JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. The matter is taken up for final hearing at admission stage with the consent of the parties. 2. The petitioner in this petition is assailing the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer No. 15, Ahmednagar dt. 31-12-2004 whereby an application tendered by the petitioner under section 28 A of the Land Acquisition Act for redetermination of the amount of compensation awarded came to be rejected. It is the contention of the petitioner that his land came to be acquired by the State for construction of minor irrigation tank. A notification was published under section 4 of the Act on 21-6-1975 which was subsequently published in Government Gazette on 24-7-1975. After following the procedure as prescribed in the Land Acquisition Act, the award was declared on 16-9-1978. One of the land owners whose land came to be acquired by same section 4 notification which was published on 21-6-1975 and were covered by the award which was published on 16-9-1978, filed reference application seeking enhancement in the amount of compensation being LAR no. 172/79. The reference application tendered by the land owner covered by same section 4 notification came to be decided by the Civil Judge, Sr.Dn., Ahmednagar on 21-4-1986 and the reference court was pleased to direct enhancement in the amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The petitioner came to know about the reference application and as such filed an application seeking certified copy of the decision rendered by the civil court in LAR no. 172/79. It is to be noted at this stage itself that an appeal was preferred by the State Government challenging the award directing enhancement in the amount of compensation in LAR no. 172/79 being First Appeal no. 310/89 which came to be dismissed by this court by an order dt. 25-2-2003. Certified copy of the award which was applied for by the petitioner herein was received by him on 4-10-1986. The petitioner on receipt of the certified copy of the award preferred an application under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act to the Collector, Ahmednagar on 10-10-1986. 3. 25-2-2003. Certified copy of the award which was applied for by the petitioner herein was received by him on 4-10-1986. The petitioner on receipt of the certified copy of the award preferred an application under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act to the Collector, Ahmednagar on 10-10-1986. 3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer who was required to take decision in the matter after holding enquiry issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on 31-8-2004 directing him to show cause as to why the application under section 28-A tendered by him shall not be rejected on the ground that the same has been tendered beyond prescribed period of limitation. The applicant on receipt of notice from Special Land Acquisition Officer tendered his reply on 7-9-2004 and contended that the application tendered by him under section 28-A of the Act on 10-10-1986 is well within prescribed period of limitation. Limitation is required to reckon in accordance with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and more specifically on considering the proviso to section 28-A(1) of the act. The period required for obtaining the certified copy of the award shall have to be excluded. It is also contended by the petitioner before the Land Acquisition Officer that the period prescribed for lodging the claim under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act is three months and considering the period requisite for receipt of certified copy of the award, the application tendered by the petitioner shall have to be treated well within limitation. 4. The Special Land Acquisition Officer did not accept the contention raised by the applicant and by order dt. 31-12-2004 rejected the application tendered by the petitioner under section 28-A of the Act. It is noted in the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer that the application under section 28-A of the Act shall have to be filed within 90 days. However, it is mentioned that the application has been tendered after 172 days of the decision rendered by the reference court. The Special Land Acquisition Officer further noted that considering the period required for obtaining certified copy of the award which the Collector computed to be 90 days, the application which is tendered under section 28-A of the Act by the petitioner is after 92 days of the decision rendered by the civil court. With this analogy the application came to be rejected. 5. With this analogy the application came to be rejected. 5. Heard arguments advanced by Shri Barde, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Gavane, learned AGP for the State. Learned counsel Shri Barde contended that the Collector has committed an error in observing that the prescribed period of limitation for filing an application under section 28-A is 90 days. However, according to the learned counsel the petitioner, period of limitation mentioned in the enactment is three months which makes difference. It is also contended by the petitioner that the time requisite for obtaining certified copy shall be computed from the date of filing the application for certified copy till receipt of the same by the petitioner, which was received by the petitioner herein on 4-10-1986. However, while computing the period for exclusion, the Special Land Acquisition Officer has considered the date 29-9-1986 as the relevant date on which the copy was said to be ready. The learned counsel has further drawn my attention to the fact that the application for certified copy was tendered on 11-7-1984 and the date fixed for readiness of the certified copy was 30-8-1986. However, on the given date the copy was not ready which was made ready for delivery on 29-9-1986 and it was actually received by the petitioner on 4-10-1986. Although the petitioner was given a date in respect of readiness of the certified copy as 30-8-1986, it is apparent from record that the copy was not ready on that day and the petitioner has received the same on 4-10-1986. According to the petitioner therefore, the period requisite for obtaining certified copy shall be computed from 11-7-1986 till 4-10-1986. Learned counsel for the respondent as supported the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and contended that the decision rendered is in accordance with the provisions of law. 6. According to the petitioner therefore, the period requisite for obtaining certified copy shall be computed from 11-7-1986 till 4-10-1986. Learned counsel for the respondent as supported the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and contended that the decision rendered is in accordance with the provisions of law. 6. It would be appropriate to refer to provisions of section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act which read thus :- 28A - (1) Where is an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court : . Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. On bare reading of the provisions of section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, it would be clear that the period prescribed for filing an application under section 28-A is three months whereas the proviso provides that the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining copy of the award shall be excluded while computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector is required to be made. The view taken by the Special Land Acquisition Officer that the limitation prescribed for filing an application under section 28-A is 90 days, is not correct. It would therefore be appropriate to consider the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in respect of computation of period of limitation for filing an application under section 28-A. 7. The view taken by the Special Land Acquisition Officer that the limitation prescribed for filing an application under section 28-A is 90 days, is not correct. It would therefore be appropriate to consider the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in respect of computation of period of limitation for filing an application under section 28-A. 7. The definition of ’month’ appearing in section 35 of the General Clauses Act and section 30 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 is "month shall mean a month reckoned according to the British Calendar". Therefore, the view taken by the Special Land Acquisition Officer that the period of three months shall be 90 days is not in accordance with the provisions of law. The terminology ’month’ has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as below :- Word "month", unless otherwise defined, means "calendar month," or time from any day or any of the months as adjudged in the calendar to corresponding day, if any, if not any, to last day, of next month. In its ordinary accepted sense the expression "month" means a "calendar month" and not a "lunar month". As to how a calendar month is to be counted from a date which is not the first of the month has been described in paragraph 143 of Halsbury’s Laws of England Volume 37 (Third Edition) in the following words:- When the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any arbitrary date the period expires with the day in the succeeding month immediately preceding the day corresponding to the date upon which the period starts; save that, if the period starts at the end of a calendar month which contains more days than the next succeeding month the period expires at the end of the latter month." 8. The question in respect of computation of period of six months had fallen for consideration before the Apex court in the matter of Tamal Lahiri Vs. Kumar P.N. Tagore reported in 1979 Cri.L.J. 1. In para no. 6 of the said judgment, the Apex court has observed as :- The only question which then requires examination is whether the prosecution which was filed on June 19, 1968, was instituted as required by S. 533, "within six months next after the commission" of the offence. Kumar P.N. Tagore reported in 1979 Cri.L.J. 1. In para no. 6 of the said judgment, the Apex court has observed as :- The only question which then requires examination is whether the prosecution which was filed on June 19, 1968, was instituted as required by S. 533, "within six months next after the commission" of the offence. An argument was raised in the High Court that ’six months’ must be construed to mean 180 days and not six calendar months. The High Court does not appear to have accepted that submission. There the High Court is right, because S. 3 (27) of the Bengal General Clauses Act, I of 1899, defines ’a month’ to mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. The expression ’six months’ which occurs in S. 533 of the Act must accordingly be construed to mean six calendar months and not 180 days. On consideration of the provisions of the Act as well as the pronouncement referred to above, the limitation is required to be reckoned for filing an application under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act in terms of the provisions of the law and the period of limitation shall be three months which shall not necessarily mean 90 days. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant that the Land Acquisition Officer has erred in considering the period of limitation for filing an application under section 28-A of the Act to be 90 days, is illegal and shall not have to be accepted. 9. So far as computation of period of limitation is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on reported judgment in the matter of M/s India House vs. Kishan N. Lalwani reported in AIR 2003 SC 2084 . The Apex court has considered the methodology of computing period of limitation by excluding the time requisite for obtaining the certified copy and has observed in para no. 6 of the judgment as below : 6. It is well-settled by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act the provisions of Section 12 are applicable for computing the period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law (See D.P. Mishra v. Kamal Narayan Sharma and another (1970)2 SCC 369 and Malojirao Nar-singhrao v. The State of Madhya pradesh (1969) 2 SCC 723 ). The period of limitation statutorily prescribed has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be relaxed or departed from for equitable considerations. At the same time full effect should also be given to those provisions which permit extension or relaxation in computing period of limitation such @ page- SC 2087 as those contained in Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The underlying purpose of these provisions is to enable a litigant seeking enforcement of his right to any remedy to do so effectively and harsh prescription of time-bar not unduly interfering with the exercise of statutory rights and remedies. That is why Section 12 has always been liberally interpreted. To wit, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the impugned decree, sentence or order has been held liable to be excluded from computing the period of limitation although such copy may not necessarily be required to be filed along with appeal, application or memo of representation or review. No distinction is drawn between decrees or orders pronounced on the original side or the appellate or revisional side. No application is required to be made seeking the benefit of section12 of Limitation act; it is the statutory obligation of the Court to extend the benefit where available. Although the language of sub-section (2) of Section 12 is couched in a form mandating the time requisite for obtaining the copy being excluded from computing the period of limitation, the easier way of expressing the rule and applying it in practice is to find out the period of limitation prescribed and then add to it the time requisite for obtaining the copy- the date of application for copy, and the date of delivery, thereof both included - and treat the result of addition as the period of limitation. The underlying principle is that such copy may or may not be required to accompany the petition in the jurisdiction sought to be invoked yet to make up one’s mind for pursuing the next remedy,for obtaining legal opinion and for appropriately drafting the petition by finding out the grounds therefor the litigant must be armed with such copy. Without the authentic copy being available the remedy in the higher forum or subsequent jurisdiction may be rendered a farce. Without the authentic copy being available the remedy in the higher forum or subsequent jurisdiction may be rendered a farce. All that sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act says is the time requisite for obtaining the copy being excluded from computing the period of limitation, or, in other words, as we have put in hereinabove, the time requisite for obtaining the copy being added to the prescribed period of limitation and treating the result of addition as the period prescribed. In adopting this methodology it does not make any difference whether the application for certified copy was made within the prescribed period of limitation or beyond it. Neither it is so provided in sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act nor in principle we find any reason or logic for taking such a view. 10. Turning to the instant matter, an application for certified copy was moved on 11-7-1986 and the copy was received by the applicant on 4-10-1986. It is to be noted at this stage that although the civil court had while delivering the copy has fixed the date of readiness of the certified copy as 30-8-1986, however, on the given date the copy was not ready and therefore the period spent until the date of delivery of the copy shall have to be reckoned for the purpose of exclusion. The judgment of the reference court in LAR no. 172/79 was delivered on 21-4-1986. In accordance with the mandate of the Apex court while computing the period of limitation if the time requisite for obtaining the copy is added to the period of statutory limitation provided under the Act, in the instant matter, the application which is tendered by the petitioner on 10-10-1986 falls within the period of limitation. Time requisite for obtaining the copy shall have to be reckoned from 11-7-1986 till 4-10-1986 which comes to 86 days. Considering this factual aspect, the contention of the petitioner shall have to be accepted that the application tendered by him on 10-10-1986 under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act is well within limitation. 11. For the reasons stated above, the petition shall succeed. In the result the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 31-12-2004 is quashed and set aside. 11. For the reasons stated above, the petition shall succeed. In the result the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 31-12-2004 is quashed and set aside. The respondents are hereby directed to decide the application tendered by the petitioner on 10-10-1986 under section 28-A of the Act in accordance with law and on its own merits. The respondents shall make endeavour to dispose of the application expeditiously and as far as possible within six months from the date of 14 receipt of writ of this court. 12. Rule made absolute accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.