JUDGMENT Honble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—All these writ petitions arise out of the common order dated 8.11.1998 passed by U.P. Public Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the “Tribunal”) involving common questions of law and facts and therefore as agreed by learned Counsel for the parties have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 2. For the purpose of giving facts in brief and with the consent of the parties the Writ Petition No. 43860 of 1998 has been taken as leading case. The respondent No. 2 Mishri Lal filed Claim Petition No. 338 of 1993 before the Tribunal claiming Regularisation and wages as admissible to regularly employed persons of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as “NOIDA”). Similar claim petitions were filed by other private respondents. The NOIDA authority putting appearance, raised a preliminary objection that the claim petitions have been filed by the persons who are workmen under U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “1947 Act”) and also that they are not the employees of NOIDA authority. They have been engaged by private contractors who are carrying out the work undertaken from NOIDA authorities under various contracts and therefore claim petition is not maintainable. The Tribunal has allowed all the claim petitions vide order impugned in these writ petitions holding that since the claimants are not enforcing any right under the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore the claim petition is maintainable. Proceeding further it has directed the petitioners to consider the respondents/claimants for regularization and also for payment of salary as is payable to the other regular employees of NOIDA. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that in view of sub-section 4 of Section 1 of the U.P. Public Service Tribunal Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), claim petitions were not maintainable and therefore the order impugned in the writ petition passed by the Tribunal is wholly without jurisdiction. 4. Sri I.R. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents however supported the order of the Tribunal and contended that since the contesting respondents are working for a long period, even in equity, this Court should not interfere with the order impugned. 5. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. Sri I.R. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents however supported the order of the Tribunal and contended that since the contesting respondents are working for a long period, even in equity, this Court should not interfere with the order impugned. 5. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. Section 1 of the Act provides short title, extent, commencement and application of the Act and sub-section (4) thereof reads as under : “(4) This Section and Sections 2 and 6 shall apply in relation to all public servants while the remaining provisions shall not apply to the following classes of public servants, namely- (a) a member of a judicial service; (b) an officer or servant of the High Court or of a Court subordinate to the High Court; (c) a member of the secretariat staff of any House of the State Legislature; (d) a member of the Staff of the State Public Service Commission; (e) a workman as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), or the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1947). (f) a member of the staff of the Lok Ayukta. (g) the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Members, Officers or other employees of the Tribunal." 6. Section 2 contains various “definitions” and “public servant” is defined under Section 2(b) which reads as under : “2. (b) “public servant” means every person in the service or pay of— (i) the State Government; or (ii) a local authority not being a Cantonment Board; or (iii) any other corporation owned or controlled by the State Government (including any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 in which not less than fifty per cent of paid up share capital is held by the State Government) but doe not include— (1) a person in the pay or service of any other company; or (2) a member of the All India Services or other Central Services;” Section 6 of the Act is in respect to bar of suits and reads as under : “6. Bar of suits.—(1) No suit shall lie against the State Government or any local authority or any statutory corporation or company for any relief in respect of any matter relating to employment at the instance of any person who is or has been a public servant, including a person specified in clauses (a) to (g) of sub-Section (4) of Section 1. (2) All suits for the like relief, and all appeals, revisions, applications for review and other incidental or ancillary proceedings (including all proceedings under Order XXXIX of the first schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908) (Act V of 1908), arising out of such suits, and all applications for permission to sue or appeal as pauper for the like relief, pending before any Court subordinate to the High Court and all, revisions (arising out of interlocutory orders) pending before the High Court on the date immediately proceeding the appointed date shall abate, and their records shall be transferred to the Tribunal and thereupon the Tribunal shall decide the cases in the same manner as if they were claims referred to it under Section 4 : Provided that the Tribunal shall, subject to the provision of Section 5, recommence the proceedings from the stage at which the case abated as aforesaid and deal with any pleadings presented or any oral or documentary evidence produced in the Court as if the same where presented or produced before the Tribunal. (3) All appeals pending before the High Court on the date immediately preceding the appointed date arising out of such suits shall continue to be heard and disposed of by that Court as heretofore as if this Act has not come into force : Provided that if the High Court considers it necessary to remand or refer back the case under Rules 23 of Rule 25 of Order XXL of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), the order of remand or reference shall be directed to the Tribunal instead of to the subordinate Court concerned and the Tribunal shall thereupon decide the case or issue, subject to the directions of High Court, in the same manner as if it were a claim referred to it under Section 4." 8. From a perusal of sub-section (4) of Section 1 read with Section 2(b) of the Act it is evident that definition of “public servant” is very wide which includes every person in the service of State Government or a local authority other than cantonment board or any other corporation owned or controlled by the State Government including any Company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act in which not less than 50% paid up share capital is held by the State Government excluding a person in the pay or service of any other Company or a member of all India services or other central services. However, a person even if is a “public servant” under Section 2(b), but, if he belongs to a category which is in the exemption clauses of Section 1(4) of the Act, Sections 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 shall not be applicable to such public servant. For example a member of judicial service though he is a public servant under Section 2(b) of the Act but he cannot file a claim petition under Section 4 of the Act in view of Section 1(4) which makes Section 4 inapplicable to such public servant. Similar is the position in respect to other “public servants” mentioned in clauses (b) to (g) of Section 1 sub-section 4 of the Act. Therefore, a person who is “workman” as defined under Industrial Disputes Act 1947 or 1947 Act, even though he is a public servant, he cannot file a claim petition under Section 4 of the Act for the reason that Section 4 has no application at all to such person. It is not disputed by learned Counsel for the contesting respondents that all the contesting respondents are covered by the definition of “workman” under 1947 Act. In this view of the matter we have no hesitation in holding that in the case in hand the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition. 9. It is not disputed by learned Counsel for the contesting respondents that all the contesting respondents are covered by the definition of “workman” under 1947 Act. In this view of the matter we have no hesitation in holding that in the case in hand the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition. 9. The Tribunal in order to justify the view taken by it that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition has placed reliance on a judgment of a Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 9216 (SS) of 1993 (Amar Nath Gupta v. State Public Service Tribunal and others) decided on 10.11.1993 wherein the learned Single Judge has taken the view that the public servant who is a workman, if is claiming enforcement of certain rights which are not based on the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, in such cases the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain his claim petition under Section 4 of the Act. We have considered the judgment of learned Single Judge. However, with great respect, we are unable to find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge in Amar Nath Gupta (supra) and it is ex-facie contrary to specific provision of the Act. The Act does not make any difference amongst workman who are though public servants by permitting them to apply Section 4, if they intent to enforce their rights under rules and regulations other than those arising out of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. This is nothing but sheer addition of so many words in the legislation which in our view is neither warranted nor permissible. 10. The learned Single Judge have placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment in Ram Krishna Yadav and others v. U.P.S.R.T.C. and others, 1981 LLT (Services) 101:1981 AWC 481 and another judgment of Hon’ble Single Judge in Sri Ram v. U.P. Public Service Tribunal and others, 1985 U.P.S.C. 212 in taking the aforesaid view. We propose to consider the said judgments also. We propose to consider the said judgments also. To start with, we find that this issue came up for consideration in Writ Petition No. 4580 of 1975 (Bhagwati Prasad Chaurasia v. U.P. Public Service Tribunal and others) decided on 27.1.1977 wherein the Tribunal decline to entertain claim petition on the ground that U.P. State Road Transport Corporation is an industry and therefore, the employees transferred to it from the Government being workman, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain their claim petition in view of Section 1(4) of the Act. The matter came up before Division Bench of this Court and two separate judgments were delivered. Hon’ble H.N. Seth, J. (as his Lordship then was) held that Sri Chaurasiya was conductor in the roadways department of the U.P. Government prior to establishment of corporation and was workmen in the corporation. However, Hon’ble Mufti, J. did not agree with the said view and held that since he was on deputation with the corporation, therefore, retained his character of Government servant and could not be said to be a workman. The matter was not referred to 3rd Judge since the case was disposed of on a different question over which there was no difference of opinion. Thereafter, a similar issue arising from the employees of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation in Jagdish Prasad Gupta and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1980 (2) LLJ 48 and the Division Bench referred to Bhagwati Prasad Chaurasia (supra) and expressed its agreement with the view of Hon’ble Mufti, J. holding that the employees of erstwhile roadways department of the State Government were Government employees when they were on deputation with the corporation and they did not loose their status as Government servant, therefore would not fall within the category of workman under Section 1 (4) of the Act. Thus there was a dispute regarding the status of the employee of U.P. S.R.T.C. who were transferred from erstwhile roadways department of the U.P. Government as to whether during the period they were on deputation with the corporation they continue to be Government servant or answer the definition of workman having become employees of the corporation. By not doing that they continued to be Government servant, this Court thus excluded Section 1(4) of the Act in those cases. By not doing that they continued to be Government servant, this Court thus excluded Section 1(4) of the Act in those cases. The same position continued in A.K. Srivastava v. State of U.P. 1986 (6) ALR 91 and 253; U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. State of U.P. and others, 1981 AWC 481. 11. Noticing divergence in the opinion as to the status of such employees and the authority competent to take action against them in various judgments, a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 150 of 1980, Ram Krishna Yadav (supra) referred this issue before a Larger Bench which was decided by the Full Bench in Ram Krishna Yadav (supra). There are two judgments delivered by the Bench one by His Lordship Hon’ble K.N. Goel, J. and another by T.S. Misra, J. for himself and Hon’ble Hari Swarup, J. The majority held that the employees of the erstwhile roadways department continue to be the Government servant while on deputation to the corporation and therefore action against them can be taken only by the State Government or the officers of the State Government who are also on deputation and not by the corporation. The majority judgment does not touch the issue of Section 1 sub-section 4 as to whether the claim petitions are maintainable before the Tribunal or not. However, His Lordship Hon’ble K.N. Goel, J. in para 20 of the judgment disagree with the view taken in J.P. Gupta (supra) that the employees who are Government servant are not workmen and held that since certain departments of the Government can also be industry, there may be a number of Government servants who answer the definition of workman. Thereafter, it further proceeded to observe that such employees, if they claim any relief arising out of their status and rights of Government servant simplicitor, claim petition under Section 4 of the Act would be maintainable. Neither in J.P. Gupta (supra) nor in any earlier judgment the question has been raised, argued and decided that a public servant, who is a workman in his case whether despite of Section 1, sub-section 4 of the Act, Section (4) would still be applicable and whether such a person can file a claim petition before the Tribunal based on the nature of relief and grounds. The application of the Act does not depend upon the nature of the relief or status of the opposite party or respondents but if the claimant belongs to any of the category which is exempted in Section 1 sub-section (4) of the Act, to such public servant, Section 4 of the Act is inapplicable and therefore, he cannot file a claim petition before the Tribunal irrespective of relief etc. The attention of the Court was neither drawn to this aspect nor this issue in so many words was raised and therefore, the Court had no occasion to deal with this matter. 12. It is true that in Ram Krishna Yadav (supra) the Counsel for the corporation raised this issue and Hon’ble K.N. Goel, J. in para 20 of the judgment held that if a Government servant who is also a workman claims any relief in his status as Government servant in that case Section 4 will be applicable and not otherwise. But this aspect has neither been considered by the majority judgment nor the correctness of the Division Bench in J.P. Gupta (supra) case has been touched by the majority judgment. Unfortunately His Lordship Hon’ble K.N. Goel, J. subsequently in Sri Ram (supra) took a view that his view expressed in para 20 of the judgment having not been disagreed by the majority, is liable to be treated as a view expressed on behalf of the Full Bench. We are constrained to observe that majority on the other hand also has not expressed its agreement of the other views of Hon’ble K.N. Goel, J. It is also worthy to notice that against the Full Bench judgment the matter was taken up in the Apex Court in Jai Jai Ram and others v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Lucknow and others, AIR 1996 SC 2289 and there in para 6 of the judgment the Apex Court crystallized the issue which was up for consideration before the Full Bench of the High Court as under : “Since the only question before the Full Bench of the High Court was whether the officers who had taken such actions were competent to do so in view of the protection afforded by Article 311 of the Constitution and as that is the only question which we have to decide." 13. Thus, it is evident from the above discussion that the Full Bench in Ram Krishna Yadav (supra) is not an authority as to whether a claim petition of a public servant who is a workman would be maintainable before the Tribunal or not since this was not the issue referred to and decided by the Full Bench. In order to constitute a binding precedent it is well settled that an issue must has been raised, argued and decided and mere observations here and there cannot make it a binding precedent. 14. On the contrary, we find that this issue straightway came up for consideration subsequently in Surendra Pal Singh v. State of U.P. and another, 1988 (56) FLR 463 where a Division Bench of this Court held that in view of the Constitution Bench judgment in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Rajappa and others, 1978 (36) FLR 266 the Government Roadways is an industry and therefore its employee, even if they are Government servant, would come within the expression of “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Since a “workman” is not entitled to file a claim petition in view of Section l(4)(e) of the Act, the claim petition at his instance is not maintainable. The Division Bench also held that the view expressed by Hon’ble K.N. Goel, J. in Ram Krishna Yadav (supra) was a minority judgment on this issue and cannot be said to be a view of the Full Bench. The Division Bench clearly held as under:- “The judgment of Hon‘ble K.N. Goel, J. was a minority judgment. In the majority opinion delivered by Hon ‘ble T.S. Misra, J. as he then was, the question as to whether J.P. Gupta’s (supra) was rightly decided or not was not considered. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the Full Bench decision has overruled J.P. Gupta’s case. We agree with Hon’ble Goel, J. to the extent that he has held that the U.P. Government Roadways was also an industry, but we do not agree with the view that J.P. Gupta’s case (supra) was wrongly decided. In fact, in the case of J.P. Gupta (supra), the Bench had not gone into the question as to what would be position in the case where an employee seeks a claim only against the State Government, who admittedly, is the employer of an employee on deputation. In fact, in the case of J.P. Gupta (supra), the Bench had not gone into the question as to what would be position in the case where an employee seeks a claim only against the State Government, who admittedly, is the employer of an employee on deputation. In the case J.P. Gupta (supra), the claim was against the Corporation and having held that there was no relationship of master and servant between the Corporation and the employee on deputation, it was held that such an employee cannot come within the definition of workman. In our opinion, consequently, we agree with the view taken in J.P. Gupta’s case (supra), but as expressed above, we are further of the opinion that in the case of an employee on deputation, if he has a claim only against the Government, then he would come under the definition of ‘workman’ both under the Central as well as the State Industrial Disputes Act and as such, he is entitled to seek an adjudication under these Acts. The State Government in the impugned order dated 13th May, 1982 has stated that the petitioner can file his claim before the U.P. Public Service Tribunal. This observation of the State Government, in our view, is manifestly erroneous. Since the petitioner is a ‘workman’ and he is seeking a claim against the Government, then he would come clearly under Section 1(4) (e) of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal Act, 1976 and as such, he cannot file a claim before the U.P. Public Service Tribunal.” (Para-18). 15. After the Division Bench judgment in Surendra Pal Singh (supra), in our view it was not open to the Hon’ble Single Judge in Amar Nath Gupta (Supra) to take a contrary view by referring to another judgment of the Hon’ble Single Judge in Sri Ram (supra). 16. 15. After the Division Bench judgment in Surendra Pal Singh (supra), in our view it was not open to the Hon’ble Single Judge in Amar Nath Gupta (Supra) to take a contrary view by referring to another judgment of the Hon’ble Single Judge in Sri Ram (supra). 16. Moreover, if the logic of the Hon’ble Single Judge in Amar Nath Gupta (supra) is extended and apply to other categories of public servant mentioned in Section 1 sub-section 4, we fail to understand as to how the category of the public servants enumerated in clauses (a) to (d) can be excluded from filing a claim petition before the Tribunal since it cannot be said that the categories of those employees are not Government servant and whenever they would file a claim petition it would be in their capacity as Government servant and would relate to a condition as Government servant. Thus the status and the nature of work is wholly irrelevant. A plain reading of Section 1 sub-section 4 makes it clear that the definition of “public servant” under Section 2 (b) is very wide and the Act in general covers a very wide category of the employees defined as “public servant” but all such “public servants” cannot file a claim petition under Section 4 of the Act. In respect to limited category of public servant the entire Act has not been applied as such and only Sections 1, 2 and 6 have been applied. In other words by making Section 4 inapplicable to certain category of public servant under Section 1(4), the legislature has denied them a right to file a claim petition before the Tribunal though bar under Section 6 of the Act would apply to those public servants and therefore, they will not be entitled to file civil suit besides also unable to file a claim petition before the Tribunal. The remedy left to them is either such as specified under any special Act like 1947 Act and in the absence thereof by approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17. The Tribunal being a forum of limited jurisdiction, there is no reason or occasion to extend the scope of the Act when a plain reading of Section 1 sub-section 4 does not warrant any such interpretation. 17. The Tribunal being a forum of limited jurisdiction, there is no reason or occasion to extend the scope of the Act when a plain reading of Section 1 sub-section 4 does not warrant any such interpretation. It would be useful to remind at this stage that where the language of statute is clear and unambiguous there is no room for reading or interpreting statute in a manner, which may add a few words therein on the assumption that the legislature has left a vacuum, needs to be bridged by judicial interpretation. It is not the function of the Court to read something in the provision of law, which is not there, or find out a way of obviating the difficulties in enforcing the law howsoever meritorious the intention of the legislature might be. A Constitution Bench in Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 123 rejecting to interpret a law on the supposed difficulty of prosecution in improving the case, observed as under : “The difficulty in the way of the prosecution proving its case need not deflect the Court from arriving at a correct conclusion. If these difficulties are genuinely felt it would be for the legislature to step in and amend the law. It would not be the function of the Court to read something in the provisions of the law, which is not there, or to find out a way of obviating the difficulties in enforcing the law howsoever meritorious the intentions of the Legislature might be." (Para-17) 18. It is settled principle of interpretation, where the words used are clear and unambiguous, the Court is bound to construe them in their ordinary sense and it is not the function of the Court to add words or expression for supposed assumption of what would have been the intention of the legislature. The Court is not entitled to go beyond, so as to supply an omission, as if, to play the role of a political reformer or Counsel to the legislature. A Constitution Bench in Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu and others AIR 2001 SC 2699 in Para 13 observed as under : “The settled principles of interpretation are that the Court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. A Constitution Bench in Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu and others AIR 2001 SC 2699 in Para 13 observed as under : “The settled principles of interpretation are that the Court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The Court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The Court cannot aid the legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there.” 19. The cardinal rule of construction is to find out the intention of the legislature in the words used by the legislature itself. The Court, in order to find out the intention of the statute framing authority must look into the statute itself without any assistance from any other external factor unless there is some doubt or ambiguity in the construction of the statute itself. It would be appropriate to remind in the words of Lord Brougham in Robert Wigram Crawford v. Richard Spooner, 4 MIA 179 (187) (PC) : “if the legislature did intend that which it has not expressed clearly; much more, if the Legislature intended some thing very different; if the Legislature intended pretty nearly the opposite of what is said, it is not for judges to invent something, which they do not meet within the words of the text (aiding their construction of the text always, of course, by the context)". 20. The Apex Court in S.Gurmej Singh v. Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon, AIR 1960 SC 122 (at page 128) also held that the Courts are not to busy themselves with “supposed intention1 or with “the policy underlying the statue but must construe the statute from plain meaning of the words used therein. In Aron Soloman v. A. Soloman & Co. Ltd. (1897) AC 22 (38) (HL) 5. In Aron Soloman v. A. Soloman & Co. Ltd. (1897) AC 22 (38) (HL) 5. Lord Watson observed : “In a Court of law or equity, what the Legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication.” 21. The aforesaid passage has been quoted with approval by the Apex Court in R.L.Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1230 (1244); Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. Workers Union, AIR 1969 SC 513 (759);, Hansraj Gordhandas v. H.H. Dave, AIR 1970 SC 755 (759); Sri Umed v. Raj Singh, AIR 1975 SC 43 (63/64); Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Super Cotton Bowl Refilling Works, AIR 1989 SC 922 (930); State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills, AIR 1991 SC 772 (785) and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India, AIR 2002 SC 1351 (1356). 22. We are aware that the rules of the interpretation are not rules of laws and are not to be followed like rules enacted by legislature in Interpretation Act as observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Superintendent and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1967 SC 997 . The principles of interpretation serve only as a guide. A casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court. There is no presumption that a casus omissus exists and language permitting the Court should avoid creating a casus omissus where there is none. It would be appropriate to recollect the observations of Devlin, LJ. in Gladstone v. Bower, (1960) 3 All ER 353 (CA) : “The Court will always allow the intention of a statute to override the defects of working but the Court’s ability to do so is limited by recognized canons of interpretation. The Court may, for example, prefer an alternative construction, which is less well fitted to the words but better fitted to the intention of the Act. But here, there is no alternative construction; it is simply a case of something being overlooked. We cannot legislate for casus omissus.” 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and others (supra) quoted with approval the following observation of Lord Simonds in the case of Magor & St. But here, there is no alternative construction; it is simply a case of something being overlooked. We cannot legislate for casus omissus.” 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and others (supra) quoted with approval the following observation of Lord Simonds in the case of Magor & St. Mellons R.D.C. v. Newport Corporation, (1951) 2 All ER 839 (841) : “The duty of the Court is to interpret the words that the Legislature has used. Those words may be ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and duty of the Court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited.” 24. It would be appropriate at this stage to remind another principle that though a Court cannot supply a real casus omissus, it is equally evident that it should not so interpret a statute as to create casus omissus when there is really none. Recently in Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy and another v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2006(2) SCC 670 the Court reiterated that while interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate. If a provision of law is misused and subject to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it if deemed necessary. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. 25. We have no hesitation in holding that judgment in Amar Nath Gupta (supra) does not lay down a correct law. 26. Now coming to the another aspect of the matter we find that the Tribunal has further held that since the contesting respondents were not claiming any benefit or right under the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore claim petition is maintainable. In our view even this finding in order to usurp jurisdiction is not correct for the reason that it is evident from the copy of the claim petition filed by the contesting respondents that they did not substantiate their claim for regularization or salary at par with regular employees on the basis of any statutory provision but set up their entire claim on the basis of various legal principles applies by the Apex Court in the cases of “workmen” of different bodies. Section 4 of the Act also shows that a person can file a claim petition before the Tribunal, if he has been dealt with by the employer in a manner which is not in conformity with any contract or in the case of a servant of a local authority or statutory corporation with Article 16 of the Constitution or the Rules and Regulations having force under any Act or legislature constituting such authority or corporation. The contesting respondents neither claim that they have any contract with the petitioners i.e. NOIDA and have not been dealt with in conformity with such contract nor have contended any violation of Rules and Regulations having force under any Act of Legislature constituting such authority or corporation. It is true that vaguely, for the purpose of regularization, violation of Article 14 and 16 has been pleaded but the said pleading is absolutely vague and has not been substantiated at all. The contesting respondents have clearly said that they are only muster roll daily wage employees. Being daily wage employees on muster roll the contesting respondents are admittedly workmen as defined under 1947 Act. Therefore on the pleadings of the contesting respondents before the Tribunal, it is evident that the said application was not maintainable due to the absence of grounds on which the application under Section 4 could have been filed. 27. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the claim petitions filed by respondents under Section 4 of the Act were not maintainable before the Tribunal and therefore the order impugned in the writ petition is wholly without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained. The writ petitions therefore succeed and allowed. The order of the Tribunal dated 8.11.1998 impugned in the writ petitions are quashed and the claim petitions consequently shall also stand dismissed. No order as to costs. ————