PRANAB KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAY, J. ( 1 ) BOTH the appeals have been preferred from the common judgment and order dated July 9, 2002 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby and whereunder the said learned Single judge finally disposed of two writ petitions being W. P. No. 15689 (W) of 1998 and W. P. No. 2769 (W) of 2000 respectively filed by the respondent No. 1/ writ petitioner herein. The first writ petition being W. P. No. 15689 (W) of 2000 was filed challenging the order of suspension and memorandum of charges issued against the writ petitioner and the other writ petition being w. P. No. 2769 (W) of 2000 was subsequently filed by the said writ petitioner challenging the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Committee. ( 2 ) BOTH the aforesaid writ petitions were ultimately disposed of by the learned Single Judge by the common judgment and order dated 9* July, 2002 whereby and whereunder the said learned Single Judge not only quashed the chargesheet, enquiry report and the final order of removal of the said writ petitioner from service but also the said learned Single Judge quashed the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the said writ petitioner who is respondent No. 1 herein. ( 3 ) BY the said order under appeal learned Single Judge also directed immediate reinstatement of the writ petitioner in service with all back wages. Being aggrieved by the said order of the learned Single Judge appellant herein preferred the instant appeals. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant that the learned Single Judge should not have quashed the chargesheet, enquiry report, the final order of removal of the writ petitioner from service and also the entire disciplinary proceedings as according to the appellant, all steps in connection with the said disciplinary proceedings were taken following the SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977. ( 4 ) MR. N. Bhattacharya, learned Advocate of the appellant submits that the competent disciplinary authority issued the chargesheet to the writ petitioner and thereafter appointed inquiring authority to conduct enquiry proceedings on the basis of the charges mentioned in the said chargesheet. Mr. ( 4 ) MR. N. Bhattacharya, learned Advocate of the appellant submits that the competent disciplinary authority issued the chargesheet to the writ petitioner and thereafter appointed inquiring authority to conduct enquiry proceedings on the basis of the charges mentioned in the said chargesheet. Mr. Bhattacharya further submits that the duly constituted inquiring authority enquired into the charges levelled against the writ petitioner upon observing the principles of natural justice and procedural justice and ultimately came to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the said writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 herein have been established. It has also been submitted on behalf of the appellant that the learned Single judge cannot sit over the findings of the Inquiring Committee as the appellate authority. As a matter of fact, the learned Counsel of the appellant also repeatedly reminded this Court that the evidence adduced in the enquiry proceedings cannot be reassessed by this Court when fact remains that this Court never intended to reassess any evidence adduced before the Inquiring Committee. It has also been urged before this Court on behalf of the appellant that the learned Single Judge without appreciating the gravity of the matter and also not considering the merits of the case passed the impugned order directing reinstatement of the writ petitioner/ respondent No. 1 in service with all back wages. The learned Advocate of the appellant referred to and relied upon the following decisions in support of his arguments: 1) 2006 (7) SCC 558 [om Prakash Mann vs. Director of Education (Basic)and Ors. ] (Paragraph 7)2) 2006 (7) SCC 410 [general Manager, Appellate Authority, Bank of India and Anr. vs. Mohd. Nizamuddin] (Paragraph 9 ). ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel of the respondent No. 1/ writ petitioner, however, submits that the disciplinary authority issued the chargesheet and initiated the disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioner on vague charges with an intention to victimise the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 herein for initiating a separate proceeding before this Hon'ble Court by filing a writ petition challenging the decision of the concerned authorities of the appellant herein in the matter of granting promotion. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondent No. I/writ petitioner that although a separate writ petition being W. P. No. 5278 (W) of 1997 was dismissed by Hon'ble justice Ajoy Nath Ray (as His Lordship then was) on 22nd April, 1997, subsequently, the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Court on 1st June, 1998 set aside the said order of the learned Single Judge and directed the concerned authority of the appellant herein to consider the claim of the writ petitioner/ respondent No. 1 herein regarding promotion. According to the respondent no. I/writ petitioner the said order of the Division Bench dated 1st June, 1998 annoyed the appellant herein and before considering the claim of the writ petitioner pursuant to the aforesaid direction of the Division Bench, chargesheet was issued to the said respondent No. I/writ petitioner. ( 6 ) THE learned Advocate of the respondent No. 1 further submits that the Hon'ble Division Bench by the aforesaid order dated 1st June, 1998 issued specific direction for considering the claim of the writ petitioner for promotion and the competent authority considered the claim of the writ petitioner for promotion on 8th September, 1998 in compliance with the aforesaid order dated 1st June, 1998 whereas the chargesheet was issued to the respondent no. I/writ petitioner by the Managing Director of the Durgapur Steel Plant as the disciplinary authority on 29th June, 1998 i. e. immediately after the said order was passed by the Division Bench and long before the consideration of the claim of the writ petitioner pursuant to the said order. ( 7 ) THE learned Advocate of the respondent No. 1 also submits that the appellant herein victimised the said respondent No. 1 only for approaching this Hon'ble Court for redressal of his grievances in the matter of granting promotion. According to the learned Advocate of the respondent No. 1, the appellant particularly the disciplinary authority proceeded in the matter with a mala fide intention and ill-motive for victimising the writ petitioner. According to the learned Advocate of the respondent No. 1, the appellant particularly the disciplinary authority proceeded in the matter with a mala fide intention and ill-motive for victimising the writ petitioner. ( 8 ) IT is not in dispute that the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court by the said order dated 1st June, 1998 set aside the earlier order of the learned single Judge and specifically directed the competent authority of the appellant to consider the claim of the writ petitioner regarding promotion to the higher rank and such consideration was made after a lapse of more than three months by the competent authority on 8th September, 1998 although the chargesheet was issued to the respondent No. I/writ petitioner within a period of less than four weeks. In the aforesaid circumstances, the contentions of the respondent No. 1 that in order to victimise the said writ petitioner/respondent No. 1, chargesheet was issued and the disciplinary proceedings was initiated, cannot be said to be without any basis. ( 9 ) MR. Bidyut Kiran Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel representing the writ petitioner referred to the memorandum of charges and the statement of allegations and submits that the same are not only vague but the same have also been issued in clear violation of the provisions of the Steel Authority of India Limited Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977. Relevant portions of the provisions of Rule 25. 0 relating to procedure for imposing major penalties under the aforesaid Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977 are set out hereunder: "25. 0. PROCEDURE FOR IMPOSING MAJOR PENALTIES: (1) No order imposing any of the major penalties specified in clauses (e), (f) and (g) of Rule 23 shall be made except after an inquiry is held in accordance with this rule. (2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against an employee, it may itself enquire into or appoint any executive of SAIL or any of its subsidiary or any public servant (hereinafter called the inquiring authority) to inquire into the truth thereof. (3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry, the disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour against the employee. (3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry, the disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour against the employee. The charges together with a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour on which they are based, a list of documents by which and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained, shall be communicated in writing to the employee, who shall be required to submit within such time as may be specified by the disciplinary authority (not exceeding 15 days), a written statement whether he admits or denies any of or all the articles of charge. . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 10 ) IT has been specifically submitted on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that in compliance with sub-rule (3) of Rule 25. 0 no list of documents by which and list of witnesses by whom the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained were not communicated to the respondent No. I/writ petitioner. The learned Advocate of the respondent No. 1 submits that by not supplying the aforesaid list of documents and the list of witnesses alongwith the memorandum of charges, the disciplinary authority has flagrantly violated the clear provision of said sub-rule (3) of Rule 25. 0 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977 and therefore, the chargesheet issued to the respondent No. I/writ petitioner cannot be said to be a valid and proper chargesheet. ( 11 ) ON examination of the records it appears that the disciplinary authority although forwarded the memorandum of charges dated 29th June, 1998 together with the statement of allegations on the basis of which charges have been framed but no list of documents and list of witnesses in terms of the sub-rule (3) of Rule 25. 0 were forwarded to the employee concerned, namely, the respondent No. 1 herein and therefore, it is established that the disciplinary authority issued the chargesheet to the respondent No. 1 without complying with the requirements as mentioned in sub-rule (3) of rule 25. 0 of SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977. 0 were forwarded to the employee concerned, namely, the respondent No. 1 herein and therefore, it is established that the disciplinary authority issued the chargesheet to the respondent No. 1 without complying with the requirements as mentioned in sub-rule (3) of rule 25. 0 of SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977. The learned advocate of the respondent No. 1 referring to the memorandum of charges and the statement of allegations specifically submits that the charges mentioned in the impugned memorandum of charges are totally vague, indefinite and devoid of material particulars. The memorandum of charges and statement of allegations issued by the disciplinary authority are set out hereunder : STEEL authority OF INDIA LTD. DURGAPUR STEEL PLANT No. PL- III/4-B (586)/959 Date: 28/29. 6. 98, Shri Debasis Biswas , Manager, T. No. 496323, Coke Ovens & Coal chemicals, Durgapur Steel plant. Sd /- 29. 6. 98. THROUGH: DGM , CO &cc, dsp. MEMORANDUM OF CHARGES Whereas it has been reported that you have committed some acts of omission and commission as per the statement of allegation enclosed and you are, therefore, charged with having committed the following acts of misconduct as per clause 5. 0 (6), (18)& (20) of the SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977: (I) Wilful insubordination or disobedience, whether or not in combination with other, of any lawful and reasonable order of your superiors; (II) Absence from appointed place of work without permission or sufficient cause ; (III) Commission of an act subversive of discipline or of good behaviour. You are required to submit to the undersigned a written explanation within seven days from, the date of receipt of this chargesheet as to why suitable disciplinary action as deemed fit should not be taken against you for committing the abovementioned acts of misconduct. Should you fail to submit your explanation as directed, it will be presumed that you have no explanation to offer and the matter will be disposed of based on available records. As the charges against you are of serious nature, you are hereby placed under suspension with immediate effect in term of sub-rule - (1a) of Rule - 20 of SAIL conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977. During the period of suspension you will be entitled to subsistence allowance as admissible as per Rule 21 of SAIL Conduct, discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977. During the period of suspension you will be entitled to subsistence allowance as admissible as per Rule 21 of SAIL Conduct, discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977. Please acknowledge receipt of the chargesheet on the duplicate copy enclosed . P. Sd /- (S. B. Singh) Managing Director, D. S. & Disciplinary Authority STEEL authority OF INDIA LTD. DURGAPUR STEEL PLANT STATEMENT OF ALLEGATION ON the BASIS OF WHICH CHARGES HAVE BEEN framed AGAINST SHRI DEBASIS BISWAS, manager, T. NO. 496323, COKE OVENS & COAL chemicals DEPTT. , DSP You, Shri Debasis Biswas , Manager, T. No. 496323, Coke Ovens & Coal Chemicals Deptt . , DSP have been refusing to accept the tasks and targets assigned to you from time to time. You are also not obeying the advice and instructions of your superiors. You are in the habit of abstaining yourself from your place of duties without keeping your superiors informed. You do not obtain any permission and remain absent from your duty place without sufficient cause of absence. You behave in very indisciplined manner on the shop floor and your attitude towards work on the shop floor is highly deplorable. In spite of many advices and instructions, you act in a manner subversive of discipline and good behaviour. You have thus committed act of misconduct as per the SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977. P. Sd /- 28. 6. 98. (S. B. Singh) Managing Director, D. S. & Disciplinary Authority ( 12 ) ON examination of the chargesheet it appears that the charges levelled against the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 are mere reproduction of Rule 5. 0, sub-rules (6), (18) and (20) of the SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal rules, 1977. Sub-rules (6), (18) and (20) of the Rule 5. 0 of the SAIL Conduct, discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977 are set out hereunder: "5. 0. MISCONDUCT: without prejudice to the generality of the term "misconduct", the following acts of omission and commission shall be treated as misconduct: (6) Wilful insubordination or disobedience, whether or not in Page 8 of 15 combination with others, of any lawful and reasonable order of his superior. (18) Absence from the employee's appointed place of work without permission or sufficient cause. (20) Commission of any act subversive of discipline or of good behaviour. (18) Absence from the employee's appointed place of work without permission or sufficient cause. (20) Commission of any act subversive of discipline or of good behaviour. " ( 13 ) THE chargesheet should contain accusation of misconduct and therefore, adequate care should be taken to ensure that the chargesheet mentions all the essential ingredients of a particular misconduct. The charge should contain all the relevant facts which constitute a particular misconduct. The charges mentioned in the chargesheet should not only be specific but the same should also be complete in all essential constituents. ( 14 ) THE Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Birichh Bhutan and Ors. vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1963 SC 1120 has specifically held that a charge is not an accusation made or information given in abstract but an accusation made against a person in respect of an act committed or omitted in violation of a penal law. There is no doubt that the disciplinary authority is under an obligation to frame charges on the basis of the allegations on which the departmental enquiry is proposed to be held. The statement of allegations on the basis of which charges have been framed against the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 also does not furnish all relevant details in relation to the charge. ( 15 ) RULE 25. 0, sub-rule (3) of the SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal rules, 1977 casts an obligation on the disciplinary authority to frame definite charges on the basis of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour against the concerned employee. The disciplinary authority is therefore, required to furnish all the allegations on which the charges have been framed in the statement of allegations in order to grant reasonable opportunity of making representation to the concerned employee. ( 16 ) ON examination of the statement of allegations we find that all relevant details in relation to the charges have not been disclosed. The chargesheet issued to the respondent No. I/writ petitioner is nothing but exact reproduction of Rule 5. 0, sub-rules (6), (18) and (20) of the said SAIL Conduct, discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977 and the statement of allegations on the basis of which the alleged charges have been framed also does not contain adequate particulars and/or sufficient allegations and/or relevant details in relation to the charges. 0, sub-rules (6), (18) and (20) of the said SAIL Conduct, discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977 and the statement of allegations on the basis of which the alleged charges have been framed also does not contain adequate particulars and/or sufficient allegations and/or relevant details in relation to the charges. Material particulars and relevant details in relation to the charges levelled against the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 have neither been mentioned in the chargesheet nor even mentioned in the statement of allegations on the basis of which charges have been framed against the said respondent No. I/writ petitioner herein. ( 17 ) THE writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 while replying to the chargesheet specifically mentioned that the alleged charges are not only vague, indefinite but without having any material particulars. The relevant portion from the reply of the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner to the disciplinary authority in answer to the chargesheet is quoted hereunder: "it is also submitted that the said alleged charges levelled against me are vague, indefinite and without having any material particulars. " Page 9 of 15 ( 18 ) IT is well-settled that whether a chargesheet in a given case is vague or not will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the event, the chargesheet does not spell out the part played by the concerned employee with appropriate details and upon disclosing material particulars then the charges mentioned in the chargesheet are bound to be declared as vague. ( 19 ) THE Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Surath Chandra ckakravarty vs. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1971 SC 752 specifically observed as hereunder: "4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This Rule embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. This Rule embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him. . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 20 ) AS the date, time and location of the alleged incident which constitute the charge of misconduct was not indicated with sufficient particularity the supreme Court held in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohd. Shariff (Dead) Through L. Rs. reported in 1982 (2) SCC 376 that the chargesheet was vague and the employee was prejudiced in the matter of his defence at the enquiry. The relevant extract from the aforesaid decision of the Apex court is quoted hereinbelow: "3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Admittedly, in the chargesheet that was framed and served upon the plaintiff no particulars with regard to the date and time of his alleged misconduct of having entered Government Forest situated in p. C. Thatia district, Farrukhabad and hunting a bull in that forest and thereby having injured the feeling of one community by taking advantage of his service and rank, were not mentioned. Not only were these particulars with regard to date and time of the incident not given but even the location of the incident in the vast forest was not indicated with sufficient particularity. In the absence of these plaintiff was obviously prejudiced in the matter of his defence at the enquiry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 21 ) IN the instant case although the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner since inception claimed that the charges mentioned in the chargesheet are vague but participated in the departmental proceedings. The participation of the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner in the enquiry proceedings cannot improve the vagueness of the charges. The charges being vague, it cannot be proved and the vague charges cannot improve as a result of participation by the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner. The participation of the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner in the enquiry proceedings cannot improve the vagueness of the charges. The charges being vague, it cannot be proved and the vague charges cannot improve as a result of participation by the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner. ( 22 ) IN the present case, scrutinising the chargesheet and also the statement of allegations on the basis of which charges have been framed, we are of the opinion that it is difficult for the charged employee to put 'forward his defence in view of the fact that relevant details and material particulars in relation to the charges levelled against the respondent No. 1/ writ petitioner have not been furnished either in the chargesheet or even in the connected statement of allegations. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are inclined to hold that the charges levelled against the writ petitioner/ respondent No. 1 are vague. Accordingly, the chargesheet issued to the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 herein and all further steps taken by the inquiring authority and also the disciplinary authority on the basis of or pursuant to the said chargesheet cannot be sustained and are bound to be quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice as have been done by the learned Single Judge in the order under appeal. ( 23 ) MR. Bidyut Kiran Mukherjee, learned senior Counsel of the respondent no. I/writ petitioner submits that the constitution of inquiring authority in the present case was illegal in view of the constitution of a committee consisting of two officers. Referring to the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 25. 0 of the SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977, Mr. Mukherjee submits that the disciplinary authority may appoint any executive of SAIL or any of it is subsidiary or any public servant as the inquiring authority and there is no scope to constitute committee of officers as the Inquiring authority under the aforesaid rules. 0 of the SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977, Mr. Mukherjee submits that the disciplinary authority may appoint any executive of SAIL or any of it is subsidiary or any public servant as the inquiring authority and there is no scope to constitute committee of officers as the Inquiring authority under the aforesaid rules. We, however, do not propose to examine the aforesaid issue regarding validity and/or legality of the constitution of the said inquiring authority in the instant case at this stage as on examination of the minutes of the records of the enquiry proceedings conducted by the said Inquiring Committee we find that the respondent No. I/writ petitioner admittedly, participated in the enquiry conducted by the said Inquiring committee without raising any objection regarding validity of the constitution of the said Inquiring Committee. ( 24 ) IT is, however, required to be considered whether the inquiring authority while conducting the enquiry proceedings have followed and/or observed the principles of natural justice. It has been specifically alleged on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that the inquiring authority conducted the enquiry proceedings without supplying the relevant documents to the said respondent No. I/writ petitioner and furthermore, the said inquiring authority did not even allow inspection of the relevant documents to the said respondent No. I/writ petitioner although the same were referred to and relied upon at the enquiry proceedings. ( 25 ) FROM the records it appears that on 19th September, 1988, respondent no. 1 herein attended the 3rd sitting of the enquiry proceeding and submitted a letter to the inquiring authority with a request to supply the copies of the documents and/or letters, a list of which was supplied earlier to the said respondent No. I/writ petitioner on 14th September, 1998 at the time of enquiry proceedings. In the said letter dated 19th September, 1998, a further prayer was made for allowing the said respondent No. I/writ petitioner to be defended through a lawyer of his choice in the enquiry proceedings on the ground that the Presenting Officer and the members of the inquiring authority are legally expert persons. ( 26 ) THE Inquiring Committee considered the aforesaid requests of the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 as mentioned in the said letter dated 19th september. 1998 and recorded its decisions in the minutes of the meeting of the said Inquiring Committee held on 19th September, 1998. ( 26 ) THE Inquiring Committee considered the aforesaid requests of the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 as mentioned in the said letter dated 19th september. 1998 and recorded its decisions in the minutes of the meeting of the said Inquiring Committee held on 19th September, 1998. The relevant extracts of the minutes of the meeting of the Inquiring Committee held on 19th September, 1998 are set out hereunder: "shri Biswas, delinquent submitted an application dated 19. 9. 98 addressed to inquiring authority which was accepted by him and acknowledgment on the 2nd copy of receipt of the same was also recorded and the 2nd copy was returned to Shri Biswas, delinquent. The content of the application was examined and considered by the Inquiry committee. Shri Biswas was told to participate in the enquiry as (1) in the first sitting he was offered to take help of a colleague to defend his case, which he did not avail. Therefore, service of any other person to defend his case will not be available in the enquiry. (2) So far as Hon'ble court's direction regarding opportunity to inspect the document to be produced by the Presenting Officer is concerned, the Inquiring Committee will abide by the direction of the Hon'ble Court and will provide opportunity to Shri Biswas to inspect those documents as and when these are produced in the enquiry in course of the proceeding. " ( 27 ) MR. Mukherjee also referred to and relied upon the order dated 8th september, 1998 passed by Altamas Kabir, J. (as His Lordship then was) in the earlier writ petition filed by the respondent No. I/writ petitioner herein being W. P. No. 15689 (W) of 1998 wherein Justice Kabir specifically directed as hereunder: "while conducting the disciplinary proceeding, the Inquiring Officer shall ensure that the petitioner is provided with all particulars for defending his case in a proper manner and shall consequently follow the principles of natural justice. Apart from the above, in keeping with the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal rules, 1977 of the Steel Authority of India Limited, the disciplinary authority shall provide the petitioner with the list of the witnesses to be examined on behalf of the management and also a list of documents on which they choose to rely in the disciplinary proceeding. The Enquiring officer shall also allow the petitioner to take inspection of such documents. The Enquiring officer shall also allow the petitioner to take inspection of such documents. " ( 28 ) MR. Mukherjee further submits that the inquiring authority violated the principles of natural justice by not allowing the requests of the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 as mentioned in the application dated 19th september, 1998 regarding supply of the copies of the relevant documents and to allow the said writ petitioner to be defended through a lawyer of his choice in the enquiry proceeding. Mr. Mukherjee referred to and relied on the following decisions of this Hon'ble Court and also of the Hon'ble Supreme court in support of the aforesaid contentions: 1) 2004 (2) CLJ 313 (Amalesh Maity vs. State of West Bengal) (Paragraphs 24 and 43)2) AIR 1998 SC 3038 (State of U. P. vs. Shatrughan Lal and Anr.)3) 1995 (1) SCC 404 (Committee of Management, Kisan Degree College vs. Shambhu Saran Pandey and Ors.) (Paragraph 6) ( 29 ) IN the case of Committee of Management, Kisan Degree College vs. Shambhu Saran Pandey and Ors. reported in 1995 (1) SCC 404 , Hon'ble supreme Court has specifically held that inspection of documents should not be permitted at the time of final hearing as the same is an erroneous procedure. The relevant passage from the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble supreme Court is quoted hereunder: "6. It is stated in the letter written by the enquiry officer that inspection of documents would be permitted at the time of final hearing. That obviously is an erroneous procedure followed by the enquiry officer. In the first instance he should be given the opportunity for inspection and thereafter conduct the enquiry and then hear the delinquent at the time of conclusion of his enquiry. In this case that procedure was not adopted. Therefore, the procedure in conducting the enquiry adopted is clearly in violation of the principles of natural justice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 30 ) MR. Bhattacharya, learned Counsel of the appellant also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of South Bengal state Transport Corpn. vs. Sapan Kumar Mitra and Ors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 30 ) MR. Bhattacharya, learned Counsel of the appellant also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of South Bengal state Transport Corpn. vs. Sapan Kumar Mitra and Ors. reported in 2006 (2)SCC 584 in support of the contention that non-supply of the documents cannot vitiate the departmental proceedings in its entirety and if necessary the disciplinary authority should be directed to continue with the disciplinary proceedings from the stage of supplying copies of the documents to the respondent No. 1. However, we do not accept the aforesaid submissions of the appellant as the respondent No. I/writ petitioner has specifically urged before this Court that the enquiry proceedings as well as the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 have vitiated not only due to non-supply of the relevant documents but also on account of the vague charges levelled against the said writ petitioner/ respondent No. 1. ( 31 ) IN any event, in the said decision also the Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically observed that the copies of the documents relied on by the inquiring officer and the disciplinary authority must be served on the concerned employee before passing any order of removal from service. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision is quoted hereunder: "11. On the question, whether copies of the documents relied on by the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority must be served on respondent no. 1 before passing any order of removal from service, it is no doubt true that such order of punishment, ought not to be passed without supplying the copies of the documents to respondent No. 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It cannot be disputed that serious prejudice would be caused to respondent no. 1 if the documents on which reliance was placed by the authorities in removing him from service were not supplied to him. This will cause denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing to him. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . This will cause denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing to him. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 32 ) IT is true that the enquiry report prepared by the Inquiring Committee cannot be sustained in view of the fact that the enquiry conducted against the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 is not only based on vague charges but also in course of conducting the enquiry proceedings, principles of natural justice and procedural justice have been flagrantly violated at various stages particularly due to non-supply of the copies of the relevant documents to the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1, which have been relied upon by the inquiring authority while conducting the enquiry proceedings. ( 33 ) IT has been urged on behalf of the appellant that the conduct of the respondent No. I/writ petitioner is unbecoming of a responsible officer for ignoring the repeated notices and not participating in the enquiry proceedings. Mr. Bhattacharya, learned Counsel of the appellant referred to and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of General manager, Appellate Authority, Bank of India and Anr. vs. Mohd. Nizamuddin reported in 2006 (7) SCC 410 in this regard. ( 34 ) IN the instant case, however, it is not in dispute that the respondent no. I/writ petitioner appeared before the inquiring authority upto 5th sitting and subsequently requested the Chairman of the Inquiring Committee to adjourn the enquiry proceedings by the written communication dated 9th january, 1999 till the disposal of his pending application by this Hon'ble court. The aforesaid prayer of the writ petitioner for adjournment of the enquiry proceedings has also been specifically recorded in the minutes of the 8th sitting of the meeting of the Inquiring Committee held on 18th February, 1999. The Inquiring Committee, however, upon rejecting the aforesaid request of the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 decided to proceed with the enquiry even in absence of the employee concerned, namely, the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 herein. The Inquiring Committee, however, upon rejecting the aforesaid request of the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 decided to proceed with the enquiry even in absence of the employee concerned, namely, the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 herein. Since the reasonable requests of the respondent No. I/writ petitioner regarding supply of the copies of the relevant documents and permission to defend through a lawyer of his choice were rejected, the said writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 herein came to the conclusion that no useful purpose will be served by attending the enquiry proceedings without receiving the copies of the relevant documents and in absence of the assistance of a lawyer. The writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 herein therefore, filed an application before this Court for further orders in connection with the writ petition being W. P. No. 15689 (W) of 1998 and by the aforesaid written communication dated 9th January, 1999 specifically requested the Chairman of the Inquiring Authority to adjourn the enquiry proceedings till the disposal of the said application filed before this Court for further orders. In the aforesaid circumstances, the decision cited by the learned Advocate of the appellant in the case of General Manager, Appellate authority, Bank of India and Anr. (supra) is not at all applicable in the facts of the present case. ( 35 ) THE respondent No. I/writ petitioner wanted to defend himself before the inquiring authority through a lawyer of his choice as the Presenting officer and the members of the inquiring authority are legally expert persons, which have been specifically mentioned in the application submitted by the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 before the inquiring authority on 19th september, 1998 and furthermore, the inquiring authority never denied that the Presenting Officer or the members of the inquiring authority are not legally expert persons. The Supreme Court in the case of Board of trustees of the Port of Bombay vs. Dilip Kumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and Ors. reported in 1983 (1) SCC 124 considered the aforesaid issue relating to representation by lawyer in a disciplinary enquiry and specifically held as hereunder: "9. The Supreme Court in the case of Board of trustees of the Port of Bombay vs. Dilip Kumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and Ors. reported in 1983 (1) SCC 124 considered the aforesaid issue relating to representation by lawyer in a disciplinary enquiry and specifically held as hereunder: "9. We concern ourselves in this case with a narrow question whether where in such a disciplinary enquiry by a domestic tribunal, the employer appoints Presenting-cum-Prosecuting Officer to represent the employer by persons who are legally trained, the delinquent employee, if he seeks permission to appear and defend himself by a legal practitioner, a denial of such a request would vitiate the enquiry on the ground that the delinquent employee had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, thereby vitiating one of the essential principles of natural justice. " ( 36 ) FOR the reasons discussed hereinabove, we hold that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 have been vitiated due to issuance of the chargesheet containing vague charges against the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 and also for non-observing the principles of natural justice while conducting the enquiry proceedings by the inquiring authority by refusing to supply copies of the relevant documents relied on by the inquiring authority and the disciplinary authority and also for refusing to allow the said writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 herein to defend himself before the inquiring authority through a lawyer of his choice when the presenting Officer and the members of the inquiring authority are legally expert persons. ( 37 ) WE, therefore, approve and affirm the decisions of the learned Single judge regarding quashing of the chargesheet, enquiry report and the disciplinary proceeding itself as specifically mentioned in the order under appeal and we also approve the decision of the learned Single Judge whereby and whereunder the said learned Single Judge directed the reinstatement of the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 in service with all back wages in view of the quashing of the disciplinary proceedings. The writ petitioner/ respondent No. 1 is entitled to full back wages as it was never contended by the appellant that the said writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 was gainfully employed elsewhere in the meantime. However, we do not approve the liberty granted to the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 to apply for voluntary retirement immediately after joining the service pursuant to the order under appeal. However, we do not approve the liberty granted to the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 to apply for voluntary retirement immediately after joining the service pursuant to the order under appeal. ( 38 ) THE learned Counsel of the appellant has rightly submitted before us that the learned Single Judge had no occasion to grant the aforesaid liberty to the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 to apply for voluntary retirement as the said issue was not raised in the writ petitions filed by the writ petitioner/ respondent No. 1 herein. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge travelled beyond the scope of the writ petitions by granting the aforesaid liberty to the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 to apply for voluntary retirement immediately after joining the service and directing the respondent authorities to accept the same and extend all retiral benefits to the said writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 within six weeks from the date of his retirement. The aforesaid direction of the learned Single Judge granting liberty to the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 to apply for voluntary retirement after joining the service and further direction to the respondent authorities to accept the same, therefore, cannot be sustained and the same are set aside. ( 39 ) THE appellant and the respondent Nos. 2 and 5 are therefore, directed to reinstate the respondent No. I/writ petitioner in service with full back wages without any further delay but positively within a week from the date of communication of this order. The concerned authorities of the appellant particularly, the respondent Nos. 2 and 5 will also take necessary steps for calculating the back wages of the said writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 within two weeks from the date of communication of this order and make necessary payment to the said writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 within a week thereafter. ( 40 ) BOTH the appeals thus stand disposed of. There will be, however, no order as to costs. .