ORDER This writ petition is directed against the orders dated 1-7-2005, 4-82005 and 2-1-2007 passed by the I Additional Labour Court, Bangalore, produced at Annexures-D, E and G respectively. 2. Petitioner is a Government of India enterprise, a company registered under the provisions of the Companies Act. Respondent is a workman employed by the petitioner-company. Respondent filed an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') claiming certain amounts. On 27-4-2005 respondent filed an application under Section 36 of the Act inter alia objecting the petitioner from engaging the services of an Advocate. Petitioner filed objections to the same and the Labour Court by its order dated 1-7-2005 allowed the application filed by the workman and rejected the request of the petitioner for engaging the services of the Advocate. The Officers of the Industrial and Commercial Employers Association (for short, 'ICEA') filed an application inter alia seeking permission to represent the petitioner-management. On 4-8-2005 the Labour Court rejected the said application on the ground that, the respondent is not represented by a union or an Advocate, hence petitioner also cannot engage the services of an Advocate or officers of the Association. Petitioner filed one more application on 26-8-2007 inter alia seeking permission to be represented by the officers of ICEA. The Labour Court on 2-1-2007 rejected the said application as not maintainable in view of the earlier two orders passed on 1-7-2005 and 4-8-2005. These orders are called in question by the petitioner in this writ petition. 3. Sri K Kasturi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that Section 36(2) of the Act provided for an officer of an association of employers and petitioner being a member of ICEA, is entitled to be represented by the officers of ICEA. In this regard he relied on the judgment reported in 1976-II-LLJ-52 and pointed out that a lawyer simpliciter cannot appear before a Tribunal, without the consent of the opposite party. However a lawyer can appear as an office-bearer of a trade union or as an officer of an association of employers and in such case, the consent of opposite party and the leave of the Tribunal is not necessary. However a lawyer can appear as an office-bearer of a trade union or as an officer of an association of employers and in such case, the consent of opposite party and the leave of the Tribunal is not necessary. Relying on para 15, he submitted that a Legal Practitioner is appointed as an officer of a company or Corporation and he is paid and is under control of the company or Corporation, the fact that he was earlier a Legal Practitioner or has a legal degree will not stand in the way of the company or the Corporation being represented by such officer. He further submitted that no permission is required to engage the services of an officer who incidentally holding a law degree. He also relied on para 16 of the said judgment and submitted, that the Tribunal cannot go into the question of motive for appointment of such Legal Practitioners as office-bearers of the trade unions or as officers of the employers associations when law clearly provides for engaging the services of an officer or office-bearers of the a'3sociation, whether he is a Legal Practitioner or not, is not the scope of Section 36 of the Act. Once a person whose services is sought to be engaged under Section 36(1) or (2) he is entitled to represent the company or the Corporation, similarly the workman is also entitled to engage such person. Only the services of an Advocate simpliciter cannot be engaged by the petitioner, without the consent of the respondent as contemplated under Section 36(4) of the Act. 4. He also relied on a judgment of this Court in the case of Hotel Ashok, Bangalore v Presiding Officer, Additional Labour Court, Bangalore and Another1 and pointed out that this Court relying on the judgment in the case of Paradip Port Trust, Paradip v Their Workmen2, has held, that a person who is an officer of an association of employers or of a federation of such association notwithstanding that he is a Legal Practitioner is entitled to represent the company. He also submitted that it is not open for the Tribunal or the Labour Court to go into the question as to how and with whose permission the petitioner-company became member of the ICEA and all such matters are inter se between the association and the petitioner and not a matter for an enquiry by the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court. He also pointed out from the later judgment in the case of Katwa lnfotech Limited, Belgaum v Bhaskar Laxamanrao Patill, wherein this Court following the judgment of Paradip Port Trust's case, has held that Section 36(4) of the Act does not prevent the office-bearers of a federation or association from appearing for a member of the federation or the association. It also does not prohibit engaging the services of an officer of the company who incidentally is a holder of law degree or who was a Legal Practitioner. 5. The respondent, party-in-person, submitted that the Tribunal considering the fact that the persons whose services sought to be engaged by the petitioner was Advocates has rightly rejected the request of the petitioner as there was no consent from the respondent to engage the services of an Advocate. In this regard he relied on Section 36(4) of the Act to contend that Section 36(4) clearly bars engagement of the services of an Advocate before the Tribunal or the Labour Court, without the consent of the other side and in this case, he further submitted he has not given consent to the petitioner to engage the services of an Advocate. He also submitted, that the Act being a special enactment it is not proper to engage the services of an Advocate and in this regard he relied on the decision of Paradip Port Trust's case and by referring to para 13, he submitted that a Government department or a public Corporation, as an employer, are not entitled to engage the services of an Advocate. He further submitted that as far as union is concerned, it stands on a different footing against the company. He also relied on para 22 of the said judgment and submitted that Section 30(i) and (ii) of the Advocates Act, 1961 which confer power on an Advocate to represent the party is restricted by means of Section 36(4) of the I.D. Act. He also relied on para 22 of the said judgment and submitted that Section 30(i) and (ii) of the Advocates Act, 1961 which confer power on an Advocate to represent the party is restricted by means of Section 36(4) of the I.D. Act. He also submitted that the Industrial Disputes Act being a special enactment prevails over the Advocates Act engaging the services of an Advocate is restricted by virtue of Section 36(4) of the Act. In this regard he also relied on another decision of this Court reported in Workmen of B.R. Darbar Ginning and Pressing Factory, Hubli v The Management of B.R. Darbar Ginning and Pressing Factory, Hubli and Other2 and submitted that the persons whose services are sought to be engaged by the petitioner, are not office-bearers nor the employees of the petitioner-company and they are not holding any office in the association and they have no responsibilities as law advisor nor they are paid any remuneration and they cannot be treated as office-bearers of the association. He has also filed written arguments placing reliance on Section 36(4) of the Act and Paradip Port Trust's case and also the order passed by the Labour Court. In his written arguments he mainly contended, that the persons proposed to appear for the petitioner admittedly being Advocates and the respondent has not given consent they cannot represent the petitioner. 6. In view of the rival contentions, the points arise for consideration in this writ petition are: (i) As to whether Legal Practitioners who are office-bearers of a federation or association of employers are entitled to represent the petitioner, member of the association under Section 36(2) of the LD. Act.? (ii) Whether the Labour Court can go into the question as to the motive as to why petitioner has become member of the association? 7. The facts which are not in dispute in this case are that there is an industrial dispute pending before the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. Petitioner has sought for engaging the services of an Advocate and the Labour Court rejected the same. Petitioner sought for engaging the services of the officer-bearers of the ICEA and the said application has also been rejected and thereafter it has filed one more application seeking permission and that was also rejected. 8. Petitioner has sought for engaging the services of an Advocate and the Labour Court rejected the same. Petitioner sought for engaging the services of the officer-bearers of the ICEA and the said application has also been rejected and thereafter it has filed one more application seeking permission and that was also rejected. 8. The main ground on which the application was rejected by the Labour Court was that the respondent-workman has not engaged the services of an Advocate and as such petitioner-company cannot engage the services of an Advocate. The question as to whether an Advocate who is an office-bearer of the employers association to which the petitioner is a member is entitled to represent the petitioner or not? In this regard it is useful to refer decision of the Apex Court in Paradip Port Trust's case, wherein the Apex Court considering the scope of Section 36(4) of the Act has observed as follows.- "It must be made clear that there is no scope for enquiry by the Tribunal into the motive for appointment of such Legal Practitioners as office-bearers of the trade unions or as officers of the employers' associations. When law provides for a requisite qualification for exercising a right, fulfillment of the qualification in a given case will entitle the party to be represented before the Tribunal by such a person with that qualification. How and under what circumstances these qualifications have been obtained will not be relevant matters for consideration by the Tribunal in considering an application for representation under Section 36(1) and Section 36(2) of the Act. Once the qualifications under Section 36(1) and Section 36(2) are fulfilled prior to appearance before Tribunals, there is no need under the law to pursue the matter in order to find out whether the appointments are in circumvention of Section 36(4) of the Act. Motive of the appointment cannot be made an issue before the Tribunal". 9. This makes clear that the Tribunal cannot go into the motive as to why the Legal Practitioners who are office-bearers of the association are asked to represent the petitioner. It is also not open to the Labour Court as to whether the petitioner is trying to circumvent the provision of Section 36(4) of the Act to engage the Legal Practitioners who are office-bearers of an association of employers. It is also not open to the Labour Court as to whether the petitioner is trying to circumvent the provision of Section 36(4) of the Act to engage the Legal Practitioners who are office-bearers of an association of employers. This judgment of the Apex Court has been followed by this Court in the case of Hotel Ashok, and held that the employer is entitled to be represented by an Advocate, who is an office-bearer of such association or of a federation notwithstanding that he is a Legal Practitioner and Section 36(4) of the Act does not prevent him from appearing before the Tribunal. Therefore if the Legal Practitioners, who are office-bearers of the association of employers of which petitioner is a member, are entitled to represent the petitioner and in this case as far as the Legal Practitioners who wanted to represent the petitioner are office-bearers of the association called ICEA and to this effect petitioner has produced documents to show that the petitioner is a member of the said association and it is also clear that the Advocates who are representing the petitioner are office-bearers of the said association and this fact has been mentioned in the application filed by the petitioner on 26-8-2006 wherein at para 3 of the affidavit, it is stated, that in terms of the memorandum of association and the rules governing the said association, petitioner is entitled to be represented by the office-bearers of the said association. Petitioner has also produced the memorandum of articles of the association. If that is so, Section 36(2) clearly provides for engaging the services of the officers of the company or office-bearers of the association or of a federation to which petitioner is a member notwithstanding the said officer or office-bearer is incidentally a law graduate or practising lawyer. This aspect of the matter has been settled not only by the decision of the Apex Court, but also the decision of this Court which is followed subsequently, in a later judgment of this Court in the case of Katwa lnfotech Limited, wherein this Court has held that, Section 36(4) of the Act will not prevent the company from engaging the services of officer-bearers of the association or a federation. That being the position of law and in this case petitioner having shown that it is a member of ICEA and the persons sought to be represented being officer-bearers of the said association Section 36(4) does not prevent them from representing the petitioner notwithstanding they are Legal Practitioners'. As such the orders passed by the Labour Court dated 1-7-2005,4-8-2005 and 2-1-2007, Annexures-D, E and G are required to be quashed. No doubt the Labour Court in its order dated 2-1-2007 has held that the earlier orders are res judicata. In this case petitioner has challenged both the earlier orders also. The scope of Section 36(1), 36(2) and 36(4) of the Act is different. Section 36(1) provides for engaging the services of the office-bearers of the union, Section 36(2) similarly provides for engaging the services of the officer of the company or Corporation and office-bearers of the association of the· employers or federation of the employers association. But Section 36(4) bars for engaging the services of Advocate simpliciter. In this case it is not the Advocates are representing the petitioner as Advocate simpliciter, but as office-bearers. As such the orders passed by the Labour Court are not sustainable. Writ petition is allowed. The orders passed by the Labour Court dated 1-7-2005, 4-8-2005 and 2-1-2007, Annexures-D, E and G are hereby quashed. The I Additional Labour Court, Bangalore is directed to pennit the petitioner to engage the services of the office-bearers of ICEA. The respondent is also at liberty to engage the services of an Advocate, if he chooses so. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also submitted, that he has no objection, if the respondent wants to engage the services of a Legal Practitioner.