Shrikrishna s/o. Sitaramji Fande v. State of Maharashtra
2007-10-29
A.P.LAVANDE, R.V.MORE, SWATANTER KUMAR
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT SWATANTERKUMAR, C.J.:- Section 19 of Act 68 of 1984 introduced present Section 28-A to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereinafter referred to as the' Act') with effect from 24th September, 1984. The State, with the object of promoting public welfare and economic development, had been acquiring land for various industrial and institutional projects and for other public purposes. With intent to avoid hardship to the persons, whose lands are acquired, and to regulate payment of fair compensation and also to avoid unrealistic state of compensation, there was need for restructuring in relation to payment of compensation for which, these amendments were carried out. The legislative intent of socioeconomic protection to the small land owners or poor people, particularly, who were not able to take recourse to the provisions of section 18 of the Act, due to their financial stringency, was in conformity with the principle of equality. With a view to avoid discrimination and inequality in payment of compensation to the persons, whose similarly situated lands were acquired for same project under the same acquisition, the concept of redetermination of compensation at the level of the Collector was introduced. The land owners, who could not avail the remedy under section 18 of the Act, after making award by the Reference Court under section 18, were given an independent right to file an application under section 28-A of the Act but within 3 months from the date of award of the Reference Court for payment of such similar higher compensation to them. 2. The amended provisions had far reaching consequences on the methodology provided for determination and disbursement of the compensation to the claimants. Section 28-A of the Act appears to be a self contained provision in regard to the stage at which it could be invoked, the forum before whom the remedy should be taken, the period within which such rights should be exercised, the manner in which it should be exercised and the method which would be adopted for determination and disbursement of the compensation. In other words an application under section 28-A is not dependent on or need to be aided by any other procedural law, except to the extent that the provision of sections 18 to 28 of the Act, shall so far as may be applied to the application filed before the Collector under these provisions.
In other words an application under section 28-A is not dependent on or need to be aided by any other procedural law, except to the extent that the provision of sections 18 to 28 of the Act, shall so far as may be applied to the application filed before the Collector under these provisions. Application and enforcement of these provisions developed the law of acquisition to a larger extent and various courts pronounced judgments relating to the scope, applicability and limitations provided under these provisions. The law essentially being progressive is mutable and is capable of varied interpretations. Reasoning and dissent are two well known concepts of judicial dictum persuaded by different views expressed by different Courts. The Division Bench of this court in this case formulated three questions for reference in regard to the scope and applicability of section 28-A of the Act to a larger Bench. The order of reference reads as under: “In this petition the petitioners are seeking relief in the nature of direction to respondent to pass an award under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 in relation to their plots situated at Mouja Shekapur, Taluka Morshi, District: Amravati and which were acquired for the purpose of Upper Wardha Project under the notification issued under section 4 dated 28-5-1981 on the ground that the Collector has allowed the application under section 28-A of the said Act in relation to some other plots which were acquired under the same notification, however, has illegally rejected the application of the petitioners. There is a controversy as to whether the petitioners had at all filed any such application under section 28-A of the said Act. It is the contention of the petitioners that such applications were filed by them, whereas the same is disputed by the respondents. Undisputedly there is no record with the respondents regarding the applications having been filed by the petitioners. 2] Placing reliance in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Rajaram Gaianan Gangal and others Vs.
It is the contention of the petitioners that such applications were filed by them, whereas the same is disputed by the respondents. Undisputedly there is no record with the respondents regarding the applications having been filed by the petitioners. 2] Placing reliance in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Rajaram Gaianan Gangal and others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in 2001(2) Mh.L.J. 279 1 the learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that irrespective of whether such application is filed or not under section 28-A, once the Collector exercises his powers under the said provision of law in relation to some of the plots which are acquired under the same notification, all other persons whose plots are acquired under the same notification would be entitled to be heard and their claim for enhancement being considered for the purpose of necessary relief under the said provision of law. According to the learned Advocate for the petitioner the expression interested person under sub-section (2) of section 28A would include all such persons who could be benefited by exercise of powers by the Collector under section 28-A(2) at the instance of anyone of the interest person and therefore, even assuming that the petitioner had not filed any application under section 28-A, moment such application was filed by some other persons whose land was acquired under the same notification, and those applications were being processed by the Collector, it was necessary for the Collector to issue notice to the petitioners and grant necessary benefit of enhancement of compensation in relation to their plots also.
3] Section 28-A of the said Act reads thus: “[Section 28-A-Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court (1) Where an award under this Part, the Court allows to the application any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under section 4, subsection (1) and - who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court : Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this subsection, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. (3)Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter by referred to the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under section 18.] (4) Under sub-section (1) of section 28-A every person aggrieved by the award made under section 11 of the said Act is entitled to file application for enhancement of compensation for his plot moment it comes to his knowledge that, some other persons whose lands were acquired under the same notification under which his land was also acquired, have been successful in getting enhancement of compensation in a reference under section 18 by those persons. However, there are four restrictions imposed to enable such person to claim enhancement of compensation by taking resort to section 28-A(1).
However, there are four restrictions imposed to enable such person to claim enhancement of compensation by taking resort to section 28-A(1). They are - firstly such person must be aggrieved by the award passed under section 11; secondly such person must not have filed an application for reference under section 18, thirdly such person should claim such enhancement by written application to the Collector and fourthly such application should be filed within three months from the date of the award of the reference court under section 18. Unless these four conditions are satisfied, it can not be said that the aggrieved person would be entitled to take resort to the provisions of law comprised under section 28-A of the said Act. (5) Sub-section (1) of section 28-A does not speak of an oral. intimation to the Collector to claim enhancement of compensation, it specifically requires the claimant to file a written application, Besides, the same has to be filed within a prescribed period of three months from the date of the award of the reference court in relation to another plot. (6) Section 28-A nowhere speaks of suo motu exercise of power there under by the Collector in relation to any plot acquired under the said Act. If under a specific notification number of plots are acquired and that one or more persons whose plots are acquired file application under section 18 for enhancements of compensation and they succeed in getting favorable award by the reference court, certainly it would entitle other persons whose plots of land were also acquired under the same notification to prefer an application for enhancement of compensation of the same basis. But there has to be a specific application in writing in that regard within the prescribed time. In the absence of such application, Collector is not authorized to take up the case of any of such person. (7) Sub-section (2) of section 28-A requires the Collector to issue notice to all persons interested.
But there has to be a specific application in writing in that regard within the prescribed time. In the absence of such application, Collector is not authorized to take up the case of any of such person. (7) Sub-section (2) of section 28-A requires the Collector to issue notice to all persons interested. The expression “interested person” has been defined under section 3(b) of the said Act as under: “3(b) the expression “person interested” includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land.” (emphasis supplied) The reading of the said definition would disclose that the term “person interested” relates to a person whose land is acquired under the Act. In other words, the expression 'interested' is in relation to subject matter of acquisition and adjudication under the said Act. It does not relate to persons who are not connected in any manner with the subject matter of acquisition as well as adjudication by the authorities or the court under the said Act. This is abundantly clear from the latter portion of the said definition wherein it is stated a person interested shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land. The expression 'the land' can not relate to any land other than which is subject matter of dispute or adjudication for the purpose of compensation or other issues which can be considered under the said Act. Similarly even in the first part of the definition, it relates to all the persons clearing an interest in the land acquired. The term “land acquired” can not relate to entire plot of land acquired under particular notification, but it necessarily relate to the land which is subject matter of adjudication for the purpose of either compensation or the area of land, the identity of the person to whom the compensation is payable or relating to the apportionment of compensation awarded for such land amongst the persons so interested. (8) The above conclusion is inevitable from Section 18 of the said Act.
(8) The above conclusion is inevitable from Section 18 of the said Act. Section 18(1) provides that any person interested who has not accepted the award may by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for determination of the Court whether he has objection to the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the persons to whom it is payable or the apportionment or of compensation amongst the persons interested. (9) It is well settled that when reference application has been filed under section 18 by any person interested, adjudication is restricted to the land belonging to such person in such proceedings and the persons who are required to appear in such proceedings are only those persons interested in such land only. It is also to be noted that if in case of reference under section 18, section 20 provides service of notice to all the interested persons. However, in that, regard also it is well settled that the notice to all persons interested mean the persons interested in the land in question and only land in question, and not other land which can be subject matter of notification under section 4 under which the land in question was also acquired. (10) It is settled principle of rule of interpretation that words used in statute would carry the same meaning all throughout unless the context requires otherwise. It is also settled principle of law that when a particular term used in statute is defined in the statute, the term has to be understood accordingly. Undoubtedly the definition clause using the term 'includes' would enlarge the scope of the meaning of the expression defined. But enlargement would depend upon the phraseology used by legislature while identifying the inclusive subjects or objects in the definition of a term" under the statute. In the case in hand the expression 'person interested' under section 3(b) is undoubtedly inc1u~ive definition it clearly refers to those who are interested or connected with the land in question and not others or even neighbors.
In the case in hand the expression 'person interested' under section 3(b) is undoubtedly inc1u~ive definition it clearly refers to those who are interested or connected with the land in question and not others or even neighbors. (11) When the legislature in its wisdom has provided under section 28-A that the aggrieved person has to file written application of the claim within specified period in order to avail benefit under section 28-A for enhancement of compensation consequent to such enhancement having been granted by the reference court in another proceedings under section 18, to accept the contention on behalf of the petitioner that Collector cannot insist for written application would virtually amount to making violence to the said provision of law. To interpret the said provision in the manner it is sought to be argued, would virtually amount to legislating upon the said provisions; of law by the court. The proposed interpretation would virtually render the Section 28-A otiose. (12) At this stage it is also to be noted that under sub-clause (3) of section 28-A it specifically provides that where an application is filed under section 28-A all the provisions of section 18 to 28 would apply to such proceedings. Obviously it would include the applicability of section 20 of the said Act which speaks about the service of notice. The said section reads thus: “Section 20. Service of notice - The Court shall thereupon cause a notice specifying the day on which the Court will proceed to determine the objection, and directing their appearance before the Court on that day, to be served on the following persons, namely: (a) the applicant; (b) all persons interested in the objection, except such (if any) of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation awarded; and (c) if the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of compensation, the Collector . (d) if the acquisition is not made for the Government, the person or authority of whom it is made. “Plain reading of section 20 would disclose that the persons interested who are entitled for service of notice in such proceedings are only those who have or who could or who are claiming interest in the land in question and not in any other land.
“Plain reading of section 20 would disclose that the persons interested who are entitled for service of notice in such proceedings are only those who have or who could or who are claiming interest in the land in question and not in any other land. It does not include the persons or the owners or the persons interested to claim interest in the neighboring plot or any other plot of land even though acquired under the same notification. (13) It is also to be noted that the payment of compensation for acquisition of land is from - public exchequer. Either under section 18 or under Section 28-A, the said Act does not provide suo motu powers to the Collector to distribute public money to the persons whose land is acquired under the said Act. The claim for enhancement is to be made within the prescribed period and it has to be established by the party with cogent evidence in support thereto. Even under Section 28-A, the enhancement of compensation is not automatic on the basis of award under Section 18 by the Reference Court. The section 28-A is not a deeming 'provision of law. The applicability of the ruling under Section 18 in other matter to the claimants land has to be established by discharging the burden of proof relating to the issue of comparability of the land in question with the land which was the subject matter of Reference award. (14) Undoubtedly the Division Bench of this Court in Rajaram Gajanan Gangal's case has held that section 28-A of the said Act is a beneficial legislation and therefore, any person interested in the land in question would include even the persons interested in the neighbouring land acquired under the same notification and further that the provisions does not postulate that all the interested persons should move an application for the same relief. With utmost respect, we are unable to persuade our self to agree with the said ruling. Therefore, it would be necessary to refer the matter to a larger bench to determine the following Issues: i) Whether under section 28-A is it, or not necessary for the interested person to file written application?
With utmost respect, we are unable to persuade our self to agree with the said ruling. Therefore, it would be necessary to refer the matter to a larger bench to determine the following Issues: i) Whether under section 28-A is it, or not necessary for the interested person to file written application? ii) Whether the Collector can suo motu exercise powers under section 28-A in relation to all the plots of land acquired under the same notification, moment any interested person in relation to anyone of the plots of the land succeeds in getting enhancement of compensation in a reference under section 18 of the said Act? iii) Whether in a proceedings under section 28-A in relation to a particular plot of land, the Collector is duty bound to issue notices to all the persons whose plots of land are acquired under the same notification. It is therefore, necessary for Registry to place this matter before the Hon. Chief Justice for appropriate order for reference to a larger bench.” 3. The facts of the case have already been referred to in the order of reference. We may just add that the present petitioners have prayed that the amended awards dated 24th January, 2002 and 15th October, 2003 passed under section 28-A of the Act be set aside and respondent No.2 be directed to pass fresh amended award granting them same compensation as has been awarded to the other claimants in terms of the award of the Reference Court dated 25th January, 1996. In the writ petition vague averment has been made that the petitioners had approached respondent No.2 by way of an application, which had been received by respondent No.2. The petitioners therefore state that though they had' already• filed their application before respondent No.2, since no register was being maintained, they have been deprived of their lawful right about the benefit of the application under section 28-A of the Act. Nothing in support of this averment has been annexed to the petition. On the contrary in both the awards dated 24th January, 2002 and 15th October, 2003 neither reference to any such application having been filed by the petitioners nor that they have been refused enhanced compensation in terms of the said provisions, has been made.
Nothing in support of this averment has been annexed to the petition. On the contrary in both the awards dated 24th January, 2002 and 15th October, 2003 neither reference to any such application having been filed by the petitioners nor that they have been refused enhanced compensation in terms of the said provisions, has been made. It may be noticed at this stage that the arguments made before us on behalf of the respondents was on the premise that no applications were filed and even if they were filed, they were not filed within the period of three months from the date of making of the award. The adjacent land owners, whose land were acquired under the same notification from the same village had filed applications under section 28-A of the Act within the prescribed period of limitation i.e. 3 months from the date of making of the award by the Reference Court dated 25th January, 1996. 4. In light of the above facts and contentions, within the scope of the framed questions, the petitioners have contended before us that on the cumulative reading of various sub-sections of section 28-A of the Act, the Collector is under an obligation to issue notices to all the persons interested under the same notification, irrespective of the fact whether they have filed an application or not. Even if one of the interested persons moves an application as contemplated under section 28-A of the Act, then it is the duty of the Collector to issue notices to all the interested persons and redetermine compensation in the light of the award passed by the Reference Court and consequently award enhanced compensation to all the interested persons. In support of this submission reliance is placed upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Rajaram Gajanan Gangal and ors Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and anr, 2001(2) Mh.L.J. 279 , wherein the Bench observed that the provisions do not postulate that all the interested persons should make an application for the same relief. Once redetermination is made, it is irrelevant as to at whose instance the same has been done, but the authorities are under obligation to give benefit of the said redetermination to all the interested persons irrespective of whether they had preferred any application or not. 5.
Once redetermination is made, it is irrelevant as to at whose instance the same has been done, but the authorities are under obligation to give benefit of the said redetermination to all the interested persons irrespective of whether they had preferred any application or not. 5. While referring to the scheme under the Land Acquisition Act it is also contended that interested person has been defined under section 3(b) of the Act which states that expression "person interested" includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and even a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land. The expression interested person has been used in different context in various provisions that is sections 9(1), 10, 11, 18, 20, 21 and 28-A(2) of the Act. Under section 28A(2) words used are after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. A person who is interested in compensation or even in land, thus is interested person within the scope of this provision and therefore it is necessary to construe this expression liberally and while reading into the provision, obligation on the part of the Special Land Acquisition Officer is to invite all the persons covered under the notification, whose land has been acquired and award compensation to all. While relying upon 2007(10) SCALE 391 : [2005(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 91] (M/s. Girnar Traders Vs. State of Maharashtra and ors.) it is argued that there would be possibility of injustice on plain and strict construction of the provisions and it being a beneficial legislation, the court should give liberal construction. The counsel appearing for the State vehemently opposed the reliefs claimed by the petitioners so also opposed interpretation suggested by the petitioners. According to the learned Government Pleader, on the plain reading of section 28-A, it is clear that the power to act suo motu is not vested in the Collector. This provision provides a complete code in itself and every applicant must comply with the mandatory conditions of section 28-A. Thus there is neither power to act suo motu nor to act in absence of an application.
This provision provides a complete code in itself and every applicant must comply with the mandatory conditions of section 28-A. Thus there is neither power to act suo motu nor to act in absence of an application. The Collector also would have no power to review earlier award made by him, as after pronouncement of the award by the Special Land Acquisition Officer he is functus officio and gets limited jurisdiction under section 28-A of the Act. In the absence of this provision the Collector has no jurisdiction to alter or modify his award, much less enhance the determined compensation. Reliance was placed upon different judgments and particularly upon Babua Ramand ors. Vs. State of U.P. and anr., (1995)2 SCC 689 ; Union of India and anr. Vs. Pradeep Kumari and anr., (1995)2 see 736 and Union of India and anr. Vs. Hansoli Devi and ors., (2002)7 see 273 : [2002(4) ALL MR 585 (S.C.)]. 6. In order to appreciate the above contentions raised on behalf of the parties, it would be necessary to refer to the language of section 28-A of the Act. Section 28-A reads as under: “Section 28-A - Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court (1) Where an award under this Part, the Court allows to the application any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under section 4, subsection (1) and-who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court: Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this subsection, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants (3)Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred to the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under section 18. 7. Before examining the legal niceties of the points raised in relation to the interpretation of this provision it is necessary to notice that the learned counsel appearing for both sides fairly conceded at the Bar that points 1 and 2 have already been answered by the Supreme Court as such it may not be necessary for this court to deliberate on these issues at any greater length, except noticing the judgments on these points. In the case of Babua Ram (supra); one of the points of reference was whether under section 28-A, a person who failed to file an application for redetermination was entitled to the benefit of redetermined award. 8. There has to be presumption in favour of the legislation as enacted. The Advantages of enacting law so greatly outweigh its defects that there can be no doubt as to the ultimate issue of its rivalry with the other forms of legal development and expression. The case law will continue to grow even when the law is codified. The case law does not lose its relevance despite codification of the law. The statute law and case law go side by side and quite often the relationship between them is supplementary. If there are ambiguities, which by passage of time come to light and if there are real and apparent inconsistencies, which are capable of being' supplied by judicial intervention, such would be supplied provided they are within the frame work of the statute law. Interpretation of an enacted law, would essentially relate to the 'litera scripta'. The interpretation will be guided by the spirit of the enactment. The spirit of law and its judicial application would have nothing in contradiction.
Interpretation of an enacted law, would essentially relate to the 'litera scripta'. The interpretation will be guided by the spirit of the enactment. The spirit of law and its judicial application would have nothing in contradiction. For every enacted law process of judicial interpretation or construction is necessary and by this process the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislation through the medium of authoritative forum, in which it is expressed. Interpretation can be literal or functional. Literal interpretation would not look beyond 'litera legis' while functional interpretation may make some deviation to the letter of the law. Unless, the law is logically defective and suffers from conceptual and inherent ambiguity, it should be given its literal meaning. Where the law suffers from ambiguity, whether conceptual or syntactic and the letter of statute provides for no solution, then the courts would go beyond the letter of the law to ascertain from other sources as best as they can. (Refer Salmond on Jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.) 9. In the words of Chinappa Reddy J.:- “Interpretation must depend upon the text and context. They are the bases of the interpretation. One may well say that if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted". (Reserve Bank of India Vs. Pearless General Finance, (1987)1 see 424). The principle of construction of law is stated by Justice Holmes as under: “You construe a particular clause or expression by construing the whole instrument and may dominant purpose that it may express. In fact, intention is a residuary clause intended to gather up whatever other aids .there may be to interpretation besides the particular words and the dictionary” (Refer to Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh - Seventh Edition, Wadhwa & Co. Nagpur) 10. A statute which confers rights, mandatory conditions or even implied conditions there to would have to be satisfied and they would be a relevant consideration for interpretation of the statute. A power conferred by a statute often contains an express condition for its exercise and in absence of or in addition to the express condition there are implied conditions also for exercise of power.
A power conferred by a statute often contains an express condition for its exercise and in absence of or in addition to the express condition there are implied conditions also for exercise of power. Exercise of statutory power in breach of express or implied conditions will be illegal, if the condition breached is mandatory. This principle to a large extent is applicable to exercise of rights arising from a statute. If a right acquired is coupled with compliance of conditions, such conditions normally would be mandatory, apparently when the legislative intent in this regard is apparent from the bare reading of the provisions. 11. Any right would have to be conjunctively read with the obligation and satisfaction of condition precedent, for invocation of such right. Such conditions would be construed as mandatory. Such provisions would not be given an enlarged meaning on the plea of liberal construction, more so, where such interpretation would frustrate the very object of the statute. Rule of natural meaning and literal interpretation could be departed only where the reading of the statute as a whole in its context need to do so. To expand the natural and ordinary meaning of the words is in line with the purposive interpretation. The golder rule of construction, that is to read the statutory language grammatically, technically and in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context without omission or addition, is the best rule of interpretation. 12. It is also a settled canon of interpretation that the construction of statute must not so strain the words as to include cases mainly omitted from the natural meaning of the language. More extended meaning could be attracted to the words only where it is so demanded by the provisions and is reflected in the intent and expression of the legislature. (Refer Maxwel on The Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition by P.St. J. Langan). In the case of Union of India Vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, 1992 Suppl. (1) see 323 the Supreme Court cautioned the courts that the courts have no power to legislate and there should be due circumspection used while interpreting law. The Court then held as under: “It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous.
The Court then held as under: “It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the courts. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature the court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. Courts should decide what the law is and not what is should be. The court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to set at naught the legislative judgment is subversive of the constructional harmony and comity of instrumentalities. Modifying and altering the scheme and applying it to others who are not otherwise entitled to under the scheme, will not also come under the principle of affirmative action adopted by courts sometimes in order to avoid discrimination. If we may say so, what the High Court has done in this case is a clear and naked usurpation of legislative power." 13. Bare reading of section 28-A of the Act clearly demonstrates that wherever an award is made by the court allowing compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11 of the Act and persons interested in all other lands covered by the same notification under section 4(1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not filed any application under section 18 of the Act, by a written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Reference court.
Under sub-section (2) of section 28-A the Collector is required to conduct an inquiry on receipt of such application under sub-section (1) of section 28-A after giving notice to all persons interested and after giving them reasonable opportunity of being heard, make an award determining the compensation. Subsection (3) further commands that while determining the compensation under section 28A, the provisions of sections 18 to 22 shall, in so far as they will apply to reference under section 28-A, would also apply to this section. These provisions are clearly indicative that section 28-A is a Code in itself. The procedure indicated in this section has to be followed and it's mandatory conditions must be satisfied before a person interested can take advantage of this provision. It will be unfair to construe this provision beyond its plain language. Omission of the words from the section would not be permissible. If we have to accept the interpretation put forward by the petitioners in that situation both expressions "by written application to the Collector - within 3 months" will have to be deleted. Recourse to sub-section (2) is permissible only when the Collector has received the application in terms of section 28A( 1) of the Act. In the case of Babua Ram (supra) the Supreme Court put at rest this controversy and after examining various provisions of the Act, the court has held as under: “35. As regards claim for higher compensation, sub-section (1) of section 28A envisages the awarding of higher compensation by the court on reference under section 18 in excess of the amount awarded under section 11 by the Collector. The aggrieved person must be the person interested in all other lands covered by the same notification of section 4(1) and the amount of the compensation determined by the court is relatable to the land similarly situated, possessed of the same value or potentialities etc. Despite their failure to seek and secure reference under section 18, they became entitled to make an application in writing to the Collector within the prescribed three months limitation.
Despite their failure to seek and secure reference under section 18, they became entitled to make an application in writing to the Collector within the prescribed three months limitation. Therefore any other non applicant is not entitled to the benefit of the award of the Collector made on redetermination under sub-section (1) of section 28-A. The contention of B.D. Aggrawal learned counsel for the claimants that all persons despite their failure to make an application for redetermination of the compensation are entitled to compensation under the redetermined award under subsection (1) of section 28-A. is without substance. It is accordingly rejected. Subsection (1) of section 28-A would apply only to a person who had failed to seek and secure reference under section 18 when one or other persons similarly interested in the land covered under the same notification published under section 4(1) received on reference under section 18 higher compensation in an award under section 26 and should make a written application under section 28-A(1). The Collector then is enjoined to redetermine the compensation in the manner laid in section 28-A(1) and to make an award under section 28-A(2).” (emphasis supplied) 14. The above dictum of the Supreme Court is clearly applicable on facts and law to the present case. In fact the Supreme Court further in paragraph 44 of the judgment went on to hold that the Collector has an obligation to conduct proper inquiry, whether or not, the claimants would be entitled to the benefit of the award under section 26, where the applicant, who fraudulently or collusively raises claim, this aspect should also be examined as the very basis is that the compensation for the land and judgment in appeal are based on redetermination of the compensation for the applicant's land. Even in case of redetermination an inquiry will have to be conducted whether the applicant need to be given same compensation or there are differences in the nature, quality and situation of the comparable land. The Court there was also concerned with the objection of anti-dated application.
Even in case of redetermination an inquiry will have to be conducted whether the applicant need to be given same compensation or there are differences in the nature, quality and situation of the comparable land. The Court there was also concerned with the objection of anti-dated application. Even in the case of Pradeep Kumari (supra), though the Supreme Court was primarily concerned with the question of starting point for computing limitation of 3 months as provided under section 28-A of the Act, and to that extent, it overruled Babua Ram (supra), but in regard to the procedure under section 28-A, it did not disturb any other dictum declared in the judgment in the case of Babua Ram. The Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumari (supra) held as under: “....The object underlying section 28-A would be better achieved by giving the expression “an award” in section 28-A its natural meaning as meaning the award that is made by the court in Part III of the Act after the coming into force of section 28-A. If the said expression in section 28-A(1) is thus construed, a person would be able to seek redetermination of the amount of compensation payable to him provided the following conditions are satisfied: i) An award has been made by the court under Part III after the coming into force of section 28-A; ii) By the said award the amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11 has been allowed to the applicant in that reference; iii) The person moving the application under section 28-A is interested in other land covered by the same notification under section 4(1) to which the said award relates; iv) The person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector under section 18; v) The application is moved within three months from the date of the award on the basis of which the redetermination of amount of compensation is sought; and vi) Only one application can be moved under section 28-A for redetermination of compensation by an applicant. 12.
12. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view expressed in Babua Ram and Kamail Singh that application under section 28-A for redetermination of compensation can only be made on the basis of the first award that is made after the coming into force of section 28-A. In our opinion, the benefit of redetermination of amount of compensation under section 28-A can be availed of on the basis of anyone of the awards that has been made by the court after the coming into force of section 28-A provided the applicant seeking such benefit makes the application under section 28-A within the prescribed period of three months from the making of the award on the basis of which redetermination is sought. The first contention urged by Shri. Goswamy in support of the review petitions is therefore rejected.” (emphasis supplied) 15. In a recent judgment in the case of State of Tripura and anr. Vs. Roopchand Das and ors., (2003)1 SCC 431 : [2003(1) ALL MR 746 (S.C.)], the Supreme Court confirmed this position of law holding that the view taken in Pradeep Kumari's case (supra) was the correct view and to that extent alone the view expressed in Babua Ram (supra) was not correct. It was observed that an application for redetermination of compensation under section 28-A has to be made within the period of limitation and the applications made long after expiry of 3 months from the date of award would be time barred and not entettainable. 16. Much prior to the above two decisions, the Supreme Court in the case of The Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda V s. Union of India and ors., AIR 1991 SC 730 , had also taken the view that redetermination is based upon the making of an application to the Collector within the prescribed period. The court therein held as under: “4. We may first deal with the contention based on the newly added S.28-A inserted by Amending Act 68 of 1984 with retrospective operation from April 13, 1982.
The court therein held as under: “4. We may first deal with the contention based on the newly added S.28-A inserted by Amending Act 68 of 1984 with retrospective operation from April 13, 1982. Under this provision where compensation awarded by the Collector under S.11 is enhanced by the court in reference under S.18, the persons interested in the acquired land who were not parties to the reference may, by a written application to the Collector made within three months from the date of the award of the court, request the Collector to redetermine the amount of compensation payable to them on the basis of the amount awarded by the court. On receipt of such an application the Collector is expected to conduct an inquiry and make an award redetermining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. Any person who does not accept the award so made may. by written application to the Collector, require that the matter of referred for the determination of the court whereupon the provisions of Ss.18 and 28-A shall. so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under S.18. It is obvious on a plaint reading of sub-section (1) of S.28-A that applies only to those claimants who had failed to seek a reference under S.18 of the Act. The determination has to be done by the Collector on the basis of the compensation awarded by the court in the reference under S.18 of the Act and an application in that behalf has to be made to the Collector within 30 days from the date of the award. Thus only those claimants who had failed to apply for a reference under S.18 of the Act are conferred this right to apply to the Collector for redetermination and not all those like the petitioners who had not only sought a reference under S.18 but had also filed an appeal in the High Court against the award made by the reference court. The newly added S.28-A therefore clearly does not apply to a case where the claimant has sought and secured a reference under S.18 and has even preferred an appeal to the High Court., This view, which we take on a plain reading of S.28-A, finds support from the judgment of this court in Mewa Ram (deceased) by his Lrs. Vs.
The newly added S.28-A therefore clearly does not apply to a case where the claimant has sought and secured a reference under S.18 and has even preferred an appeal to the High Court., This view, which we take on a plain reading of S.28-A, finds support from the judgment of this court in Mewa Ram (deceased) by his Lrs. Vs. State of Haryana (1986)3 SCR 660 ( AIR 1987 SC 45 )" (emphasis supplied) 17. Even Mewa Ram's case (supra) relied upon by the petitioners does not support the contention raised on their behalf. Two main issues were decided by the Supreme Court in that case. Firstly, that merely because the Supreme Court in other cases enhanced the rate of compensation for the adjacent land by itself would not provide a ground to the claimants for condoning the delay in filing the appeal and claiming same compensation. Secondly, the principle that was clearly enunciated in relation to the operation of section 28-A of the Act that there is no provision in the Act apart from Section 28-A for reopening of an award which has become final and conclusive. For availing the remedy of redetermination of the amount of compensation under this provision, the conditions laid down therein are to be fulfilled. It may also to be noticed that the Division Bench of this court had taken a contrary view in the case of Rajaram (supra) and held that it was obligatory on the part of the authorities to give the benefit of redetermination irrespective of whether they had preferred any application or not. While making these observations reliance was also placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of A. Vishwanatha Pillai and ors. Vs. Special Tahasildar for Land Acquisition No. IV and ors. AIR 1991 SC 1966 . It needs to be noticed firstly that the judgment was not relevant law or proposition, for facts raised in this case. Secondly, the case related to co-owners of the same property where one co-owner had approached the court as the sole owner of the property. It was the case of the co-owners or coparceners and a statement was made in a petition under section 18 of the Act that they are equally entitled to receive compensation where the applicant was the owner along with other brothers.
It was the case of the co-owners or coparceners and a statement was made in a petition under section 18 of the Act that they are equally entitled to receive compensation where the applicant was the owner along with other brothers. That is a case relating to filing of reference petition under section 18 of the Act and for determination of compensation as contemplated under section 23 of the Act and thus could not give much assistance in relation to the provisions of section 28-A, which is a self contained Code and its benefits are subject to compliance of its conditions, which are mandatory in nature. Under section 18 the claimant is required to file a written application within the specified time, failing which no reference can lie to the Collector or to the competent authority. Under section 28-A(3) the provisions of section 18 are applicable and as such it will be more in line with the scheme of the Act and same meaning to the expression 'written application' appearing in section 28-A shall be applied as well. With respect, the view taken by the Division Bench in Rajaram (supra) is not correct exposition of law. We hold that it is obligatory upon every interested person to file written application to the Collector, if he wishes to draw the benefit or advantage of redetermination of compensation within the prescribed period as contemplated under section 28-A of the Act. 18. Coming to the second question of law referred by the Bench, which in fact is a corollary to the first question, a person interested and aggrieved from the award and who did not avail the remedy requesting reference under section 18 of the Act, has to file an application to put in motion the mechanism contemplated under section 28-A of the Act for redetermination of the compensation. Once the language of the section is explicit that written application within the prescribed period has to be filed, there is hardly any scope to come to the conclusion that there is no requirement on the part of the applicant to move an application or that the Collector would exercise such power suo motu.
Once the language of the section is explicit that written application within the prescribed period has to be filed, there is hardly any scope to come to the conclusion that there is no requirement on the part of the applicant to move an application or that the Collector would exercise such power suo motu. Such an approach would be contrary to the scheme of the Act and in fact it would amount to vesting of powers in SLAO which are not given by the Legislature and in fact such powers would be deemed to have been excluded by necessary implication on the cumulative reading of the relevant provisions. But for the limited scope or jurisdiction vested in the Collector under section 28-A of the 'Act, the Collector would be functus officio in all other respects and would have no jurisdiction to redetermine the compensation under the scheme of the Act. The provisions of section 28-A(2) do not give any substantive right for redetermination of the compensation. The legal right accrues under sub-section (1) of section 28-A while subsection (2) regulates the procedure for redetermination of the compensation upon receipt of an application under sub-section (1) of section 28-A. The procedural or regulatory sub-sections cannot be read to alter the scope of the substantive provisions which creates a right but subject to the satisfaction of the mandatory conditions stated in the section. In the case of Union of India and ors. Vs. Mangatu Ram and ors., 1997(6) SCC 59 , the Supreme Court stated that the persons who are interested in redetermination of the compensation must apply for such redetermination within three months from the date of award of the reference court excluding the period spent in obtaining the certified copy. This decision of the Supreme Court and particularly the observations made in paras 11, 14 and 17 of the judgment clearly negatives the interpretation put forward on behalf of the petitioners, of course half heartedly, that the Collector is vested with suo motu powers to give the benefit of section 28-A to all the land owners, whose lands have been acquired under the same notification irrespective of whether they have chosen to invoke the jurisdiction of the Collector under section 28-A by filing proper application within the stipulated time or not Paragraphs 11, 14 and 17 of the said judgment read as under: “11.
A reading thereof would clearly indicate that the persons interested who had not sought reference under section IS but whose land is covered by the same notification published under section 4(1) and who are aggrieved by the acquisition, are entitled to make a written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Reference Court for redetermination of the compensation. Admittedly, since the application under section 28-A of the Act had been made on 24-6-1989 within three months, he is entitled to the same compensation awarded by the Reference Court in its award and decree dated 3-4-1989 as affirmed by the High Court on appeal. 14. Notification under section 4(1) of the Act was published on 18-6-1984. The Collector made his award on 21-1-1986 under section 11. On reference under section 18, at the instance of some other claimants, the Reference Court, by its award and decree dated 3-4-1989, enhanced the compensation. On appeal, it was confirmed. The application seeking redetermination of the compensation under section 28-A(1) came to be made on 24-4-1989. Thus, it is seen that by operation of the limitation prescribed under subsection (1) of section 28-A, since the written application was not filed within three months from the date of the award of the Reference Court, the application is barred by limitation. The compensation granted by the Collector on the basis of the said application is clearly illegal. Therefore, the view of the High Court also is incorrect. 17. In respect of the notification published on 18-6-1984, the Collector made his award on 31-1-1986 under section 11. On reference under section 18 at the instance of some claimants the Reference Court, by its award and decree dated 21-11-1988, enhanced the compensation. The application under section 28-A was filed on 1-10-1991. The written application can be filed by some who had not sought the reference under section 18. Though they are entitled to make the application, the application should be filed within three months from the date of the award of the Reference Court excluding the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the award as provided under proviso to section 28-A. Since the application under section 28-A was filed beyond three months, on the above facts the same is barred by limitation.
The award of the enhanced compensation to the respondents in this appeal is clearly illegal and without jurisdiction.” 19. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and anr. Vs. Marri Venkaiah and ors., (2003)7 SCC 280 : [2003(4) ALL MR 347 (S.C.)] the Supreme Court reiterated the law that the application for redetermination of compensation has to be filed within 3 months and the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the award and not from the date of knowledge of the award. While dealing with the argument of interpreting the provisions of section 28-A being a beneficial provision, the court held that where applications were filed after 5 years after passing of the award cannot be held to be maintainable and also held that there would be obligation on the part of the claimants to make efforts to know about the award and presumption of knowledge would have to be inferred. While applying the doctrine of finality to such proceedings the court even further held that there was no obligation on the part of the Collector and the award passed by the court could not be termed as an offer for market price for the land. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment are quoted as follows: “10. In our view, with regards to the first contention that section 28-A is a beneficial provision, there cannot be any dispute. However, the advantage of the benefit which is conferred is required to be taken within the stipulated time. A landowner may be poor or illiterate and because of that he might not have filed reference application but that would not mean that he could be negligent, in not finding out whether other landowners have filed such applications. Whosoever wants to take advantage of the beneficial legislation has to be vigilant and has to take appropriate action within the prescribed time. He must at least be vigilant in making efforts to find out whether the other landowner has filed any reference application and if so, what is the result. If that is not done then the law cannot help him. Admittedly in the present case, award enhancing the compensation was pronounced by the civil court by order dated 29-11-1984 and application were filed on 27-11-1989 i.e., after a lapse of 5 years.
If that is not done then the law cannot help him. Admittedly in the present case, award enhancing the compensation was pronounced by the civil court by order dated 29-11-1984 and application were filed on 27-11-1989 i.e., after a lapse of 5 years. In such case, as the applicant was having an opportunity of knowing the award and or he was required to make efforts of knowing about such proceedings, he must be presumed to have had knowledge of the award. If the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted, it will create total vagueness and uncertainty as the landowners can claim that they have come to know of the award after a long lapse of time and, therefore, the application even though beyond time may be entertained. If such applications are entertained there may not be an finality to the award and payment of compensation. Result may be that such proceedings may adversely affect where land is acquired by the government for a project which is to be carried out by local bodies. 12. The aforesaid reasoning would not be applicable for interpretation of section 28-A because there is no question of issuing notices to such an applicant as he is not a party to the reference proceeding before the court. The award passed by the court cannot be termed as an offer for market price for purchase of the land. There is no duty cast upon the court to issue notice to the landowners who have not initiated proceedings for enhancement of compensation by filing reference applications; may be, that their lands are acquired by a common notification issued under section 4 of the Act. As against this under section 18 it is the duty of the Collector to issue notice either under section 12(2) of the Act at the time of passing of the award or in any case the date to be pronounced before passing of the award and if this is not done then the period prescribed for filing application under section 18 is six month from the date of the Collector's award.” A reference in this behalf can also be made to the judgment in the case of Bhagti (deceased) by Lrs. Vs. State of Haryana, (1997)4 SCC 473 . 20. The expression “suo motu” means of its own initiative.
Vs. State of Haryana, (1997)4 SCC 473 . 20. The expression “suo motu” means of its own initiative. The power to initiate must emerge from the language of the provisions. Where the language of the provision is simple, unambiguous and is incapable of various meanings, then the principle of plain interpretation has to be applied. The power to act suo motu should be spelt out from the provisions and it is normally difficult to infer such power, particularly when specific mode to initiate such process is stipulated in the statute itself. Filing of an application, that too within the specified period from the date of award by the reference court, is the condition precedent for invocation of the scheme under section 28A of the Act and its intent and purpose cannot be defeated by introducing power to act suo motu and giving notice to all concerned. Thus the second point of law has to be answered in the negative. 21. Question No.3 under reference is whether or not it is obligatory upon the Collector to issue notices to all the persons, whose lands are acquired under the same notification, irrespective of the fact whether such persons have filed an application under section 28-A of the Act or not. We may again refer to the language and the scheme underlying the provisions of section 28-A. Sub-section (1) of section 28-A requires a written application to be moved within three months from the date of the award praying for redetermination of the compensation. Provisions of sub-section (2) of section 28-A would come into play only when there is compliance of the provisions of sub-section (1). If an application under subsection (1) is not moved it is difficult to understand as to how the prescribed procedure under sub-section (2) would come into play. The Collector is to exercise his power under sub-section (2) only upon receipt of an application under sub-section (1). This provision does not exhibit any ambiguity in its language and it stand to clear and prudent interpretation. The notice, the Collector is required to give, is to 'all the persons interested' and to give them reasonable opportunity of being heard before he makes his award redetermining the compensation payable to the applicants. The expression 'persons interested' cannot be read beyond its scope.
The notice, the Collector is required to give, is to 'all the persons interested' and to give them reasonable opportunity of being heard before he makes his award redetermining the compensation payable to the applicants. The expression 'persons interested' cannot be read beyond its scope. Interested persons would be such who have interest in one way or the other in the acquired land, which is the subject matter of the application, filed under section 28-A(1) of the Act. It appears to us that it is neither permissible nor possible to give meaning to this expression that it would deem to include all the land owners, whose lands have been acquired under the same notification, though they have taken benefit of the provisions of section 18 or who have not filed application and do not satisfy the conditions stated in sub-section (1). The object of section 28-A appears to be to provide another opportunity to such kind of claimants who have not availed of the remedy under section 18 or could not avail the same for any reasons whatsoever to file an application for redetermination of the compensation within the stipulated period before the Collector. The legislative intent appears to be that it is for granting of another opportunity subject to the satisfaction of the mandatory conditions. Every person/claimant is expected to be vigilant of his rights and if so desires should exercise his right and not to leave to the Collector to issue notice to all interested persons and then seeking redetermination of the compensation. Such an approach would neither be in line with the scheme of the Act nor in line with the legislative intent. If the legislature had the intention that upon pronouncement of the award by the reference court enhancing compensation awarded by the Collector, all the claimants, irrespective of any procedure, or satisfaction of the conditions, would be entitled to receive that compensation, and such redetermination would be obligatory on the State/Collector, then section 28-A would simply have been worded by using one line stating that the Collector upon the award passed by the reference court enhancing compensation shall disburse similar amount to all the claimants, whose lands have been acquired under the same notification from the same revenue estate. But it is not worded so. It prescribes specific procedure for redetermination.
But it is not worded so. It prescribes specific procedure for redetermination. Another aspect of this argument is that there will be no need to give power to the Collector for redetermination. If the submission of the petitioners is accepted then it would amount to payment of already determined amount by reference court and the concept of redetermination would not have been attracted. The Courts have held that the scope of section 28-A, despite application, is not automatic payment of the amount but still the Collector would have to examine whether the lands are similarly situated/located or there are reasons for paying similar compensation. In this regard a reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Babua Ram (supra). 22. In the case of Marri Venkaiah [2003(4) ALL MR 347 (S.C.)] (supra), following dictum of the Supreme Court would clearly indicate that the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioners even in regard to this point are to be noticed only being rejected: “3. That order was challenged by filing writ petitions before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment and order dated 249-1993 held that three months period prescribed under section 28-A of the Act has to be computed from the date of the knowledge of the passing of the award and not from the date of the award by the civil court and thereby directed the appellants to entertain the applications filed by the respondents under section 28-A of the Act and to deal with them in accordance with law. The High Court further recommended to the Government to bring suitable amendment in the Land Acquisition Act authorising the Land Acquisition Officer or the Collector to send intimation in relation to passing of the award by the civil court to the persons interested, who had not sought reference under section 18 of the Act, to make them know about the said award.” From the various judgments of the Supreme Court, which we have already referred to above, it is clear that persons who are entitled to claim the benefit of redetermination under the provisions of section 28-A of the Act are essentially those persons who have applied for redetermination of compensation within the stipulated period. 23.
23. It is legally and historically true that different lands acquired under the same notification can be awarded different compensation. Even a small acquisition can result in payment of varied compensation granted to the claimants by recourse to the belting system, irrigated and non-irrigated lands, lands adjacent and far away from the highways and even subject to payment of differentiated land revenue. Application for redetermination is not only a condition precedent for prayer for redetermination but it alone is the machinery provided under this provision to set the process of redetermination into motion. If the application is not filed for redetermination there would be no occasion for the Collector to issue notices to the interested persons. To expand the meaning or scope of the term persons interested to all persons interested whose lands have been acquired under the same notification would not be permissible. This expression has to be construed and given its literal meaning. The words All the persons who are interested in the subject matter of that application, could have reference to co-owners or persons who claim apportionment in the acquired land which is specified in the application filed by the applicants under section 28-A. The conditions of section 28-A being mandatory and that they would apply in a limited circumstances, is clear from the principle stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagti (supra) where the court held that the persons who had sought reference under section 18 and even filed appeal to the High Court against the award made by the Reference Court cannot take recourse to the provisions of section 28-A. 24. Arguments made on behalf of the petitioners was sought to be buttressed by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunderlal Vs. Paramsukhdas and ors., AIR 1968 SC 366 . In this case the Court held that the definition of interested persons in terms of section 3(b) of the Act is inclusive definition. The Court said that it was necessary, in order to fall within the definition, that person should claim interest in land, which has been acquired. A person could claim interest in the land as well as in compensation to be awarded. 25.
The Court said that it was necessary, in order to fall within the definition, that person should claim interest in land, which has been acquired. A person could claim interest in the land as well as in compensation to be awarded. 25. Thus, no doubt it is not only the owner of the land, whose lands have been acquired and who will be covered under the expression persons interested, but also a person who may become interested person in the compensation to be awarded or even a person who claim or has a right of easement in the acquired land, would be a person interested. In the present case, the question before us is whether all persons interested, whose lands have been acquired by the same notification, irrespective of whether they are or not the persons interested in the subject matter of the application filed by the claimants under section 28-A of the Act, may be considered as persons interested, or whether such expression would have to be restricted to the persons who are interested in the subject matter of the application pending before the Collector for redetermination. We are of the view that later approach would be the correct approach and would be in consonance with the settled principles of law. In the present case we are not concerned with the definition of interested person per se for all other purposes of this Act. From the scheme of the Act it is even clear that certain persons would not have a right to move an application under section 28-A of the Act viz persons who had availed the remedy under section 18 and have received some lesser compensation in different acquisition proceedings relating to the same notification. Those persons are excluded by operation of law but they would become eligible for redetermination of compensation, if the interpretation put forward by the petitioners is accepted. It is settled canon of law that what is prohibited directly cannot be achieved indirectly.
Those persons are excluded by operation of law but they would become eligible for redetermination of compensation, if the interpretation put forward by the petitioners is accepted. It is settled canon of law that what is prohibited directly cannot be achieved indirectly. Scott L.J. Said: “Where the words of an Act of Parliament are clear, there is no room for applying any of the principles of interpretation which are merely presumptions in cases of ambiguity in the statute.” This principle was further affirmed and it is now settled that the safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves am arrive, if possible, at their meaning without any other aid. Ever shed M. R. said "I prefer to avoid exegeses of the statutory language unless they are absolutely necessary: for the result would otherwise tend thereafter to substitute for the problem of construction of parliamentary language the problem of the construction of the judgments of the courts.” Such principles would have to be applied more effectively when the legislative intend is clear and there is no scope for speculation of such intent. In the case of Dadi Jagannadham Vs. Jammulu Ramulu and ors., (2001)7 SCC 71 the Supreme Court also stated the settled principles of interpretation as under: a) the court must start with presumption that legislature did not make a mistake; b) the court must interpret so as to carry out the obvious intention of legislature; c) the court must not correct or make up a deficiency, neither add nor read into a provision words which are not there particularly when literal reading leads to an intelligible result. 26. Certainly the provisions of section 28-A of the Act are beneficial provision and thus they must be construed in terms of the plain language that the legislature has used. Legislative expectancy requiring persons interested to be vigilant of their legal rights and to act in accordance with law by satisfying the mandatory conditions contemplated under section 28-A, is clear beyond ambiguity in the language of the provisions. The purpose and object of the provision is to provide additional opportunity to claim compensation at parity to the owners of the lands which have been acquired by the Government but who could not take recourse to the benefit of reference proceedings under section 18, by moving an application under section 28-A for redetermination.
The purpose and object of the provision is to provide additional opportunity to claim compensation at parity to the owners of the lands which have been acquired by the Government but who could not take recourse to the benefit of reference proceedings under section 18, by moving an application under section 28-A for redetermination. The language of the provision neither suggests a statutory obligation upon the Collector to issue notices to all persons interested whose lands have been acquired under the same notification beyond the scope of the persons interested in the subject matter of application nor that there is procedural obligation upon the Collector to do so. Such interpretation would certainly be beyond the plain meaning of the provision and for that matter even beyond the legislative intent. It is for the legislature to frame the law and to declare what law shall be is the legislative power. To interpret and to declare what law is the judicial power. In the domain of the judicial power the courts (would always attempt to further the cause of the legislature and ensure achievement of the object. 27. The provisions of section 28-A, in our view, do not suffer from any legal defect, ambiguity or omission. It also does not demand application of liberal or beneficial construction so as to expand the scope of the application of the said provisions beyond its plain and literal language. Rights accruing to the claimants are controlled by the condition precedent of exercise of such rights and they do not admit any uncertainty. The law does not require the Collector to invite, by issuance to notice to all persons, whose lands have been acquired under the same notification. Of course, right is available to all eligible claimants to move an application for redetermination under section 28-A of the Act, provided they satisfy the conditions contemplated under that section. The legislative intent to provide opportunity to the persons who could not take recourse to the proceedings under section 18 cannot be construed to say that all persons covered under a particular notification of acquisition of land get automatic right whether or not they comply with the conditions postulated under section 28A. Notices to “all persons interested” will have to be read in conjunction with the language of sub-section (1) and thus would essentially refer to the persons who are interested in that application.
Notices to “all persons interested” will have to be read in conjunction with the language of sub-section (1) and thus would essentially refer to the persons who are interested in that application. Such persons could be co-owners, could be persons claiming easement in the land or even interested in compensation, but with reference to that application only. Any contrary approach would in fact frustrate the very legislative purpose and would not be in line with the rule of plain interpretation. There is nothing in sub-section (2) which commands the Collector to issue notice to all the persons interested under the same notification. We have already noticed that if the legislative intent and purpose was such then there was hardly any need for enacting section 28-A(1) and section 28-A(3). The word application in sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) and reference to any person interested" in sub-section (1), later part, has its reference to an application made to the Collector i.e. a written application made within three months. It conveys beyond any ambiguity the legislative intent of controlling the proceedings under section 28-A in the prescribed manner and therefore any general approach or interpretation would not be permissible. We are unable to accept the interpretation put forward on behalf of the petitioners that it is obligatory upon the Collector to give notice to and invite claimants covered under the same notification for the remaining land whether or not they had discharged their obligation and initiated proceedings in accordance with the procedure provided under section 28-A. 28. In view of the above analysis of the statutory provisions and our discussion, we answer the three questions as follows: (i) It is mandatory for a person to file a written application under the provisions of section 28-A(1); (ii) The Collector cannot suo motu exercise his powers under section 28-A of the Act in relation to all other persons covered under the same notification where one such interested person had succeeded in getting enhanced compensation under section 18 of the Act; (iii) It is neither mandatory nor obligatory upon the Collector to issue notices to all persons whose plots of lands are acquired under the same notification where the proceedings under section 28-A of the Act are pending before him in relation to a particular plot of land. 29.
29. Having answered the questions above, we direct the matter be placed for disposal in accordance with law before the appropriate Bench. Ordered accordingly.