ORAL JUDGIVIENT:- Rule. By consent rule is made returnable forthwith. 2. Heard the learned Counsel for the respective panics. 3. By the present petition, the petitioner has put to challenge order dated 26-9-2005 made by 5th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur below exhibits 25 and 26 in Special Civil Suit No. 718 of 2004. Facts: 4. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed a civil suit for specific performance of contract against the defendants in respect of Flat No. C-2, 2nd floor, “Nirmal Ganga Apartments”, Ramdaspeth Nagpur on the allegation that there was oral agreement and receipts dated 24-9-2003 and 6-6-2003 executed in favour of respondent No. 1 pursuant to the said oral agreement for purchase of the flat. It is then stated in the suit that on 19-8-2004, however, the suit flat was sold to defendants No. 4 and 5 by defendant No. 1 to the suit. The defendants entered appearance in the suit and defendant No. 3 i.e. the petitioner filed applications Exh. 25 and 26 By application Exh. 25 it was prayed that defendant No. 3 Rajendra i.e. the petitioner was not at all party to the said document of conveyance dated 19-8-2004 and only two persons namely; Sarla Kamdar and Shreyans Kamdar were the purchasers. In the said document defendant No. 3 Rajendra had absolutely no interest in the property conveyed under the sale deed dated 19-8-20.04. Since the petitioner-defendant No. 3 had no interest in the property conveyed .under the said document dated 19-8-2004, he was neither necessary or proper party in the suit, and therefore, liable to be deleted from the array of the defendants. By another application Exh. 26 filed by the petitioner defendant No. 3 it was prayed that the name of the petitioner-plaintiff No. 2 i.e. respondent No. 2 herein will have to be deleted because even according to plaintiff No. 1 there is no agreement of sale between the parties-plaintiff No. 2 and defendant No. 1. Merely because plaintiff No. 2 has alleged that he was instrumental in getting the said document of agreement executed, he does not become necessary or proper party because he is not a party to the agreement at all The learned trial Court heard both the applications and rejected the same by making common order which is impugned in the present writ petition. Arguments: 5. Mr. Arguments: 5. Mr. Gharote, learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that in a suit of specific performance of contract, the person with whom the agreement is entered or executed, can be made parties to the suit who can be called as necessary or proper parties. But, a person like respondent No.2 i.e. respondent No.2, who admittedly is not a party to the agreement of sale, cannot be a necessary or proper party. The allegation that respondent No.2 was instrumental in bringing out agreement between respondent No. 1 (respondent No.3 herein) is not enough for arraying him as defendant No. 2. At the most, he could be witness in the suit. He then argued that insofar as the document of conveyance dated 19-8-2004 is concerned, the same is admittedly not executed in favour of the petitioner Rajubhai @ Rajendra Kamdar, but the same is executed in favour of Smt. Sarla Kamdar and Shreyans Kamdar. It is further argued that Rajendra has absolutely no interest under the said document of conveyance. Therefore, merely because Rajendra i.e. petitioner is a husband of respondent No. 5 and father of respondent No. 6, he could not be made party-defendant to the suit. He relied on the following decisions: (i) 1973 Mh.L.J. 683, E. Ajay Kumar vs. Tulsabai, ii) 1994 Mh.L.J. 628, Sanjiv vs. Shamrao, iii) (1995) 3 SCC 147 , Anil Kumar Singh vs. Shivnath, iv) 1995 Mh.L.J. 893, Shamrao vs. G.G.N.B.M.S. Santha, v) 2005(3) Mh.L.J. 1 , Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal. 6, Per contra, Mr. Bhangde, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 vehemently opposed the writ petition and argued that looking to the averments in the plaint it is amply clear that though the agreement is only in the name of respondent No.1, respondent No.2, the husband of respondent No. 1 did· everything for execution of agreement in favour of respondent No.1. Not only that even the payments were paid by respondent No.2 to defendant No.1, and therefore, he is a necessary party to the suit and that is why he is joined as party to the suit. Alternatively, he submitted that he is at least a proper party to the suit and thus, cannot be deleted Insofar as the submissions regarding arraying the petitioner as party-defendant to the suit i.e. defendant No. 3 is concerned, Mr. Alternatively, he submitted that he is at least a proper party to the suit and thus, cannot be deleted Insofar as the submissions regarding arraying the petitioner as party-defendant to the suit i.e. defendant No. 3 is concerned, Mr. Bhangde replied by arguing that after all, the document of conveyance dated 198-2004 is executed in favour of his wife and sons wholly at the instance of petitioner-defendant No.3, and therefore, it cannot be said that he is not a proper and necessary party. He, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. Consideration: 7. Perused the record of the writ petition including the plaint so also the impugned order and various application. For deciding the controversy, it would be relevant to have a look to sections IS and 19 of the Specific Relief Act which runs as under: “15. He, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. Consideration: 7. Perused the record of the writ petition including the plaint so also the impugned order and various application. For deciding the controversy, it would be relevant to have a look to sections IS and 19 of the Specific Relief Act which runs as under: “15. Who may obtain specific performance Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, the specific performance of a contract may be obtained by (a) any party thereto; (b) the representative in interest or the principal, of any party thereto; Provided that where the learning, skill, solvency or any personal quality of such party is a material, ingredient in the contract, or where the contract provides that his interest shall not be assigned, his representative in interest of his principal shall not be entitled to specific performance of the contract, unless such party has already performed his part of the contract, or the performance thereof by his representative in interest of his principal has been accepted by the other party; (c) where the contract is a settlement on marriage, or a compromise of doubtful rights between members of the same family, any person beneficially entitled there under; (d) Where the contract has been entered into by a tenant for life in due exercise of power, the remainder man; (e) a reversioner in possession, where the agreement is a covenant entered into with his predecessor-in-title and the reversioner is entitled to the benefit of such covenant; (f) a reversioner in remainder, where the agreement is such a covenant, and the reversioner is entitled to the benefit thereof and will sustain material injury by reason of its breach; (g) when a company has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with another company, the new company which arises out of the amalgamation; (h) when the promoters of a company have, before its incorporation entered into a contract for the purposes of the company, and such contract is warranted by the terms of the incorporation, the company; Provided that the company has accepted the contract and has communicated such acceptance to the other party to the contract. 19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. 19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. - Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of contract may be enforced against: (a) either party thereto; (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequent to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. (c) any person, claiming under a title which, though prior to the contract and known to the plaintiff might have been displaced by the defendant; (d) when a company has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with another company the new company which arises out of the amalgamation; (e) When the promoters of a company have before its incorporation, entered into a contract for the purpose of the company and such contract is warranted by the terms of the incorporation the company; Provided that the company has accepted the contract and communicated such acceptance to the other party to the contract” Perusal if the above provisions clearly show that the person who can sue for specific performance of contract has been specifically mentioned therein. Similarly, the person who can be sued or against whom relief can be sought are clearly mentioned in section 19. Now, with this background, it would be necessary to quote paragraph 9 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case or Anil Kumar Singh vs. Shivnath Mishra (cited supra): “Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 provides that the Court may either party or upon or without an application of either party, add any party whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. Since the respondent is not a party to the agreement of sale it cannot be said that without his presence the dispute as to specific performance cannot be determined. Therefore, he is not a necessary party”. In the light of the above pronouncement of law, in my opinion, both the application Exh 25 and Exh. 26 were required to be allowed. The reasons given by the learned trial Court for rejecting those applications are not sound in law. 8. Mr. Bhangde placed reliance on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sumtibai and others VS. 26 were required to be allowed. The reasons given by the learned trial Court for rejecting those applications are not sound in law. 8. Mr. Bhangde placed reliance on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sumtibai and others VS. Paras Finance Co., reported in 2007(11) SCALE 595. Having carefully gone through the said decision, the same cannot be applied in the instant case as in that case the Supreme Court as a fact found vide para 9 that sons of Kapurchand were also the purchasers along with Kapurchand in the sale deed dated 12-8-1960 and hence they had title in their favour, and therefore, were necessary parties. Thus the said decision is clearly distinguishable. In the same decision in para 13 the Supreme Court then observed; “As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and another vs. N. R. Vairamani and another, AIR 2004 SC 4778 , a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same Judgment this Court also observed:- “Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of the context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain und not to define. Judges imerpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes”. 9. The learned trial Court got much impressed with the fact that the members of two families namely; Kamdar and Gandhi are involved. The trial Court ought to have seen that each individual of the family has independent legal status and merely because they belong to one family, the same cannot be a ground to add them plaintiffs or defendants. 10. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned trial Court is quashed and set aside. The trial Court ought to have seen that each individual of the family has independent legal status and merely because they belong to one family, the same cannot be a ground to add them plaintiffs or defendants. 10. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned trial Court is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clauses A and B. No order as to costs. Writ petition allowed.