. 17. The learned counsel for the respondents contends that a person who has suffered an exparte interim order under S.23 can always go before the Magistrate and request for modification/vacation of the interim order or not to extend the interim order. That course is certainly available to a person who has suffered an exparte interim order under S.23. But the mere fact that such a course is available to him cannot at all persuade the Court to hold that such an interim order will be beyond the purview of S.29 and no such appeal would at all be maintainable. In this context, I again look at the possible interim orders that can be passed under S.23 read with Ss.18 to 22. I have no hesitation to agree that such interim orders passed under S.23 read with Ss.18 to 22 would affect the rights of parties substantially and provisions for appeal under S.29 will be available against such orders also. 18. The question as to how a stipulation for appeal should be interpreted and the cannons of interpretation which must apply while interpreting provisions relating to right of appeal has been considered by this Court in many decisions. Right of appeal is often reckoned as the minimum procedural safeguard against error, arbitrariness and unreasonableness. In Shahul Hameed v. R.T.A., Palghat (1987 (2) KLT 620), Mohammed v. Koyammu Haji (1989 (1) KLT 317), Vamanan Nambudiri v. N. Kurup (1964 KLT 516 (F.B), this Court had emphasised "the need for liberality" while considering provisions relating to the right of appeal. S.29 of the Act is also entitled to such liberality while attempting to interpret the same and ascertaining the width and amplitude of the expression ‘the order' in S.29. 19. Whether an interlocutory order will be appealable was also considered by this Court in several decisions under O.43 R.1(r). S.29 of the Act is also entitled to such liberality while attempting to interpret the same and ascertaining the width and amplitude of the expression ‘the order' in S.29. 19. Whether an interlocutory order will be appealable was also considered by this Court in several decisions under O.43 R.1(r). The decisions in Bhaskaran v. Ambika (1977 KLT 476), Alice v. Thommen (1983 KLT 97) and V.T. Thomas is Malayala Manorama Co.Ltd. (1988 (1) KLT 433) have considered this aspect in detail and this Court had come to the conclusion that even an interim exparte order under o.39 R.1 would be appealable. The Supreme Court in A. Venkatasubbiah v S. Chellappan (AIR 2000 S.C. 3032) has also affirmed that an exparte interim injunction does also fall within the sweep of appealable orders under O. 43 R.1. There can hence be no possible challenge that an interim exparte order is not appealable by its very nature. 20. What remains to be considered is the contention that such a wider understanding of the sweep of S.29 would contribute to the delay in the disposal of applications under Chapter 4 and may in turn defeat the mandate of expedition in Ss.12(4) and 12(5). I am unable to accept this contention at all. The mere fact that an appeal is preferred against an interim order need not necessarily retard the progress of disposal of the applications under Ss. 18 to 22. It will be wrong to assume that the right to appeal against an interlocutory order would necessarily entail delay in the disposal of the applications under Chapter 4. Nor am I impressed with the contention that such an understanding of the sweep of S.29 would be detrimental to the target group to whom the Act endeavours to do justice - viz, the victim women. The right of appeal would be available to such victim women also in case an order under S.23 is not passed in their favour. Therefore it would be incorrect to interpret the expression `the order' in S.29 based on any theory of possible retardation of progress in the disposal of applications under Chapter 4 or on the argument that such right of appeal would be detrimental to the interests of the target group. 21. Therefore it would be incorrect to interpret the expression `the order' in S.29 based on any theory of possible retardation of progress in the disposal of applications under Chapter 4 or on the argument that such right of appeal would be detrimental to the interests of the target group. 21. The counsel for the petitioners raises a further contention that under S.12(4) normally an exparte interim order will have a life of only 3 days and it is not necessary in these circumstances to confer on a person who has suffered an exparte interim order with a right to appeal under S.29. I am unable to accept this contention. Of course, under S.12(4), the first date of hearing must be within 3 days of the date on which the court passed the order. But the exparte interim order may live longer. Moreover in a case depending on the place where the respondent is, the date of first hearing may suitably be fixed on a later date and in such event also, the period of life of the interim order may be longer. The mere fact that the respondent who has suffered the interim order can go to the Magistrate seeking modification of the order passed under Section 23 and can secure an order with expedition is also according to me no ground to interpret S.29 to exclude any right of appeal against an interim order under S.23. 22. I have no hesitation to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that ordinarily and normally a person who has suffered the order would do well to appear before the learned Magistrate and pray for modification vacation of the interim order or not to extend the interim order passed under S.23. A court considering the entertainment of an appeal against an interim exparte order under S.29 will certainly be conscious of this fact - that the aggrieved persons can approach the Magistrate who passed the interim order and seek its variation under S.23 read with S.28(2) of the Act. A Court considering admission of an appeal under Section 29 must always remind itself of the fact that such a course/remedy is available to the aggrieved person and as a reasonably prudent person, a Court will certainly took for answers as to why without and before exhausting that remedy resort is made to the provisions under S.29 to prefer an appeal. But that is not to say that an appeal is not maintainable. Only in an appropriate case need the powers under S.29 be invoked and the appeal entertained. That discretion vests with the appellate court. But the jurisdiction or the competence to entertain an appeal cannot be doubted. 23. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that an order of stay has been granted without due and proper application of mind. I find force in this submission. The court had not even referred to the contentions of the parties. The nature of the order of suspension passed also reveals that there has been no due and proper application of mind. In the same manner in which a sentence is suspended, an order of suspension has been passed also. An appellate court considering the admission of an appeal and considering grant of stay against the interim orders appealed against, must certainly and alertly consider all the circumstances and then only grant interim orders of suspension. Not to do so, would be to do violence to the statutory rationale underlying a welfare statute enacted by the Parliament. I am in agreement with the learned counsel for the petitioner that great care and caution must be applied before granting exparte orders of suspension/stay in appeals' preferred under S.29 of the Act. 24. The appeal was admitted on 19.01.2007 and remains without disposal even now, it is submitted. I must caution the appellate courts of the need to dispose of appeals under S.29 - more so when the order challenged is an interim exparte order under S.23, with great expedition and urgency. I am disappointed to note that the appeal is pending even now. I am satisfied that the learned Sessions Judge can be directed to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible - at any rate, within a period of 15 days from 15.03.2007, on which date both parties/their counsel shall appear before the learned Sessions Judge and if the appeal is not posted for hearing to that date, the learned Sessions Judge shall advance hearing of the appeal to that date for consideration. 25. It may not inapposite in this context to remind the Magistrates also of the great responsibility on them while considering grant of interim exparte orders under S.23 of the Act. 25. It may not inapposite in this context to remind the Magistrates also of the great responsibility on them while considering grant of interim exparte orders under S.23 of the Act. The nature of the possible orders under Ss.18 to 22 and the interim orders that can be passed by invocation of such powers under S.23 must instill in the mind of the Magistrate the concomitant degree of care and caution which is necessary before passing exparte interim orders under S.23 read with S.38 to 22. In cases where existence of matrimony is disputed etc., alert application of mind will certainly be required before such exparte interim orders are passed. I need only mention that the Magistrates must be conscious of the repercussions and ramifications of such exparte interim orders which may be passed under S.23 of the Act. 26. This Crl.M.C. is, in these circumstances, dismissed, but with the specific directions given above to the learned Sessions Judge for expeditious disposal of the appeal.