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2007 DIGILAW 1516 (PNJ)

Sukhdev Raj (dead) represented through his LRs. v. Babu Ram

2007-08-21

VINOD K.SHARMA

body2007
JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma, J. - This Regular Second Appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 11-03-1981 passed by the learned District Judge, Roop Nagar, vide which suit filed by the plaintiff for separate possession by means of partition of the joint property in question was ordered to be decreed. 2. Plaintiff-respondent No. 1 herein had brought a suit against Sukhdev Raj and Dev Raj, defendants for separate possession by way of partition of the joint property i.e. two shops, one house and the site thereunder marked as ABCDEF as described in the head-note of the plaint. It was pleaded that Babu Ram and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 along with their brothers, Megh Raj, Madan Gopal and Hem Raj, purchased a plot described in the head-note of the plaint for a consideration of Rs. 7330/- vide sale deed dated 29-01-1969 from one Jamadar Singh son of Hans Raj. The plaintiff had 2/7th share in the plot, whereas defendant Nos. 1 and 2 alongwith their brothers Megh Raj, Madan Gopal and Hem Raj had 5/7 shares therein. The plaintiff, defendant No. 1 and Megh Raj, Madan Gopal and Hem Raj, constructed shops on the vacant site. The plaintiff and defendant No. 1 purchased the share of their brothers in the site along with the shops constructed thereon in equal shares vide sale deed dated 30-9-1974 for a sum of Rs. 8500/-. The plaintiff and defendant No. 1, therefore, became the owners in possession of two shops to the extent of half share each. It was further averred that the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 constructed a house jointly in the rest of the plot marked as CDEF as shown in the site plan. It was also claimed that the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 had half share each in two shops as well as half share each in the house. The plaintiff was said to be having 3-1/2/7 share and defendant No. 1 had 2-1/2/7 share and defendant No. 2 had 1/7 share in the site underneath the building shown as ABCDEF in the site plan. On these pleadings, the possession by way of partition was sought. 3. The plaintiff was said to be having 3-1/2/7 share and defendant No. 1 had 2-1/2/7 share and defendant No. 2 had 1/7 share in the site underneath the building shown as ABCDEF in the site plan. On these pleadings, the possession by way of partition was sought. 3. The suit was contested by defendant No. 1 where he had admitted that he along with the plaintiff had purchased the share of their brothers Megh Raj, Madan Gopal and Hem Raj in the site along with the shops standing thereon through the sale deed dated 29-1-1969. It was denied that the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 were in joint possession of the property mentioned in the plaint. It was claimed that the property was in possession of defendant No. 1 as exclusive owner. It was admitted that the house marked as CDEF was jointly constructed. However, it was claimed that the plaintiff had no share in any part of the suit property. Dev Raj was said to be having 1/7 share in the vacant site, but the plaintiff was said to have no share therein. It was further claimed that there had been a partition between the parties and the share of the plaintiff was adjusted as he had been given whole of the house in the boarding house street near house of Ch. Sarwan Singh son of Rangi Ram as per the agreement dated 3-01-1977. It was also claimed that there was a partition prior to it also which was opposed and subsequent partition was effected. As regards the joint business and immovable property, it was claimed that under the terns of the agreement dated 30-1-1977, the plaintiff was liable to pay to defendant No. 1 an amount of Rs. 12,500/- (Rs. Twelve Thousand Five Hundred) in three instalments. It was further claimed that it was agreed that under the agreement the plaintiff would execute a sale deed in respect of the property which was given up in favour of defendant No. 1 in the suit property and the said sale deed was to be executed on 15-6-1977. The property in suit was known as Main Road Wali shop and house. Defendant No. 1 claimed to have been put in possession of the property by the plaintiff in part performance of the agreement dated 03-01-1977. The property in suit was known as Main Road Wali shop and house. Defendant No. 1 claimed to have been put in possession of the property by the plaintiff in part performance of the agreement dated 03-01-1977. The agreement was said to have been duly written and signed by the parties in which defendant No. 1 had given up his share in the house situated in Boarding House Wall Gali. It was also agreed that defendant No. 1 would manage the share of Dev Raj himself. It was also the case of defendant No. 1 that plaintiff was not in possession of the suit property. The other objections were also raised. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed : "1. Whether the partition has taken place between the parties and the suit property has fallen to the share of the defendant No. 1 ? 2. Whether the plaintiff has got 1/2 share in the suit property ? 3. Whether the suit is properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction and proper court fee has been paid ? 4. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties ? 5. Relief." The learned trial Court on issue Nos. 1 and 2 came to the conclusion that the partition had already taken place between the parties and defendant No. 1 was in exclusive possession of the property in dispute on the basis of the agreement. On issue No. 3, it was held that the suit was properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction. On issue No. 4, it was held that the suit was not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. In view of the findings recorded on issues No. 1 and 2, the suit was dismissed. 5. The plaintiff-respondent filed an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 4-3-1980 passed by the learned trial Court. Before the learned lower Appellate Court, it was pleaded that the document Exhibit D-1 was an unregistered partition deed involving creation and extinguishment of rights and interest in immovable property of the value of more than Rs. 100/- was, thus, inadmissible and oral evidence to prove the partition was also inadmissible in view of the provisions of Section 91 of the Evidence Act. 100/- was, thus, inadmissible and oral evidence to prove the partition was also inadmissible in view of the provisions of Section 91 of the Evidence Act. It was also held by the learned lower Appellate Court that the document Exhibit D-1 was inadmissible in evidence as held by the trial Court. The learned trial Court had dismissed the suit on the plea that the said document could be looked into for the collateral purpose of proving the factum of partition and could be read into evidence for the said limited purpose. The learned lower Appellate Court accepted the appeal by recording a finding that the document Exhibit D-1 was a partition deed purporting to create and distinguish the right and interest in the immovable properties of the value of more than Rs. 100/- and it being unregistered was not admissible in evidence for proving a term of partition embodied therein and in order to come to this conclusion reliance was placed on the judgment of Honble Calcutta High Court in the case of Ram Prasad Mondal v. Smt. Sanehlata Ghosh, AIR 1967 Calcutta 367. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Raghunath and others v. Kedar Nath, AIR 1969 SC 1316. The learned lower Appellate Court also reversed the finding of the learned trial Court to the effect that the appellant-defendant was entitled to the benefit of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. 6. Learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant raised the following substantial questions of law :- "1. Whether the family settlement/Partition Deed dated 3-01-1977 (Exhibit D-1) arrived at between the parties and acted upon requires registration under the Transfer of Property Act/Registration Act ? 2. Whether Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable to the present case ? He made a reference to the document Exhibit D-1 to contend that it was in fact an agreement of partition, vide which the terms were settled to implement it in future and, therefore, it could not be said to be a partition deed which requires registration. However, this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted as the reading of document Exhibit D-1 leaves no manner of doubt that the partition was said to have been effected by way of said document. However, this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted as the reading of document Exhibit D-1 leaves no manner of doubt that the partition was said to have been effected by way of said document. This document also talks of relinquishment of some earlier partition dated 12-12-1976. In this situation, it has to be held that the document Exhibit D-1 was in fact a partition deed vide which rights were created and extinguished in immovable property of value of more than Rs. 100/- and, therefore, was compulsorily registrable and for want of registration the same could not be read in evidence to prove partition between the parties, as it is the main object of no collateral purpose. 7. Learned senior counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Tehmi P. Sidhwa and others v. Shib Banerjee and sons Pvt. Ltd. and another, AIR 1974 SC 1912 to contend that an award relating to partition of immovable property and to execute other documents was not required to be registered. The Honble Supreme Court in the said judgment has been pleased to lay down as under : " (A) Where an arbitration award, relating to the partition of immovable property of the value exceeding Rs. 100/- directed some of the parties to execute certain documents as may be necessary for declaring the shares and for transferring the property such an award itself did not create or declare any right, title or interest in the property but it merely created a right to obtain another document which will when executed create such right, title or interest. Such award fell under Section 17(2)(v) and not under Section 17(1)(b) and was therefore not registrable." However, there is no force in this contention as in the present case the document Exhibit D-1 in fact was a deed of partition vide which shares were distributed and, therefore, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel has no application to the facts of the present case. Even otherwise, the arbitration award cannot be equated with a partition deed executed between the parties. 8. Even otherwise, the arbitration award cannot be equated with a partition deed executed between the parties. 8. The learned senior counsel, thereafter placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Siromani v. Hemkumar and others, AIR 1968 SC 1299 to contend that Exhibit D-1 was admissible to prove the collateral purpose. The contention of the learned senior counsel, therefore, was that the learned lower Appellate Court was not justified in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court as the document Exhibit D-1 in fact proved that the parties had partitioned their property and were not joint. The learned senior counsel for the appellant further contended that the learned lower Appellate Court was not justified in giving benefit of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act to the appellant-defendant herein while accepting the appeal filed by the plaintiff-respondent. The contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant also cannot be accepted as in this very judgment the Honble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the party was entitled to seek partition and the unregistered document was only to be used to come to the conclusion that there was intention of the parties to be separate. Para 8 of the said judgment reads as under : "On behalf of the respondents reference was made to the evidence of D.W.1 Dinamoni and D.W.2 Dindayal that there was an actual partition of joint family properties not on December 27, 1943 when Ex.D-4 was executed but about two months later and specific allotments were made to each of the coparceners. There is, however, no pleading in the written statement on behalf of the respondents that apart from the document, Ex.D.4 there was a partition of the joint family properties. We are satisfied in this case upon examination of the evidence that the intention of the parties was that document Ex.D-4 should be the sole evidence of partition and since we have held that Ex.D-4 is not admissible in evidence on account of non-registration to establish when the property was so partitioned, it is manifest that no oral evidence is admissible to prove any subsequent partition having regard to the provisions of Section 91 of the Evidence Act. It is clear therefore that the appellants are entitled to a preliminary decree for partition of joint family properties." Thus, in view of authoritative judgments of the Honble Supreme Court, the first question of law, as framed, has to be answered against the appellant and it has to be held that Exhibit D-1 was necessarily a registrable document and in absence of payment of stamp duty and the document having not been registered, the same was not admissible in evidence to prove the factum of partition to defeat the rights of the plaintiff-respondent. The second question of law does not arise as the co-owner cannot claim benefit of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, the learned lower Appellate Court was right in reversing the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in this regard. In view of what has been stated and discussed above, there is no merit in this appeal, which is, accordingly, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.