Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 1513 (PNJ)

Devinderpal v. State Of Punjab

2007-08-21

MAHESH GROVER

body2007
Judgment Mahesh Grover, J. 1. On 13.2.1992 at 2.50 A.M., Anju Rani daughter of complainant-Parkash Chand (PW5), who was married to the appellant about 3-1/2 years ago, died on account of receiving severe burn injuries. 2. According to the F.I.R. registered at the behest of the complainant, the deceased was subjected to mal-treatment and a demand of Rs. 20,000/- was being made upon her by the appellant and his family members for the purpose of construction of a house. Since he could not fulfill their demand, the appellant along with his mother and brother, namely, Kailash Rani and Kewal Krishan alias Pappu set the deceased on fire. 3. The police, after investigation of the case, submitted a challan against the appellant and the aforesaid two accused persons. 4. The Sessions Judge, Ferozepur (hereinafter described as the trial Court) charge-sheeted all the accused persons for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 302 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 5. In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses including the complainant, the brother of the deceased and the doctors, who attended on Anju Rani when brought to the hospital and who conducted the post mortem examination on her dead body. 6. In their statements recorded under Section 313-3 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant and other accused persons claimed innocence and stated that the marriage took place eight years prior to the occurrence and not 3-1/2 years as was alleged by the complainant. The allegation of demand of dowry was also denied. Kailash Rani and Kewal Krishan further stated that they were not staying with the appellant and were residing separately. Respective evidence in the shape of ration cards was also produced in support of their version of defence. 7. The trial Court, after considering the entire evidence on record, concluded vide its judgment dated 4.4.1996 that the co-accused of the appellant, namely, Kailash Rani and Kewal Krishan were not guilty and accordingly acquitted them of the charge. The appellant was, however, convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. In default of payment of fine, he was directed to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. 8. The appellant was, however, convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. In default of payment of fine, he was directed to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. 8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the demands of dowry are not borne out from any evidence on record. The only allegation against the appellant is that he had demanded a sum of Rs. 20,000/- which, considering the status of the parties, was not possible as the appellant is a labourer. That apart, learned counsel contended that in the absence of any categoric allegation of demand of dowry, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act (for short, the Act) cannot be attracted to convict the appellant under the provisions of Section 304-B of the I.P.C. He argued that even though, the case of the appellant is that the deceased received burn injuries accidentally, but given the worst of the case against him, it can, at best, be a case of suicide and the conviction ought to be considered under Section 306 of the I.P.C. and the sentence reduced appropriately. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State contended that the deceased had died within 3-1/2 years of her marriage and in view of the testimony of the complainant regarding demand of Rs. 20,000/- which is also fortified by the statement of PW6-Harjinder Kumar (brother of the deceased) and PW7-Tarsem Lal (Sarpanch of the village of the deceased). Besides, the presumption of law under Section 113-B of the Act is straight away attracted to the facts of this case. In view of this, learned counsel contended that there is no infirmity in the findings recorded by the trial Court. 11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 12. Section 301-B of the I.P.C. is a unique provision to check the ills of the society prevailing in this country where the occasion of marriage and the consequent arrangements are treated as a financial bonanza by the groom and his family. 11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 12. Section 301-B of the I.P.C. is a unique provision to check the ills of the society prevailing in this country where the occasion of marriage and the consequent arrangements are treated as a financial bonanza by the groom and his family. It is for this reason that the presumption of law under Section 113-B of the Act has been introduced so as to meet a situation in the event of an unnatural death of a bride taking place within seven years of her marriage on account of unsavoury demands of dowry having been made on her and her family. 13. But, to attract the aforestated provisions, it is imperative that the demands of dowry and the consequent ill-treatment on account thereof leading to death, be established by way of cogent evidence. This obviously has to be inferred and gathered from the facts of each case. 14. In the instant case, the marriage is stated to be 3-1/2 years old at the time of occurrence and it has not come in evidence as to the specific period of time when demands of dowry were raised. There is no evidence to suggest that the demands raised bore a close proximity to the occurrence or that the demands and consequent ill-treatment led to the incident in which Anju Rani lost her life. Had the marriage been of a lesser period, then the yard-sticks to consider such an allegation would have been different because in a case of that situation, it would imply that the demand which led to the ill-treatment had further led to the death of the deceased. 15. Consequently, in the absence of any evidence, it would not be safe to record the conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B of the I.P.C. 16. The Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that an unnatural death has taken place within seven years of the marriage, a death which is gruesome in nature. There is evidence on record by way of the statements of the complainant and the brother of the deceased indicating that she had been ill- treated in her matrimonial home. The Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that an unnatural death has taken place within seven years of the marriage, a death which is gruesome in nature. There is evidence on record by way of the statements of the complainant and the brother of the deceased indicating that she had been ill- treated in her matrimonial home. The sense of injury, which the complainant bore against the appellant, is reflected in his version given to the police whereby he tried to implicate him and his mother and brother by suggesting a murder. Even though, this aspect has been disbelieved by the trial Court, yet, it reflects on the state of affairs which were existing between the two families. It was implicit in this that the deceased was being subjected to ill-treatment in her matrimonial home which apparently led to her death. It is probable and, indeed, possible that she might have taken her own life. 17. The presumption under Section 113-A of the Act would, therefore, be attracted to the facts of the present case and the appellant cannot escape the onslaught of such a presumption. 18. Consequently, in the absence of any evidence to substantiate the charge under Section 304-B of the I.P.C., the conviction of the appellant is converted to that under Section 306 of the I.P.C. 19. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant contended that it is in evidence that when the incident took place, the deceased had left behind two minor children, aged two years and one year and that by now, they would be in their teens and to divest them of the care and affection of their father would be extremely harsh. 20. I have considered the matter from this aspect as well. It is, indeed, cruel upon the children, who lost their mother to the unreasonable attitude of the appellant when they were just toddlers and now, once again they would be deprived of the protection and security of their father. But, no matter how harsh it may be, the law has to take its own course. However, to mitigate the sufferings of the children, who have been left behind on account of unfortunate death of their mother, the appellant is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years and the sentence awarded by the trial Court is reduced appropriately. But, no matter how harsh it may be, the law has to take its own course. However, to mitigate the sufferings of the children, who have been left behind on account of unfortunate death of their mother, the appellant is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years and the sentence awarded by the trial Court is reduced appropriately. With the aforesaid modification in the impugned judgment, the appeal is disposed of.